In “International Relations in the US Academy” Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson and Michael Tierney attempt to categorize trends and the extent of theoretical, methodological, and epistemological diversity amongst IR scholars at American universities and its relationship to policy making. While the conclusions of this article are widespread across both the length of trends analyzed as well as the amount of theories taken into consideration, the general trends of this paper illustrate the pervasiveness of often overlooked ‘American school’ of IR. In particular, this paper serves to illustrate the dominance of positivism as an epistemology, quantitative methods as evidence and the conflicting theoretical approaches to global politics analysis.

This article makes a particularly intriguing claim by illustrating that the four core theoretical traditions of IR (realism, liberalism, constructivism. and Marxism) are apparently far less dominating than expected with the majority of scholarly literature taking positions based on different ontologies, some even taken from disciplines outside of traditional political science and reapplied to suit IR. At first glance this seems like a healthy route for IR to take, one that encompasses a wide range of theoretical viewpoints to provide a holistic perception of what is happening in world politics at multiple levels of analysis. However, this utopian idea at viewpoints does not seem to represent the true reality of American IR scholarship. Despite this prevalence of viewpoints, and realism oriented articles peaking at only 15% in the highest point of this study, realism can still seen to be the norm in international relations thought. While new articles championing realism appear to be rare, it nethertheless remains the paradigm taken the most seriously by both opposing and supporting scholars and papers adhering to realism receive a disproportionately large amount of citations. I would maintain that this indirectly illustrates the concept of American erasure in IR we have examined in the classroom concerning how American values of realism and positivism can often remain unexamined and unchallenged. As realism has long been the dominant theory of IR, it is often not reflected on but accepted as a hegemonic fact. Its role in american IR remains somewhat unchallenged, but scholars from other theoretical standpoints still appear to be interacting with its ideas more so than those of other paradigms.

While the theory side of IR implies a hidden dominance of traditional theories influencing intermingling with fresh theoretical standpoints, American IR appears to be more overtly dominated by positivist epistemologies and quantitative methods. This prevalence of “hard science” trends can even be seen in this survey itself which, while making room to share normative arguments from non-positivist writers such as Steven Smith, the vast majority of the data of this paper uses quantitative methods to replicate hard data, demonstrating how nationalistic trends may continue even amongst self-reflective IR scholars . This leaves the paper with some lacking nuance, such as finer details on the relationship between the “core” IR theories and new approaches to global politics that gets lost in the vast amount of data collected for this piece.

Ultimately, this reading serves to illustrate the pervasiveness of American IR as an unrecognized school of thought. There are observable distinctions of the ‘American School’ that relies heavily on traditional theories, positivism and quantitative data. However, many scholars fail to critically engage with this aspect of the field and can in turn be limited by hegemonic nationalistic driven perceptions of what constitutes the science of IR. This is dangerous as, while values and biases are inherent in any writing, a lack of perception to these inclinations can only serve to omit valuable voices perceptions from the field.

As if it was not bizarre enough that IR is described as having more than one birth, Carvalho et al. further complicate things in their article “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths Your Teachers Still Tell You”. In this reading, the authors argue that the classic textbook explanation of IR’s emergence from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the end of the First World War in 1919 as myths.  Drawing from a wide array of historical documents for reference, the authors argue that contrary to a well-accepted belief, the Peace of Westphalia constituted a “step back from an already established idea of state sovereignty” and reiterates an earlier and more feudal heteronomous order. They expand on this by arguing that a proliferation of international imperial-hierarchies can be observed in the post-1648 era, and the sovereign state did not become the generic political unit of the global system until the late 20th century.

As a political science major, I have encountered the Treaty of Westphalia in many textbooks, and it has repeatedly been regarded as the origin of the sovereign state. In fact, true to Carvalho et al.’s claim, the Westphalian axiom has been used in all discussions of state sovereignty with no references or need for scrutiny. The same phenomenon can be observed in the discipline of IR, and while the authors offer no alternative theories for the “true origins” of IR, they question why such myths continue to be held by IR scholars. In my opinion, the most interesting explanation offered by the authors is IR’s inherent tendency towards presentism and lack of interest in history. This posed two questions for me – if IR is only interested in present truths, why then is the discussion of its origins present in such a large number of textbooks, and is the study of historical events not important in the search for patterns, explanations, and solutions?

The authors also discuss the influence of Eurocentrism on these myths and the difficulty in revising the officially accepted origins of IR. They posit that disbanding the myths of 1648 and 1919 will require a confrontation of IR Eurocentrism. As we’ve discussed in the recent lectures,  the discipline of IR is dominated by American thought, similar to the prevailing theories of realism and liberalism. To this point, I question if it is possible to confront and disband Eurocentrism in IR.

Overall, the article posed some questions and some worries for me as a student of IR. As fascinating as it is, it is clearly a discipline with highly contested explanations of theories and its origins.

I chose to critically discuss a required course reading from week 4: Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John Hobson (2011) ‘The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919’, Millennium 39(3): 735-758. Carvalho

A recurring theme/point that has been driven home throughout lectures so far revolves around the fact that IR is a divided “discipline” on many fronts in which schools of thought and paradigms compete. Upon the many divisions, we explored the contested and debated questions of why, what and how do we study IR. Furthermore, we saw that queries in relation to the foundation of  IR do not stop there; even the question of identifying the birth(s) of IR is argued about! 

If I remember correctly, as the great debates and the competing views concerned with the foundation/birth of IR were being discussed, a student asked in class “Why is it so complicated to decide when IR was born?”. This question stuck with me and drew me towards Carvalho’s article titled “The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919”. 

SUMMARY 

The article claims that the prevalent ‘big bangs’ that we know to have constituted the formation of the discipline of IR— 1648 (Peace of Westphalia) and 1919 (First Debate between idealists and realists)—are nothing but established myths that are demolished by historical and historiographical counterarguments. However, this article notes that these successful counterarguments turn out to remain obscured as the popular foundational myths continue to be perpetuated in textbooks of IR students. 

The article organizes its argument by first explaining that Westphalia was viewed as the location in which the overarching and contemporary ideas of the “sovereign state and the anarchic states-system” (Carvalho) began, thus marking a foundational moment of the IR discipline. Futhermore, 1919 was the time in which scholars began to theorize about the international subject matter as an independent area of study thus birthing the discipline of IR. The article then identifies these moments as myths by presenting historical and historiographical contestations that problematize and debunk them while offering alternative moments of “sovereign state formation and the origins of the discipline” (Carvalho).  For example, the article emphasizes the way in which the treaty of 1648 limits a previously accepted idea of state sovereignty seen in how rulers had final authority over their territory as early on as 1534 (Preamble to the English Statute of Appeals) and 1555 (Peace of Augsburg). The article further disputes the myths of 1648 and 1919 by claiming that the former twists the way in which the modern  sovereign state and states-system were established and the latter (among many other critiques) falsely assumes that IR was miraculously born overnight (Carvalho).

ANSWERING THE QUESTION: “Why is it so complicated to decide when IR was born?”

Seeing as how the text focuses on exploring why the pervading myths of 1648 and 1919 still persist “despite repeated attempts to prosecute the myths in the revisionist court of IR scholarship” (Carvalho), it deduces answers such as extreme researcher specialization, eurocentrism and presentism as being some of the primary perpetuators of these myths that stifle the rise of the alternative historical/historiographical revisions.

With this in mind, the text thus successfully showcases that it is in fact a complicated affair for the discipline of IR to come to a conclusion concerning its founding moments; however, I do not feel as though it satisfies my question of why it is in fact so difficult. While the factors discussed above may be valid reasons that prevent the success of the latter side’s claim over the former and thus result in an overarching conclusion of IR’s point of origin, perhaps there is a simpler reason as to why there is a lack of consensus on the matter. 

When the overlooked historical and historiographical reviews concerned with the birth of IR are added into the conversation involving the pre-existing accepted “mythical origins” of IR, the dialogue becomes further muddled with more options that add to the complexity of the answer to this question rather than narrowing it down. However, it seems to be the case that each of these supposed foundational moments explore distinct foundational facets that may or may not overlap (while certain moments such as 1648 are claimed to bring the concept of the modern sovereign state and states-system into fruition, the alternative is 1919 which is a period that is claimed to have begun the scholarly theorizing of international material as an autonomous field). Accordingly, I believe that the reason why it is so complicated to decide when IR was born goes beyond the fact that mythical conceptions are competing with and overlooking historical/historiographical reviews—instead, I believe that the reason why there are so many contradictory claims of when IR was born is because each claim of origin looks at different pieces of the puzzle as opposed to the whole. Going back to simple definitions, if we don’t understand nor agree on what constitutes the birth of a disciple (IR) as a whole, how can it be argued that any of these claims is the true birthing point?

This point carries us right back to the original wicked problem of International Relations in which there is a lack of consensus on what we should study, how we should study and why we should study it. Without a Kuhnian core paradigm—or in this case, core defining characteristics of disciplinary origin in the realm of IR—it is highly unlikely that there will emerge  a new paradigm—or in this case, an overarching consensus on the birth point of IR.  

-Joanna El-mikati

An analysis of Keohane’s “Hegemony and After”

In his article, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”, Kenneth Waltz discusses the current instability in the Middle East over Iran’s interest in continuing with its own nuclear program. Although many actors, both regional and foreign have made various speculations over the true reason behind this behavior, most agree that if Iran does develop a nuclear bomb or at the very least the means to do so, the result could be disastrous and therefore it must be avoided at all costs. Thusly, Waltz chooses to begin by focusing the possible ways that the United States and Israel, (two of the powers most concerned about this problem) can respond to Iran’s nuclear aspirations.

Firstly, Waltz notes the option of maintaining the strategy of increasing economic sanctions over the Iranian regime in the hope of dissuading its leaders from continuing with the program through economic pressure. On this point however, he argues that opting for this strategy might exacerbate tensions as economic sanctions have not proven to be the most effective tools in international relations and might additionally increase Iran’s sense of vulnerability and force them to pursue nuclear power with even greater determination. Secondly, there is the option of allowing Iran to go forth with its nuclear program without letting them get to the point of developing a nuclear bomb, thus increasing Iran’s level of security and keeping them from becoming such a major threat in the region. Finally, Waltz’s last option, and the one he favours most, is that of permitting Iran to develop their own nuclear weapon. He claims this course of action is the one that is most likely going to bring instability to the Middle East as it will reestablish a regional balance of power and deter other actors in the region to challenge it.

Nevertheless, I have to say I do not entirely agree with Waltz on this point. It seems he places too much confidence on the ability that balance of power and military capability alone have to act as an effective deterrent in the region. Although of course as a neorealist, this manner of thinking would make sense, I believe that while allowing Iran to get a hold of a future nuclear arsenal would increase its own sense of security in the region, other powers in the Middle East such as Turkey and (most notably) Saudi Arabia would feel less secure. Moreover, these countries among others, have been seeking greater power and influence in the region for nearly as long as Iran and view themselves as direct rivals based not only on the military arena but also on a variety of other factors including, religion, economy and political ideology.

For this reason, I believe that Waltz presents an interesting argument and although I agree that perhaps countries like the United States and Israel base their own foreign policy towards Iran based on possibly exaggerated and inaccurate assumptions, there are or consideration to be taken into account contextually in order to figure out the true repercussions that the rise of a new nuclear power could have in the region.

Alfonso García

This is the link to my 2nd blog post.

POLI367B 2nd Blog Post

Ayumi Hirata #41534819

Although I’ve been taking political science courses all throughout my university career this is the first year I have heard of the Hegemonic stability theory. Funny enough, this is also a common theme in my International Organizations class however it is classified as the hegemonic theory of states instead. That being said, It is an area of global politics which has really sparked my interest. The realist perspective has always attracted my attention but has seem a little dismissive of other global political theories at times. The hegemonic centred theory however ties in the realist power dynamic with some of the organizational institutions and norms which govern global anarchy. Many realists for instance would dismiss IGOs as window dressing without much real substance. I can understand that ideology behind this sort of though however as I mentioned before it seems dismissive. Contrary to this, a hegemonic based outlook of world politics would argue that these IGOs are used as tools as the hegemonic power to help organize global politics through burden sharing and deflection of blame.

This interest in hegemonic world governance has led me to focus my blog post around the article review of Keohane’s, Hegemony and After: Knowns and Unknowns in the Debate Over Decline. This article focuses around the presence of an American based hegemony but also its perceived decline. It begins on a pessimistic tone discussing the stresses and problems faced by hegemonic states. This pessimism isn’t based in current conflicts and troubles that America faces but the constant worry that all hegemonic states experience of a future decline. The article then takes a turn towards the positive as it discusses the numerous positive impacts the US has had on international relations. For instance, a number of institutions propped up as a result of American hegemony, namely, the World Bank, The UN peacekeeping force as well as NATO. The article continues to express how the US may not always have a direct impact in changing world politics but that the global sphere is constantly under the influence of American norms. Democracy and Neo-liberalism are core values of the American hegemony and are inflicted upon the rest of the world. Obviously like with any Ideology or theoretical perspective they have their short comings, nonetheless, American hegemony has led to a period of ongoing peace and stability. Democracy has seen a sharp incline with the number of democracies global wide quadrupling after the post war period.

Further criticism is made of the institutions which have blossomed under US hegemony and their potential shortcomings. For instance, peace keeping organizations such as NATO and the UN were criticized for being to indirect in their approach at time causing inefficiencies. From my perspective this is fair a criticism but must also be put into context. Peace keeping failures such as the Rwandan genocide are horrible mistakes which serve as an example for how acting to late can cause dire results. On the other hand, there are circumstances where acting too forcefully or preemptively could result in deeper conflicts. By taking a back seat at times and allowing conflicts to play their course, the US is playing it safe, attempting to constrain the possibilities of upsetting the global community. That being said, many would argue preemptive war is a necessary evil which the US has done, most often in situations directly affecting their own interests.

Most importantly perhaps, is the overarching need for a global leader to promote stability and create a international set of objectives. The point is made within the article that having a democratic nation as the world leader is more beneficial than an authoritarian regime. This is because typically democratic regimes have more checks and balances which would encourage stability and prevent rash decisions. On the other hand, this is written from an American perspective so I wouldn’t expect anything less than for an American journal to support American hegemony. In fact, China is used as an example of a regime which may be less successful at being a hegemonic world leader. This is unsurprising since China is currently seen as the US’s largest rival or threat at the moment.

At first the hegemonic global theory sounded quite pessimistic to me as it confirmed many of my fears of American dominance and a puppet master type identity. However, as I learnt more about the matter, it began to make sense on why a hegemony is not only a useful structure within global politics but also necessary for sustained growth and peace. One point I am still unclear on is how much a majority of realists accept this as a viable theory of global governance. I know the idea of Hegemony is one that realists accept as it deals with power relationship but the governance aspect where the international community is temporarily thrust out of the state of global anarchy is one that contrasts much of realists core beliefs. I also wonder at what point a global hegemony could be considered a true one world government. Although borders and opposition may remain, a truly all powerful hegemony who structures not only the institutions but also the core beliefs and values of the political world would closely resemble this possibility. Although we are not there yet, is this sort of unwavering dominance possible or will the American hegemony inevitably fall like so many before it.

“Power begs to be balanced”: this quote qualifies Waltz’s ideological position pithily. The passive tense of this phrase is parallel with neorealists’ commitment that states’ behaviours are determined by the objective constraints that the international system imposes. In the article, Waltz makes a persuasive argument, in my opinion, that Iran should be allowed (by greater powers) to develop nuclear bombs, as past instances suggest that nuclear enrichment would likely leads to greater stability instead of less. However, other neorealists will take issue with some statements he makes.

Waltz asserts that aggressive expansion of power will likely lead to pushback from other powers. In the neorealist paradigm, increase in Iranian power ipso facto hurts other powers, who might form a coalition against Iran, which Iranians, as rational actors, should be aware of and avoid. Thereby, great powers such as the US should not worry about Iran’s rising nuclear capacity, as Iran would be cautious after nuclear enrichment. However, this position would be debated by offensive neorealists such as John Mearsheimer. They would argue that coalitions are insufficient as countries naturally buck-pass, so that possibility would not be enough to intimidate Iran. Iran would continue to increase military power as much as possible, so the US should try to prevent that from happening. In their paradigm, the system makes it so that nations seek every opportunity to maximize power.

Furthermore, Waltz seems to believe that balanced power would be more likely to lead to security in a region – as in, the Middle East might become more stable if Iran acquires the military capacity to counter Israel. The rationale is perhaps that Iran and Israel could work to control each other’s military empowerment. However, some other neorealist theorists would disagree, as if there is only one great power in the region (Israel), that great power can control other states’ ambitions, and the power itself will feel secure against a group of much less powerful competitors, thus not likely to be too aggressive. For the latter theorists, power does not have to be balanced, because status quo can be maintained.

The fact that we are talking about nuclear power, instead of other military power, complicates the situation. Because neither power, whether as the defender or the rising power, will have the advantage, so reluctant peace is likely to follow, as in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet some other neorealists might believe that a power rising against the preponderant power is very dangerous, as that situation presents a direct conflict of interest unmitigated by other states in the region. As one can see, although Kenneth Waltz is perhaps the most recognizable name among the neorealists, his positions are not unchallenged.

Omri second blog post:

IR’s Genesis: Myth, Truth, and Incommensurability