Hi,

Here’s my second blog post:

https://blogs.ubc.ca/sofandinternationaltheory/2018/10/16/second-blog-post-international-theory-a-shape-shifter/

Hope you enjoy!

Best,

Sofia Shamsunahar

In his article, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”, Kenneth Waltz introduces the debate between how the United States and Israel should react to Iran’s nuclear activities. He elaborates on three possible outcomes of these nuclear standoff. Firstly, The US and Israel and other states could convince Iran with sanctions to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapon. However, Waltz argues that this method would cause more trouble, making Iran feel the need to acquire nuclear weapons even more. Second, Iran could develop a breakout capability similar to Japan, where although a nuclear weapon would not be created, they would develop an easy way to create on quickly when needed. Israel fears Iran as a threat, and even though no weapon would be created, just the thought of its recipe in Iran’s hands would keep Israel uneasy. Lastly, an outcome that might be most likely, is Iran continuing as they are, pursuing nuclear weapons publicly. In regards to international relations, especially in the Middle East, the pursuit for nuclear weapons by Iran might be the best outcome. Why? It creates a balance of power.

This article is related to the content we study in class to explain the exact reason why Kenneth Waltz created structural realism. Waltz believes that power is a means, not an end. States value power as the most important factor of International Relations. Since the 1960s, Israel has been the nuclear monopoly of the Middle East region. This has created an imbalance of power between states in that region. Waltz argues that Iran is finally reacting as a security response to Israel’s growing power. He says that this is not the beginning of a Iranian nuclear crisis, but the ending of the Middle East nuclear crisis that started with Israel being the only state with nuclear weapons. It is a similar event to the events of the Peloponnesian War, where as Thucydides says “the growth of Athenian power and the fear this occasioned in Sparta”. Waltz being a huge fan of Thucydides, would agree that Iran is simply fearful of the growth of Israeli power. They are not wanting to start any conflict or war, but simply increasing their own security. In relation to our course, this is about structural realism. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is the pursuit for power to maintain security.

Iran is not run by “mad mullahs” as the United States and Israel fear, but rational people who want to keep themselves and their state safe. The pursuit for power, is the pursuit of security, not the destruction of other states, or themselves. In addition, other states fear that the terrorists coming from Iran may have access to these weapons, but what kind of state leader would allow these dangerous and important things be given to just anyone? To conclude, this article is related to our course where it is a perfect example of how structural realism is visible in our world relations. I think it was a great comparison to the original argument of power as a means.

Please find my second blog post here.

-Odessa Jarman

The article “Why Iran should get the bomb by Kenneth Waltz describes the issue of power politics in the realist perspective of international politics. He discusses the issue of international security and vulnerability. The article describes the security dilemma in which one state (Iran) wishes to become nuclear in order to be less vulnerable and increase their security and in turn, this desire for personal security makes another state (Israel) feel insecure as they fear that their own security would be compromised and at risk if Iran became Nuclear. This insecurity leads to Israel taking action to attempt to stop Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.

Waltz argues that Iran should be allowed and potentially encouraged to become Nuclear as by gaining that status, the Middle East as a whole would have increased stability as the two nuclear states, Iran and Israel, will deter each other therefore promoting stability by creating a balance of military power. He notes that, “Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East” and as such, having another nuclear state will provide the much needed deterrence. The idea of deterrence promoting stability stems from the fact that there hasn’t been any full-scale wars between two strong nuclear powers as the possibility of completely destroying each other has meant that the conflicts never escalate to that level. The self-preservation of each state prevents them from risking themselves to destroy the other. He mentions examples of other states that this has worked for, such as India and Pakistan who have had conflict and hostility between them for a very long time, but when Pakistan became nuclear, the two states both become more cautious towards each other.

Waltz also mentions the US role in this situation. As a global power and potential hegemony, the US has a unique involvement in the issue. Waltz suggest the US should not be overly concerned with preventing Iran from getting nuclear power, however, as a hegemony, the US has to consider the possibility of other states attempting to get nuclear if they step back and allow Iran, they have to consider their own security and whether any global action would be a threat to their hegemony.

This reading helped shed light on how for realists, the world and world politics are viewed through the lens of power and prospective power dynamics. It helped relate the ideas and themes of the course and IR theory such as the security dilemma to current global issues

Kenneth Waltz (2012) “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5

Blog Post 2

Here is my second blog post.

In Why Iran Should Get the Bomb, Waltz argues that a nuclear Iran could possibly have a stabilizing effect, one in which Iran and Israel would keep each other in check. This would help Iran’s leaders feel less vulnerable to Israel, which is a rising hegemony in the Middle East. Waltz reminds us readers that throughout history, there has never been a full-scale nuclear war between two nuclear-armed countries. Aside from concerns about Israel, Iran continues to combat ISIS and therefore wants to heighten its nuclear arsenals as a defense mechanism.

Waltz’ statement that “open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran” is implausible. In 2003, an Islamic government official asked for the Ayatollah’s religious opinion on nuclear weapons. In response, the Ayatollah wrote a fatwa – an Islamic legal document that deemed nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction, and recognized that Iran was a victim of such weapons in the past. Therefore, the use of such weapons on the general public is considered haram, illegal under Islamic law. Current leader Hassan Rouhani seemed to share the same stance as Khamenei in 2013, when he said “nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defence doctrine and contradict our fundamental religious and ethical convictions”. It is inconsistent statements like these and a lack of credibility that would inhibit any possibility of “open lines of communications”.

Waltz suggests that the United States should not “take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon”. However, if the U.S. refrains from taking action against disarming Iran, the U.S. would be perceived as sending an unclear message to other nuclear-seeking countries, which would also weaken its reputation as a global power.  The U.S. has a history of interfering in international issues, but this has only solidified its position on the world scale, on a consistent platform where leadership is exercised. In the last 25 years, there have been six countries that have attempted to become nuclear states: Libya, South Africa, Syria and Iraq. Libya and South Africa gave up, while Syria and Iraq were stopped. Pakistan and North Korea continued and are now both nuclear-armed states. If Iran joins Pakistan and North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, this would result in a security dilemma in which other countries follow suit to protect themselves. This would effectively put an end to the global disarmament that the U.S. has been pursuing for almost 70 years.

Why Iran Should Get the Bomb helped associate relevant themes in our class such as the security dilemma, commitment problems, and hegemonies – it was very effective at bringing in these key IR topics and relating it to today’s global crisis.

According to Kenneth Waltz and other neorealist thinkers, power is the main driving force in any interaction between states within the international arena. States are constantly thinking about how to gain more power in order to establish themselves as dominant in relation to their neighbours. In the article “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Waltz argues that the United States and the European Union should stop trying to interfere in the Iranian quest for nuclear weaponry. Israel, in particular, is especially concerned about the prospect of a nuclear Iran because it would mean the loss of Israel’s dominance in the Middle East. Israel wants to maintain its control over the nuclear market of the Middle East because that would ensure their survival since no one would dare challenge them. The concerns surrounding the possibility of Iran becoming nuclear are all rooted in this fear of losing power. Countries are mistrusting of Iranian intentions and are worried that if Iran attempts to attack with nuclear weapons, deterrence would be near impossible. Israel does not wish to lose its edge in the nuclear arena and, thus, has a significant interest in preventing Iran from achieving their goal. If Iran has nuclear weapons, Israel would be less powerful within the Middle East, no longer holding the monopoly.

However, Waltz’s argumentation centres around the idea of a balance of power. Since Israel is the only Middle Eastern country with nuclear capabilities, the introduction of Iran into the equation would only serve to create increased stability. The crisis in the Middle East, Waltz argues, was brought about thanks to Israel’s nuclear arsenal rather than the Iranian desire to create one. When one country has more power than the rest of the countries in an area, the other countries are increasingly prone to feelings of insecurity. On the other hand, when there are two or more countries which hold the same or similar amounts of power, they are less likely to engage in a conflict. Waltz strongly believes in the idea that equal amounts of power across states will increase the stability of the international sphere since no one is necessarily more powerful than anyone else. This is a clear example of Waltz’s neorealist tendencies since classical realists are more prone to believe that hegemony is the way to ensure stability in international relations. This article is a great help in discerning the differences between classical and neorealist theory and helps shed some light on the issues surrounding power politics.

Kenneth Waltz (2012) “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5

Two readings, in particular, have caught my attention and I find them extremely relevant. We began the course with the study of realism and last week covered the concept of hegemonic stability theory.

Our earlier reading specifically focused on different strands of Structural Realism. Having only known about classical realism and the general components of realism, which includes self-interested motives in pursuit of power in an anarchic world, I had a hard time identifying with which theory I identified with. As I talked about in my first blog, my background as an Iranian girl, naturally drew me to realist ideas; That all countries are after their own self-interest and Iran, having been isolated for so many years from the global community, must also be in pursuit of military expansion and gaining more power. However, I also believe that a selfish anarchic system can only lead to destructive competition. I believe in cooperation but one that is done in the self- interest of a state. In fact, through cooperation, the interests of states are more easily achieved. Having had this view of politics, naturally, defensive structural realism was the strand that stood out to me the most. Another element that distinguishes defensive realists from the other strands is their stand on hegemony. Defensive realists are not in pursuit of maximizing their power as they believe it will put them at a greater risk. As the name suggests their approaches are more defensive and conservative in an attempt to reach their self-interest.

On the other hand, we discussed the concept of hegemonic stability theory which states that in the presence of a hegemon- Pax Britannica, the hegemony of Great Britain and Pax Americana, the current period of American hegemony- the world is more stable and is at peace. Being a realist I disagree with the above statement. Even though the world might appear to be at peace,  in my opinion, the absence of war does not necessarily bring forward peace.

In the world of today, countries go to war by destroying each other’s economy through sanctions, by isolating countries by forming exclusive coalitions and by engaging in proxy wars. Additionally, countries can still be in tension in the absence of war.

As the reading by Kobane suggests, the world does need leadership, however, I believe, that a single hegemon would not necessarily take this position, but instead would misuse their position in pursuit of their interest. There are many states in today’s world with different interests, some of which contradicts with that of American values. The United States cannot possibly act as neutral hegemon in pursuit of collective gains and world peace while maintaining its hegemony.

Additionally, it is very tempting for any individual- in the view of realism the state- with great powers, not to use their power for their personal gains. Intuitively, in order to remain powerful, they must be in pursuit of their self-interest rather than making sacrifices and engaging as the referee or the leader of the world. I argue that the United States hasn’t acted as a leader or a referee but more so as a strong state who is powerful enough to attain its goals and execute its plans.