I chose to critically discuss a required course reading from week 4: Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John Hobson (2011) ‘The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919’, Millennium 39(3): 735-758. Carvalho

A recurring theme/point that has been driven home throughout lectures so far revolves around the fact that IR is a divided “discipline” on many fronts in which schools of thought and paradigms compete. Upon the many divisions, we explored the contested and debated questions of why, what and how do we study IR. Furthermore, we saw that queries in relation to the foundation of  IR do not stop there; even the question of identifying the birth(s) of IR is argued about! 

If I remember correctly, as the great debates and the competing views concerned with the foundation/birth of IR were being discussed, a student asked in class “Why is it so complicated to decide when IR was born?”. This question stuck with me and drew me towards Carvalho’s article titled “The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919”. 

SUMMARY 

The article claims that the prevalent ‘big bangs’ that we know to have constituted the formation of the discipline of IR— 1648 (Peace of Westphalia) and 1919 (First Debate between idealists and realists)—are nothing but established myths that are demolished by historical and historiographical counterarguments. However, this article notes that these successful counterarguments turn out to remain obscured as the popular foundational myths continue to be perpetuated in textbooks of IR students. 

The article organizes its argument by first explaining that Westphalia was viewed as the location in which the overarching and contemporary ideas of the “sovereign state and the anarchic states-system” (Carvalho) began, thus marking a foundational moment of the IR discipline. Futhermore, 1919 was the time in which scholars began to theorize about the international subject matter as an independent area of study thus birthing the discipline of IR. The article then identifies these moments as myths by presenting historical and historiographical contestations that problematize and debunk them while offering alternative moments of “sovereign state formation and the origins of the discipline” (Carvalho).  For example, the article emphasizes the way in which the treaty of 1648 limits a previously accepted idea of state sovereignty seen in how rulers had final authority over their territory as early on as 1534 (Preamble to the English Statute of Appeals) and 1555 (Peace of Augsburg). The article further disputes the myths of 1648 and 1919 by claiming that the former twists the way in which the modern  sovereign state and states-system were established and the latter (among many other critiques) falsely assumes that IR was miraculously born overnight (Carvalho).

ANSWERING THE QUESTION: “Why is it so complicated to decide when IR was born?”

Seeing as how the text focuses on exploring why the pervading myths of 1648 and 1919 still persist “despite repeated attempts to prosecute the myths in the revisionist court of IR scholarship” (Carvalho), it deduces answers such as extreme researcher specialization, eurocentrism and presentism as being some of the primary perpetuators of these myths that stifle the rise of the alternative historical/historiographical revisions.

With this in mind, the text thus successfully showcases that it is in fact a complicated affair for the discipline of IR to come to a conclusion concerning its founding moments; however, I do not feel as though it satisfies my question of why it is in fact so difficult. While the factors discussed above may be valid reasons that prevent the success of the latter side’s claim over the former and thus result in an overarching conclusion of IR’s point of origin, perhaps there is a simpler reason as to why there is a lack of consensus on the matter. 

When the overlooked historical and historiographical reviews concerned with the birth of IR are added into the conversation involving the pre-existing accepted “mythical origins” of IR, the dialogue becomes further muddled with more options that add to the complexity of the answer to this question rather than narrowing it down. However, it seems to be the case that each of these supposed foundational moments explore distinct foundational facets that may or may not overlap (while certain moments such as 1648 are claimed to bring the concept of the modern sovereign state and states-system into fruition, the alternative is 1919 which is a period that is claimed to have begun the scholarly theorizing of international material as an autonomous field). Accordingly, I believe that the reason why it is so complicated to decide when IR was born goes beyond the fact that mythical conceptions are competing with and overlooking historical/historiographical reviews—instead, I believe that the reason why there are so many contradictory claims of when IR was born is because each claim of origin looks at different pieces of the puzzle as opposed to the whole. Going back to simple definitions, if we don’t understand nor agree on what constitutes the birth of a disciple (IR) as a whole, how can it be argued that any of these claims is the true birthing point?

This point carries us right back to the original wicked problem of International Relations in which there is a lack of consensus on what we should study, how we should study and why we should study it. Without a Kuhnian core paradigm—or in this case, core defining characteristics of disciplinary origin in the realm of IR—it is highly unlikely that there will emerge  a new paradigm—or in this case, an overarching consensus on the birth point of IR.  

-Joanna El-mikati

Many of the Political Science classes that I have taken thus far have included several allusions to International Relations. Going back to POLI 100 (Introduction to Politics), the course introduced multiple schools of thought (including Green theory and Feminist theory) and vaguely glossed over each paradigm’s views when it came to the international realm. Then came POLI 260 (Introduction to Global Politics), a course that focused more on the practical aspect of International Relations, with scattered explanations of their theoretical foundations—in my experience with the course, at least. While these two courses covered a fair amount of material, there seemed to be a critical piece missing that I felt I needed in order to complete my foundational understanding of IR. I didn’t realize what it was until I took POLI 240 (Currents of Political Thought), which was fairly theory based, that I realized that it was not enough for me to just have an understanding of different political theories in general and then merely assume where they would stand in international terms. I wanted a class that would focus on exploring each theory in the specific context of International Relations. This is why I was drawn to this course.

Having attended a few classes of this course, I am confident in that I probably will come out of this class having gotten out of it what I came in searching for: an understanding of each school of thought in the specific context of IR. The class discussions concerning if IR is a “normal science” as well as the discussions about each theory being a different lens through which the world is viewed has somehow simplified my introduction to IR theory—only after taking the time to try and wrap my head around the idea that this is a discipline with little consensus and no “core paradigm” or set of foundational rules upon which all theories are constructed. While discussing the disagreements and uncertainties within the field IR at the beginning of the course made me feel hesitant about exploring this area of study, the more I let it simmer, the more sense it makes and the more I feel like the previous questions my mind had raised when IR was brought up in previous courses are being clarified. 

The discussions to do with pluralism and the lack of consensus within IR are what have intrigued me the most thus far—ironically, seeing as how this is what confused me about the field, from the start of my exposure to it. I couldn’t help but link the conversations from class with discussions had in POLI 240. My first connection was concerning Weber’s views on value-pluralism/proliferation of value spheres in modernity. The idea that world’s values were being initially shaped and controlled beneath the hands of the church/religion mirrors the grasp realism had on the world by claiming to be the only “real” school of thought. The church was an integrated/unifying institution that defined meaning (aka. thought of as a “core paradigm” – Kuhn), but having it gone meant a loss of “consensus” that puts the world in a condition of disarray—which is similar to what happened to the world after the great debates resulted in the loss of consensus in IR according to Holsti. 

Then, Weber’s idea that the world was disenchanted (given the rise of the enlightenment, science etc.) to the extent where values became fragmented to the point where the world was gaining multiple conflicting and competing value systems reflects the emerging schools of thought that have since challenged realism. 

As discussed, while this break down of consensus can be despairing for some, it is a positive thing for others. The following comparisons might be too much of a stretch but I couldn’t help but notice the similarities between our discussions and the ones had about Hobbes and Arendt in POLI 240. We discussed that Ferguson and Mansbach thought of this breakup of consensus as a way of freeing the field to other perspectives. To me, this mirrors the principle of Hannah Arendt’s perspective that separation and division of powers (ie. in government) is an intentional and good thing because it creates more centres for power and more places for debate and thus freedom. So the division of sovereignty for her creates MORE power and freedom instead of breaking it down. This is mirrored with the idea that when realism was the main school of thought, it concentrated power—or in this case, limited the view of the world to one lens without the freedom of allowing us to view the world through others. However for Hobbes, power needed to be centralized in the Leviathan, seeing as how when power is divided, civil war ensues and the Leviathan breaks down. This to me mirrors Kuhn’s thoughts on how the loss of a core paradigm—or debate without emerging with a new consensus on a new paradigm—breaks down a science, or disqualifies it from being a natural science. Following this perspective, since IR does not emerge with a new foundational and healthy core paradigm and instead, there are multiple cores belonging to each school of thought, IR breaks down, just as the Leviathan would.

After making this comparison, I feel as though I side with Arendt, Ferguson and Mansbach more than I would the others. To me, without trying on multiple lenses, it is difficult to claim that the first one tried is the correct one. Without the breakdown of the original consensus (ie. without having room to consider anything other than realism), the emergence of new lenses/paradigms would be stunted, and there would be lesser lenses to try on. In my opinion, stepping away from realism and the emergence of newer schools of thought are thus a necessary first step that is needed, in order to view the world as it is in as many perspectives as possible in order to create as complete of a picture as possible. Perhaps then, there may be potential to reach a genuine, complete and well-informed consensus (or not). 

Joanna El-Mikati