Amongst the various theories of International Relations, realism is one which focuses on hard power, security, and the state. Warfare, however, is changing. Technological advances, subnational and transnational groups, and political movements have all contributed to different means of waging and acting in war. For example, some parties in the Syrian War have strategically utilized gender-based violence as a form of coercion or intimidation (The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2018). In contrast, the Maywand District Murders were a series of deaths of unarmed civilians perpetrated by American soldiers who were looking for opportunities to kill people for “trophies” (Gregory 2016).

The discourse surrounding non-combatant immunity shows that the international arena is concerned with and tries to address issues related to changing conflict norms; realism, however, is not equipped to neither explain nor address these events. In what follows, classical realism, structural realism, and post-realism will be explained. Then, using the two examples above, I will show how realism’s explanatory power falls short and how other theories hold the theoretical explanatory power.

Realists have a pessimistic view towards life where individuals act in an unpredictable environment and may employ violent means to achieve their ends (Rösch and Lebow 2018, 7). In the relationship between people or groups, power plays a large and influential role (Rösch and Lebow 2018, 8). For realism, states are the main actors within international politics and international relations, and their aim is to maximise power through force and war in an international self-help system built upon anarchy (Beer and Hariman 2018, 16). This results in a security dilemma which happens when “a state seeks to improve its own security, resulting in the decreased security of other states. Providing assurances to the contrary is not effective, realists argue, given the lack of trust between actors in a self-help world… (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith 2016, 353). The security dilemma is an endless action-reaction cycle. Actors struggle to increase their power which causes a reaction from other actors to increase their power.

Structural realism, or neorealism, is an outgrowth of classical realism with elements of liberalism. It seeks to answer some of the questions left by classical realism. For structural realists, the structure of the international system shapes state’s actions. Structural realism is divided into two sub-categories: offensive realism and defensive realism. Offensive realism believes that states should maximize their power if they are able to do so; whereas, defensive realism believes that states should be selective with their power, only acquiring that which is necessary for them to succeed as states without provoking other states (Pashakhanlou 2018, 29).

Finally, one more form of realism comes to the forefront with post-realism. Some argue that the realist narrative is not reflected in political theorizing or political operations; instead, “professionals operate within their own regimes and disciplines, epistemic communities and knowledge-based networks, private languages and political bases” (Beer and Hariman 2018, 16). Post-realists argue that states, power, and violence or force are not the only factors in international relations. Post-realism has “thicker description, more intricate explanation, more nuanced prediction, and a better toolbox for policy-makers” (Beer and Hariman 2018, 16-17).

So, what does a realist state think of the attack of non-combatants? First, realism’s focus is on the state, so its concern is not for the individual, especially the individual in another country. Second, as was explained, realism is self-interested, so, if an intrastate of civil conflict does not hinder a state’s security, then realism will also be unconcerned about a civil conflict. Nevertheless, “Non-state actors…can now pose state-scale levels of threat and destruction” (Orend 2006, 25-26). From a realist perspective, the gender-based violence in Syria is an internal affair. To put it another way, in “The Case For and Against a ‘Realist’ Strategy in Syria,” Cordesman and Nerguizian explain that the U.S. should minimize its role within Syria and become a spectator, for it is not strategically advantageous for the U.S. (Cordesman 2017). In other words, the U.S. does not have concerns about security or power when it comes to the Syrian conflict.

Post-realism is the only form of realism that may be influenced by norms. As Beer and Hariman explain, ideas and explanations are more nuanced. For post-realists, a state may be influenced by various communities or networks, one of which is the international viewpoints on conflict norms. However, post-realism is still silent on why these influences can occur and what their purpose is. Realism does not deal with norms or morality (Orend 2006, 223). Orend states that a realist “state ought to do what ever it can to win” (Orend 2006, 223, emphasis in original). Just war theory is unrealistic. The idea is that self-interested actors in an anarchic environment will do what needs to be done when push comes to shove. Thus, realism starts to lose it grip on its explanatory power, for states sometimes do act upon moral precepts rather than a moral self-interest (Orend 2006, 226). For example, Orend gives the example of the outlaw of the slave trade (Orend 2006, 226).

Realism and just war theory are at odds, when one ascends, the other descends (Orend 2006, 26). However, the just war tradition has become a highly influential international norm. The just war tradition examines when war is justified and how war can be justly undertaken (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith 2016, 351). This tradition sets limits on when force can be used and provides boundaries on how force can be applied (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith 2016, 250). Orend explains that just war theory rests on the claims that “sometimes, it is at least morally permissible for a political community to go to war” (Orend 2006, 31, emphasis in original). Thus, just war theory sets boundaries on warfare.

There are two components to just war theory: “jus ad bellum” and “jus in bello” (Orend 2006, 31). Jus ad bellum relates to the just of war, for a state must have a legitimate reason to go to war, namely: 1) just cause, 2) right intention, 3) public declaration by a proper authority, 4) last resort, 5) probability of success, and 6) proportionality (Orend 2006, 61). These factors determine the justness of a war and provide a check on the intentions and objectives a state’s decision to go to war.

Jus in bello, on the other hand, places boundaries that a solider must follow while undertaking warfare. These boundaries include both external and internal rules (Orend 2006, 136). External rules include such things as proportionality of weapons, good treatment of POWs, and care of civilians, and internal restrains include proper conduct with one’s own fellow citizens (Orend 2006, 136-137). While all of these factors can be contrasted with realism’s stance on conflict, this essay will focus on the jus in bello principle of non-combatant immunity.

The principle of non-combatant immunity draws the line between a legitimate and illegitimate force or target (Orend 2006, 106). According to Orend, “A legitimate target in wartime is anyone or anything engaged in harming” (Orend 2006, 206, emphasis in original). In other words, because non-combatants do not present a threat and have not surrendered their rights, a soldier cannot harm them with just cause.

The just war norms have become imbedded in international politics. Norms can be very influential and effective (Romaniuk and Grice 2018a). Constructivists argue that social perceptions of a state’s actions can influence its behaviour (Romaniuk and Grice 2018b). Thus, if a state does not want to be perceived as an inhumane violator of the internationally recognized just war theory, it will change its actions accordingly (Romaniuk and Grice 2018b). For example, while the realist would not see anything “wrong” with the Maywand District Murders, the constructivist would argue that the social pressure and moral outrage compelled the soldiers’ punishment. For constructivists, shared values, norms, and ways of thinking can have dramatic affects on state behaviour (Romaniuk and Grice 2018b). Thus, the constructivist viewpoint goes a long way to explaining the outrage related to the attack of unarmed civilians.

International relations (IR) is composed of a complex web of theories, stories, ideas, and concepts. In fact, unlike the natural sciences, international relations does not have what Kuhn calls a “core paradigm” (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith 2016, 18). Instead, there are various perspectives and paradigms. It seems that, when one theory comes to the limits of its explanatory power, another theory begins. This is true of realism and its relationship to norms. Realism is preoccupied with the security dilemma. It theorizes about the world through the lens of power and security. However, when its theory is applied to the world, its explanatory power is facing a security dilemma, for normative theories are taking power.

Realism is unable to fully explain changing conflict norms. It focuses on states as the main actors, but states are coming into conflict with non-state actors or intrastate groups. Furthermore, realism is not concerned with the individual, but individuals have become the focus of international conflict norms. As a result, there is a tension between theory and practice, between the ideas of realism and what is happening within international politics. International norms are constraining state behaviour and discrediting the explanatory power of realism. In the introduction to International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Smith, copying from his colleague, states, “All these theories but the bodies keep piling up” (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2016: 3). Despite non-combatant immunity, non-combatant casualties keep piling up due to changing norms in combat. Realism, however, can neither explain this phenomenon nor is it concerned with it; its explanatory power has reached its limit.

Bibliography

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Cordesman, Anthony H., and Aram Nerguizian. 2017. “The Case For and Against a “Realist” Strategy in Syria.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/case-and-against-realist-strategy-syria.

Dunne, Tim, Kurki Milja, and Steve Smith, eds. 2016. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gregory, Thomas. 2016. “The Maywand District Murders: Violence, Vulnerability and Desecrating the Body.” E-International Relations, March 8, 2016. https://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/08/the-mayawand-district-murders-violence-vulnerability-and-desecrating-the-body/.

Orend, Brian. 2006. The Morality of War. Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press.

Orsi, Davide, J. R. Avgustin, and Max Nurnus. 2018. “Introduction: The Practice of Realism in International Relations.” In Realism in Practice: An Appraisal, edited by Davide Orsi, J. R. Avgustin, and Max Nurnus, 1–5. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing. https://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Realism-in-Practice-E-IR.pdf.

Pashakhanlou, Arash Heydarian. 2018. “The Past, Present and Future of Realism.” In Realism in Practice: An Appraisal, edited by Davide Orsi, J. R. Avgustin, and Max Nurnus, 29–42. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing. https://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Realism-in-Practice-E-IR.pdf.

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Rösch, Felix, and Richard Ned Lebow. 2018. “Realism: Tragedy, Power and the Refugee Crisis.” In Realism in Practice: An Appraisal, edited by Davide Orsi, J. R. Avgustin, and Max Nurnus, 6–15. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing. https://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Realism-in-Practice-E-IR.pdf.

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. 2018. “UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria: Sexual and gender-based violence against women, girls, men, and boys a devastating and pervasive feature of the conflict and must end now.” United Nations Human Rights Council, March 15, 2018. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=22833&LangID=E

POLI 367B has deconstructed my previous categorization of IR theory as a dichotomy between realism and idealism, and, in its place, created a complex structure based on theoretical pluralism. This theoretical pluralism can be disorienting and overwhelming. However, Holsti, in The Dividing Discipline, gave me some clarity to this theoretical pluralism, for, instead of focusing on the divisions and debates within international theory, Holsti argues for its continuity and similarity (Holsti 1985, 37).

Holsti begins his work by stating that “International theory is in a state of disarray” (Holsti 1985, 1). Holsti defines international theories as “descriptive and explanatory statements about the structure, units, and processes of international politics that transcend time, location, and personality” (Holsti 1985, 3). He then explains how some scholars have organized the theoretical field into such categories as pluralist (state-centric), functionalist (multiple actors), or structuralist (constructed horizontal hierarchies), among others (Holsti 1985, 5). Nevertheless, he argues that there is no single answer to the continuing debates within international theory (Holsti 1985, 7).

However, in the following pages, he proposes three key threads which hold international theories together, namely: 1). The causes of war and conditions for peace, including the concept of power, 2). The actors and units of analysis, and 3). The images of the world or system of states (Holsti 1985, 8). With these three criteria, Holsti examines the classical tradition, liberalism, and the behavioural revolution. His goal is not to create a winning paradigm, but to illustrate how all three criteria are present in all three approaches to the study of international theory from the classical tradition to liberalism (Holsti 1985, 27). Even the behavioural revolution did not alter these three threads, for it still examined these three fundamental characteristics. Indeed, Holsti explains that the behavioural revolution altered methodologies but not the essence of international politics and theory, for only normative priorities can create different paradigms (Holsti 1985, 39).

Holsti acknowledges that he is examining the discipline in broad strokes which can lead to generalizations and marginalization of certain theories. Furthermore, this narrow categorization may label some ways of thinking as non theoretical. Despite these potential shortcomings, this categorization of theory can help one to better understand the world of international theory. Holsti’s perspective or approach is different from other works and authors which choose to focus on the debates within the field concerning such concepts as positivism, realism, or quantitative research, for example. These divides and differences between paradigms and perspectives can create an understanding of the discipline that is chaotic. Holsti’s work, however, brought some uniformity to my understanding of international theories.

Kal Holsti. The Dividing Discipline. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985.

Throughout my undergraduate studies, I have known that theory is important for both political science and international relations. Nevertheless, while I have taken courses related to political theory and ideologies and heard the terms “realist” and “idealist” in many of my course, before POLI 367B I had never taken a course that examined the various IR theories and the roll they play in both understanding and interacting with global politics past and present. So, being in my final year of my undergraduate degree, I thought it was better late than never to learn about IR theory and these terms.

By the second week into POLI 367B, I realized how little I knew about IR theory; previous to POLI 367B, I only had a surface knowledge of IR theory. I had thought that IR theory was a dichotomy between realism and idealism, and other theories such as feminism and Marxism were mainly relegated to the field of political ideology. Now, I understand that IR theory is complex.

By the first class, I learned that IR theory has two birthdays, one after World War One and another after World War Two. By the second class, I learned that IR theory has been deconstructed in multiple ways through meta-theoretical analysis. For instance, the classical realist explanation by Thucydides that the growth of Athenian power and the fear it created in Sparta were the reasons for war was no longer satisfactory. Now IR was asking questions related methodology, epistemology, and ontology; some IR theorist also wanted to question, describe, and analyze that fear rather than assume a common understanding of the fear of growth and power. In other words, IR theory became amorphous and began to expand beyond traditional boundaries.

One question asked in this course is if the lack of consensus and theoretical pluralism within IR theory is healthy. My answer is that it is healthy. If IR were bound to consensus, then it would be a forced consensus. I really appreciate the analogy in the textbook of how theories are like lenses through which one sees the world, for multiple lenses also imply a lack of consensus. However, I am beginning to think of IR theory as a plant, and its struggles with pluralism and consensus as growing pains. A plant can be discovered, named, rediscovered, and then renamed. A plant continues to grow new branches, and some plants that were previously separate from it can be grafted in. So, maybe the foundation of IR theory is shaking and shattering, but, for the roots of IR theory to grow deeper, cracks need to form for roots to grow. Smith explains, “…the social location of the observer will influence which theory they see as most useful…,” and assumption can play a role in determining was is right or even applicable (Dunne et. al. 2016, 11-12). Thus, each observer will view and use each branch differently and give more importance to some branches over others.

Finally, there may be debates regarding consensus within IR theory, but, for me, this course in IR theory is unifying my undergraduate degree. The many debates and theories discussed within POLI 367B have clarified other ideas, concepts, and events that I have learned within political science. Even concepts outside of political science are reflected within IR theory. For example, the tension between structure and agency that I learned about in a history class where causal factors can be attributed to institutions (structure) or the main actors involved (agency) is similar to some theories within IR. Structure is like critical theory’s “unjust state of affairs” or feminist theory’s discussion of “social arrangements,” and agency is like the social theorists’ examination of the social actors and their understanding of the world discussed in the course text (Kurki and Wight 2016, 26-27). Thus, POLI 367B is connecting the dots of many aspects of my undergraduate degree, amalgamating them into a massive, intricate, and interconnected web.

Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.