According to Kenneth Waltz and other neorealist thinkers, power is the main driving force in any interaction between states within the international arena. States are constantly thinking about how to gain more power in order to establish themselves as dominant in relation to their neighbours. In the article “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Waltz argues that the United States and the European Union should stop trying to interfere in the Iranian quest for nuclear weaponry. Israel, in particular, is especially concerned about the prospect of a nuclear Iran because it would mean the loss of Israel’s dominance in the Middle East. Israel wants to maintain its control over the nuclear market of the Middle East because that would ensure their survival since no one would dare challenge them. The concerns surrounding the possibility of Iran becoming nuclear are all rooted in this fear of losing power. Countries are mistrusting of Iranian intentions and are worried that if Iran attempts to attack with nuclear weapons, deterrence would be near impossible. Israel does not wish to lose its edge in the nuclear arena and, thus, has a significant interest in preventing Iran from achieving their goal. If Iran has nuclear weapons, Israel would be less powerful within the Middle East, no longer holding the monopoly.

However, Waltz’s argumentation centres around the idea of a balance of power. Since Israel is the only Middle Eastern country with nuclear capabilities, the introduction of Iran into the equation would only serve to create increased stability. The crisis in the Middle East, Waltz argues, was brought about thanks to Israel’s nuclear arsenal rather than the Iranian desire to create one. When one country has more power than the rest of the countries in an area, the other countries are increasingly prone to feelings of insecurity. On the other hand, when there are two or more countries which hold the same or similar amounts of power, they are less likely to engage in a conflict. Waltz strongly believes in the idea that equal amounts of power across states will increase the stability of the international sphere since no one is necessarily more powerful than anyone else. This is a clear example of Waltz’s neorealist tendencies since classical realists are more prone to believe that hegemony is the way to ensure stability in international relations. This article is a great help in discerning the differences between classical and neorealist theory and helps shed some light on the issues surrounding power politics.

Kenneth Waltz (2012) “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5

Two readings, in particular, have caught my attention and I find them extremely relevant. We began the course with the study of realism and last week covered the concept of hegemonic stability theory.

Our earlier reading specifically focused on different strands of Structural Realism. Having only known about classical realism and the general components of realism, which includes self-interested motives in pursuit of power in an anarchic world, I had a hard time identifying with which theory I identified with. As I talked about in my first blog, my background as an Iranian girl, naturally drew me to realist ideas; That all countries are after their own self-interest and Iran, having been isolated for so many years from the global community, must also be in pursuit of military expansion and gaining more power. However, I also believe that a selfish anarchic system can only lead to destructive competition. I believe in cooperation but one that is done in the self- interest of a state. In fact, through cooperation, the interests of states are more easily achieved. Having had this view of politics, naturally, defensive structural realism was the strand that stood out to me the most. Another element that distinguishes defensive realists from the other strands is their stand on hegemony. Defensive realists are not in pursuit of maximizing their power as they believe it will put them at a greater risk. As the name suggests their approaches are more defensive and conservative in an attempt to reach their self-interest.

On the other hand, we discussed the concept of hegemonic stability theory which states that in the presence of a hegemon- Pax Britannica, the hegemony of Great Britain and Pax Americana, the current period of American hegemony- the world is more stable and is at peace. Being a realist I disagree with the above statement. Even though the world might appear to be at peace,  in my opinion, the absence of war does not necessarily bring forward peace.

In the world of today, countries go to war by destroying each other’s economy through sanctions, by isolating countries by forming exclusive coalitions and by engaging in proxy wars. Additionally, countries can still be in tension in the absence of war.

As the reading by Kobane suggests, the world does need leadership, however, I believe, that a single hegemon would not necessarily take this position, but instead would misuse their position in pursuit of their interest. There are many states in today’s world with different interests, some of which contradicts with that of American values. The United States cannot possibly act as neutral hegemon in pursuit of collective gains and world peace while maintaining its hegemony.

Additionally, it is very tempting for any individual- in the view of realism the state- with great powers, not to use their power for their personal gains. Intuitively, in order to remain powerful, they must be in pursuit of their self-interest rather than making sacrifices and engaging as the referee or the leader of the world. I argue that the United States hasn’t acted as a leader or a referee but more so as a strong state who is powerful enough to attain its goals and execute its plans.

Aisha Dos Santos

45786150

POLI 367B

Blog Post #2: Kenneth Waltz: Why Iran should get the bomb

         Why Iran should get the bomb by Kenneth Waltz helped to provide further insight into the topic/theme of neorealism and structural realism. More specifically, that for realist’s international politics will always be synonymous with the issue of power politics. The crisis of Iran’s nuclear program displays the threat between nations over existing military powers and the need for a restoration through the balance of military power. Waltz highlights the fact that as one state amasses a wealth of power that has not yet been superseded in the region (ie. Israel) it causes other states (ie. Iran) to gain a nuclear arsenal for themselves, not necessarily to attack the state with the monopoly of power offensively, but to take the defensive approach to protect themselves. But from Israel’s point of view, Iran amassing more nuclear power poses a potential threat to the stability of their power.

This article helped to be a great example of what Thucydides stated in his famous quote about how “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable”, even though this is a classical realist approach to international relations theory we can still see how structural realists like Waltz can see the power dynamics between Israel and Iran as synonymous with the power struggles exemplified between Athens and Sparta. Waltz’s remedy to this looming power is to realize that as a structural realist he maintains that nations will act rationally and will try there best not to act in irrational and impulsive ways that will undermine their own power and security, so Iran is less likely to employ an offensive attack against Israel even with their growing nuclear power. This rationality employed by nations is demonstrated through Iran’s lack of action with their nuclear arsenal, and this example provided by Waltz in this article helps me to understand this realist notion with a real-life case shown between competing nations in the Middle East. This rationality stems from the fact that conflict amongst two strong nuclear powers will never amount to a full-scale war due to the deterrence and fear of one striking first. This reading exemplifies the need for diplomacy between states to bring about peace and stability between nations and their allies into the forefront of the international sphere, and that it’s possible that as multiple countries become equally as strong as one another stability may be achieved.

Kenneth Waltz (2012) “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5.

LINK

<Waltz, Positivism and Structural Realism>

In a close examination of Waltz’s article ‘Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability’, I will discuss the extent to which the article sheds light on the realist theory as well as the debates surrounding the discipline of International Relations.

Waltz and Positivism

Waltz’s article demonstrates one of the defining features of International Relations positivists, which is a belief in the possibility of fact and value distinction. In the article, Waltz attempts to make a distinction between fact and value by drawing references to historical events and presenting them as facts. Specifically, when it comes to the nuclear weaponization of Iran, Waltz uses historical evidence to predict that nuclear weapon will accompany mutual deterrence. For example, he refers to historical events, such as Maoist China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. He then goes on to argue that the historical event ‘shows’ that nuclearization of states tend to encourage the states to be more cautious and less bellicose (Waltz, 2012). In this reference, Waltz extrapolates the situation in Middle East from a past event surrounding Maoist China. His retroactive approach, therefore, can be understood as the realist desire to move away from the normative by establishing ‘laws and patterns’.

Waltz and Structural Realism

In the previous section, from examining his positivist approach, we can learn that positivists attempt to discover patterns and establish laws to describe the world objectively. In line with my previous finding, Waltz’s reliance on history also help us understand a structural realist approach to International Relations. As we discussed in the lecture, structural realists (also known as neorealists) look at the system in which states seeks power as a means of security. Considering Waltz is one of the leading thinkers of structural realism, the article reflects a structural realist thought on the international order; for example, in the article, Waltz assumes that all states will behave the same when it comes to attaining power and security, regardless of the national identities (Waltz, 1979). Waltz disregards the uniqueness of each individual state (e.g. geopolitics) and rather focuses on the international system as a whole (Waltz, 2012). This aexplains why Waltz refers to a past event in a non-Middle East region (i.e. Maoist China) in order to make a knowledge claim that nuclearization of Iran is the most likely way to bring stability to the Middle East region.

Behind the Scene 

The article shows the neorealist, positivist approach to International Relations. Walt’z argument exemplifies the positivist belief in the possibility of fact-value distinction and the structural realist idea. At the same time, examining his article requires us to have a understanding of the ongoing epistemological debate in IR. Waltz considers his article a value-neutral and objective description of how the world works, however, a strong belief in the fact-value distinction might lead to the marginalization of other ‘non-realist’ IR theories. Although an examination of his article gives us a window to the positivist, neorealist perspective on IR, Waltz, just like other American IR thinkers, disregards the existence of the plurality of the IR theory, which is one of the big themes addressed in class. Especially considering that the mainstream theory of positivism is dominating the field IR, it is important to be aware of the implications of believing in the possibility fact-value distinction in the field of IR.

So.. What?

Waltz’s claim allows for a critical evaluation of the discipline of IR. Admittedly, Waltz’s article will be helpful for understanding a IR positivist, neorealist perspective about the way the world works; however, what’s more important is to acknowledging the plurality in IR theories. Rather than viewing his knowledge claims as undeniable facts, I would rather see his theory as one of the ‘fulcrum’ of many diverse IR methodologies that are designed to leverage the world.

Kenneth Waltz (2012) “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5

Kenneth Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley

Blog Post 2 – Iran Nuclear Crisis

Note: In this post, I use the words structural realism and neorealism interchangeably. The meaning is the same.

Overview of the Iran Deal

Ina controversial article sparking debate among international relation scholars, Kenneth Waltz defends the Iranian endeavor towards a nuclear bomb. Waltz published his piece in the journal of Foreign Affairs in 2012, approximately three years before the Iran Deal. Now, six years after Waltz’ publication, little optimism remains after United States President Donald Trump announced his decision to withdraw from the Iran Deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), on May 8^th 2018. The JCPOA was a deal between Iran, the P5+1[1] and the European Union. In short, the agreement cut Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium by 98%, reduced its number of gas centrifuges by two thirds and allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the right to inspections of Iranian test.[2] In exchange, the six countries and the EU would lift sanctions imposed on Iran that greatly hindered its access to the global market. Lifting of nuclear-related economic sanctions allowed Iran to recover approximately $100 billion of its assets frozen in overseas banks[3].

Kenneth Waltz’s Take

Kenneth Waltz, having written the “Why Iran should get the Bomb” three years before the Iran deal, makes the claim that Iran’s attainment of the bomb would most likely “restore stability to the Middle East.”[4] He argues that by developing a bomb, Iran finally puts an end to Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly, which has long “fueled instability in the Middle East.”[5] Waltz uses historical records and North Korea’s current situation to argue that sanctions implemented on Iran fail to deter Iran’s building of the bomb. He goes further to say economic pressures may instill feelings of isolation within Iran, furthering their interest in nuclear development, hence being counterproductive to the Western agenda. Waltz explores the option of Iran going ahead with nuclear development, however, Waltz argues this is not undesirable, since it can “produce more regional and international stability.”[6] Ultimately, if Iran goes nuclear, deterrence on a global scale will apply, and the power balance is restored in the Middle East. Quickly, it becomes evident that Kenneth Waltz is looking through a neorealist lens to prove his argument that where “nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability.”[7]

Neorealism, also known as structural realism, postulates that great powers and states are the major players in international society. Using power as the currency of international politics, structural realism examines structural constraints within the international system. Specifically, structural realism rests on the premise that states operate in an anarchic system, where centralized authority is simply nonexistent. Due to this, states are constantly in a position to seek gaining relative power and pursuing animus dominandi, or their desire for power as mentioned by Hans Morgenthau. A prominent neorealist, Morgenthau published in 1984 that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.” [8] This ultimately leads to what realists refer to a “self-help” system, where states rely solely on themselves to ensure survival – furthering competition with other states.

For Kenneth Waltz, a prominent structural realist, Iran’s attainment of a nuclear weapon is simply a natural progression towards a regional balance of power. It strengthens the relative power and security for not only the United States, but regionally in the Middle East as well. This can be brought back to the concept of the security dilemma, a term coined by John H. Herz. The security dilemma, in simple terms, means that the steps one state takes towards security (usually through strengthening military or building nuclear arms) leads another state to feel less secure, hence triggering the second state to also take actions to feel more secure. In turn, the first state then feels less secure. For Waltz and John Mearshimer alike, this is completely natural in an anarchic international system, and leads to stabilization. Through mutually possessing the power to cause mass destruction, Iran and Israel use internal balancing to reach a desired outcome of peace and stability.  If more states possess the ability to use nuclear arms offensively, these powers balance one another and states are less likely to pursue destructive warfare. This is the driving point of Waltz’ article. The rise of one hegemon in the Middle East, with no counter balancing force is particularly dangerous to neorealists such as Waltz.

Can structural realism support the Iran Deal?

          Application of Waltz’ theory of structural realism to the Iran nuclear crisis indicates that Waltz supports Iran obtaining nuclear power. However, I pose a potential argument against the neorealist perspective. If one takes a cost-benefit analysis approach to the Iran Deal, an argument can be made that the Iran deal is a more desirable outcome rather than the possibility of Iran developing arms. Firstly, the JCPOA aligned with American raison d’état (national interest) of the United States by stopping Iran from developing weapon grade uranium. Weapon grade uranium is approximately 90%, and Iran must keep enrichment to 3.7%.[9] We can also note that uranium enrichment used for medicinal practice is 20% enriched, which demonstrates the severe level of restriction Iran faces. Through the IAEA inspections, transparency is encouraged between Iran and the US and US can further use Iran to promote its political interests within the region. The deal also lifts a tremendous amount of sanctions – as mentioned above – re-establishing Iran as a major player in the oil trade and international market. Bringing in huge profits, the Iranian government and people also benefit greatly through the JCPOA since it puts an end to years of economic turmoil for Iranian citizens. Through the structural realist lens, Iran is still achieving stability through economic development and improvement. Iran can also work on strengthening its military, furthering its power in the Middle East, and supporting Iranian pursuit for influence. The deal also outweighs alternatives such as the use of hard power or an attack on Iran, which could forever damage the political climate of the Middle East. Through the neorealist lens of International Relations, all states are rational actors that must act rationally. However, if a rational actor conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the Iran Deal, it is a far more fruitful alternative than potential war.

In response to this, I counter argue that the Iran deal demonized the idea of Iran going nuclear, and saw it as something that needed to be stopped immediately. It also failed to establish a bipolar balance between Israel and Iran in the Middle East. A bipolar Middle East is by far more stable than Israel’s present nuclear monopoly, as the principle of deterrence would diminish all incentives for either side to wage war. My perspective would surely be supported by structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz, however, other International relations theorists may place greater importance on international cooperation. The English School would be a great example of this, as discussed by Tim Dunne in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. The English School in general would place value on informational institutionalism, such as the signing of treaties, peace talks and overall diplomacy. [10] The battle between contesting theories will continuously persist, however, it is time that may truly dictate Iran’s fate in the atomic twenty first century.

By: Shakiba Fadaie

[1] P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany.

[2] UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme], 20 July 2015, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/55b9e2084.html [accessed 13 October 2018]

[3] Jackie Northam, “Lifting Sanctions Will Release $100 Billion To Iran. Then What?”, All Things Considered, NPR (16 July 2015).

[4] Kenneth Waltz “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5 Waltz. 2015

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Morgenthau, Hans J., 1954. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

[9] UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme], 20 July 2015, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/55b9e2084.html [accessed 13 October 2018]

[10] Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

My second blog post is available right here.

Second blog post

For my second blog post I’m focusing on the textbook’s third chapter by John Mearsheimer on structural realism. Structural realism is always something that has fascinated and confused me, because as I understand it attempts to understand the issues of IR by both attempting to create almost scientific like theories and frameworks, while simplifying the state actors of IR to a point where they can almost no longer be recognizable in the real world. This reading was illuminating yet, did not clear up all my confusion on the issue, probably because the very theory and philosophy itself is what I find confusing. Mearsheimer opens up by bringing up the obvious distinction between classical realists and structural or neo-realists, clearly arguing that while classical realists base many of their premises on concepts like human nature, structural realists attempt understands the structure of politics and how it can compel people to do violence. For structural realists’ humans don’t want to particularly fight each other, but rather due to the anarchic state of international affairs due to the lack of a true overarching sovereign there are security dilemmas and commitment problems which compel states into war. Within this structural realist debate there is a division between the defensive realist and the offensive realist, the defensive realist seeks to maintain security by not upsetting the balance of power through seeking too much power, whereas an offensive realist seeks to maintain security by pursuing as much power as possible and if possible becoming a hegemon. As I have had some experience in past classes dealing with this theory I understand this framework, yet even as this model is helpful for understanding the unfolding events of world war 1 and 2 it still strikes me as odd how these theorists while attempting to be scientific reduce the status of a state to a singular entity. While it is helpful to think of a state as a singular entity, realist theory completely ignores the multipolarity of states, how often states—particularly liberal democratic ones—fight internally when acting in the geo-political sphere. The multi-track nature of states foreign policy can be seen especially during the cold war, when one division of the US government such as the state department creates or enables a policy which goes in stark contrast of the CIA or the pentagon. I think this reading helped reaffirm some assumptions I’ve had about structural realism which is that it can be extremely helpful when looking at the international system over long periods of time when there is an obvious military conflict between two states or two spheres of influence, but it is far less useful when examining the complex continual interactions of states especially when those interactions are being led by non-state actors such as MNC’s or IO’s. Structural realism while helpful in understanding the decision of the US to engage with china and increase china’s global economic ties is unhelpful when these decisions are made by non-state’s and for reasons beyond security such as ideas of economic prosperity.

This blog post is going to focus on the week-two reading, Why Iran Should Get the Bomb. Written by Waltz, with his unique “lenses” of Neo-realism, the article discussed the potential effect of when Iran obtained nuclear power. To be more specific, Waltz argues that the best way to maintain the balance of nuclear power and the power of a state (in this case, Iran) is to try to use the nuclear power within the country while other countries are not interpreting aggressively as Israel did in the past. The article discussed the current potential methods to balance the nuclear power, the Middle East nuclear crisis, as well as the misunderstanding among countries.

Waltz listed three possible practices to balance Iran’s power. The first is economic sanctions, which is a highly aggressive method that may cause opposite effect due to the vulnerability of the state power (p. 2). In the case of Iran, the result of sanctions may cause the country to build nuclear weapon faster to maintain its power status among nations. The second method suggests Iran could develop a conceptual framework of nuclear power instead of creating the actual bomb (p. 2, 3). While the third way is letting Iran build its own nuclear weapon (p. 3).

Interestingly, through the article, Waltz claims that the third method is the best way to balance the international and regional stability. Waltz proposed that due to Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly, caused a series of troubles in the Middle East (Middle East nuclear crisis) (p. 3). The aggressive progression over the nuclear monopoly could be seen from the last forty years, both Iran and Syria was bombed (p. 3). The unbalanced power in the Middle East may create potential rivals, in this case, Iran. The ongoing debate caused by misunderstanding is also notable. Stated by Waltz, the creation of nuclear power will increase the state’s self-awareness of power. By listing the example of China, India and Pakistan (p. 4), the awareness of power will hence the national security as well as making the state more cautious about the nuclear materials (p. 4, 5). Thus the overall international and regional stability will be improved.

I see the link between lectures and readings from this article. With Waltz’s invention of structural realism, I also see the hegemonic state’s fear of rising power. Stand from the Iran aspect or Waltz’s, the desire for power is for national/international security. However, because of the “security dilemma,” the Western power (US, Europe), as well as Israel, felt threatened by the rising power of Iran; thus they tried to implement various aggressive methods to stop Iran obtain the bomb.

Kenneth Waltz (2012) “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5.