54 thoughts on “Week 8 and 10, Kornbluh and LeoGrande”
This week I really enjoyed our readings, especially the chapter “Kennedy” in Kornbluh and Leogrande. I chose this chapter because I’m currently taking a class on Cold War era in the United States and we finished Kennedy last week so I thought I might have a little background knowledge on the important things that happened! The chapter started off on familiar ground for me with the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis, but quickly brought things to light that I had never heard of. I found it interesting that Castro appeared to be quite eager to ameliorate relations with the United States despite the fact that his May Day speech conveyed a very strong anti-American sentiment and rightly so considering Kennedy had just attempted to overthrow Castro via internal uprising. I also find it interesting and a little confusing that although Castro wanted better relations with the U.S. and Kennedy wanted better relations with Cuba that no conclusion could be found over a period of two years. In Chapter two of their book Kornbluh and Leogrande describe a lot of back and forth between the two factions that all basically conveyed hope that a solution to better Cuban-American relations could be found but didn’t actually provide any real way to achieve that. Then of course like any dramatic story, Kennedy was assassinated just when it seems like a big change could have been made and thus the embargo has continued up to the present day. This is interesting to note especially since the UN just yesterday announced that 191 countries voted “yes” to condemn the embargo while the United States voted the same as it has for the last twenty-four years of this vote: no. Although Barack Obama has said that he wants to improve Cuban-American relations just as Kennedy did, he has done even less to try and end the embargo. Maybe the Castro regime can offer the olive branch first this time.
Wow… what biased simplification of a super complex story. How conveniently you left out that the Castro brothers sent 46,000 souls to Gehenna between 1959-1965. Who says that democratic nations deal with terrorists? The Castro régime has enslaved 12,000,000 people for nearly six decades. I hooe that EMBARGO is in fact accelerated and tightened. And… who is the DISUNITED NATIONS serving? Isn’t it a den of mafiosi who all cowtow to the Castros?
Carter entered his presidency with the view that it was about time to normalize relations with Cuba; something that the authors argue had never been done previously with such a determination. At the same time, it seems that Castro was also ready for a normalization of the relationship at this point. I feel like we are building up towards normalizing relations but then there is always some minor setback that exacerbates the situation again and again. Whether drug sales, maritime boundaries, refugees or the intervention in Angola and Ethiopia. Did Carter give up too easily? Was his administration too internally divided and stubborn on the Africa-issue? His optimism seems to have been abruptly cut, just as there were lights of optimism. It is interesting and perhaps also a great obstacle to base US-Cuban relations in the context of Africa. It seems like this was the ultimate setback which put a halt to the normalization process. This resulted in the diplomatic efforts just going around in circles. Although it seems like both Castro and Carter were ready to start constructive discussions on cultural exchanges and emigration possibilities, it just did not work. There were so many internal obstacles and external, international events that influenced the two leaders. What was so important for the US was the withdrawal of forces from Angola and Ethiopia, something that was received as plainly offensive and non-negotiable by the Cubans. I can’t help but be critical when reading this chapter because it is ultimately written from within Washington. I am wondering what, if any, components from the Cuban side of the diplomacy that are missing? I think knowing more from within the Cuban administration would have provided a great insight into many of the issues at hand. Overall, I really enjoyed the writing style in which the author uses quotes by the diplomats to reflect upon the various meetings and discussions that were happening. It really gives the reader an insight! It is unbelievably frustrating yet compelling to learn of the small obstacles that obviously represented strong, global matters of principles to the two states that were so powerful and certain in their political principles. Carter’s principle when he became President was to normalize bilateral relations wherever possible, but saw himself give up in that very process. Perhaps the two leaders were both overly optimistic in thinking that the reversal of the cold war-era would come so quickly. Perhaps neither the US nor Cuba were ready.
This week, I read the chapter entitled “Nixon and Ford: Kissinger’s Caribbean Détente” in Back Channel to Cuba, which opened my eyes to the intricacies of foreign policy between United States and Cuba. I was interested in this time period since I have studied the sixties, although I have not learned about the diplomatic situation with Cuba and the United States during this time. I felt that this era was a pivotal time for the world with technology, and changed the way that many foreign players interacted. Building on the theme of technology, media and the information that is known to the public, I thought this chapter really exemplified the caution and care around which information was leaked to the public, even concerned dialogue between the Cubans and Americans. The secret notes that were passed between ambassadors to the different countries, as well as the code that they communicated in was astounding, exhibiting a complexity of foreign politics that I was unaware of. The fact that the meetings were so secret, that only three people were involved in the secret talks, as well as the only ones who knew about it, shows the fragility of the knowledge of these policies possibly changing, in the public as well as political spheres. Further, the baby steps that were taken by each side, and the extreme hesitancy the two powers felt in making these steps, worried that the other wouldn’t cooperate, is an indication that amendment of this relationship was a massive decision for the United States, as well as a huge turning point for Cuba.
The chapter entitled “Nixon and Ford: Kissinger’s Caribbean Détente” in Back channel to Cuba really resonated with me especially considering what I already knew about Kissinger’s controversial diplomacy. Considering that Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his negotiations of a ceasefire in Vietnam it didn’t surprise me that he would lead relations with Cuba during the time of the Cold war. What did surprise me was how back channeled these political negotiations were (considering that this was the age of media and the relations were held very primitively and secretly) and how open Kissinger was to Cuba as a political partner. The Chapter states that Kissinger’s policies and relations with Havana were unlike those of any other politician in Washington since they broke ties with Havana in January 1961. Kissinger’s approach in the opening relations to Cuba through his chivalrous, unilateral, and if necessary reciprocity really, while unsuccessful under Nixon and Ford, really set the stage for the opening of relations under the democratic government to this day. I think Kissinger’s diplomacy was a very important turning point in U.S. foreign policy in that he didn’t necessarily seek to control Cuba as something resembling a satellite state, as it had been done since the U.S. won the Spanish-American war, but that he chose to treat them as an equal and respected power in world affairs. I recently read an article by Kissinger about the Ukraine Crisis (Ukraine their own entity and should be allowed to think as such – economically and politically – without the control of another power) and I think much of the views he expressed toward Cuba can also be found in that. I therefore find it very interesting how current Kissinger’s diplomacy in Cuba is, not only in regards to the opening of Cuban-U.S. relations but also in the Ukraine Crisis.
For this weeks reading, I chose to focus on chapter one of LeoGrande and Kornbluh’s ” Back Channel to Cuba”. The chapter really provided a close analysis the begining of USA-Cuban relations after Fidel Castro came to power. Starting right at the beginning of the Castro’s presidency the book overviews his first unofficial trip to the USA. I found it really interesting how LeoGrande and Kornbluh demonstrate how the US government and Castro had a competition over the public opinion of USA citizens. For example, the American’s really framed the executions of Batista’s officials as a human rights abuse and intolerable.Broadcasting this sort of rhetoric the USA sought to demonize him to the public. As a result, before his trip Castro went so far as to hire a public relations firm to coach him on how to make a good impression to the crowds and US media. Despite ignoring their advice on shaving his beard and wearing a suite, Castro left a great impression on the public during his first trip and was often described as charming and intelligent. I find it interesting how both sides placed such a heavy amount of importance on the public opinion and as a result employed such drastically different rhetoric. I’m looking forward to reading more about how relations progressed from this point and to see if a similar style of rhetoric was used when cold war tensions became even more heated.
Amongst the five chapters to choose from I was drawn instantly by “Kennedy: The Secret Search for Accommodation.” My knowledge of Kennedy’s legacy is that him and his family were celebrity figures that were respected amongst Americans. Being the U.S. President in office when the beginning the Cuban Missile Crisis began is regarded as one of the most tense issues in U.S. foreign policy and is extremely interesting to learn about. As much as this chapter was about the tense relations between Cuba and the U.S. at the time, Kornbluh and LeoGrande, however, focus primarily on U.S. diplomacy moves and negotiations, while quoting Castro from this almost distanced perspective that makes Castro seem far away, transcending the reality of what was really going on during this difficult time. As much as actors such as John B. Donovan attempted to deal with Castro in a timely, efficient, and peaceful manner, I greatly respect Castro’s commitment to the regime and his boundaries set for cultivating reasonable relations. In hindsight, I see the failure of the Bay of Pigs and Cuba’s domination of the U.S.’ attempt at enforcing hegemonic power as a great success at meaningful impeding Western imperialism. Right now, in 2015, it seems that Western culture and imperialism is the bane of the world’s existence and is at the root of meddling with Middle Eastern countries and destroying essentially Aboriginal and Indigenous cultures as well as the mass exploitation as a result of this. I must argue that I read these portions of history and I have to say that I feel like I am rooting for Cuba and I am rooting for Fidel.
This weeks readings were very interesting , it felt like I was looking at the transformation of Cuba as a rose of American economic prowess a deep sticking thorn that would bug the United States for decades . It was interesting looking at Cuba instead of the American side of history during this time period. I had a few concerns with Sweig’s readings this week , I’m kinda confused with area of censorship around artists particularly how wide ranged its measures were enforced and how strict it became at times while remaining less enforced during other moments . But Sweig allowed me to think critically about the US administrations efforts to remove Castro from Eisenhower , Kennedy and secondary research of Johnson’s affairs. Was also interesting reading about the Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose from a Cuban perspective and how underestimated the Americans were of Castro. This weeks readings made me think that this was the beginning of the end for American interventions into foreign affairs. As we see the failure with seizing power in Cuba , later Vietnam , Afghanistan and Iraq. It was interesting to read about the CIA and their initiatives and struggles to control their activities and the effects of their method with regards to Cuban Airlines Flight 455. Lastly its interesting how Castro seemed to be a pawn in the bigger scene of things during the Missie Crisis with his lack of voice in the resolution of the conflict
From the Kornbluh and LeoGrande reading, I opted to read chapter 4 (Nixon and Ford: Kissenger’s Caribbean Detente), as I had a loose understanding of the overall period of détente. What I found particularly interesting was the level of secrecy, which to say was extreme was an understatement. Many of Kissenger’s dialogues with Cuba during the end of Nixon’s rule was without the knowledge of the president, and when Ford arrived in office, he too was largely kept in the dark regarding the communications with Cuba. In fact during early 1974 only three people in the state department were aware of the Cuban communications. Pseudonyms were also used to further the secrecy of the talks, Lawrence Eagleburger – the US negotiator with the Cubans – would be known as Mr. Henderson, a fact he did not even tell his wife! Code language was also established for telephone calls; for example asking “how is your health?” was an indication that the caller wanted to arrange a meeting, a response of “I have a slight headache, how is your sister?” indicated “agreed, and where?” and there was an elaborate conversation designed to follow this to indicate exactly where and when the meeting could occur. Paranoia also crept into the thinking of the secret negotiators. Whilst conducting a meeting at La Guardia airport and blind man selling pens approached the table, threw a few down and would not leave until one of the negotiators purchased them, they later suspected that these pens could have contained recording devices linking to the CIA or FBI.
I really enjoyed this week’s reading (I selected #4) and I look forward to hearing about the other chapters. I found this chapter very well written and captivating.
The relationship between Kissinger and Castro is a very intriguing one. Kissinger initiates it yet some how I think Castro has most of the control. The relationship stops and starts multiple times over the years. In most cases there is no response from Castro while the Kissinger keeps sending messages in hopes of another meeting. I think the biggest roadblock they hit is a power struggle. Cuba makes a move against the US (supporting the independence of Puerto Rico for example) and the US being the global power won’t stand for it.
Demands are being made yet nobody is will to make the first big move. Smalls signs of faith are shown but ultimately nothing really changes because each side’s demands are too risky for the other side to accept. It really does have a lot to do with power and how a country is portrayed to others. If the US were to give into all of Cuba’s demands they would look weak and that is not something that the US would be interested in. The same is true vice versa, Cuba doesn’t want to seem like they are bowing down to the US or being handled or manipulated by them. They want to keep their strong independent image.
Their method of communication is also really exciting to read about. The secret meetings held at airports restaurants and hotels sounds like something out of a spy novel. It’s accompanied by a bit of paranoia, which is entertaining to read. (When a blind man brings pens to their table and the men think there are hidden microphones in the pens!)
This is all happening while Nixon is refusing to deal with Castro. This is an interesting fact because it might mean, since the relationship fell through that Nixon was right and they should have spend time on Castro. But on the other hand it can be argued that you don’t know unless you try!
The most captivating part of this whole situation is that the world was convinced that there was no relationship between Cuba and the US and that the US was giving Cuba the cold shoulder. While behind closed doors (or in public places!) the story was the opposite. Attempts were being made to cooperate with one another and try to find a way to have a working relationship even though their fundamental beliefs were different.
Wow, what a powerful and interesting read. I read Ch. 2: “Kennedy, the Secret Search for Accommodation.” There are so many things I could say about this text:
1. First of all, it made excellent use of sources. I felt like I was hearing the story directly from the horse’s mouth; that is, from direct quotes by Castro and Kennedy themselves taken from Top Secret White House memorandum and other confidential sources. The writing told a story; it was interesting, engaging, and convincing. It didn’t bore me to tears or lose me in all the details.
2. It gave me a good sense of what was really at play in the US-Cuban conflict: forgive my overarching generalizations, but to me it seems clear that the main issue was an ideological power struggle between a political and economic powerhouse and a defiant and visionary island. The fact that neither wanted to bow down and be the first to make a move toward reconciliation, shows how much image and reputation (keeping a stance of superiority and control) played into the lack of communication. A power struggle…between a dominant society (US) and a leader who was willing to fight for the sovereignty of his people (Cuba, representing Latin America). As Fidel replies to Kennedy’s last message: “So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty.”
3. The role of media. What to release to the public and what to maintain in secrecy; what makes headlines, and what is hidden; the role of Lisa Howard in negotiating dialogue; and the use of communications to spit out propaganda in service of political agendas. What dishonesty and manipulation on all sides!
4. The intriguing coincidence and mystery surrounding Kennedy’s death. His last speech leaves much to be pondered, especially in regards to his statement that Cuba had become “a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics…This and this alone divides us. As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it, everything is possible.”
This suggest that the story of Cuba and the US is indicative of a much greater story that has to do with orchestrating global power to keep certain countries and peoples as subservient to that power.
I read Chapter 2 of “Back Channels to Cuba,” and was fascinated at the level of detail that the text provided. First point that jumped out at me was how one-sided the relationship between Cuba and the United States continued to be; even at the height of the Cold War, the Socialist/Communist Castro was still continuing to reach out to the United States in the hope of some kind of reproach, only to be snubbed time and time again. The behaviour of both governments during tractors-for-freedom incident is a great example of Cuba being (perhaps overly) accommodating towards the US in the hopes that relations may be normalized. I think the reading places a significant amount of blame on Kennedy’s early administration as a cause of the US’s behaviour – Kennedy’s fixation on righting the wrongs of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and atoning for what he did to the members of Battalion 2506. The invasion was a huge loss of face for the US at the international level, and it appears rather than try to cut their losses and normalize relations they decided to “double down” and continue to play “hardball” and hope that Cuba would bend eventually. It was also tragic that Kennedy was assassinated just as it appeared that Donovan, Howard, and Daniel’s collective work to establish covert communications with Cuba was paying off. Also interesting in this chapter was the power of the media – Howard, the ABC news reporter, did more to bring the two parties to the table than most US and Cuban officials, and Castro jumping on the opportunity to have an hour-long television special aired in the US.
My choice of reading for this week was chapter one of Peter Kornbluh and William LeoGrande’s book “Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and havana. In this reading I found that there was a great introduction to how the book would explain piece by piece just how the dialogue between the United States and Cuba was since the year 1959. What really got my attention in this article though was at the beginning of it where it mentioned, for a couple short paragraphs, how the presentation of themselves to each other was critical. What to wear and how to represent yourself to the audience you were addressing was a key factor in getting messages and points across. Another interesting point I recall was how secretive the political meetings were between Cuba and the United States. There were meetings set up in third world countries and other random spots in which the two countries would talk about politics in order for the United States to keep a low profile politically with the Cubans. The secret meetings makes me wonder just what exactly was spoken about in them and what the arguments, agreements and disagreements were in these private gatherings. I am excited to continue reading the chapters and finally finding out what happened behind the scenes of these two Countries in history that was kept so secretive as classified information for so long.
From skimming the first five chapters of Leogrande and Kornbluh, one of things that I found most interesting about the book was how each chapter started with a quote from a political player that was relevant to the chapter. These quotes along with other snippets of dialogue within the chapters made the readings much more interesting and I felt that it provided us with new information and insight that we wouldn’t have had access to otherwise (as many of these quotes were said in private/secret documents).
The chapter that I focused on this week was “Nixon and Ford: Kissinger’s Carribbean Detente”. One of the main things that stood out to me in this chapter was the fact that despite the heavy use of media and communicative technologies during this period (as discussed in previous lectures), the way that Kissinger communicated with Castro and Cuba was quite primitive. Mankiewicz describes how he carried with him a short, handwritten, and unsigned note from Kissinger to Castro when he traveled to Cuba in 1974. The secrecy of this action as well as others such as secret meetings, talks and communicative codes highlight to me just how fragile political negotiations and relations are. During this period of the Cold War in which information and events was easily manipulated, misintepreted and misunderstood, chapter 4 brings to attention to the fact that politicians and leaders felt that knowledge and key information needed to be heavily protected during times of ever changing policies and political relations.
Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s chapter on Kennedy and his government’s policies and reactions towards Cuba presented a conflicting narrative for me; a narrative that showed a desperation for peace but not at any cost. The secret meetings and many attempts at communication between the two countries appeared as though they both wanted to reach a stage of rapprochement, which was never officially achieved. Although politicians like Donovan attempted to broker peace between the two nations, the timing always seemed to be off. For example, before the Cuban Missile Crisis came to a head, Kennedy sent a message to Castro in an attempt to neutralize tensions but by then, the crisis had been averted. However, Castro was left angry after the Soviets failed to include Cuba in their negotiations. This shows that Kennedy was at least marginally willing to listen to Cuban sentiments but his message arrived too late. The CIA was also heavily involved in relations between Cuba and the U.S. For example, when Donovan met with Castro on a fishing trip to negotiate the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, the CIA wanted him to bring a wetsuit laced with poison and present it as a gift to Castro. The CIA acting as a third party amid talks of reconciliation made relations between the two nations more complex. Peace and reconciliation between the two wasn’t a far-fetched idea and there were attempts made to achieve some sort of agreement but it never came to fruition during Kennedy’s tenure as president.
In the book assigned to us, I focused on Chapter one “Eisenhower”, I’m glad I picked this one because it really set the relationship up of Cuba and the U.S when Castro came in power. I did not know before that U.S was actually in favour of Batista being in power because he was a “faithful ally” and was safeguarding U.S interests. They would have wanted to support him had he not have been so unpopular to the public. Castro was the complete opposite he wanted to protect the Cuban autonomy from U.S influence. The U.S saw him as a dangerous radical and it is clear why he was much more towards communism, and his socialist ways weren’t something they liked. This chapter talked a lot about Castro’s visit to the U.S and how they public actually really liked him and his effort to speak in english was found endearing. Yet, Eisenhower refused to meet with him and went golfing instead. The other U.S officials seemed to find his ideals charming and yet they were contradicting themselves later by calling him immature, they seemed wary of him it seems, and couldn’t completely trust him. Though both the countries wanted cordial relationship, I felt like Castro spoke his mind and even blasted U.S for its support for Batista in his public speech. It seems that right of the bat they were off to a bumpy start. I can totally understand where Castro is coming from on not wanting to ask for financial aid and just reducing U.S influence because right after the Spanish influence ended U.S has been making the decisions and effecting Cuba, socially, economically and culturally. Castro certainly sent the message to them, by not meeting with the U.S ambassador who at one point was seen as more important as the Cuban president in Cuba. Relations between them just got worse and it seemed because Castro did not want to compromise anymore and U.S did not like this big change in Cuba and wanted things to remain in all ways for their benefit. Castro had the courage to admit that the relationship between the two countries could have been a bit better if he had changed his behaviour a bit, U.S just wanted Castro out.
After reading about John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro, I have gained valuable insight into the inner workings of the varying levels of communications that went between both parties. Kornbluh and LeoGrande have depicted an interesting picture whereby Kennedy, while always toting his gun-slinging attitude towards Cuba in public, often used many measures to ensure that there was dialogue between him and Castro. Reading through the chapter, I notice that Kennedy was always interested in having some form of communication available with Castro, regardless of what the geopolitical situation was. Castro always maintains the stance that he wants Cuba to be recognized as equals rather than a pawn that either the Americans or the Soviets could exploit. After the debacle of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, this was a very necessary measure to take in order to return the Cuban exile hostages that were captured during the botched plot against Castro’s Cuba. James Donovan was the key person from Kennedy’s administration used as the one to create and maintain dialogue with Castro. He successfully managed to rescue most of the captured invaders of the Bay of Pigs. I also find very interesting was the use of ABC reporter Lisa Howard to gain information about Castro and to further maintain dialogue between America and Cuba.
Sweig offers a very condense and summarized version of the events that took place around this time, in contrast to Kornbluh and LeoGrande. However she does touch on how this entire period affected the Cuban population. It was seen that during the time of the Revolution, that the life of the average Cuban markedly improved compared to during the Batista regime.
This week I read Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s chapter on Nixon and Ford: Kissenger’s Caribbean Détente. It was interesting to learn about the political layers underlying US-Cuba diplomacy. The secret messages sent to Castro by Kissenger had instigated a process of reconciliation. The ways in which strategic moves in the direction of normalization were pretty fascinating; ideas like trading a game of baseball for the release of three US citizens that were imprisoned in Cuban jails for counterrevolutionary activities were discussed. Although the idea had actually been rejected, Castro did express a willingness to mend relations in different ways via negotiation. Yet, despite the willingness to normalize relations, it was so easily undermined by the power of politics in the international arena. Nixon’s tough stance towards Cuba had been advised by the CIA director as a way to maintain a little bit of internal difficulty within the Soviet Union, when it was costing the country up to $1 million a day to fund Cuba. Furthermore, the differing support for the internal affairs differed between Cuba and the US within Angola and Puerto Rico—which had essentially exacerbated the political tension. In spite of the efforts made, it was so easily undermined because of the international political climate.
For the week 8 readings, I decided to read Chapter 3: Johnson. I figured LBJ might be left out of this discussion because he is somewhat of a lesser known president, probably due to his predecessor’s assassination, and his successor’s scandals. I was hoping to read about how LBJ would make a classic American stand against Communism, after all the Vietnam War was raging on and they had to do everything to contain the commies. But I was left disappointed, learning that LBJ had really just confirmed his presidency as low-key. Now, low-key does not mean ineffective, just not as interesting as some other president’s actions. For most of the chapter, it seemed like a majority of the US/Cuba talks and deals were made at a distance from LBJ, and sometimes it appeared to be deliberate and other times it sounded like they just didn’t make it all the way to the top – like a bad game of Telephone. In addition to this bureaucratic web of messengers, LBJ himself distanced the issue a number of times, even saying literally that it was going to be put on the shelf for a while. In fairness, the President was dealing with a lot more important issues back home: civil rights, voting rights for blacks, healthcare reform and most importantly the Vietnam war.
My question for this chapter would be, did LBJ have a motive behind distancing the Cuban discussion? Or was it just simply that he had more important things to worry about, and Cuba was not one of them?
‘Back Channel to Cuba’ narrates the intricate records of negotiations between Cuba and the United States. On its pages, I find interesting how the talks between the two nations have evolved through the decades and how some initiatives of rapprochement worked while others did not. I chose the Kennedy chapter because both leaders accepted that the normalization of relations was a beneficial and a strategic move for both nations.
Even though, in the beginning, Kennedy followed Eisenhower’s condemnation of Cuba for being communist, he came to the conclusion that it could be possible to live in the west hemisphere with different government systems. The ironic part is that all the diplomatic conversations and secret meetings seem to me like a childish tug of war contest, in which the USA looks like a stubborn kid that does not want to let go an inch because of losing its superior image and control over foreign affairs. It has to be the United Statesian way otherwise no agreement can follow through. Not even the help of a well-intentioned Lisa Howard could speed the process of bringing both nations closer. In the end, Kennedy dies, Lisa commits suicide, and Castro gets no deal. I guess the CIA officers might have lit the Cuban cigars to celebrate their efforts on keeping the US hegemony in the region.
From the reading, Back Channel to Cuba, I decided to look at Chapter 3 Johnson: Castro Reaches Out. What I found most interesting is the level of secrecy of communication between America and Cuba, the lack of communication reaching Johnson or when it did how sometimes it was pushed back to focus on other things (such as Vietnam) and how various tactics were used such as black channel communication. Both Che and Castro wanted “peaceful coexistence” and “normalising” of Cuban-US relations, with Che in an interview with Lisa Howard wanting America to simply do “nothing for or against us. Just leave us alone.” But Johnson was unwilling to see Howard with information from Castro who believed that communication was key to avoiding further problematic issues, as he said he was willing to meet the US negotiators any place to discuss improving relations, “even the moon.” Castro continued to escalate his efforts to reach out to the Johnson administration. It seems communication between the two were dealt with by outside people and various countries who played as intermediaries between Washington and Havana. For example using Howard to press the Johnson administration to communicate with Castro, the use of media as Castro used the NY Times to conduct an interview and using Che’s visit to the US to communicate, or how Castro used both the British (offered to be middlemen but US rejected) and Spanish to get into contact with Johnson. This decision by Castro to reach out seems to reflect a concern over the inherent danger of conflict with the United States. However, many dismissed Castro’s peace proposals. The relationship between the two were also suffering many conflicts, with the Cuban fisherman being held in a US naval base and dumped into a Florida jail, Castro’s threat to fire on U-2 reconnaissance planes conducting surveillance flights over the island & the Aranzazu Incident in which American mistook a Spanish boat to be Cuban which was a huge embarrassment and scandal. These events created huge mistrusts and fears of US intervention for Cuba.
I chose to read chapter one since I was interested to see how the relationship between Cuba and the U.S started out after the Cuban revolution.
Although it seems both countries were willing to talk about issues at the beginning of Castro’s tenure, the relationship rapidly fell apart.The U.S did not know what to think of Castro on his first visit and were highly cautious about having any optimistic views on Castro and his willingness to act upon American interests since he was deemed radical. It was interesting to see how much of an emphasis was placed on the communist threat in Latin America by the U.S on Castro, and how they warned him of the communists in Cuba. I liked how diplomatic the whole situation seemed at the start, as if both sides were swallowing their pride to try and see if a more equal relationship could be achieved, and how quickly this deteriorated. Ultimately the Cuban revolution was determined to end the US dominance over Cuba and so there was a conflict of interest that I think could not be overcome in their talks.
Reading Chapter 4 of “Back Channel to Cuba” was intriguing and suspenseful. It was fascinating to see how Cuba and the US communicated in secret, through intermediaries and coded language. However, it was also frustrating to follow the attempt at negotiating normalization between the two countries and ultimately gain little outcome. The chapter seems to bring a few major obstacles which slowed this process of negotiation. Because Cuba supported the Independence of Puerto Rico and Angola, the US saw this as an “unfriendly” gesture, creating US insecurities. Cuba, on the other end saw these issues as separate, and should not be included in conditions for normalization. The on-going back and forth between the two countries seems to be characterized by Cuba being reluctant to lose prestige in negotiations, as the US proposed terms which Cuba would never consider (such as restraint in promoting Puerto Rican independence). Reading this chapter I felt a sense of fear and hesitation from both sides, as Cuba awaited communication from the US and withheld (perhaps unintentionally) its responses which kept the US guessing Cuba’s position. It seems that even though there was so much communication between Cuba and the US, and there were major issues to be discussed, it doesn’t seem like much was really put into action.
Learning that Castro saw the Kennedy assassination with concern was refreshing, since after all, Kennedy was the one who authorized an invasion of Cuba, right?
Succeeding Kennedy was Johnson, but I never learned much about Johnson in high school other than the fact that his presidency mostly revolved around the Vietnam War, so I decided to read more about what his administration did with Communist Cuba. I expected at the end of the chapter there would be some breakthrough between the two countries’ relationship, but it seemed that Johnson only contributed further to “back channel” communication. In fact, I was somewhat surprised it was Castro who was often willing to initiate the dialogue with the Americans (though getting it across proved to be another challenge).
Like Monica, I found it interesting that Cuba-US relations at the time operated on such a secretive level, relying on reporters and various other third-party intermediaries to communicate with one another. It turned out both countries played this constant back-and-forth game of diplomacy, in which Cuba would make some sort of small concession, and the US would return that favour in the form of some other small concession.
It seems that during his Johnson’s presidency, Cuba wasn’t all that important to the US. Even though it was a communist nation in their backyard, Cuba was a contained military threat now that the U2 flights were safe and the missile crisis was over. What was uncontained was the Vietnam War, and we all know how that went for the Americans under Johnson. In the end, in 1968, what to do with Cuba was essentially handed off to Nixon’s administration…
This week I read chapter 3, “Johnson,” in Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s book. While reading this chapter, several things struck me, including the sources themselves. I really enjoyed reading a narrative that used declassified secret government documents as sources. For me, reading documents that were once classified provided a really unique perspective on US/Cuban relations. They revealed the nuances of the situation not known to the public at the time, giving an extremely turbulent and unstable picture of the period. This was far different from the one-sided official hard line policy publicly presented by the American government. These sources were really useful in delving into the thought processes of the leaders, especially regarding pivotal decisions such as the debate on whether the US should attempt to provoke a coup, or attempt accommodation. For me this really illustrated that there was no clear or easy outcome to this situation. In retrospect, it is easy to make assumptions about the inevitability of events, but I found these documents to be helpful in challenging this idea.
Another aspect of the chapter that I found interesting the high level of secrecy as a refection of the American public opinion at the time. For a chapter entitled “Johnson,” I found that Johnson himself was mentioned very little, with individuals such as Lisa Howard and Adlai Stevenson playing more central roles. I think that the overall concealment of any attempts to communicate with Cuba shows how leaders are often restricted by their obligation to maintain a good public image. After the assassination of Kennedy and rumours of Cuban involvement, Johnson was forced to take a tough approach to Cuban relations in order to keep in the public favour. This severely limited his ability to take an active role in the necessary discussion of improving US/Cuban relations, further complicating an already delicate situation.
This week’s reading is really interesting. I felt really relaxed and comfortable when I read those materials. I want to discuss the chapter “Eisenhower” in Kornbluh and Leogrande. Here are things that interested me in the beginning of the book.
1. This book reminds me of the idea of micro-history that professor talked in the discussion. I found this book is also a kind of micro-history book. The book comprises untold stories which are full of details. Therefore, changing reading readers mind about this period of history. The author reappeared relationship between Cuba and US in a way of negotiation that the bilateral efforts at dialogue, rapprochement, and reconciliation.
2. I really like authors’ writing style. I guess that the reason why I thought it was so relaxed to read this book. By inserting dialogues, it is seems the author was recreating that realistic settings at that time. This approaching of writing closed the distance between readers and the book. And for readers, like me, this way of reading is also joyful.
3. Before, I always thought revolution was the best way to achieve goals because of its direct and effective. However, after reading these chapters. I started to think that negotiation, as a peace and mild method, is also an alternative choice in certain situations. In chapter1, the author mentions that, due to economic ties between Cuba and US, they all tried to find a soft way to ease their tensions. In the beginning, both of these countries expressed disagree and distrust with each other. As author mentioned, on the US side, positions often reflected arrogance. On the Cuban side, positions often reflected a stubborn pride. Both of these have their own belief and show distrust with each other. However, 1959 Castro visit US became a turning point which emerged an possible possibility for them to change. In the following chapters, I will keep focus on how US and Cuba’s attitudes towards each other changed in the following years.
Like others who read chapter 3 on Johnson, I was looking forward to know more about the president who, it seems, high school history textbooks all around deemed irrelevant, or only interested in the Vietnam War. After reading the chapter, his position remains the same to me. Not only does he seem more interested in other topics such as an election year, but also he simply is not available for readers to really grasp what he thought about the conflict with Cuba; in a way, he remains as unavailable as he was at the time to read Castro’s messages and follow up Kennedy’s strategic conversations in search of conciliation with the island. What the chapter does give is a very rare instance of Fidel’s introspection on his position as leader of the Revolution, shaken by the notion that the world signals him as the killer of a young leader who might have solved the problems between US and Cuba. This line of his called my attention the most: “There was the passion and extremism that characterizes the initial phase of any revolution on our part.”
By following up the amazing and interesting days of Lisa Howard, we get to learn about a Castro who is still very much a defiant and pungent leader, trying to put the US against the wall by way of extreme measures every time he could (like when he cut the water supply to the Guantánamo Base), but also, he is listening now. More than anyone, he seems to pay attention to his foreign detractors, because as much as he would like to have the power on his own, he also understands that he is dependent of bigger powers, and if it won’t be the USSR, the door for the US should still be open, to some degree. He even tries to negotiate cutting any support to revolutionaries in Latin America in exchange of healing the relationship with the United States, a move that looking in retrospect, asks the question of how important were these revolutions for Castro in actuality? how committed was him to them? After all, it is in that same train of thought that he sent his close ally, Guevara, to fight and finally die in one of these revolutions…
The classified documents and citation from different memoirs written by the people involved in this chapter of history gives it apart from a broader view of the subject, larger than what anyone could have had at that time, a sense that the expiry date for it has come and gone. Even if the embargo is just being lifted and the conflicts are starting to fade away (in the surface), for some of the key players these notes and memos and intricate diplomatic arrangements for ONE meeting, are simply not necessary to hold in secrecy anymore.
Whenever I have thought about Cuban-US relations in the Castro era, I have held a general assumption that the negative relationship that has now existed for so many decades was an inevitable result of two ideologically opposed nations being in such close proximity to one another. I therefore chose to read the opening chapter on Eisenhower’s presidency to illuminate whether this was the case from the beginning. It was both illuminating and hugely frustrating to learn that it was not.
There were many in the US government who accepted that Castro was there to stay and so realised that the best way to protect US interests was to work for good relations and try to exert a moderating influence over the new revolutionary regime. I see this as a very rational and pragmatic viewpoint which, had it been adopted, may have saved the US half a century of a problematic Cuba in its backyard and spared Cuba the pain of the economic blockade. Interestingly the people who held this position were those who had more first-hand knowledge of the realities on the ground, with the Ambassador Bonsul having worked in other post-revolution South American countries and the CIA having followed events in Cuba closely for a long time. Ike’s administration seemed to have been stuck in an outdated mindset, not accepting the reality that the US-Cuban relationship was going to have to change, the Cuban people had been awoken and the US could no longer treat Cuba like a vassal where they could just replace leaders with ease. The informal visit of Castro to Cuba was a huge missed opportunity by the United States to take the first step towards positive relations, an opportunity they were lucky to have considering the support they had given to the brutal Batista regime (something that seemed completely lost on Eisenhower’s dealings with the new government).
I really enjoyed reading “Nixon and Ford: Kissinger’s Caribbean Détente” from the Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s book, Back Channel to Cuba. The authors provide very detailed information, which I wonder how they obtained so much of this kind of information.
The story begins from Nixon who very much disliked Castro and Kissinger who tried to initiate the communication with Cuba. So, Kissinger secretly opened the conversation with Cuba through his agents, and Castro suggested a desire for détente. However, Nixon refused to change Cuban policy as he was afraid of the effects of détente which might spread out over Latin America and encourage Communists, such as Allende. In spite of Nixon’s hesitance to change policy, negotiation about hijacking accord with Cuba gradually opened up the conversation for détente, and domestic and international pressure for Cuban policy change got stronger. Then, Ford came in after Nixon’s resign, and Kissinger suggested him to move on with Cuban détente. Ford gave it a go, so Eagleburger (U.S. agent) and Garcia (Cuban agent) started talking over phone with coded language and also in person. The first diplomat meeting was held at the Pierre Hotel in NY in July 1975, but didn’t go very well. After that, the conversation got stagnated, and the two obstacles: Puerto Rico and Angola’s matters finally made it impossible to negotiate the détente.
Throughout reading the chapter, I was very surprised by Kissinger’s furtiveness and realistic attitude. It seems like Kissinger never cared about ideology seriously but really cared about his status. Also, Cuba’s poker-game like reaction toward the U.S. effort for détente is specifically interesting to me as historically Japan (my country) has this kind of relationship with U.S. but in a very different way. It would be interesting to hear more from Cuban side as this chapter mainly tells from U.S. perspective. Overall, this chapter is very well written and really interesting.
While I read the chapter that focuses on relations between the US and Cuba during the presidency of George W. Bush, in this blog post I would like to focus instead on former president Jimmy Carter and his visit to Cuba in 2002. I thought several details of the description were particularly interesting. One noteworthy example is the way the two leaders are named by the historians. Fidel Castro is referred to as both Fidel and as Castro, whereas Jimmy Carter is referred to by his last name only. I wonder what this signifies in terms of leadership and respect. On the one hand, Castro enjoys a very different reputation both internationally and within Cuba, where the population cries ?Fidel, Fidel, Fidel!? during rallies. Thus using Fidel may signify the more personal political image that has been cultivated of the Cuban leader. On the other hand, I was absurdly reminded of several articles discussing how members of various political parties in Canada always spoke of ?Justin? as opposed to of ?Trudeau,? in an effort to make him seem unprofessional leading up to the recent elections. I definitely see that it is a different case here. In 2002 Fidel Castro had been the president of Cuba for over 25 years. Nonetheless, politicians and other historical figures are rarely referred to by their first names. Another fact I thought was really fascinating about the visit was the dynamic between personal and political relations. Carter and Castro seemed so friendly on a personal level despite not making much progress on a political level. Castro is described as being very accommodating and Carter as very respectful. Yet Castro did not budge on any actual policies and Carter, as former president, did not have the mandate to make any decisions on behalf of the US. Finally, it was interesting to note that baseball continued to be an important part of Cuba, both culturally and politically, into the 21st century. In conclusion I think it is safe to say that much of this visit, as demonstrated by the baseball game, was more symbolic than anything else. Nonetheless it seems like it was more productive than anything the Bush administration managed to achieve with regard to Cuba at this time.
For week 10 I chose to read about the Clinton administration. Many things surprised me. Firstly, the fact that Clinton needed the electoral votes in Florida seems to have shaped so much of his political agenda with normalizing relations with Cuba. The loss of Cuban-American votes was obviously something he would not risk in going forward with fully improving relations. I am particularly amazed and surprised at the Elian incident, and its enormous political significance. The choice by the Clinton administration to return the boy to his father in Cuba not only led to huge riots and enraged the Cuban-American community. It also stopped Clinton’s considerations of lifting the travel ban and easing cooperation with Cuba, and one could certainly argue that it might have caused Al Gore to lose the presidential bid in 2000 due to the Florida votes. Undoubtedly, it seems like Clinton and his administration deeply cared for US-Cuban relations, but that they were too captured in the static realities of political predecessors, political capital and years of restrained diplomacy in order to achieve something substantial. This chapter is written in such an eloquent, detailed manner that the reader is inclined to believe at every turning point that some great change is going to come. It is fascinating to see the clandestine realities of diplomacy, people-to-people relations and the importance of face and personality in politics. I found it impressive how the Clinton administration and the many years of back and forth with Castro, together, were able to improve and negotiate on important issues such as migration, counterterrorism and cultural exchanges. This certainly led to the rebuilding of bridges and extremely tense relations, but unfortunately it was not enough to fully normalize relations. What is so interesting with this era is that there are many moments where you think a real breakthrough could have happened. Had I not known anything of US-Cuban relations after 1999 I probably would have had a much more optimistic outlook for the next couple of years, because it seems like the two nations are very close to a breakthrough. The Clinton years constructed an optimistic era nonetheless, independently of what was to happen later.
While Chapter 8 of Back Channel to Cuba, was called “George W. Bush: Turning Back the Clock”, it focused largely on former president Jimmy Carter’s trip to Cuba. Although this trip was during Bush’s time in office, I found it surprising that the authors chose to focus on Carter’s trip to the extent that they did. By the end of this chapter, it seems that Carter’s trip had essentially done nothing to move US-Cuban relations forward or backward, aside from being the first US president to make a peaceful visit since 1959. While that seemed to lighten the atmosphere surrounding political negotiations between Castro and Carter, it was explained that Carter had no actual political power that he could not submit to any of Castro’s proposals officially. This made me wonder why Carter had even gone to Cuba in the first place, and sparked the idea that this could have even aggravated Castro further. While I understand that the tension between the two countries is extreme, making it so anything can help, I find it mildly counterproductive to visit a country to negotiate and have political discussions, when a massive factor in the argument cannot do anything within his government. Another thing that I found interesting within this chapter as well as the last chapter I read was the topic of hijacking. I found it to be a common theme that I have noticed through reading this chapter as well as the chapter “Nixon and Ford”, placing emphasis on the hijackings in Cuba and the United States. While neither the US nor Cuba necessarily agreed with one another in the circumstances regarding this issue, it spurred many conversations and what seemed to be more effective communication between the two unfriendly powers. Throughout the story of US-Cuban relations, it is clear that both sides constantly searched for a sign of respect or a reason to believe that their opponent would make the first move. After reading this chapter and examining the extreme detail in which LeoGrande and Kornbluh discuss Bush and Carter’s relations with Castro and Cuba, I am even more convinced that the US-Cuban relationship faced a constant stalemate throughout their history.
Chapter 10 of Back Channel to Cuba focuses on Cuba and the US as the “closest of enemies” through their mutual concerns, shared culture, and common humanity and how this intensifies the relationship between the two nations but is also a continued incentive toward cooperation. The chapter tried to get at the root of the problematic relations (and the attempt to normalize them) and nicely tied together the opinions held by the US and Cuban administrations all the way from John Quincy Adams to Obama and Jose Marti to Raul Castro (and what the end of his presidency in 2018 would have in store for the relations).
I thought it was interesting that the authors looked at both the US and Cuba and their opinions toward the problems in relations, for example where the US saw Cuba moving away from its concession attempts by involving themselves with the USSR, the Cuban’s saw an opportunity to create a community of likeminded socialists and strengthen its economy. Furthermore, the fact that post-war relations are more intense seems absurd to me, especially considering that Cuba made the concession the US wanted with the end of the cold war, but the US keeps “moving the goal posts” in their promise of restoring relations with Cuba. Under the more recent US administrations changes in Cuba’s internal and political order have been called for which is ironic considering a statement by George W. Bush that “Cuba is a domestic issue for the US rather than a foreign policy issue”, this statement to some extent undermines Cuban sovereignty and emphasizes the issues between the two nations. The pressure to normalize relations between the US and Cuba is now also an international one with the US paying a growing diplomatic price in Latin America over its static relations with Cuba. The authors conclude the chapter with 10 lessons of 50 years of hindsight in Cuban-US relations. The chapter nicely outlined the problems in communication and timing as well as lack of understanding by the two governments toward each others bureaucracy and sovereignty as the problem between normalizing relations. The fact that the chapter looked back on the relations with 50 years of hindsight and the problems of each nation in reconciliation attempts, not just one, as well as predicting future problems with the end of the Castro administration with Raul’s end of presidency in 2018, as the Castro’s are to Washington what Nixon was to China. The picture in this chapter sums it up nicely, the normality of a handshake (between Raul and Obama at Mandela’s funeral in the wake of his legacy of reconciliation) has the potential to change the world.
For this week’s reading, I chose the chapter on George W. Bush’s relation with Cuba. From my previous reading of LeoGrande and Kornbluh regarding the Kennedy administration, I see many parallels between how both presidents dealt with Cuba. Mainly it was on their insistence that economic sanctions through a trade embargo and the development and funding of Cuban dissidents to overturn Fidel Castro’s government. However, were the two presidents contrasted were on their stance of dialogue with Cuba. While Kennedy sought to keep channels of communication open with Cuba through various diplomats, Bush decided that it was no longer necessary and more of a pointless exercise. Bush believed that Cuba was already politically very weakened and in a state akin to the own health of Castro. What was interesting was the recount of Jimmy Carter’s unofficial visit to Cuba. He was trying to mend the relations that the Bush administration had already begun to dismantle. Bush wanted to employ a policy in Cuba similar to those being used in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to facilitate a regime change to one that would to the US party line. A prominent example of this was with the migration issue of Cubans going to the US. Bush had effectively stalled the programs set in place by previous administrations in order to tackle the migration issue. By leaving potential migrants in Cuba, his government was hoping that resentment of Castro would eventually fester and lead to Castro being toppled. With this not being the case, Bush turned to using state funded donations during natural disasters as a way to enforce the strict economic sanctions the US imposed on Cuba. Ironically enough, Castro turned down the desperately needed aid packages down in favor of not showing weakness. From what I have gathered in this chapter, Castro wanted to be acknowledged by Bush as an equal partner. Carter showed Castro a high level of respect on his trip, which Castro seemed to appreciate greatly. However Bush did not want to waste resources on communication, as he believed that the end was near for Castro.
This week I focused on Chapter 8: George W. Bush: Turning Back the Clock. What I found particularly interesting was the sort of ‘psychological war’ prompted by the continual animosity between the two countries. Despite the attempts on both sides towards reconciliation (Carter’s meetings with Castro, and later Castro through humanitarian relief), the lingering bitterness resulted in predictable patterns of rejection. Cuba’s desire to be treated with mutual respect and reciprocity was constantly being undermined by a Western imperialist outlook.
After 9/11, Bush’s famous declaration, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”, epitomized the doctrine of pre-emptive war on Iraq which inevitably had its resonances within its relations with Cuba, as well. The Bush administration took an unwavering stance on non-democratic regimes and was unwilling to tolerate and be open to other forms of authority. The strategy for the invasion of Iraq had strong parallels with Cuba—the US was funding Cuban human rights activists, independent journalists, and other counterrevolutionaries. Even during US-Cuban cooperation of hi-jackers, Washington refused to further negotiate migration with Cuba because it would not address issues on it’s own agenda. Most importantly, James Cason (US foreign service officer) tried to provoke the Cuban regime to oust him from the country to give Washington a reason to retaliate. The endless ways the US tried to undermine Castro led to bold, back and forth responses: billboards with photographs of US soldiers abusing Abu Ghraib prisoners to screen displays of excerpts from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Martin Luther King to annoy Castro. Finally, the retaliatory responses escalated to a breaking point where they would only interact if they had to. Later on, when Cuba was struck with a series of hurricanes, other than being able to purchase food, it declined US assistance due to the years of distrust.
With all that said, this chapter offers an interesting glimpse into Bush’s political doctrine during his time in office and its reverberations around the world. The dialogue between US and Cuba epitomized intolerance and prejudice at such a stark point in 21st century history, after 9/11. At this point, the political deadlock between the US and Cuba revealed the decline of relations during this timeframe—as Cuba declined US aid after a succession of hurricanes hit the island that contrasted with its response immediately after 9/11 (Cuba had tried to demonstrate Good faith by signing international protocols against terrorism and allowing the US to use Guantanamo as a detention centre).
In the chapter from Back Channel to Cuba, George W. Bush, the relationship between the United States and Cuba seem have been just as bad, if not worse than in 1959. The objective of “regime change” was extremely present throughout this time, but at the same time, Bush severed almost all relations with Cuba. It seems to me, that the authors definitely sided with Cuba in their depiction of events during Bush’s administration. The chapter highlights the ‘olive branches’ extended to the USA by Cuba, starting with their response to 9/11, which was somewhat unacknowledged by the States. I found Carter’s trip to Cuba truly to be the main focus of the chapter although it was supposed to be about George Bush. The trip had gone well and that did not benefit Bush because Carter’s travels alongside other American’s travels to Cuba had begun to “demystify” the horrendous nature of Castro’s government. The relations between the two nations seemed to have become less tense due to the hurricanes and stormed that caused so much damage to Cuba. At first, some laws were changed to make the purchasing of food from the USA possible. In 2008 however, Bush did not allow for the embargo to be lifted in order for Cuba to purchase construction material for extensive repairs caused by another storm. The summarizing statement of the relations between Cuba and the United States as left by Bush, can be seen in Raul Castro’s speech (2007) extending an olive branch to the NEXT president of the States…two years prior to the start of Obama’s presidency. This just shows how tense the situation was for a whole two years and all the work that Obama was handed!
I chose to read the Reagan and Bush Sr. chapter of Back Channel to Cuba. During the early 1980’s Mexico played a large role in reopening a dialogue between the US and Cuban governments. I didn’t know that Mexico was involved in reconciliation but it does make sense based on Mexico’s geographic proximity and economic ties to both countries. These factors made it in Mexico’s best interest for the US and Cuba to loosen tensions so they acted accordingly. The Mexican government attempted and failed to get Castro and Reagan in the same room at the North-South summit but succeeded in convincing Reagan to agree to a meeting of the two vice presidents. These negotiations were a step in the right direction but consisted mostly of both sides stating their views and grievances without listening what the other had to say, particularly on the US side. This theme continued when US ambassador Walters visited Cuba, after Mexico put diplomatic pressure on them, with a list of demands. A general trend in Cuban-American relations is that there is no desire to listen to the perspective of other because both sides are entrenched in their views. In the event of the Walters visit, Castro did offer compromise in the form of suspending aid to the rebels in Nicaragua and Salvador but Walters had no really intention of working out an agreement. For the Cuba government the American’s seemed unable or unwilling to listen to their moderate proposals while the US heard and saw any negotiation through their conviction of Castro’s communist dogmatism.
Chapter 8 of Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s Back Channel to Cuba provides us with an insight into the policies of George W. Bush towards Cuba. Bush was adamant that the only way for relations with Cuba to normalise was to replace the Cuban regime, and thus did not engage in any dialogues or negotiations with the Cubans other than what they were required to do. What is interesting is the excuses Washington were able to coin in order to justify their stance. The US refused to remove Cuba from the list of potential terrorist threats, despite their unwavering support for the US following the 9/11 disaster. It is also true that the evidence for Cuba’s inclusion on the list was minimal, or even non-existent. A number of political commentators and historians have suggested that terrorism is the fear of the 21st century in the same way that communism was the fear of the 20th century, and this could certainly be the case here. Throughout the 20th century relations between the US and other Latin American nations frequently turned frosty due to the supposed communist threat they posed; nations such as Guatemala in 1954 and Grenada in the 1980s, and obviously even Cuba itself throughout the latter half of the century. Perhaps then we can see a continuum. The fall of the USSR, and thus the decline of anti-communism, meant that the US needed a new justification for negative relations, and therefore altered the anti-communist rhetoric to feature counterterrorism.
This week I read about chapter 7, which was about Clinton’s presidency. Most of this chapter is concerned with the President’s relationship with the Cuban-American community in Florida. I know Florida is one of those swing districts (reminds me of Bush v. Gore), and Clinton recognized that he needed the Cuban community’s support, so it is no surprise his policies were mediated by that relationship. Once again, it was unsurprising to learn that while Clinton wanted to normalize relations with Cuba, the Republicans only made things worse than before.
I was surprised by the BTTR’s bold move to drop propaganda on Havana as well as Castro’s response to the intrusions. I don’t think anyone expected Castro to actually shoot down two of the Cessnas. I thought that after the hostile shootdown, the bridges between the two nations were burned once and for all and that there was no going back. But when I found out the Clinton administration was able to make some achievements in terms of remedying the hardships of the Cuban people, there must have been some optimism that the next President would be able to achieve even greater diplomatic improvements.
I chose to read Chapter 8 of Back Channel to Cuba, “George Bush: Turning Back the Clock”. I agree with Lindsay’s interest on the authors focusing on Jimmy Carter. But I think LeoGrande and Kornbluh highlighted former President’s Jimmy Carter trip to Cuba in such detail in order to demonstrate that support for Bush’s extremity towards Castro was not all encompassing. Rather, as Jimmy Carter proves a much more open opinion towards Cuba existed. Even though Jimmy Carter had no political power, he did have media influence, which I think could have worked to slightly normalize relations. This is evident in Carter’s acceptance of walking onto the baseball field with Castro minus their security personnel. Despite Carter’s failure to create policy changes, he did demonstrate to Cuba that not all of the U.S. was so opposed or afraid of Castro.
In terms of Bush I agree with Jimmy Carter’s comment that he was very counterproductive towards Cuba. Bush’s unwavering goal for a regime change in Cuba is seen through his travel bans, stalling of visa applications and complete lack of trust. Overall I think Bush reinforced the existing tensions between Cuba and the U.S. and made developing a productive relationship even more difficult.
I chose to read Chapter 8 this week (for various reasons…). I found it particularly interesting when there were times of danger or disaster, and how that somehow managed to spark some type of re-connection between the two states. However, it was often if not always short lived because both of them were too proud – neither of them was willing to step off their high horse.
Jimmy Carter’s visit really fascinated me. I feel like the visit actually proved a lot, but in the end it really did nothing because Carter was just a past president with no power, and both Castro and Bush rejected Carter’s proposals.
The US Interests Section is kind of an item of curiosity to me. Why is it even there? I understand that it (kind of?) was a channel of US-Cuban diplomacy but did it really even do it’s job? To me, it sounded like an almost covert (but not really) establishment to fuel “democracy promotion”, especially with the actions of Huddleston and Cason, and even Parmly. It became a propaganda war, and I can’t really imagine what the Cubans were thinking, seeing what the US would post up and what the Cuban government would counter with. Was it really aimed at the citizens, or just at the governments?
This chapter really highlighted what I want to call a series of “Pride Wars” between the US and Cuba. While there obviously is a lot more than just pride, I thought there was always that underlying tone of “if we accept, we’ll be seen as needy or helpless or weak”. Every time a chance came up, it was always “Pride or diplomacy?” To me it seems like pride.
After Reading Chapter Nine of “Back Channel to Cuba” the description of Cyber War really peaked my interest. As outlined by Kornbluh and LeoGrande, Cyber War refers to the USA?s attempts to implement advanced communication networks In Cuba in hopes to bring about regime change. As a Political Science Major, I?ve studied a lot about how communication networks and social media are increasingly becoming a fundamental ingredient in how groups organize to bring about political change. Perhaps the most well known example of this of the Arab Spring in which groups organized protests on social media. I found it interesting how the United States attempted to mirror this process by essentially setting up capabilities for social media networks, crossing their fingers, and hoping people would organize around democracy. While reading this it kind of reminded me how Batista was overthrown and how radio and improvements in communications technology was a major factor in bringing about that change. It seemed to me like the USA was hoping that social media and Internet would be the new ?radio? and would allow people to organize and overthrow Castro. In sum, the parallels between internet and radio in fostering communication networks that in turn bring about change was a major theme in the back of my head while reading this chapter.
What surprised me in Chapter 8 “George Bush: Turning Back the Clock” was how cooperative Cuba initially was with the U.S. After the 9/11 attack Cuba was one of the first to offer condolences and reach out to the U.S. Not only that but even after Castro grew worried Cuba could be a target of U.S unilateralism , they signed all twelve international protocols against terrorism, and even them use the naval base as a detention centre. Cuba thought of the American movement in Afghanistan excessive so after that tensions escalated and Bush’s behaviour did not help. U.S still considered Cuba as a potential terrorist threat. Yes, Bush appointed more Cuba Americans to senior positions in his presidency but after the 9/11 attacks he seemed to alienate them more, by Bush refusing to remove the embargo, enforced economic sanctions, and wanted to change the Cuban regime all together. Carters visit to Cuba seemed to have gone much better than I would have thought, though unfortunately he was not able to take any big decisions so not much changed. If Bush had not been so extreme and trying to dismiss the problem as Castro things could have been very different. Carter seemed to be willing to negotiate with Cuba, but Bush wanted everything to be perfect for the U.S, and did not care so much about others.
I chose to read Chapter 8 from Kornbluh and LeoGrande. This chapter demonstrated the relationship with Cuba under the influence and President Bush, yet had a focal on Jimmy Carter. The chapter starts by looking at the turmoil and uncertainty that the United States felt after 9/11 and the attitude that they established was either you are against us, or with us. The United States was very suspicious of other countries, and even though Cuba was not on good terms with the US, they reached out despite their rough history in support during their time of crisis. This could have been a moment that the US could realize that there isolation from Cuba is far outdated and an opportunity to reconcile with Cuba would be beneficial to both countries, but instead Bush remained skeptical. The rest of the chapter emphasis’s Jimmy Carter and his pursue to connect with Cuba in hopes of re-establishing a relationship and the barriers and obstacles that made recognizable the challenges in moving forward as a country in this pursuit.
It seems that President Bush was one of the biggest barriers in moving forward with Cuba, and played an active role in detouring American citizens from questioning the separation and wanting to open trade and travel between the two countries. I find this interesting because it would seem that both countries would ultimately benefit by amending, rather then continuing to remain separate. I think that fact that the US strongly wanted to have a large amount of power over Cuba if any sort of negotiation was to take place, disengaged Cuba in their willingness to take steps together towards a relationship.
The main issues seem to remain between leaders, an instance that really stuck out to me was the 2008 hurricanes that hit, and Cuba rejected aid, and the US rejected Cuba’s request for the embargo to be lifted for 6 months in order to help restore the Countries housing and damages from the storm. It seems in instances such as these that the leaders of both countries are too caught up in the histories before, instead of what the Countries and their people need at the time. It is evident that both countries have the ability to accept and give aid, yet it was decided against in order for each to feel like they “haven’t given in,” this was chosen instead of allowing safety and comfort for the people who suffered after the storm.
I think this chapter pointed out some critical points in the more recent Cuba and United States relationships, particularly in regard to both leaders grasps on the country and inability to let go of the past, even in times of need.
For this week, I decided to read Chapter 9, Obama: A New Beginning?, What really stuck out to me reading this chapter (and the whole book really) was the back and forth in regards to remedying relations with Cuba. It seems to be a pattern that when forward steps are taken, the next president would impose harsh/strict policies that would anger the Cuban government and thus take a steps back. This point is one of the reasons why I chose to focus on this chapter, in light of Obama’s recent changes in regulations and policies concerning Cuba, I wanted to see if he always held this stance and other background information that led to his present day decisions.
What really stood out to me and I found interesting in this chapter was the fact that while Obama stated that he wanted to negotiate relations with Cuba, at the same time, the US was still heavily funding programs that sought to facilitate a regime change in Cuba that was more towards one that is democratic. In the Cuban government’s perspective it was not hard to be distrustful of the US considering other actions of “bad faith” from the past. The words of the US government did not reflect those of its actions and this is reflective in the growing of programs such as the “democracy growing” ones that were used in the “Cyber War” against Cuba. One constant point that Raul Castro wanted when negotiating relations with the US was to be treated as equals, but the underlying rhetoric from the US was still one that regarded Cuba as an inferior state that needed to change it’s political system into one that is more reflective and similar to that the of the United States.
The Chapters “George W. Bush” and “Obama” in LeoGrande and Kornbluh’s Back Channel to Cuba were really interesting as the story concerns very recent politics which I have heard about in my everyday life. Chapter eight “George W. Bush” describes how Bush administration went hard on Cuba, such as claiming Cuba as a pro-terrorism country and tightening U.S.-Cuba travel ban. Jimmy Carter tripped to Cuba to help normalizing the relationship which Bush really worsened, Carter’s attempt failed. The imperialistic idea that “rather than engage the Cuban government, Bush aimed to replace it” (355) made me think about other Latin American countries whose governments U.S. also tries hard to replace in history, such as Chile and many other. I personally very much dislike Bush as his idea seems to be old fashioned and irrational.
The chapter “Obama” was more pleasant to read as Obama made some positive and rational changes to U.S.-Cuba politics. The case of Alan Gross is particularly interesting as he remains main figure in the political discourse between U.S and Cuba during the re-opening phase. Also, the U.S.’s decision to be partnering with Spain and the influence of the Church in the negotiation are thought-provoking that there is still colonial power of Spain, which however could be used in a positive way. The story of Jimmy Carter’s re-visiting to Cuba is quite impressive as he is still active and tries to contribute to normalizing the relationship, and I have started liking Carter for my first time after reading this chapter. It is also interesting that Fidel says that “he needed a two-term U.S. president to normalize relations with Cuba because no first-term president would have the political courage to do it” (397). I think Fidel is right that Obama could move forward on this issue largely because he had already secured his second term presidency as U.S. politics tend to be hugely affected by election campaigns. Obama’s stable position made it possible to continue the negotiation with Cuba and finally succeeded to reach the point where no former ten presidents had achieved which the next chapter covers. This chapter really made me want to read the next chapter which I’m sure I’ll do soon.
For this week’s reading I decided to read chapter 9 on “Obama- A New Beginning?” In this chapter what interested me the most was the relation between Obama’s democratic government and Castro’s through solving issues that has stemmed from the last 50 years. This shows that even though the Obama administration is in control now, previous presidents like Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had always tried to use other strategies such as media and Internet as a tool to gain political influence in Cuba. In particular through the case of ‘cyber war’ and the arrest of Alan Gross, this further showed how tense the relations between the two countries were with the hopes of improving the relations. With the US government providing more tools and access to the Internet and the cyberspace (wanting a regime change in Cuba), this further showed the fear for the Cuban government in maintaining control. After reading the chapter, I was really interested in Gross’s case and further researched what has happened to him after various occasions of the US (including Bill Richardson flying to Havana to negotiate terms) trying to release him from the Cuban authorities. It seemed to me that the cyber war has further created a stalemate situation in restoring the two countries relations, as there are still many issues such as the embargo on Cuba, political prisoners and other economic issues still really unchanged. However, referring the Gross’s case, a positive sign shown between Obama’s government and Castro’s was the prisoner swap at the end of 2014. Gross in exchange for members of the Cuban Five was the deal to finally bring Gross back to the US. This to me shows that even though progress is slow from the two governments, the issue of Gross marks a meaningful advancement towards both countries.
This week, I chose to focus on chapter 10: Intimate Adversaries, Possible Friends. I really liked reading this chapter because I felt that it was very current and it was interesting to follow the history of US-Cuban relations and see it brought so tactfully into the present. I found this chapter to be an important reminder that history does not exist in isolation and can have a profound influence on present issues and concerns. We can see this even two years ago when Raúl Castro and Obama met at the memorial for Nelson Mandela. Although the two shared a public exchange – a huge step considering the secretive past between the nations, neither side acknowledged the meeting as an invitation to pursue improved relations. This reluctance can be seen as a trend in previous chapters with past leaders on both sides attempting to save face on the delicate issue.
As a conclusion to the book, I found it useful that Kornbluh and LeoGrande ended with some insight on why US-Cuban relations have not yet improved. After 50 years of conflict, one might assume that some progress has been made, however, this chapter shows conflicts of interest between the two countries still remaining today. The authors draw several lessons from the past, connecting issues that arose over multiple presidencies, in order to inform the future of diplomatic relations between the two countries. These lessons include everything from the importance of considering domestic politics to a word of caution concerning an incremental approach to normalization. By making these connections, they drew the history into the present and the future, making a strong case for the currency of the past and providing an insightful conclusion to the book.
I chose to read the final chapter of Kornbuh and leoGrande’s book in order to find out what their hopes were for the future and if the edition of the book we were reading dealt with the very recent changes in the relationship between the United States and Cuba. The authors focused on the different approaches each president they discussed in the chapters had regarding Cuba, and reminded the reader that while at times communications between Cuban and American bureaucrats was possible, there were still some specific impediments (coming from both sides) that sort of explain why, after fifty years, an arrangement was never achieved. The authors summarized these points into ten lessons both the politicians involved in the conflict and the general audience could learn and understand, a sort of historical summary on what has been the political relationship of the countries.
What is most interesting to me is to see how some of the lessons the authors found after revising the history could have been taken in consideration when Obama announced the changes on Cuban policy. The approach of Obama and Castro at the Nelson Mandela memorial signified a change of pace for both countries, and it symbolized the changes within both of those governments. Is you think about once, the other Castro was always so adamant or how former US presidents didn’t show enough interest in changing the relationship with the island, the reopening of the embassies and possible official visits between presidents are outstanding announcement that end an era of hostilities in the forefront. What I don?t agree with the authors is how they think that after Castro leaves his position in 2018, whoever comes next won?t be able to retain that apparent closeness with the States happening now. Maybe the authors think of that because they do not discuss the last events, but in any case, I believe that for better or worse, the United States will push for an inclusive agenda ever more so than ever. The end of the Castro era is something long waited by US politicians, commerce experts, people living in the US with relatives in Cuba, among others, so it?s clearly going to create an even bigger opening. Even if the next person in charge is under Castro’s command or follows up the idealism of the last fifty years, the shift on the relationship with the US seems a strong indicative of where the island?s population (including the people in charge) see themselves in the next ten, twenty years. Though for Fidel, that might be a stretch, and for the first time since 1959 Cuba will transition into something new, without him.
I was really glad that we continued with the book by Kornbluh and Leogrande this week since I found it so interesting when we read it two weeks ago. Since I read a chapter about a Democrat last week, John F. Kennedy, I decided to read about a Republican this week. George W. Bush (the younger) just also happens to be my least favourite president, so I was worried about what this chapter might have revealed about him. Not only did this chapter validate my feelings about President Bush but it almost exceeded my expectations! Especially in comparison with the Kennedy chapter it almost seems that Bush has taken relations in the complete opposite direction, without too much thought on the matter. While Kennedy, nearing the end of his presidency, began to discuss a peaceful coexistance with Cuba that allowed them to even retain the U.S.S.R. as trading partners as long as they promised to cease intervention in other Latin American revolutions and uprisings. Bush on the other hand completely halted the normalization of relations by acknowledging that the United States could never have relations with a non-democratic state. Leogrande and Kornbluh note that one reason for this aggressive anti-Cuban stance could have been to garner support of him among conservative Cuban exiles who were a growing minority in the electoral district of Florida. This struck me because it shows that Bush would have had motive not to normalize relations and therefore another American president wastes a golden opportunity for positive change in international relations. Towards the end of the chapter Kornbluh and Leogrande mention a meeting where Carter and his Latin American advisor, Jennifer McCoy, met with President Bush after their return from meeting with Fidel in Cuba. The authors describe that Carter and his aid were “surprised that Bush seemed so uninformed about Cuba”(p 355). To me this seems to make sense considering the Bush administration was notorious for either creating rumours or processing false information about Cuba. This just goes to show that the American presidents clearly aren’t that concerned about the Cuban people if eleven of them have failed to bring about a normalization of relations, despite the fact that they believe so greatly in human rights or the betterment of the poor in other countries. The United States reaches out a hand to almost every other country in this world that requires financial or medical help but simply cannot stoop to pick up Cuba because they have a different political ideology.
For this week, I decided to read Obama: A new beginning. The relationship with Obama started off well as the Cuban American National Foundation warmly received him in Miami. With this being said, conditions for a rapprochement between Cuba and the United States appeared more promising than at any time in a half-century. For example, Obama fulfilled his pledge to lift travel and remittance restrictions on Cuban Americans, provide improved television, radio, telephone, and Internet access & Cuban scholars granted visas, and cultural exchanges flourished once again. It seemed both were interested in engaging in communication and cooperation, as Cuba was willing to open a dialogue on all issues, including human rights, political prisoners, and political freedoms. However, Obama didn’t move as fast as expected or as promised. Cuba could not gain attention as many other international issues were at the forefront of America’s mind. What the US wanted most of Cuba with they didn’t see happen was reciprocal recognition by the Cuban Government for the US to continue to engage in this dialogue and take further steps. It was interesting to read how the US used ‘cyber war’ by undermining the Cuban regime, as the effort were believed to promote people to challenge & destabilise the government, this emphases Cuban government insistence on control. Alan Gross is also another important factor to consider when thinking about the fragile relationship. The US were unwilling to make any commitment unless this issue was dealt with as it signalled disinterest in making a better relationship. Even Carter tried to get involved to sort this issue. I looked up Gross to see if he was still imprisoned or had been realised, and saw in 2014 there had been an exchange of prisoners which suggests an improvement in relations. The main issues were the constant agreements and steps forward but then steps were also made backwards constantly. The US were always making offers but never anything solid, which never really gave Cuba much hope. We also see numerous things which had been present throughout their relationship (from reading previous chapters), from the influence of other nations as Spain played a middle man position – with Spain’s encouragement Cuba agreed to release prisoners to using people as communication back and forth.
I was not surprised, but nevertheless disappointed, to have it confirmed for me that electoral politics played an important role in George W. Bush’s policy towards Cuba. Bush was trying to appeal to a growing conservative minority of Cuban exiles in Florida with his strong anti-Castro position. This of course was not unique to Bush (I expect electoral issues were important for all of the Presidents), with Clinton’s policy being shaped by wanting to appeal to the more pro-Cuban faction in Florida. Nevertheless in Bush’s case it seems yet another great opportunity was missed to find compromise and improve relations with Cuba because of politics and a wish to appear Hawkish. The chapter talks about how Cuba made efforts to extend an olive branch after the events of 9/11, from expressing their grief and solidarity initially to supporting international condemnations of terrorism. While I believe this empathy to be genuine, I also wonder if the Cuban government were growing increasingly worried about the potential for a more concerted effort by Bush’s administration to bring about regime change in Cuba. With the successful regime changes brought about by US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bush’s hawkish foreign policy and his negative position on Cuba must have been threatening to Castro. So perhaps Cuba was making efforts at appeasement, to portray themselves less as an enemy of the United States. Bush’s position on Cuba has much continuity with the Republican presidents that have preceded him, with the belief that Cuba is so close that it is actually more a domestic issue than a foreign policy one, and as such he has little respect for Cuban sovereignty. This mindset is hundreds of years old but still seems to carry sway in the Republican party. I hope that the improvements currently being made in relations aren’t scuppered by the next Republican president, but I am not confident.
As a socialist country, Cuba’s foreign policies are fairly unique when compared with most other countries. However, at the same time, Sweig’s book illustrates how Cuba and the US both pursued interventionist policies in order to promote their ideologies. It is no surprise that their bilateral relations have been strained.
I read chapter 9: Obama A New Beginning? by Kornbluh and Leogrande. I chose this chapter because I find the contemporary relations to be very interesting and obviously pertinent to our world today. As with many other people, I am very glad to see some rapprochement between the two rivals. This provides and opportunity to open the island for trade and cooperation. Ultimately, this will help the lives of everyday Cubans. However, what I found most interesting about this chapter, was the continued criticism and moral superiority expressed by the US. The Obama administration seemed to be trying to paint Cuba in a negative light by continuing to bring up its political prisoners and human rights abuses. Meanwhile, Guantanamo bay is on the island, and the US is often at fault for supporting and promoting these political dissidents. When the US allowed Cuba’s entry to the Organization of American States (OAS), it claimed it as an incredibly permissive gesture. However, Cuba had very little interest in the OAS, and this was perhaps even more belittlement of the island country.
I found it to be fairly ridiculous that a country, which financed an invasion, attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro, and has led an embargo since 1960 would claim the moral high ground. However, with the renewing of bilateral diplomatic relations, there is a reasonable hope that discussion will be conducted on even footing and mutual respect. I believe that in order to really achieve normalization of relations, this mutual respect must be attained. If this is accomplished, there is certainly strong hope for the bilateral relations of these two countries.
I am glad that I caught up on this reading for week 8. I have found LeoGrande and Kornbluh?s book to be an incredibly interesting and detailed look into Cuban-American relations. Had I been able to read it the week it was assigned, I am sure I would have been even more blown away in my medicated post-surgery state! On a more serious note, before coming into this course, I had a relative interest in Cuba, but it had been more of a general knowledge about its history. The detail provided in this book helps shed light on how complicated these negotiations had been. Meanwhile, Sweig has continued to provide an insightful look at Cuba from the domestic side. Her descriptions of the goals and achievements of the Revolution were a bit of a surprise, but also inspiring in some ways. The massive improvements in literacy, education, and medicine were definitely not something to be easily dismissed.
I chose to read the chapter about Kennedy?s presidency. I had previously studied the Cuban Missile Crisis from a Soviet point of view, so I was naturally interested in seeing the other sides. It was interesting to see how Cuba was used as a sort of pawn for the superpowers? bilateral struggles. I found it very interesting to see how individual diplomats like Richard Goodwin and James Donovan were able to have meaningful discussions with the Cuban leaders. Evidently, the anti-communism sentiment in the US was far too strong for any President to begin much of a rapprochement, but the individual diplomats were able to make some headway. Had Kennedy stayed in power, there may have been more progress, and perhaps we would not be experiencing a renewing of relations in 2015.
This week I really enjoyed our readings, especially the chapter “Kennedy” in Kornbluh and Leogrande. I chose this chapter because I’m currently taking a class on Cold War era in the United States and we finished Kennedy last week so I thought I might have a little background knowledge on the important things that happened! The chapter started off on familiar ground for me with the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis, but quickly brought things to light that I had never heard of. I found it interesting that Castro appeared to be quite eager to ameliorate relations with the United States despite the fact that his May Day speech conveyed a very strong anti-American sentiment and rightly so considering Kennedy had just attempted to overthrow Castro via internal uprising. I also find it interesting and a little confusing that although Castro wanted better relations with the U.S. and Kennedy wanted better relations with Cuba that no conclusion could be found over a period of two years. In Chapter two of their book Kornbluh and Leogrande describe a lot of back and forth between the two factions that all basically conveyed hope that a solution to better Cuban-American relations could be found but didn’t actually provide any real way to achieve that. Then of course like any dramatic story, Kennedy was assassinated just when it seems like a big change could have been made and thus the embargo has continued up to the present day. This is interesting to note especially since the UN just yesterday announced that 191 countries voted “yes” to condemn the embargo while the United States voted the same as it has for the last twenty-four years of this vote: no. Although Barack Obama has said that he wants to improve Cuban-American relations just as Kennedy did, he has done even less to try and end the embargo. Maybe the Castro regime can offer the olive branch first this time.
Wow… what biased simplification of a super complex story. How conveniently you left out that the Castro brothers sent 46,000 souls to Gehenna between 1959-1965. Who says that democratic nations deal with terrorists? The Castro régime has enslaved 12,000,000 people for nearly six decades. I hooe that EMBARGO is in fact accelerated and tightened. And… who is the DISUNITED NATIONS serving? Isn’t it a den of mafiosi who all cowtow to the Castros?
Carter entered his presidency with the view that it was about time to normalize relations with Cuba; something that the authors argue had never been done previously with such a determination. At the same time, it seems that Castro was also ready for a normalization of the relationship at this point. I feel like we are building up towards normalizing relations but then there is always some minor setback that exacerbates the situation again and again. Whether drug sales, maritime boundaries, refugees or the intervention in Angola and Ethiopia. Did Carter give up too easily? Was his administration too internally divided and stubborn on the Africa-issue? His optimism seems to have been abruptly cut, just as there were lights of optimism. It is interesting and perhaps also a great obstacle to base US-Cuban relations in the context of Africa. It seems like this was the ultimate setback which put a halt to the normalization process. This resulted in the diplomatic efforts just going around in circles. Although it seems like both Castro and Carter were ready to start constructive discussions on cultural exchanges and emigration possibilities, it just did not work. There were so many internal obstacles and external, international events that influenced the two leaders. What was so important for the US was the withdrawal of forces from Angola and Ethiopia, something that was received as plainly offensive and non-negotiable by the Cubans. I can’t help but be critical when reading this chapter because it is ultimately written from within Washington. I am wondering what, if any, components from the Cuban side of the diplomacy that are missing? I think knowing more from within the Cuban administration would have provided a great insight into many of the issues at hand. Overall, I really enjoyed the writing style in which the author uses quotes by the diplomats to reflect upon the various meetings and discussions that were happening. It really gives the reader an insight! It is unbelievably frustrating yet compelling to learn of the small obstacles that obviously represented strong, global matters of principles to the two states that were so powerful and certain in their political principles. Carter’s principle when he became President was to normalize bilateral relations wherever possible, but saw himself give up in that very process. Perhaps the two leaders were both overly optimistic in thinking that the reversal of the cold war-era would come so quickly. Perhaps neither the US nor Cuba were ready.
This week, I read the chapter entitled “Nixon and Ford: Kissinger’s Caribbean Détente” in Back Channel to Cuba, which opened my eyes to the intricacies of foreign policy between United States and Cuba. I was interested in this time period since I have studied the sixties, although I have not learned about the diplomatic situation with Cuba and the United States during this time. I felt that this era was a pivotal time for the world with technology, and changed the way that many foreign players interacted. Building on the theme of technology, media and the information that is known to the public, I thought this chapter really exemplified the caution and care around which information was leaked to the public, even concerned dialogue between the Cubans and Americans. The secret notes that were passed between ambassadors to the different countries, as well as the code that they communicated in was astounding, exhibiting a complexity of foreign politics that I was unaware of. The fact that the meetings were so secret, that only three people were involved in the secret talks, as well as the only ones who knew about it, shows the fragility of the knowledge of these policies possibly changing, in the public as well as political spheres. Further, the baby steps that were taken by each side, and the extreme hesitancy the two powers felt in making these steps, worried that the other wouldn’t cooperate, is an indication that amendment of this relationship was a massive decision for the United States, as well as a huge turning point for Cuba.
The chapter entitled “Nixon and Ford: Kissinger’s Caribbean Détente” in Back channel to Cuba really resonated with me especially considering what I already knew about Kissinger’s controversial diplomacy. Considering that Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his negotiations of a ceasefire in Vietnam it didn’t surprise me that he would lead relations with Cuba during the time of the Cold war. What did surprise me was how back channeled these political negotiations were (considering that this was the age of media and the relations were held very primitively and secretly) and how open Kissinger was to Cuba as a political partner. The Chapter states that Kissinger’s policies and relations with Havana were unlike those of any other politician in Washington since they broke ties with Havana in January 1961. Kissinger’s approach in the opening relations to Cuba through his chivalrous, unilateral, and if necessary reciprocity really, while unsuccessful under Nixon and Ford, really set the stage for the opening of relations under the democratic government to this day. I think Kissinger’s diplomacy was a very important turning point in U.S. foreign policy in that he didn’t necessarily seek to control Cuba as something resembling a satellite state, as it had been done since the U.S. won the Spanish-American war, but that he chose to treat them as an equal and respected power in world affairs. I recently read an article by Kissinger about the Ukraine Crisis (Ukraine their own entity and should be allowed to think as such – economically and politically – without the control of another power) and I think much of the views he expressed toward Cuba can also be found in that. I therefore find it very interesting how current Kissinger’s diplomacy in Cuba is, not only in regards to the opening of Cuban-U.S. relations but also in the Ukraine Crisis.
For this weeks reading, I chose to focus on chapter one of LeoGrande and Kornbluh’s ” Back Channel to Cuba”. The chapter really provided a close analysis the begining of USA-Cuban relations after Fidel Castro came to power. Starting right at the beginning of the Castro’s presidency the book overviews his first unofficial trip to the USA. I found it really interesting how LeoGrande and Kornbluh demonstrate how the US government and Castro had a competition over the public opinion of USA citizens. For example, the American’s really framed the executions of Batista’s officials as a human rights abuse and intolerable.Broadcasting this sort of rhetoric the USA sought to demonize him to the public. As a result, before his trip Castro went so far as to hire a public relations firm to coach him on how to make a good impression to the crowds and US media. Despite ignoring their advice on shaving his beard and wearing a suite, Castro left a great impression on the public during his first trip and was often described as charming and intelligent. I find it interesting how both sides placed such a heavy amount of importance on the public opinion and as a result employed such drastically different rhetoric. I’m looking forward to reading more about how relations progressed from this point and to see if a similar style of rhetoric was used when cold war tensions became even more heated.
Amongst the five chapters to choose from I was drawn instantly by “Kennedy: The Secret Search for Accommodation.” My knowledge of Kennedy’s legacy is that him and his family were celebrity figures that were respected amongst Americans. Being the U.S. President in office when the beginning the Cuban Missile Crisis began is regarded as one of the most tense issues in U.S. foreign policy and is extremely interesting to learn about. As much as this chapter was about the tense relations between Cuba and the U.S. at the time, Kornbluh and LeoGrande, however, focus primarily on U.S. diplomacy moves and negotiations, while quoting Castro from this almost distanced perspective that makes Castro seem far away, transcending the reality of what was really going on during this difficult time. As much as actors such as John B. Donovan attempted to deal with Castro in a timely, efficient, and peaceful manner, I greatly respect Castro’s commitment to the regime and his boundaries set for cultivating reasonable relations. In hindsight, I see the failure of the Bay of Pigs and Cuba’s domination of the U.S.’ attempt at enforcing hegemonic power as a great success at meaningful impeding Western imperialism. Right now, in 2015, it seems that Western culture and imperialism is the bane of the world’s existence and is at the root of meddling with Middle Eastern countries and destroying essentially Aboriginal and Indigenous cultures as well as the mass exploitation as a result of this. I must argue that I read these portions of history and I have to say that I feel like I am rooting for Cuba and I am rooting for Fidel.
This weeks readings were very interesting , it felt like I was looking at the transformation of Cuba as a rose of American economic prowess a deep sticking thorn that would bug the United States for decades . It was interesting looking at Cuba instead of the American side of history during this time period. I had a few concerns with Sweig’s readings this week , I’m kinda confused with area of censorship around artists particularly how wide ranged its measures were enforced and how strict it became at times while remaining less enforced during other moments . But Sweig allowed me to think critically about the US administrations efforts to remove Castro from Eisenhower , Kennedy and secondary research of Johnson’s affairs. Was also interesting reading about the Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose from a Cuban perspective and how underestimated the Americans were of Castro. This weeks readings made me think that this was the beginning of the end for American interventions into foreign affairs. As we see the failure with seizing power in Cuba , later Vietnam , Afghanistan and Iraq. It was interesting to read about the CIA and their initiatives and struggles to control their activities and the effects of their method with regards to Cuban Airlines Flight 455. Lastly its interesting how Castro seemed to be a pawn in the bigger scene of things during the Missie Crisis with his lack of voice in the resolution of the conflict
From the Kornbluh and LeoGrande reading, I opted to read chapter 4 (Nixon and Ford: Kissenger’s Caribbean Detente), as I had a loose understanding of the overall period of détente. What I found particularly interesting was the level of secrecy, which to say was extreme was an understatement. Many of Kissenger’s dialogues with Cuba during the end of Nixon’s rule was without the knowledge of the president, and when Ford arrived in office, he too was largely kept in the dark regarding the communications with Cuba. In fact during early 1974 only three people in the state department were aware of the Cuban communications. Pseudonyms were also used to further the secrecy of the talks, Lawrence Eagleburger – the US negotiator with the Cubans – would be known as Mr. Henderson, a fact he did not even tell his wife! Code language was also established for telephone calls; for example asking “how is your health?” was an indication that the caller wanted to arrange a meeting, a response of “I have a slight headache, how is your sister?” indicated “agreed, and where?” and there was an elaborate conversation designed to follow this to indicate exactly where and when the meeting could occur. Paranoia also crept into the thinking of the secret negotiators. Whilst conducting a meeting at La Guardia airport and blind man selling pens approached the table, threw a few down and would not leave until one of the negotiators purchased them, they later suspected that these pens could have contained recording devices linking to the CIA or FBI.
I really enjoyed this week’s reading (I selected #4) and I look forward to hearing about the other chapters. I found this chapter very well written and captivating.
The relationship between Kissinger and Castro is a very intriguing one. Kissinger initiates it yet some how I think Castro has most of the control. The relationship stops and starts multiple times over the years. In most cases there is no response from Castro while the Kissinger keeps sending messages in hopes of another meeting. I think the biggest roadblock they hit is a power struggle. Cuba makes a move against the US (supporting the independence of Puerto Rico for example) and the US being the global power won’t stand for it.
Demands are being made yet nobody is will to make the first big move. Smalls signs of faith are shown but ultimately nothing really changes because each side’s demands are too risky for the other side to accept. It really does have a lot to do with power and how a country is portrayed to others. If the US were to give into all of Cuba’s demands they would look weak and that is not something that the US would be interested in. The same is true vice versa, Cuba doesn’t want to seem like they are bowing down to the US or being handled or manipulated by them. They want to keep their strong independent image.
Their method of communication is also really exciting to read about. The secret meetings held at airports restaurants and hotels sounds like something out of a spy novel. It’s accompanied by a bit of paranoia, which is entertaining to read. (When a blind man brings pens to their table and the men think there are hidden microphones in the pens!)
This is all happening while Nixon is refusing to deal with Castro. This is an interesting fact because it might mean, since the relationship fell through that Nixon was right and they should have spend time on Castro. But on the other hand it can be argued that you don’t know unless you try!
The most captivating part of this whole situation is that the world was convinced that there was no relationship between Cuba and the US and that the US was giving Cuba the cold shoulder. While behind closed doors (or in public places!) the story was the opposite. Attempts were being made to cooperate with one another and try to find a way to have a working relationship even though their fundamental beliefs were different.
Wow, what a powerful and interesting read. I read Ch. 2: “Kennedy, the Secret Search for Accommodation.” There are so many things I could say about this text:
1. First of all, it made excellent use of sources. I felt like I was hearing the story directly from the horse’s mouth; that is, from direct quotes by Castro and Kennedy themselves taken from Top Secret White House memorandum and other confidential sources. The writing told a story; it was interesting, engaging, and convincing. It didn’t bore me to tears or lose me in all the details.
2. It gave me a good sense of what was really at play in the US-Cuban conflict: forgive my overarching generalizations, but to me it seems clear that the main issue was an ideological power struggle between a political and economic powerhouse and a defiant and visionary island. The fact that neither wanted to bow down and be the first to make a move toward reconciliation, shows how much image and reputation (keeping a stance of superiority and control) played into the lack of communication. A power struggle…between a dominant society (US) and a leader who was willing to fight for the sovereignty of his people (Cuba, representing Latin America). As Fidel replies to Kennedy’s last message: “So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty.”
3. The role of media. What to release to the public and what to maintain in secrecy; what makes headlines, and what is hidden; the role of Lisa Howard in negotiating dialogue; and the use of communications to spit out propaganda in service of political agendas. What dishonesty and manipulation on all sides!
4. The intriguing coincidence and mystery surrounding Kennedy’s death. His last speech leaves much to be pondered, especially in regards to his statement that Cuba had become “a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics…This and this alone divides us. As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it, everything is possible.”
This suggest that the story of Cuba and the US is indicative of a much greater story that has to do with orchestrating global power to keep certain countries and peoples as subservient to that power.
Much to continue chewing on….
I read Chapter 2 of “Back Channels to Cuba,” and was fascinated at the level of detail that the text provided. First point that jumped out at me was how one-sided the relationship between Cuba and the United States continued to be; even at the height of the Cold War, the Socialist/Communist Castro was still continuing to reach out to the United States in the hope of some kind of reproach, only to be snubbed time and time again. The behaviour of both governments during tractors-for-freedom incident is a great example of Cuba being (perhaps overly) accommodating towards the US in the hopes that relations may be normalized. I think the reading places a significant amount of blame on Kennedy’s early administration as a cause of the US’s behaviour – Kennedy’s fixation on righting the wrongs of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and atoning for what he did to the members of Battalion 2506. The invasion was a huge loss of face for the US at the international level, and it appears rather than try to cut their losses and normalize relations they decided to “double down” and continue to play “hardball” and hope that Cuba would bend eventually. It was also tragic that Kennedy was assassinated just as it appeared that Donovan, Howard, and Daniel’s collective work to establish covert communications with Cuba was paying off. Also interesting in this chapter was the power of the media – Howard, the ABC news reporter, did more to bring the two parties to the table than most US and Cuban officials, and Castro jumping on the opportunity to have an hour-long television special aired in the US.
My choice of reading for this week was chapter one of Peter Kornbluh and William LeoGrande’s book “Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and havana. In this reading I found that there was a great introduction to how the book would explain piece by piece just how the dialogue between the United States and Cuba was since the year 1959. What really got my attention in this article though was at the beginning of it where it mentioned, for a couple short paragraphs, how the presentation of themselves to each other was critical. What to wear and how to represent yourself to the audience you were addressing was a key factor in getting messages and points across. Another interesting point I recall was how secretive the political meetings were between Cuba and the United States. There were meetings set up in third world countries and other random spots in which the two countries would talk about politics in order for the United States to keep a low profile politically with the Cubans. The secret meetings makes me wonder just what exactly was spoken about in them and what the arguments, agreements and disagreements were in these private gatherings. I am excited to continue reading the chapters and finally finding out what happened behind the scenes of these two Countries in history that was kept so secretive as classified information for so long.
From skimming the first five chapters of Leogrande and Kornbluh, one of things that I found most interesting about the book was how each chapter started with a quote from a political player that was relevant to the chapter. These quotes along with other snippets of dialogue within the chapters made the readings much more interesting and I felt that it provided us with new information and insight that we wouldn’t have had access to otherwise (as many of these quotes were said in private/secret documents).
The chapter that I focused on this week was “Nixon and Ford: Kissinger’s Carribbean Detente”. One of the main things that stood out to me in this chapter was the fact that despite the heavy use of media and communicative technologies during this period (as discussed in previous lectures), the way that Kissinger communicated with Castro and Cuba was quite primitive. Mankiewicz describes how he carried with him a short, handwritten, and unsigned note from Kissinger to Castro when he traveled to Cuba in 1974. The secrecy of this action as well as others such as secret meetings, talks and communicative codes highlight to me just how fragile political negotiations and relations are. During this period of the Cold War in which information and events was easily manipulated, misintepreted and misunderstood, chapter 4 brings to attention to the fact that politicians and leaders felt that knowledge and key information needed to be heavily protected during times of ever changing policies and political relations.
Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s chapter on Kennedy and his government’s policies and reactions towards Cuba presented a conflicting narrative for me; a narrative that showed a desperation for peace but not at any cost. The secret meetings and many attempts at communication between the two countries appeared as though they both wanted to reach a stage of rapprochement, which was never officially achieved. Although politicians like Donovan attempted to broker peace between the two nations, the timing always seemed to be off. For example, before the Cuban Missile Crisis came to a head, Kennedy sent a message to Castro in an attempt to neutralize tensions but by then, the crisis had been averted. However, Castro was left angry after the Soviets failed to include Cuba in their negotiations. This shows that Kennedy was at least marginally willing to listen to Cuban sentiments but his message arrived too late. The CIA was also heavily involved in relations between Cuba and the U.S. For example, when Donovan met with Castro on a fishing trip to negotiate the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, the CIA wanted him to bring a wetsuit laced with poison and present it as a gift to Castro. The CIA acting as a third party amid talks of reconciliation made relations between the two nations more complex. Peace and reconciliation between the two wasn’t a far-fetched idea and there were attempts made to achieve some sort of agreement but it never came to fruition during Kennedy’s tenure as president.
In the book assigned to us, I focused on Chapter one “Eisenhower”, I’m glad I picked this one because it really set the relationship up of Cuba and the U.S when Castro came in power. I did not know before that U.S was actually in favour of Batista being in power because he was a “faithful ally” and was safeguarding U.S interests. They would have wanted to support him had he not have been so unpopular to the public. Castro was the complete opposite he wanted to protect the Cuban autonomy from U.S influence. The U.S saw him as a dangerous radical and it is clear why he was much more towards communism, and his socialist ways weren’t something they liked. This chapter talked a lot about Castro’s visit to the U.S and how they public actually really liked him and his effort to speak in english was found endearing. Yet, Eisenhower refused to meet with him and went golfing instead. The other U.S officials seemed to find his ideals charming and yet they were contradicting themselves later by calling him immature, they seemed wary of him it seems, and couldn’t completely trust him. Though both the countries wanted cordial relationship, I felt like Castro spoke his mind and even blasted U.S for its support for Batista in his public speech. It seems that right of the bat they were off to a bumpy start. I can totally understand where Castro is coming from on not wanting to ask for financial aid and just reducing U.S influence because right after the Spanish influence ended U.S has been making the decisions and effecting Cuba, socially, economically and culturally. Castro certainly sent the message to them, by not meeting with the U.S ambassador who at one point was seen as more important as the Cuban president in Cuba. Relations between them just got worse and it seemed because Castro did not want to compromise anymore and U.S did not like this big change in Cuba and wanted things to remain in all ways for their benefit. Castro had the courage to admit that the relationship between the two countries could have been a bit better if he had changed his behaviour a bit, U.S just wanted Castro out.
After reading about John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro, I have gained valuable insight into the inner workings of the varying levels of communications that went between both parties. Kornbluh and LeoGrande have depicted an interesting picture whereby Kennedy, while always toting his gun-slinging attitude towards Cuba in public, often used many measures to ensure that there was dialogue between him and Castro. Reading through the chapter, I notice that Kennedy was always interested in having some form of communication available with Castro, regardless of what the geopolitical situation was. Castro always maintains the stance that he wants Cuba to be recognized as equals rather than a pawn that either the Americans or the Soviets could exploit. After the debacle of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, this was a very necessary measure to take in order to return the Cuban exile hostages that were captured during the botched plot against Castro’s Cuba. James Donovan was the key person from Kennedy’s administration used as the one to create and maintain dialogue with Castro. He successfully managed to rescue most of the captured invaders of the Bay of Pigs. I also find very interesting was the use of ABC reporter Lisa Howard to gain information about Castro and to further maintain dialogue between America and Cuba.
Sweig offers a very condense and summarized version of the events that took place around this time, in contrast to Kornbluh and LeoGrande. However she does touch on how this entire period affected the Cuban population. It was seen that during the time of the Revolution, that the life of the average Cuban markedly improved compared to during the Batista regime.
This week I read Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s chapter on Nixon and Ford: Kissenger’s Caribbean Détente. It was interesting to learn about the political layers underlying US-Cuba diplomacy. The secret messages sent to Castro by Kissenger had instigated a process of reconciliation. The ways in which strategic moves in the direction of normalization were pretty fascinating; ideas like trading a game of baseball for the release of three US citizens that were imprisoned in Cuban jails for counterrevolutionary activities were discussed. Although the idea had actually been rejected, Castro did express a willingness to mend relations in different ways via negotiation. Yet, despite the willingness to normalize relations, it was so easily undermined by the power of politics in the international arena. Nixon’s tough stance towards Cuba had been advised by the CIA director as a way to maintain a little bit of internal difficulty within the Soviet Union, when it was costing the country up to $1 million a day to fund Cuba. Furthermore, the differing support for the internal affairs differed between Cuba and the US within Angola and Puerto Rico—which had essentially exacerbated the political tension. In spite of the efforts made, it was so easily undermined because of the international political climate.
For the week 8 readings, I decided to read Chapter 3: Johnson. I figured LBJ might be left out of this discussion because he is somewhat of a lesser known president, probably due to his predecessor’s assassination, and his successor’s scandals. I was hoping to read about how LBJ would make a classic American stand against Communism, after all the Vietnam War was raging on and they had to do everything to contain the commies. But I was left disappointed, learning that LBJ had really just confirmed his presidency as low-key. Now, low-key does not mean ineffective, just not as interesting as some other president’s actions. For most of the chapter, it seemed like a majority of the US/Cuba talks and deals were made at a distance from LBJ, and sometimes it appeared to be deliberate and other times it sounded like they just didn’t make it all the way to the top – like a bad game of Telephone. In addition to this bureaucratic web of messengers, LBJ himself distanced the issue a number of times, even saying literally that it was going to be put on the shelf for a while. In fairness, the President was dealing with a lot more important issues back home: civil rights, voting rights for blacks, healthcare reform and most importantly the Vietnam war.
My question for this chapter would be, did LBJ have a motive behind distancing the Cuban discussion? Or was it just simply that he had more important things to worry about, and Cuba was not one of them?
‘Back Channel to Cuba’ narrates the intricate records of negotiations between Cuba and the United States. On its pages, I find interesting how the talks between the two nations have evolved through the decades and how some initiatives of rapprochement worked while others did not. I chose the Kennedy chapter because both leaders accepted that the normalization of relations was a beneficial and a strategic move for both nations.
Even though, in the beginning, Kennedy followed Eisenhower’s condemnation of Cuba for being communist, he came to the conclusion that it could be possible to live in the west hemisphere with different government systems. The ironic part is that all the diplomatic conversations and secret meetings seem to me like a childish tug of war contest, in which the USA looks like a stubborn kid that does not want to let go an inch because of losing its superior image and control over foreign affairs. It has to be the United Statesian way otherwise no agreement can follow through. Not even the help of a well-intentioned Lisa Howard could speed the process of bringing both nations closer. In the end, Kennedy dies, Lisa commits suicide, and Castro gets no deal. I guess the CIA officers might have lit the Cuban cigars to celebrate their efforts on keeping the US hegemony in the region.
From the reading, Back Channel to Cuba, I decided to look at Chapter 3 Johnson: Castro Reaches Out. What I found most interesting is the level of secrecy of communication between America and Cuba, the lack of communication reaching Johnson or when it did how sometimes it was pushed back to focus on other things (such as Vietnam) and how various tactics were used such as black channel communication. Both Che and Castro wanted “peaceful coexistence” and “normalising” of Cuban-US relations, with Che in an interview with Lisa Howard wanting America to simply do “nothing for or against us. Just leave us alone.” But Johnson was unwilling to see Howard with information from Castro who believed that communication was key to avoiding further problematic issues, as he said he was willing to meet the US negotiators any place to discuss improving relations, “even the moon.” Castro continued to escalate his efforts to reach out to the Johnson administration. It seems communication between the two were dealt with by outside people and various countries who played as intermediaries between Washington and Havana. For example using Howard to press the Johnson administration to communicate with Castro, the use of media as Castro used the NY Times to conduct an interview and using Che’s visit to the US to communicate, or how Castro used both the British (offered to be middlemen but US rejected) and Spanish to get into contact with Johnson. This decision by Castro to reach out seems to reflect a concern over the inherent danger of conflict with the United States. However, many dismissed Castro’s peace proposals. The relationship between the two were also suffering many conflicts, with the Cuban fisherman being held in a US naval base and dumped into a Florida jail, Castro’s threat to fire on U-2 reconnaissance planes conducting surveillance flights over the island & the Aranzazu Incident in which American mistook a Spanish boat to be Cuban which was a huge embarrassment and scandal. These events created huge mistrusts and fears of US intervention for Cuba.
I chose to read chapter one since I was interested to see how the relationship between Cuba and the U.S started out after the Cuban revolution.
Although it seems both countries were willing to talk about issues at the beginning of Castro’s tenure, the relationship rapidly fell apart.The U.S did not know what to think of Castro on his first visit and were highly cautious about having any optimistic views on Castro and his willingness to act upon American interests since he was deemed radical. It was interesting to see how much of an emphasis was placed on the communist threat in Latin America by the U.S on Castro, and how they warned him of the communists in Cuba. I liked how diplomatic the whole situation seemed at the start, as if both sides were swallowing their pride to try and see if a more equal relationship could be achieved, and how quickly this deteriorated. Ultimately the Cuban revolution was determined to end the US dominance over Cuba and so there was a conflict of interest that I think could not be overcome in their talks.
Reading Chapter 4 of “Back Channel to Cuba” was intriguing and suspenseful. It was fascinating to see how Cuba and the US communicated in secret, through intermediaries and coded language. However, it was also frustrating to follow the attempt at negotiating normalization between the two countries and ultimately gain little outcome. The chapter seems to bring a few major obstacles which slowed this process of negotiation. Because Cuba supported the Independence of Puerto Rico and Angola, the US saw this as an “unfriendly” gesture, creating US insecurities. Cuba, on the other end saw these issues as separate, and should not be included in conditions for normalization. The on-going back and forth between the two countries seems to be characterized by Cuba being reluctant to lose prestige in negotiations, as the US proposed terms which Cuba would never consider (such as restraint in promoting Puerto Rican independence). Reading this chapter I felt a sense of fear and hesitation from both sides, as Cuba awaited communication from the US and withheld (perhaps unintentionally) its responses which kept the US guessing Cuba’s position. It seems that even though there was so much communication between Cuba and the US, and there were major issues to be discussed, it doesn’t seem like much was really put into action.
Learning that Castro saw the Kennedy assassination with concern was refreshing, since after all, Kennedy was the one who authorized an invasion of Cuba, right?
Succeeding Kennedy was Johnson, but I never learned much about Johnson in high school other than the fact that his presidency mostly revolved around the Vietnam War, so I decided to read more about what his administration did with Communist Cuba. I expected at the end of the chapter there would be some breakthrough between the two countries’ relationship, but it seemed that Johnson only contributed further to “back channel” communication. In fact, I was somewhat surprised it was Castro who was often willing to initiate the dialogue with the Americans (though getting it across proved to be another challenge).
Like Monica, I found it interesting that Cuba-US relations at the time operated on such a secretive level, relying on reporters and various other third-party intermediaries to communicate with one another. It turned out both countries played this constant back-and-forth game of diplomacy, in which Cuba would make some sort of small concession, and the US would return that favour in the form of some other small concession.
It seems that during his Johnson’s presidency, Cuba wasn’t all that important to the US. Even though it was a communist nation in their backyard, Cuba was a contained military threat now that the U2 flights were safe and the missile crisis was over. What was uncontained was the Vietnam War, and we all know how that went for the Americans under Johnson. In the end, in 1968, what to do with Cuba was essentially handed off to Nixon’s administration…
This week I read chapter 3, “Johnson,” in Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s book. While reading this chapter, several things struck me, including the sources themselves. I really enjoyed reading a narrative that used declassified secret government documents as sources. For me, reading documents that were once classified provided a really unique perspective on US/Cuban relations. They revealed the nuances of the situation not known to the public at the time, giving an extremely turbulent and unstable picture of the period. This was far different from the one-sided official hard line policy publicly presented by the American government. These sources were really useful in delving into the thought processes of the leaders, especially regarding pivotal decisions such as the debate on whether the US should attempt to provoke a coup, or attempt accommodation. For me this really illustrated that there was no clear or easy outcome to this situation. In retrospect, it is easy to make assumptions about the inevitability of events, but I found these documents to be helpful in challenging this idea.
Another aspect of the chapter that I found interesting the high level of secrecy as a refection of the American public opinion at the time. For a chapter entitled “Johnson,” I found that Johnson himself was mentioned very little, with individuals such as Lisa Howard and Adlai Stevenson playing more central roles. I think that the overall concealment of any attempts to communicate with Cuba shows how leaders are often restricted by their obligation to maintain a good public image. After the assassination of Kennedy and rumours of Cuban involvement, Johnson was forced to take a tough approach to Cuban relations in order to keep in the public favour. This severely limited his ability to take an active role in the necessary discussion of improving US/Cuban relations, further complicating an already delicate situation.
This week’s reading is really interesting. I felt really relaxed and comfortable when I read those materials. I want to discuss the chapter “Eisenhower” in Kornbluh and Leogrande. Here are things that interested me in the beginning of the book.
1. This book reminds me of the idea of micro-history that professor talked in the discussion. I found this book is also a kind of micro-history book. The book comprises untold stories which are full of details. Therefore, changing reading readers mind about this period of history. The author reappeared relationship between Cuba and US in a way of negotiation that the bilateral efforts at dialogue, rapprochement, and reconciliation.
2. I really like authors’ writing style. I guess that the reason why I thought it was so relaxed to read this book. By inserting dialogues, it is seems the author was recreating that realistic settings at that time. This approaching of writing closed the distance between readers and the book. And for readers, like me, this way of reading is also joyful.
3. Before, I always thought revolution was the best way to achieve goals because of its direct and effective. However, after reading these chapters. I started to think that negotiation, as a peace and mild method, is also an alternative choice in certain situations. In chapter1, the author mentions that, due to economic ties between Cuba and US, they all tried to find a soft way to ease their tensions. In the beginning, both of these countries expressed disagree and distrust with each other. As author mentioned, on the US side, positions often reflected arrogance. On the Cuban side, positions often reflected a stubborn pride. Both of these have their own belief and show distrust with each other. However, 1959 Castro visit US became a turning point which emerged an possible possibility for them to change. In the following chapters, I will keep focus on how US and Cuba’s attitudes towards each other changed in the following years.
Like others who read chapter 3 on Johnson, I was looking forward to know more about the president who, it seems, high school history textbooks all around deemed irrelevant, or only interested in the Vietnam War. After reading the chapter, his position remains the same to me. Not only does he seem more interested in other topics such as an election year, but also he simply is not available for readers to really grasp what he thought about the conflict with Cuba; in a way, he remains as unavailable as he was at the time to read Castro’s messages and follow up Kennedy’s strategic conversations in search of conciliation with the island. What the chapter does give is a very rare instance of Fidel’s introspection on his position as leader of the Revolution, shaken by the notion that the world signals him as the killer of a young leader who might have solved the problems between US and Cuba. This line of his called my attention the most: “There was the passion and extremism that characterizes the initial phase of any revolution on our part.”
By following up the amazing and interesting days of Lisa Howard, we get to learn about a Castro who is still very much a defiant and pungent leader, trying to put the US against the wall by way of extreme measures every time he could (like when he cut the water supply to the Guantánamo Base), but also, he is listening now. More than anyone, he seems to pay attention to his foreign detractors, because as much as he would like to have the power on his own, he also understands that he is dependent of bigger powers, and if it won’t be the USSR, the door for the US should still be open, to some degree. He even tries to negotiate cutting any support to revolutionaries in Latin America in exchange of healing the relationship with the United States, a move that looking in retrospect, asks the question of how important were these revolutions for Castro in actuality? how committed was him to them? After all, it is in that same train of thought that he sent his close ally, Guevara, to fight and finally die in one of these revolutions…
The classified documents and citation from different memoirs written by the people involved in this chapter of history gives it apart from a broader view of the subject, larger than what anyone could have had at that time, a sense that the expiry date for it has come and gone. Even if the embargo is just being lifted and the conflicts are starting to fade away (in the surface), for some of the key players these notes and memos and intricate diplomatic arrangements for ONE meeting, are simply not necessary to hold in secrecy anymore.
Whenever I have thought about Cuban-US relations in the Castro era, I have held a general assumption that the negative relationship that has now existed for so many decades was an inevitable result of two ideologically opposed nations being in such close proximity to one another. I therefore chose to read the opening chapter on Eisenhower’s presidency to illuminate whether this was the case from the beginning. It was both illuminating and hugely frustrating to learn that it was not.
There were many in the US government who accepted that Castro was there to stay and so realised that the best way to protect US interests was to work for good relations and try to exert a moderating influence over the new revolutionary regime. I see this as a very rational and pragmatic viewpoint which, had it been adopted, may have saved the US half a century of a problematic Cuba in its backyard and spared Cuba the pain of the economic blockade. Interestingly the people who held this position were those who had more first-hand knowledge of the realities on the ground, with the Ambassador Bonsul having worked in other post-revolution South American countries and the CIA having followed events in Cuba closely for a long time. Ike’s administration seemed to have been stuck in an outdated mindset, not accepting the reality that the US-Cuban relationship was going to have to change, the Cuban people had been awoken and the US could no longer treat Cuba like a vassal where they could just replace leaders with ease. The informal visit of Castro to Cuba was a huge missed opportunity by the United States to take the first step towards positive relations, an opportunity they were lucky to have considering the support they had given to the brutal Batista regime (something that seemed completely lost on Eisenhower’s dealings with the new government).
I really enjoyed reading “Nixon and Ford: Kissinger’s Caribbean Détente” from the Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s book, Back Channel to Cuba. The authors provide very detailed information, which I wonder how they obtained so much of this kind of information.
The story begins from Nixon who very much disliked Castro and Kissinger who tried to initiate the communication with Cuba. So, Kissinger secretly opened the conversation with Cuba through his agents, and Castro suggested a desire for détente. However, Nixon refused to change Cuban policy as he was afraid of the effects of détente which might spread out over Latin America and encourage Communists, such as Allende. In spite of Nixon’s hesitance to change policy, negotiation about hijacking accord with Cuba gradually opened up the conversation for détente, and domestic and international pressure for Cuban policy change got stronger. Then, Ford came in after Nixon’s resign, and Kissinger suggested him to move on with Cuban détente. Ford gave it a go, so Eagleburger (U.S. agent) and Garcia (Cuban agent) started talking over phone with coded language and also in person. The first diplomat meeting was held at the Pierre Hotel in NY in July 1975, but didn’t go very well. After that, the conversation got stagnated, and the two obstacles: Puerto Rico and Angola’s matters finally made it impossible to negotiate the détente.
Throughout reading the chapter, I was very surprised by Kissinger’s furtiveness and realistic attitude. It seems like Kissinger never cared about ideology seriously but really cared about his status. Also, Cuba’s poker-game like reaction toward the U.S. effort for détente is specifically interesting to me as historically Japan (my country) has this kind of relationship with U.S. but in a very different way. It would be interesting to hear more from Cuban side as this chapter mainly tells from U.S. perspective. Overall, this chapter is very well written and really interesting.
While I read the chapter that focuses on relations between the US and Cuba during the presidency of George W. Bush, in this blog post I would like to focus instead on former president Jimmy Carter and his visit to Cuba in 2002. I thought several details of the description were particularly interesting. One noteworthy example is the way the two leaders are named by the historians. Fidel Castro is referred to as both Fidel and as Castro, whereas Jimmy Carter is referred to by his last name only. I wonder what this signifies in terms of leadership and respect. On the one hand, Castro enjoys a very different reputation both internationally and within Cuba, where the population cries ?Fidel, Fidel, Fidel!? during rallies. Thus using Fidel may signify the more personal political image that has been cultivated of the Cuban leader. On the other hand, I was absurdly reminded of several articles discussing how members of various political parties in Canada always spoke of ?Justin? as opposed to of ?Trudeau,? in an effort to make him seem unprofessional leading up to the recent elections. I definitely see that it is a different case here. In 2002 Fidel Castro had been the president of Cuba for over 25 years. Nonetheless, politicians and other historical figures are rarely referred to by their first names. Another fact I thought was really fascinating about the visit was the dynamic between personal and political relations. Carter and Castro seemed so friendly on a personal level despite not making much progress on a political level. Castro is described as being very accommodating and Carter as very respectful. Yet Castro did not budge on any actual policies and Carter, as former president, did not have the mandate to make any decisions on behalf of the US. Finally, it was interesting to note that baseball continued to be an important part of Cuba, both culturally and politically, into the 21st century. In conclusion I think it is safe to say that much of this visit, as demonstrated by the baseball game, was more symbolic than anything else. Nonetheless it seems like it was more productive than anything the Bush administration managed to achieve with regard to Cuba at this time.
For week 10 I chose to read about the Clinton administration. Many things surprised me. Firstly, the fact that Clinton needed the electoral votes in Florida seems to have shaped so much of his political agenda with normalizing relations with Cuba. The loss of Cuban-American votes was obviously something he would not risk in going forward with fully improving relations. I am particularly amazed and surprised at the Elian incident, and its enormous political significance. The choice by the Clinton administration to return the boy to his father in Cuba not only led to huge riots and enraged the Cuban-American community. It also stopped Clinton’s considerations of lifting the travel ban and easing cooperation with Cuba, and one could certainly argue that it might have caused Al Gore to lose the presidential bid in 2000 due to the Florida votes. Undoubtedly, it seems like Clinton and his administration deeply cared for US-Cuban relations, but that they were too captured in the static realities of political predecessors, political capital and years of restrained diplomacy in order to achieve something substantial. This chapter is written in such an eloquent, detailed manner that the reader is inclined to believe at every turning point that some great change is going to come. It is fascinating to see the clandestine realities of diplomacy, people-to-people relations and the importance of face and personality in politics. I found it impressive how the Clinton administration and the many years of back and forth with Castro, together, were able to improve and negotiate on important issues such as migration, counterterrorism and cultural exchanges. This certainly led to the rebuilding of bridges and extremely tense relations, but unfortunately it was not enough to fully normalize relations. What is so interesting with this era is that there are many moments where you think a real breakthrough could have happened. Had I not known anything of US-Cuban relations after 1999 I probably would have had a much more optimistic outlook for the next couple of years, because it seems like the two nations are very close to a breakthrough. The Clinton years constructed an optimistic era nonetheless, independently of what was to happen later.
While Chapter 8 of Back Channel to Cuba, was called “George W. Bush: Turning Back the Clock”, it focused largely on former president Jimmy Carter’s trip to Cuba. Although this trip was during Bush’s time in office, I found it surprising that the authors chose to focus on Carter’s trip to the extent that they did. By the end of this chapter, it seems that Carter’s trip had essentially done nothing to move US-Cuban relations forward or backward, aside from being the first US president to make a peaceful visit since 1959. While that seemed to lighten the atmosphere surrounding political negotiations between Castro and Carter, it was explained that Carter had no actual political power that he could not submit to any of Castro’s proposals officially. This made me wonder why Carter had even gone to Cuba in the first place, and sparked the idea that this could have even aggravated Castro further. While I understand that the tension between the two countries is extreme, making it so anything can help, I find it mildly counterproductive to visit a country to negotiate and have political discussions, when a massive factor in the argument cannot do anything within his government. Another thing that I found interesting within this chapter as well as the last chapter I read was the topic of hijacking. I found it to be a common theme that I have noticed through reading this chapter as well as the chapter “Nixon and Ford”, placing emphasis on the hijackings in Cuba and the United States. While neither the US nor Cuba necessarily agreed with one another in the circumstances regarding this issue, it spurred many conversations and what seemed to be more effective communication between the two unfriendly powers. Throughout the story of US-Cuban relations, it is clear that both sides constantly searched for a sign of respect or a reason to believe that their opponent would make the first move. After reading this chapter and examining the extreme detail in which LeoGrande and Kornbluh discuss Bush and Carter’s relations with Castro and Cuba, I am even more convinced that the US-Cuban relationship faced a constant stalemate throughout their history.
Chapter 10 of Back Channel to Cuba focuses on Cuba and the US as the “closest of enemies” through their mutual concerns, shared culture, and common humanity and how this intensifies the relationship between the two nations but is also a continued incentive toward cooperation. The chapter tried to get at the root of the problematic relations (and the attempt to normalize them) and nicely tied together the opinions held by the US and Cuban administrations all the way from John Quincy Adams to Obama and Jose Marti to Raul Castro (and what the end of his presidency in 2018 would have in store for the relations).
I thought it was interesting that the authors looked at both the US and Cuba and their opinions toward the problems in relations, for example where the US saw Cuba moving away from its concession attempts by involving themselves with the USSR, the Cuban’s saw an opportunity to create a community of likeminded socialists and strengthen its economy. Furthermore, the fact that post-war relations are more intense seems absurd to me, especially considering that Cuba made the concession the US wanted with the end of the cold war, but the US keeps “moving the goal posts” in their promise of restoring relations with Cuba. Under the more recent US administrations changes in Cuba’s internal and political order have been called for which is ironic considering a statement by George W. Bush that “Cuba is a domestic issue for the US rather than a foreign policy issue”, this statement to some extent undermines Cuban sovereignty and emphasizes the issues between the two nations. The pressure to normalize relations between the US and Cuba is now also an international one with the US paying a growing diplomatic price in Latin America over its static relations with Cuba. The authors conclude the chapter with 10 lessons of 50 years of hindsight in Cuban-US relations. The chapter nicely outlined the problems in communication and timing as well as lack of understanding by the two governments toward each others bureaucracy and sovereignty as the problem between normalizing relations. The fact that the chapter looked back on the relations with 50 years of hindsight and the problems of each nation in reconciliation attempts, not just one, as well as predicting future problems with the end of the Castro administration with Raul’s end of presidency in 2018, as the Castro’s are to Washington what Nixon was to China. The picture in this chapter sums it up nicely, the normality of a handshake (between Raul and Obama at Mandela’s funeral in the wake of his legacy of reconciliation) has the potential to change the world.
For this week’s reading, I chose the chapter on George W. Bush’s relation with Cuba. From my previous reading of LeoGrande and Kornbluh regarding the Kennedy administration, I see many parallels between how both presidents dealt with Cuba. Mainly it was on their insistence that economic sanctions through a trade embargo and the development and funding of Cuban dissidents to overturn Fidel Castro’s government. However, were the two presidents contrasted were on their stance of dialogue with Cuba. While Kennedy sought to keep channels of communication open with Cuba through various diplomats, Bush decided that it was no longer necessary and more of a pointless exercise. Bush believed that Cuba was already politically very weakened and in a state akin to the own health of Castro. What was interesting was the recount of Jimmy Carter’s unofficial visit to Cuba. He was trying to mend the relations that the Bush administration had already begun to dismantle. Bush wanted to employ a policy in Cuba similar to those being used in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to facilitate a regime change to one that would to the US party line. A prominent example of this was with the migration issue of Cubans going to the US. Bush had effectively stalled the programs set in place by previous administrations in order to tackle the migration issue. By leaving potential migrants in Cuba, his government was hoping that resentment of Castro would eventually fester and lead to Castro being toppled. With this not being the case, Bush turned to using state funded donations during natural disasters as a way to enforce the strict economic sanctions the US imposed on Cuba. Ironically enough, Castro turned down the desperately needed aid packages down in favor of not showing weakness. From what I have gathered in this chapter, Castro wanted to be acknowledged by Bush as an equal partner. Carter showed Castro a high level of respect on his trip, which Castro seemed to appreciate greatly. However Bush did not want to waste resources on communication, as he believed that the end was near for Castro.
This week I focused on Chapter 8: George W. Bush: Turning Back the Clock. What I found particularly interesting was the sort of ‘psychological war’ prompted by the continual animosity between the two countries. Despite the attempts on both sides towards reconciliation (Carter’s meetings with Castro, and later Castro through humanitarian relief), the lingering bitterness resulted in predictable patterns of rejection. Cuba’s desire to be treated with mutual respect and reciprocity was constantly being undermined by a Western imperialist outlook.
After 9/11, Bush’s famous declaration, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”, epitomized the doctrine of pre-emptive war on Iraq which inevitably had its resonances within its relations with Cuba, as well. The Bush administration took an unwavering stance on non-democratic regimes and was unwilling to tolerate and be open to other forms of authority. The strategy for the invasion of Iraq had strong parallels with Cuba—the US was funding Cuban human rights activists, independent journalists, and other counterrevolutionaries. Even during US-Cuban cooperation of hi-jackers, Washington refused to further negotiate migration with Cuba because it would not address issues on it’s own agenda. Most importantly, James Cason (US foreign service officer) tried to provoke the Cuban regime to oust him from the country to give Washington a reason to retaliate. The endless ways the US tried to undermine Castro led to bold, back and forth responses: billboards with photographs of US soldiers abusing Abu Ghraib prisoners to screen displays of excerpts from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Martin Luther King to annoy Castro. Finally, the retaliatory responses escalated to a breaking point where they would only interact if they had to. Later on, when Cuba was struck with a series of hurricanes, other than being able to purchase food, it declined US assistance due to the years of distrust.
With all that said, this chapter offers an interesting glimpse into Bush’s political doctrine during his time in office and its reverberations around the world. The dialogue between US and Cuba epitomized intolerance and prejudice at such a stark point in 21st century history, after 9/11. At this point, the political deadlock between the US and Cuba revealed the decline of relations during this timeframe—as Cuba declined US aid after a succession of hurricanes hit the island that contrasted with its response immediately after 9/11 (Cuba had tried to demonstrate Good faith by signing international protocols against terrorism and allowing the US to use Guantanamo as a detention centre).
In the chapter from Back Channel to Cuba, George W. Bush, the relationship between the United States and Cuba seem have been just as bad, if not worse than in 1959. The objective of “regime change” was extremely present throughout this time, but at the same time, Bush severed almost all relations with Cuba. It seems to me, that the authors definitely sided with Cuba in their depiction of events during Bush’s administration. The chapter highlights the ‘olive branches’ extended to the USA by Cuba, starting with their response to 9/11, which was somewhat unacknowledged by the States. I found Carter’s trip to Cuba truly to be the main focus of the chapter although it was supposed to be about George Bush. The trip had gone well and that did not benefit Bush because Carter’s travels alongside other American’s travels to Cuba had begun to “demystify” the horrendous nature of Castro’s government. The relations between the two nations seemed to have become less tense due to the hurricanes and stormed that caused so much damage to Cuba. At first, some laws were changed to make the purchasing of food from the USA possible. In 2008 however, Bush did not allow for the embargo to be lifted in order for Cuba to purchase construction material for extensive repairs caused by another storm. The summarizing statement of the relations between Cuba and the United States as left by Bush, can be seen in Raul Castro’s speech (2007) extending an olive branch to the NEXT president of the States…two years prior to the start of Obama’s presidency. This just shows how tense the situation was for a whole two years and all the work that Obama was handed!
I chose to read the Reagan and Bush Sr. chapter of Back Channel to Cuba. During the early 1980’s Mexico played a large role in reopening a dialogue between the US and Cuban governments. I didn’t know that Mexico was involved in reconciliation but it does make sense based on Mexico’s geographic proximity and economic ties to both countries. These factors made it in Mexico’s best interest for the US and Cuba to loosen tensions so they acted accordingly. The Mexican government attempted and failed to get Castro and Reagan in the same room at the North-South summit but succeeded in convincing Reagan to agree to a meeting of the two vice presidents. These negotiations were a step in the right direction but consisted mostly of both sides stating their views and grievances without listening what the other had to say, particularly on the US side. This theme continued when US ambassador Walters visited Cuba, after Mexico put diplomatic pressure on them, with a list of demands. A general trend in Cuban-American relations is that there is no desire to listen to the perspective of other because both sides are entrenched in their views. In the event of the Walters visit, Castro did offer compromise in the form of suspending aid to the rebels in Nicaragua and Salvador but Walters had no really intention of working out an agreement. For the Cuba government the American’s seemed unable or unwilling to listen to their moderate proposals while the US heard and saw any negotiation through their conviction of Castro’s communist dogmatism.
Chapter 8 of Kornbluh and LeoGrande’s Back Channel to Cuba provides us with an insight into the policies of George W. Bush towards Cuba. Bush was adamant that the only way for relations with Cuba to normalise was to replace the Cuban regime, and thus did not engage in any dialogues or negotiations with the Cubans other than what they were required to do. What is interesting is the excuses Washington were able to coin in order to justify their stance. The US refused to remove Cuba from the list of potential terrorist threats, despite their unwavering support for the US following the 9/11 disaster. It is also true that the evidence for Cuba’s inclusion on the list was minimal, or even non-existent. A number of political commentators and historians have suggested that terrorism is the fear of the 21st century in the same way that communism was the fear of the 20th century, and this could certainly be the case here. Throughout the 20th century relations between the US and other Latin American nations frequently turned frosty due to the supposed communist threat they posed; nations such as Guatemala in 1954 and Grenada in the 1980s, and obviously even Cuba itself throughout the latter half of the century. Perhaps then we can see a continuum. The fall of the USSR, and thus the decline of anti-communism, meant that the US needed a new justification for negative relations, and therefore altered the anti-communist rhetoric to feature counterterrorism.
This week I read about chapter 7, which was about Clinton’s presidency. Most of this chapter is concerned with the President’s relationship with the Cuban-American community in Florida. I know Florida is one of those swing districts (reminds me of Bush v. Gore), and Clinton recognized that he needed the Cuban community’s support, so it is no surprise his policies were mediated by that relationship. Once again, it was unsurprising to learn that while Clinton wanted to normalize relations with Cuba, the Republicans only made things worse than before.
I was surprised by the BTTR’s bold move to drop propaganda on Havana as well as Castro’s response to the intrusions. I don’t think anyone expected Castro to actually shoot down two of the Cessnas. I thought that after the hostile shootdown, the bridges between the two nations were burned once and for all and that there was no going back. But when I found out the Clinton administration was able to make some achievements in terms of remedying the hardships of the Cuban people, there must have been some optimism that the next President would be able to achieve even greater diplomatic improvements.
I chose to read Chapter 8 of Back Channel to Cuba, “George Bush: Turning Back the Clock”. I agree with Lindsay’s interest on the authors focusing on Jimmy Carter. But I think LeoGrande and Kornbluh highlighted former President’s Jimmy Carter trip to Cuba in such detail in order to demonstrate that support for Bush’s extremity towards Castro was not all encompassing. Rather, as Jimmy Carter proves a much more open opinion towards Cuba existed. Even though Jimmy Carter had no political power, he did have media influence, which I think could have worked to slightly normalize relations. This is evident in Carter’s acceptance of walking onto the baseball field with Castro minus their security personnel. Despite Carter’s failure to create policy changes, he did demonstrate to Cuba that not all of the U.S. was so opposed or afraid of Castro.
In terms of Bush I agree with Jimmy Carter’s comment that he was very counterproductive towards Cuba. Bush’s unwavering goal for a regime change in Cuba is seen through his travel bans, stalling of visa applications and complete lack of trust. Overall I think Bush reinforced the existing tensions between Cuba and the U.S. and made developing a productive relationship even more difficult.
I chose to read Chapter 8 this week (for various reasons…). I found it particularly interesting when there were times of danger or disaster, and how that somehow managed to spark some type of re-connection between the two states. However, it was often if not always short lived because both of them were too proud – neither of them was willing to step off their high horse.
Jimmy Carter’s visit really fascinated me. I feel like the visit actually proved a lot, but in the end it really did nothing because Carter was just a past president with no power, and both Castro and Bush rejected Carter’s proposals.
The US Interests Section is kind of an item of curiosity to me. Why is it even there? I understand that it (kind of?) was a channel of US-Cuban diplomacy but did it really even do it’s job? To me, it sounded like an almost covert (but not really) establishment to fuel “democracy promotion”, especially with the actions of Huddleston and Cason, and even Parmly. It became a propaganda war, and I can’t really imagine what the Cubans were thinking, seeing what the US would post up and what the Cuban government would counter with. Was it really aimed at the citizens, or just at the governments?
This chapter really highlighted what I want to call a series of “Pride Wars” between the US and Cuba. While there obviously is a lot more than just pride, I thought there was always that underlying tone of “if we accept, we’ll be seen as needy or helpless or weak”. Every time a chance came up, it was always “Pride or diplomacy?” To me it seems like pride.
After Reading Chapter Nine of “Back Channel to Cuba” the description of Cyber War really peaked my interest. As outlined by Kornbluh and LeoGrande, Cyber War refers to the USA?s attempts to implement advanced communication networks In Cuba in hopes to bring about regime change. As a Political Science Major, I?ve studied a lot about how communication networks and social media are increasingly becoming a fundamental ingredient in how groups organize to bring about political change. Perhaps the most well known example of this of the Arab Spring in which groups organized protests on social media. I found it interesting how the United States attempted to mirror this process by essentially setting up capabilities for social media networks, crossing their fingers, and hoping people would organize around democracy. While reading this it kind of reminded me how Batista was overthrown and how radio and improvements in communications technology was a major factor in bringing about that change. It seemed to me like the USA was hoping that social media and Internet would be the new ?radio? and would allow people to organize and overthrow Castro. In sum, the parallels between internet and radio in fostering communication networks that in turn bring about change was a major theme in the back of my head while reading this chapter.
What surprised me in Chapter 8 “George Bush: Turning Back the Clock” was how cooperative Cuba initially was with the U.S. After the 9/11 attack Cuba was one of the first to offer condolences and reach out to the U.S. Not only that but even after Castro grew worried Cuba could be a target of U.S unilateralism , they signed all twelve international protocols against terrorism, and even them use the naval base as a detention centre. Cuba thought of the American movement in Afghanistan excessive so after that tensions escalated and Bush’s behaviour did not help. U.S still considered Cuba as a potential terrorist threat. Yes, Bush appointed more Cuba Americans to senior positions in his presidency but after the 9/11 attacks he seemed to alienate them more, by Bush refusing to remove the embargo, enforced economic sanctions, and wanted to change the Cuban regime all together. Carters visit to Cuba seemed to have gone much better than I would have thought, though unfortunately he was not able to take any big decisions so not much changed. If Bush had not been so extreme and trying to dismiss the problem as Castro things could have been very different. Carter seemed to be willing to negotiate with Cuba, but Bush wanted everything to be perfect for the U.S, and did not care so much about others.
I chose to read Chapter 8 from Kornbluh and LeoGrande. This chapter demonstrated the relationship with Cuba under the influence and President Bush, yet had a focal on Jimmy Carter. The chapter starts by looking at the turmoil and uncertainty that the United States felt after 9/11 and the attitude that they established was either you are against us, or with us. The United States was very suspicious of other countries, and even though Cuba was not on good terms with the US, they reached out despite their rough history in support during their time of crisis. This could have been a moment that the US could realize that there isolation from Cuba is far outdated and an opportunity to reconcile with Cuba would be beneficial to both countries, but instead Bush remained skeptical. The rest of the chapter emphasis’s Jimmy Carter and his pursue to connect with Cuba in hopes of re-establishing a relationship and the barriers and obstacles that made recognizable the challenges in moving forward as a country in this pursuit.
It seems that President Bush was one of the biggest barriers in moving forward with Cuba, and played an active role in detouring American citizens from questioning the separation and wanting to open trade and travel between the two countries. I find this interesting because it would seem that both countries would ultimately benefit by amending, rather then continuing to remain separate. I think that fact that the US strongly wanted to have a large amount of power over Cuba if any sort of negotiation was to take place, disengaged Cuba in their willingness to take steps together towards a relationship.
The main issues seem to remain between leaders, an instance that really stuck out to me was the 2008 hurricanes that hit, and Cuba rejected aid, and the US rejected Cuba’s request for the embargo to be lifted for 6 months in order to help restore the Countries housing and damages from the storm. It seems in instances such as these that the leaders of both countries are too caught up in the histories before, instead of what the Countries and their people need at the time. It is evident that both countries have the ability to accept and give aid, yet it was decided against in order for each to feel like they “haven’t given in,” this was chosen instead of allowing safety and comfort for the people who suffered after the storm.
I think this chapter pointed out some critical points in the more recent Cuba and United States relationships, particularly in regard to both leaders grasps on the country and inability to let go of the past, even in times of need.
For this week, I decided to read Chapter 9, Obama: A New Beginning?, What really stuck out to me reading this chapter (and the whole book really) was the back and forth in regards to remedying relations with Cuba. It seems to be a pattern that when forward steps are taken, the next president would impose harsh/strict policies that would anger the Cuban government and thus take a steps back. This point is one of the reasons why I chose to focus on this chapter, in light of Obama’s recent changes in regulations and policies concerning Cuba, I wanted to see if he always held this stance and other background information that led to his present day decisions.
What really stood out to me and I found interesting in this chapter was the fact that while Obama stated that he wanted to negotiate relations with Cuba, at the same time, the US was still heavily funding programs that sought to facilitate a regime change in Cuba that was more towards one that is democratic. In the Cuban government’s perspective it was not hard to be distrustful of the US considering other actions of “bad faith” from the past. The words of the US government did not reflect those of its actions and this is reflective in the growing of programs such as the “democracy growing” ones that were used in the “Cyber War” against Cuba. One constant point that Raul Castro wanted when negotiating relations with the US was to be treated as equals, but the underlying rhetoric from the US was still one that regarded Cuba as an inferior state that needed to change it’s political system into one that is more reflective and similar to that the of the United States.
The Chapters “George W. Bush” and “Obama” in LeoGrande and Kornbluh’s Back Channel to Cuba were really interesting as the story concerns very recent politics which I have heard about in my everyday life. Chapter eight “George W. Bush” describes how Bush administration went hard on Cuba, such as claiming Cuba as a pro-terrorism country and tightening U.S.-Cuba travel ban. Jimmy Carter tripped to Cuba to help normalizing the relationship which Bush really worsened, Carter’s attempt failed. The imperialistic idea that “rather than engage the Cuban government, Bush aimed to replace it” (355) made me think about other Latin American countries whose governments U.S. also tries hard to replace in history, such as Chile and many other. I personally very much dislike Bush as his idea seems to be old fashioned and irrational.
The chapter “Obama” was more pleasant to read as Obama made some positive and rational changes to U.S.-Cuba politics. The case of Alan Gross is particularly interesting as he remains main figure in the political discourse between U.S and Cuba during the re-opening phase. Also, the U.S.’s decision to be partnering with Spain and the influence of the Church in the negotiation are thought-provoking that there is still colonial power of Spain, which however could be used in a positive way. The story of Jimmy Carter’s re-visiting to Cuba is quite impressive as he is still active and tries to contribute to normalizing the relationship, and I have started liking Carter for my first time after reading this chapter. It is also interesting that Fidel says that “he needed a two-term U.S. president to normalize relations with Cuba because no first-term president would have the political courage to do it” (397). I think Fidel is right that Obama could move forward on this issue largely because he had already secured his second term presidency as U.S. politics tend to be hugely affected by election campaigns. Obama’s stable position made it possible to continue the negotiation with Cuba and finally succeeded to reach the point where no former ten presidents had achieved which the next chapter covers. This chapter really made me want to read the next chapter which I’m sure I’ll do soon.
For this week’s reading I decided to read chapter 9 on “Obama- A New Beginning?” In this chapter what interested me the most was the relation between Obama’s democratic government and Castro’s through solving issues that has stemmed from the last 50 years. This shows that even though the Obama administration is in control now, previous presidents like Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had always tried to use other strategies such as media and Internet as a tool to gain political influence in Cuba. In particular through the case of ‘cyber war’ and the arrest of Alan Gross, this further showed how tense the relations between the two countries were with the hopes of improving the relations. With the US government providing more tools and access to the Internet and the cyberspace (wanting a regime change in Cuba), this further showed the fear for the Cuban government in maintaining control. After reading the chapter, I was really interested in Gross’s case and further researched what has happened to him after various occasions of the US (including Bill Richardson flying to Havana to negotiate terms) trying to release him from the Cuban authorities. It seemed to me that the cyber war has further created a stalemate situation in restoring the two countries relations, as there are still many issues such as the embargo on Cuba, political prisoners and other economic issues still really unchanged. However, referring the Gross’s case, a positive sign shown between Obama’s government and Castro’s was the prisoner swap at the end of 2014. Gross in exchange for members of the Cuban Five was the deal to finally bring Gross back to the US. This to me shows that even though progress is slow from the two governments, the issue of Gross marks a meaningful advancement towards both countries.
This week, I chose to focus on chapter 10: Intimate Adversaries, Possible Friends. I really liked reading this chapter because I felt that it was very current and it was interesting to follow the history of US-Cuban relations and see it brought so tactfully into the present. I found this chapter to be an important reminder that history does not exist in isolation and can have a profound influence on present issues and concerns. We can see this even two years ago when Raúl Castro and Obama met at the memorial for Nelson Mandela. Although the two shared a public exchange – a huge step considering the secretive past between the nations, neither side acknowledged the meeting as an invitation to pursue improved relations. This reluctance can be seen as a trend in previous chapters with past leaders on both sides attempting to save face on the delicate issue.
As a conclusion to the book, I found it useful that Kornbluh and LeoGrande ended with some insight on why US-Cuban relations have not yet improved. After 50 years of conflict, one might assume that some progress has been made, however, this chapter shows conflicts of interest between the two countries still remaining today. The authors draw several lessons from the past, connecting issues that arose over multiple presidencies, in order to inform the future of diplomatic relations between the two countries. These lessons include everything from the importance of considering domestic politics to a word of caution concerning an incremental approach to normalization. By making these connections, they drew the history into the present and the future, making a strong case for the currency of the past and providing an insightful conclusion to the book.
I chose to read the final chapter of Kornbuh and leoGrande’s book in order to find out what their hopes were for the future and if the edition of the book we were reading dealt with the very recent changes in the relationship between the United States and Cuba. The authors focused on the different approaches each president they discussed in the chapters had regarding Cuba, and reminded the reader that while at times communications between Cuban and American bureaucrats was possible, there were still some specific impediments (coming from both sides) that sort of explain why, after fifty years, an arrangement was never achieved. The authors summarized these points into ten lessons both the politicians involved in the conflict and the general audience could learn and understand, a sort of historical summary on what has been the political relationship of the countries.
What is most interesting to me is to see how some of the lessons the authors found after revising the history could have been taken in consideration when Obama announced the changes on Cuban policy. The approach of Obama and Castro at the Nelson Mandela memorial signified a change of pace for both countries, and it symbolized the changes within both of those governments. Is you think about once, the other Castro was always so adamant or how former US presidents didn’t show enough interest in changing the relationship with the island, the reopening of the embassies and possible official visits between presidents are outstanding announcement that end an era of hostilities in the forefront. What I don?t agree with the authors is how they think that after Castro leaves his position in 2018, whoever comes next won?t be able to retain that apparent closeness with the States happening now. Maybe the authors think of that because they do not discuss the last events, but in any case, I believe that for better or worse, the United States will push for an inclusive agenda ever more so than ever. The end of the Castro era is something long waited by US politicians, commerce experts, people living in the US with relatives in Cuba, among others, so it?s clearly going to create an even bigger opening. Even if the next person in charge is under Castro’s command or follows up the idealism of the last fifty years, the shift on the relationship with the US seems a strong indicative of where the island?s population (including the people in charge) see themselves in the next ten, twenty years. Though for Fidel, that might be a stretch, and for the first time since 1959 Cuba will transition into something new, without him.
I was really glad that we continued with the book by Kornbluh and Leogrande this week since I found it so interesting when we read it two weeks ago. Since I read a chapter about a Democrat last week, John F. Kennedy, I decided to read about a Republican this week. George W. Bush (the younger) just also happens to be my least favourite president, so I was worried about what this chapter might have revealed about him. Not only did this chapter validate my feelings about President Bush but it almost exceeded my expectations! Especially in comparison with the Kennedy chapter it almost seems that Bush has taken relations in the complete opposite direction, without too much thought on the matter. While Kennedy, nearing the end of his presidency, began to discuss a peaceful coexistance with Cuba that allowed them to even retain the U.S.S.R. as trading partners as long as they promised to cease intervention in other Latin American revolutions and uprisings. Bush on the other hand completely halted the normalization of relations by acknowledging that the United States could never have relations with a non-democratic state. Leogrande and Kornbluh note that one reason for this aggressive anti-Cuban stance could have been to garner support of him among conservative Cuban exiles who were a growing minority in the electoral district of Florida. This struck me because it shows that Bush would have had motive not to normalize relations and therefore another American president wastes a golden opportunity for positive change in international relations. Towards the end of the chapter Kornbluh and Leogrande mention a meeting where Carter and his Latin American advisor, Jennifer McCoy, met with President Bush after their return from meeting with Fidel in Cuba. The authors describe that Carter and his aid were “surprised that Bush seemed so uninformed about Cuba”(p 355). To me this seems to make sense considering the Bush administration was notorious for either creating rumours or processing false information about Cuba. This just goes to show that the American presidents clearly aren’t that concerned about the Cuban people if eleven of them have failed to bring about a normalization of relations, despite the fact that they believe so greatly in human rights or the betterment of the poor in other countries. The United States reaches out a hand to almost every other country in this world that requires financial or medical help but simply cannot stoop to pick up Cuba because they have a different political ideology.
For this week, I decided to read Obama: A new beginning. The relationship with Obama started off well as the Cuban American National Foundation warmly received him in Miami. With this being said, conditions for a rapprochement between Cuba and the United States appeared more promising than at any time in a half-century. For example, Obama fulfilled his pledge to lift travel and remittance restrictions on Cuban Americans, provide improved television, radio, telephone, and Internet access & Cuban scholars granted visas, and cultural exchanges flourished once again. It seemed both were interested in engaging in communication and cooperation, as Cuba was willing to open a dialogue on all issues, including human rights, political prisoners, and political freedoms. However, Obama didn’t move as fast as expected or as promised. Cuba could not gain attention as many other international issues were at the forefront of America’s mind. What the US wanted most of Cuba with they didn’t see happen was reciprocal recognition by the Cuban Government for the US to continue to engage in this dialogue and take further steps. It was interesting to read how the US used ‘cyber war’ by undermining the Cuban regime, as the effort were believed to promote people to challenge & destabilise the government, this emphases Cuban government insistence on control. Alan Gross is also another important factor to consider when thinking about the fragile relationship. The US were unwilling to make any commitment unless this issue was dealt with as it signalled disinterest in making a better relationship. Even Carter tried to get involved to sort this issue. I looked up Gross to see if he was still imprisoned or had been realised, and saw in 2014 there had been an exchange of prisoners which suggests an improvement in relations. The main issues were the constant agreements and steps forward but then steps were also made backwards constantly. The US were always making offers but never anything solid, which never really gave Cuba much hope. We also see numerous things which had been present throughout their relationship (from reading previous chapters), from the influence of other nations as Spain played a middle man position – with Spain’s encouragement Cuba agreed to release prisoners to using people as communication back and forth.
I was not surprised, but nevertheless disappointed, to have it confirmed for me that electoral politics played an important role in George W. Bush’s policy towards Cuba. Bush was trying to appeal to a growing conservative minority of Cuban exiles in Florida with his strong anti-Castro position. This of course was not unique to Bush (I expect electoral issues were important for all of the Presidents), with Clinton’s policy being shaped by wanting to appeal to the more pro-Cuban faction in Florida. Nevertheless in Bush’s case it seems yet another great opportunity was missed to find compromise and improve relations with Cuba because of politics and a wish to appear Hawkish. The chapter talks about how Cuba made efforts to extend an olive branch after the events of 9/11, from expressing their grief and solidarity initially to supporting international condemnations of terrorism. While I believe this empathy to be genuine, I also wonder if the Cuban government were growing increasingly worried about the potential for a more concerted effort by Bush’s administration to bring about regime change in Cuba. With the successful regime changes brought about by US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bush’s hawkish foreign policy and his negative position on Cuba must have been threatening to Castro. So perhaps Cuba was making efforts at appeasement, to portray themselves less as an enemy of the United States. Bush’s position on Cuba has much continuity with the Republican presidents that have preceded him, with the belief that Cuba is so close that it is actually more a domestic issue than a foreign policy one, and as such he has little respect for Cuban sovereignty. This mindset is hundreds of years old but still seems to carry sway in the Republican party. I hope that the improvements currently being made in relations aren’t scuppered by the next Republican president, but I am not confident.
As a socialist country, Cuba’s foreign policies are fairly unique when compared with most other countries. However, at the same time, Sweig’s book illustrates how Cuba and the US both pursued interventionist policies in order to promote their ideologies. It is no surprise that their bilateral relations have been strained.
I read chapter 9: Obama A New Beginning? by Kornbluh and Leogrande. I chose this chapter because I find the contemporary relations to be very interesting and obviously pertinent to our world today. As with many other people, I am very glad to see some rapprochement between the two rivals. This provides and opportunity to open the island for trade and cooperation. Ultimately, this will help the lives of everyday Cubans. However, what I found most interesting about this chapter, was the continued criticism and moral superiority expressed by the US. The Obama administration seemed to be trying to paint Cuba in a negative light by continuing to bring up its political prisoners and human rights abuses. Meanwhile, Guantanamo bay is on the island, and the US is often at fault for supporting and promoting these political dissidents. When the US allowed Cuba’s entry to the Organization of American States (OAS), it claimed it as an incredibly permissive gesture. However, Cuba had very little interest in the OAS, and this was perhaps even more belittlement of the island country.
I found it to be fairly ridiculous that a country, which financed an invasion, attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro, and has led an embargo since 1960 would claim the moral high ground. However, with the renewing of bilateral diplomatic relations, there is a reasonable hope that discussion will be conducted on even footing and mutual respect. I believe that in order to really achieve normalization of relations, this mutual respect must be attained. If this is accomplished, there is certainly strong hope for the bilateral relations of these two countries.
I am glad that I caught up on this reading for week 8. I have found LeoGrande and Kornbluh?s book to be an incredibly interesting and detailed look into Cuban-American relations. Had I been able to read it the week it was assigned, I am sure I would have been even more blown away in my medicated post-surgery state! On a more serious note, before coming into this course, I had a relative interest in Cuba, but it had been more of a general knowledge about its history. The detail provided in this book helps shed light on how complicated these negotiations had been. Meanwhile, Sweig has continued to provide an insightful look at Cuba from the domestic side. Her descriptions of the goals and achievements of the Revolution were a bit of a surprise, but also inspiring in some ways. The massive improvements in literacy, education, and medicine were definitely not something to be easily dismissed.
I chose to read the chapter about Kennedy?s presidency. I had previously studied the Cuban Missile Crisis from a Soviet point of view, so I was naturally interested in seeing the other sides. It was interesting to see how Cuba was used as a sort of pawn for the superpowers? bilateral struggles. I found it very interesting to see how individual diplomats like Richard Goodwin and James Donovan were able to have meaningful discussions with the Cuban leaders. Evidently, the anti-communism sentiment in the US was far too strong for any President to begin much of a rapprochement, but the individual diplomats were able to make some headway. Had Kennedy stayed in power, there may have been more progress, and perhaps we would not be experiencing a renewing of relations in 2015.