Neo-realism is much more than a descriptive theory of international relations. It is the magnum opus – the vision of the international system as a full-blown world order that is both enduring and inevitable. Neo-realism can be, and often is, viewed as a framework to understand the international system but that is to drastically devalue its significance. For neo-realism is a body of knowledge that grapples with fundamental questions such as the primary role of states above all else and how states behave and respond to other states. Neo-realism is the dominant body of knowledge inside the discipline of international relations because its major assumptions about the realm of international politics are supported through enduring empirical evidence. In other words, Neo-realism stands above other theories because it seems to just get history right.

Before diving into Neo-realism itself, it is worthwhile to understand its pursuits through theoretical methods. The aim of theory is to transcend the descriptive world and develop a method and framework to conceptualize the world and make predictions. Theory is a “depiction of the organization of a domain and the connection among its parts” (Waltz, p. 26). Put more fully, a theory recognizes some parts are more important than others and specifies its relation amongst a particular set of phenomena. Put simply, theory simplifies excessive data points by reducing the information to the central tenants. This makes it easier to understand the particular phenomenon being studied because too much information leads to other bodies of knowledge which may and different causal mechanisms. In this case, economics, for example, can become blended psychology and sociology.

The pursuit of theory itself is to simplify the world to make observations and predictions. Kenneth Waltz in Realist thought and neorealist theory argues” to achieve closeness of fit would negate” (Waltz, p.31) the entire purpose of a theory. That is, theory cannot describe the facts or actual events it seeks to explain because this would merely correspond the writing the fine details of the world. For this reason, to argue neo-realism is unjust in only looking through one level of analysis or lens is to misinterpret the theoretical initiative. Theory needs to make a set of assumptions to simplify yet falsifies reality because discipline boundaries will otherwise become nonexistent. Adding new details, therefore, details lead to a complete reworking of the theory itself.

Now that the ambitions theory has been established, we can now turn to the major assumptions about the international system. The source of these observations is found in John Mearsheimer’s book The Tragedy of great power politics. Through this inquiry, he persuasively establishes truths about the world of international politics by asserting great power politics is undeniably founded on the structure of the international system.

The first major assumption is states operate in a system of anarchy and are the principal actors in world politics. It is worthwhile to note, anarchy in this sense does not mean chaos or disorder. Instead, anarchy represents a system of order in which no central authority exists. That is, there is no level of analysis above the state. For this reason, states cannot appeal to any actor or agent for support or policing. They are ultimately on their own as they are the highest authority. As such, non-governmental agencies are of little to no importance in this conception of the international system. They only work when states want them to work. Multinational corporations are also of little importance to realists. They fall in inside the state along with norms, individuals and ethics.

Each state, to a large extent, possesses some degree of military capabilities which can damage or completely abolish other states. These capabilities fluctuate over time and vary state to state but each state generally contributes a fixed percentage of their GDP each year. The members of NATO, for example, pledged in 2014 to each individually contribute two percent of their respective GDP towards their own defense spending (Defensenews). The actual spending can vary drastically given the size of the economy. One state may only contribute one percent while another contributes ten percent but the former spends a hundredfold given the size of the economy. All states nonetheless, possess some offensive military ability and therefore pose a threat.

Given the configuration of the international system and the possibility of a foreign attack, states can never be certain of the intentions of other states. Some may choose to accept the status quo and thereby refrain from engagement while other states may become revisionists and seek to shift the balance of power. Ultimately, states may say one thing and do another. It is impossible to know with any amount of certainty that a state is not determined to shift the balance of power. Even if states were to be entirely honest with regards to their ambitions, any exogenous force pivot state objectives. As such, states never know whether other states are intent on keeping the status quo or desire change.

Survival becomes the ultimate goal for states as the state itself and all its policies cease to exist under foreign occupation. In other words, economic prosperity, human rights among all other political endeavors are secondary matters as they can only be pursued if the state itself exists. Thomas Hobbes, in his book Leviathan fully unpacks this notion. He argues the reason we enter a social contract and create the state is to escape the dangers of the state of nature. This consent, whether it be tacit or explicit subsequently compels an exchange between the state/sovereign and the individual where rights and freedom are exchanged for protection and new liberties. Though Hobbes is persuasive, one need not accept his justification for the creation of the state whereby he argues state stay is better than the brutal and harsh reality of the state of nature; but it is rather difficult to deny that security is the most important duty of the state. Friends, feelings of accomplishment and happiness, for example, are important for individuals so long as they have food, water, and other essential components to survive. Security must always be the primary aim as the state is an immaterial object that is created to protect all those that reside inside.

States are to be understood as actors that make rational choices. It is worthwhile to note, rational in this sense does not mean omniscient. Instead, states operate in a realm with incomplete information. They can and do make mistakes but that is not to say they are not rational. Sates with utmost intent, formulate strategies to ensure survival because the stakes are high as a miscalculation could lead to another state gaining an edge and perhaps lead to a foreign occupation. States therefore with utmost intent, formulate strategies and choose the most rational option.

These five major assumptions about the state of international relations explicate why states pursue power. Together, as Mearsheimer contends, these five major assumptions are the reason why states are perpetually consumed with expanding power relative to other states. This heavily incentivized reasoning is called offensive Neo-realism and is developed by Mearsheimer. It takes the status of the international system and explains state behavior and the history of international politics through structural arguments. Support for this particular approach to Neo-realism is explained in later paragraphs. For now, we will turn to the behaviors in which states exhibit given the structural arguments for the international system.

Great powers have a great deal of reason to fear other great powers. There exists a great propensity for states to inflict violence on other states given the fact that states possess the power and the means to do so. States find no “mechanism or institution either to prevent the use of violence or for a state to turn to once it has been victimized” (Schmidt, p.432). This gives rise to what Mearsheimer coins as the existence of a “911” problem. Ultimately, there is a lack of central authority to which states can go to for aid. This raises a level of fear in everyone but for some states more than others. Fear is mostly dependent on one’s relative power to the rest of the international system. A state with immense power in terms of military power will have little fear compared to a small bordering state with a small army.

Because states reside in an anarchic international system, they will commit to a general pattern of behavior known as self-help. States ultimately look out for their own best interests to ensure survival. To bring this into practice, states will employ Mearscheimer’s concept of offensive realism and maximize power. States, as Mearsheimer argues, given that states are “apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of the other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, they will quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system (Schmidt, p.433).

Power is the main unit of account in the realm of international relations. It is the yardstick to which one state compares itself to another and can be used to gauge fear and subsequently develops coping strategies. Power in this sense is not to be confused with coercive power in which one agent causes a change in the behavior of another. Instead, power is to be understood as material capabilities to which a state uses for militaristic purposes. This includes military personnel, land superiority and latent power. By definition, latent power falls lower on the hierarchy of power but it nonetheless is important. Population and wealth, which are latent capabilities, can further increase military capabilities but require a further step. For this reason, many states put less of an emphasis on latent power.

International politics can only be conceptualized through the effects of structure on the international system. The causal link that drives state behavior is between other states and the international system. It runs in two directions; the state influences the system and the system influences the state. In other words, some international outcomes extend beyond the state. The system itself, through the issue of self-help, can coerce a rational actor to increase its power in terms of military capabilities. Moreover, one state can cause another state to intervene simply by increasing its military capabilities.

These intuition notions about the realm of international politics can be implemented to explicate state behavior over the entirety of history to the extent that states have existed. This, however, is a daunting and exhaustive task. Instead, I have chosen to focus on the theoretical framework so that readers can apply this knowledge to the past or future as per individual interests. I will, however, shed light on one modern example of state behavior influenced by the international system so readers can gain a further depth of understanding towards Neo-realism. China, as many have predicted, is emerging as a great power and will perhaps become a regional hegemon in the near future.

Chinese defense spending is continuing to rise as China seeks to further establish its power in the international system (Tradingeconomics). Much of this investment in expenditure is being directly put to work in the south pacific sea to further expand their territory. To this pursuit, China is using enormous dredging vessels to strategically place islands in the middle of the ocean. These can and most likely will be used to interfere with shipping routes and establish military dominance. Through satellite images, it has become apparent that airstrips and missile defense systems are indeed present and ready for action.

China’s pursuit to great power is further raising cause for concern for the rest of the world as it is continuing to pursue its own aims despite an international tribunal dismissing China’s historical relevance (NYtimes). Their defiance clearly illustrates the acknowledgment of anarchy in the international system. They recognize no state or institution is going to hold them accountable unless they plan on escalating the situation by entertaining the idea of sanctions or a full-fledged war. For this reason, China will continue to pursue power in an effort to provide security for itself inside the international system. To Mearsheimer point, China most likely acknowledges anarchy and other states military capabilities coupled with uncertainty. This gives rise to the rational its best to increase capabilities to ensure survival. Furthermore, from the state to state perspective, other states will see China’s rise and take action by increasing their relative power.

Neo-realism is a dominant theory because it provides a compelling framework to understand the international system and behavior between states. States will forever be fearful because impunity is enduring as no actor can extend beyond the state and hold states accountable. Though it may appear at times the system is peaceful, states will forever invest in military capabilities and strive for power to protect themselves. This is the ultimate tragedy of international politics. States will forever be fearful and strive for relative power at another states expense.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

References

Dunne text: Richard Ned Lebow, “Classical Realism” (ch. 2); and John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism” (ch. 3)

Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kenneth Waltz, and Robert Gilpin: selections from Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, eds. (1987) International Relations Theory. New York: Macmillan.

 

Kenneth Waltz (1990) “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs 44: 21-37.

 

Brian C. Schmidt (2004) “Realism as Tragedy,” Review of International Studies, 30(3) (2004), 427-441.

 

Kenneth Waltz (1993) “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security,18(2): 44-79.

 

2. H. Carr, (1939), The Twenty Years Crisis. London: Macmillan, chapters 1 and 2.

 

Tweed, David. “China’s Territorial Disputes.” Bloomberg.com. October 03, 2018. Accessed November 5, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/territorial-disputes.

 

Tweed, David. “How Asia’s Military Spending Growth Is Outpacing the World.” Bloomberg.com. May 31, 2016. Accessed November 5, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31/asia-military-spending-rises-in-china-s-shadow-spurring-deals

 

Chun, Ja-hyun, and Ja-hyun Chun. “When National Pride Meets Naval Power: Maritime Insecurity and Chinese Hegemony.” International Politics (Hague, Netherlands), vol. 54, no. 5, 09/01/2017, pp. 598-617,

 

Katty Hunt (2006) “Showdown in the South China Sea: how did we get here?” Cnn.com. August 02, 2016. Accessed November 5, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/index.html

 

Martin Brown, (2017) “How much NATO allies spent on defense in 2017” defensenews.com, Accessed December 2^nd, 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/03/15/results-are-in-heres-how-much-nato-allies-spent-on-defense-in-2017/

 

Tobin Harshaw, (2018) “China outspends the U.S. on defense? Here’s the math”, Bloomberg.ca, Accessed December 2^nd 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-25/china-outspends-the-u-s-on-the-military-here-s-the-math

 

(2017) “China military expenditure”, Tradingeconomics.com, Accessed December 2^nd 2018. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/military-expenditure

 

Jane Perlez, (2016) “Tribunal rejects Beijing’s claims in south China sea”, nytimes.com, Accessed December 2^nd 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.html

 

 

Thomas Hobbes “Leviathan” Norton Critical edition

 

E. H. Carr is persuasive in his conception of the international political arena. Instead of sticking to one theory, like all the other theorist we have encountered so far, Carr sees value in two major schools of thought. As such, he contends sound political though will always be a combination of idealism and realism. This strategy is convincing because he is able to choose the best components of each theory and dismiss their individual flaws. It is as though, implicitly picks up on the widely held maxim “pray for peace but prepare for war” that even extends beyond the realm of international relations.

Flaws of both theories are laid out throughout the book twenty years crisis. Idealism is said to be a great illusion. It is criticized as looking more like indoctrination than academic research. Promoting global peace may be initially viewed as ideal but it proves to be evermore aspirational. That is, there is a dangerous disconnect from the real world. Woodrow Wilson sought to promote idealism onto the world stage but ultimately failed through the commencement of the second world war. As such, idealism at the time succumbed to the powerful explanations of war provided by realism. Carr, however, remains equally critical of realism. He maintains realist want war but doesn’t see a way out of it. For this reason, it is fathomable that realism is not a desirable theory.

Utopia and reality offer a compelling explanation of both schools of thought. Through Albert Sorel, Carr contends “it is the eternal dispute between those who imagine the world to suit their policy and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world” (Carr, p.11). To put things simply, Carr ingeniously frames both theories through the concepts of free will and determinism. He contends idealism is free will as it entertains the possibility of rejecting reality for utopia. Realism, on the other hand, is substituted with determinism because it accepts that one is powerless in changing the realities of the world.

Both idealism and realism fight for the right to be the dominant school of thought in international relations. This dual happens in the 1940’s and is widely regarded as the first great debate. Through this debate, both rival theories seek to establish a paradigm for the discipline of IR. This aim, however, rests unaccomplished as there is always more than one story to tell. That is, there is no vantage point outside the world. Therefore, it is difficult to make claims about the world while in it. Put simply, each theory speaks from a specific vantage point that attempts to make claims about the world. This is problematic because theories are lenses that construct what we see. This meta-theoretical claim persuasively highlights the lack of certainty and ability to apply laws to social sciences. Carr is rational in picking premises from both idealism and realism because neither ideology can claim to be a paradigm. For this reason, a combination of idealism and realism seems like the most logical ideology for international relations.

My initial interest in international relations sparked from watching China’s power moves in the south pacific sea. I recall watching a brief segment on my local news channel that displayed satellite images of massive dredging vessels strategically situated in the middle of the ocean. The report proceeded to explicate that these soon to be islands would become tactical military compounds. As such, I began thinking to myself, how is it China can simply claim international waters as they did and not face any sort of repercussions? What right do they have to occupy and militarize the middle of the ocean where numerous countries border and billions of dollars are funneled through by container ships. This situation raised a lot of questions for me due to its sheer magnitude of scale and rather discreet reporting. As a young Canadian, I had little experience with anything to do with modern war. I couldn’t help but want to learn more.

As I venture further into my undergraduate degree in political science and philosophy, I’ve begun to understand why states exist and how they operate. Theorist like Hobbes, Machiavelli and Nietzsche have shown me a different side of politics. Instead of always focusing on operating for “the greater good”, I got a taste of the darker side of politics. These theorists, among others, illustrate how individuals, states and other agents often act cynically. That is, they do what is best for them because it is the rational choice. Take, for example, structural realism, which we have just begun to touch on in class. One of its many assertions is that an international body does not exist to save the day when a state is in trouble. Put simply, during times of war, if your state is losing, you don’t have an external police force to call upon. As such, it is in your best interests to become as powerful as possible to defend your state.

This theory is largely evident in Hobbes’ Leviathan. I am particularly intrigued by his writing because of his exploration of the state of nature. He argues, inside the state of nature, there is no incentive to trust other people because contracts or agreements cannot be enforced. As such, it is in your best interest to become as powerful as possible. Only then do you experience liberty. This simplification of Hobbes’ argument is interesting because it parallels many of the assertions of structural realism but conversely places the unit of analyses on the individual instead of the state.

Both philosophy and particularly political philosophy have provided me with an understanding of normative issues inside the realm of politics and assumptions about human nature. I now wish to push further inquiry into the state level, particularly to understand how states coexist. I want to comprehend what power incentives lay at the international level and what goals states are pursuing. Rational choice, game theory and the dark side of politics and human nature are of interests. David Hume, John Locke, and Plato are fun to read but I prefer the cynical approach favored by theorists like Machiavelli and Hobbes.

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