Described as “probably the most friendless people in the world” in a 2009 UN report, the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar have been for generations subject to systemic marginalization, mistreatment and violence by the country’s military government and the extremist Buddhist monks who view the Rohingya Muslims as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.[i] Rendered stateless after the loss of their citizenship as a result of changes in Myanmar’s citizenship laws in 1982, The violence against the Rohingya has ramped up since 2015 in the aftermath of a series of attacks on a number of Myanmar military and police posts by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) rebels associated with the Rohingya minority. In the latest wave of the military’s “clearing operations” which has reportedly involved rape, indiscriminate murder of civilians and burning of Rohingya villages, Bangladesh which shares a border with Rohingya’s home state of Rakhine has witnessed a new surge in the inflow of refugees who now approximately number 370,000.[ii]

Although the political and humanitarian response from the international community to the prosecution of Rohingya has been inadequate by many accounts, much of the criticism made mainly by Muslim countries and human rights activists have been directed at Aung Sun Suu Kyi, the Noble prize laureate who is leading Myanmar’s fledgling democracy since the 2015 election. Although Suu Kyi’s failure to speak out against the atrocities committed against the Rohingya is objectionable, the fact of the matter is that she has no real authority over the Myanmar military which exerts tremendous influence over the country’s governance and economic development.[iii]  On this basis, if international pressure is to have any tangible consequences on the ground, it must be focused on areas of interest to the Burmese military.

While communal ethnic and religious differences lie at the root of the tensions in Myanmar, natural resources development which require land appropriation by the government provide an added incentive for pursuing policies the contribute to the forceful movement of minorities such as the Rohingya. In achieving economic growth through developing mining, oil and gas, and agriculture sectors the Burmese military relies on the investment and collaboration of China, Korea and Japan as well as some multinational corporations and investors.[iv] Since these international partners are more vulnerable and responsive to criticism on humanitarian grounds, the Burmese military is more likely to change its approach to minorities such as the Rohingya, if it feels that international criticism could jeopardise the country’s long term economic prospect.

[i] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38168917

[ii] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41222210

[iii] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-41243635

[iv] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/14/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-rohingya-crisis-and-how-it-could-roil-southeast-asia/?utm_term=.4cef8a1367c1

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Policy Brief review
Case #1
“The Truth about Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan” (http://www.cips-cepi.ca/how-canada-failed-in-afghanistan/)
Roland Paris is the University Research Chair in International Security and Governance at the University of Ottawa and has served as a senior advisor for the Prime Minister of Canada and Global Affairs Canada. In this 2014 piece for the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS), Roland Paris assesses Canada’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan upon it’s then-anticipated end in March 2014.
After providing a brief context for Canada’s mission in Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Paris takes it upon himself to provide an objective evaluation of the mission which he claims, despite the positive assessments by the Canadian military and government officials, to have been a failure.
On the military front, Paris focuses his analysis on Canada’s major contribution to the war in Afghanistan in the province of Kandahar between 2006 and 2011. He claims that despite the consistently positive evaluation of achievements by the Canadian military, after the initial success of the Operation Medusa in September 2006 that resulted in a decisive defeat of the Taliban forces, the employment of unconventional military tactics by the Taliban led to continuous deterioration of security condition in the province until 2011 when the surge in the military presence of the US forces led to a temporary stabilisation of security in the province.
In evaluating Canada’s non-military involvement in Afghanistan, Paris maintains that the prospect for Canada’s major contributions in the rehabilitation of Dahla Dam, building of 50 schools and its support for polio immunization remained contingent upon its success on the security front.
Roland Paris draws on a variety of academic and related primary sources to make a persuasive case that despite the invaluable sacrifices of Canadian soldiers, Canada’s mission in Afghanistan has fallen far short of meeting its strategic objective of stabilizing the political and security situation in the country.
Case #2
Policy Brief: EU and Ukraine (https://d1pbog36rugm0t.cloudfront.net/-/media/eucentre/pdfs/policy-briefs/eu-and-ukraine-policy-brief.pdf)
University of Alberta’s European Union Center of Excellence (EUCE) is one of the three EUCE institutions in Canada that according to the centre’s website tries to provide Canadians with information about various aspect of European Union and its diverse relationship with Canada.
This 2015 policy brief looks at political and economic context, the dynamics and the prospects of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). Having reviewed the political challenges that DCFTA’s ratification and implementation had encountered in Ukraine, the policy brief goes on to discuss the significance of DCFTA under the reform agenda that AA outlines for the country’s relationship with the EU. The policy brief maintains that while under the framework of European Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), which guides EU’s relations with its neighbours, DCFTA offers no prospect of EU membership for Ukraine, the acknowledgement of Ukraine’s European status, the prospect of access to EU’s vast market, and the size of EU Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) package to Ukraine are great enough incentives for Ukraine to undertake implementation of the political, economic, and legal reforms that EU expects in return.
In the light of the developments such as the outbreak of a civil war and the de facto annexation of Crimea by Russia that have taken place in Ukraine since the composition of this policy brief, one has to acknowledge that the brief mention of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine’s politics in this policy brief fails to anticipate the degree of Russia’s reaction to the developments under study and the prospect of EU relations with Ukraine in general.
Case #3
On Iran, Canada should pick up where Obama left off (http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/navid-hassibi/canada-iran-relations_a_23020018/)
Navid Hassibi is the founding director of the Council on International Policy and a non-resident fellow with the Nuclear Security Working Group at the George Washington University. In this blog post for Huffington post Canada, Hassibi argues that with regards to relations with Iran, Canada’s economic and political interest would be best served, if Canada supports EU’s commitment to the nuclear deal it had reached with the Islamic regime with the agreement and collaboration of Obama administration in 2015.
Hassibi explains that the deal that was achieved after intense multilateral negotiations and under the pressure of economic sanctions on Iran has managed to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He points out that in the light of the development that were made possible through collaborative approach by the EU and the US under Obama, important economic prospects have opened up for western corporations that Canada could take advantage of them. Hassibi warns however that Trump administration’s more adversarial approach to Iran and its continuous threat to withdraw from the deal not only could undermine the economic prospect of relations with Iran, but also add more volatility in the Middle East, a region already embroiled in war and insecurity. Based on these concerns and observations, Hassibi suggests that Canada under Prime Minister Trudeau should continue to support the deal alongside the EU.
Hassibi’s analysis of the significance and the consequences of the failure of nuclear deal are well supported by evidence and data, I find, however, his estimation of Canada’s leverage on influencing the US foreign policy unrealistic.