Afghanistan National Army has taken over the bulk of counterinsurgency operations in the country since 2014. This came in the aftermath of the change in the role and strategy of International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan to transfer a greater role on the battlefield against the Taliban to Afghan forces and perform in the training and advising capacity for the Afghan military. Three years after the transition and despite the intensifying security challenges and incurring rising casualty rates, the Afghan Army has managed to pull off the task and maintain a government’s control over much of the country’s major urban centers. The situation, however, will be sustainable if no step is taken to address the ever-exacerbating attrition rates in the Afghanistan National Army that is losing more soldiers in the battle and to desertion than it can recruit.

Consisting of approximately 350,000 personnel, The Afghanistan army has lost approximately 6500 soldiers, with another 10,000 wounded in the fight against various insurgency and terrorist groups in 2016 alone. More alarming, the army had to replace 170,000 of the force due to the career changes of the personnel, or simply due to their desertion of duties. To sustain its capabilities, Afghanistan National Army is expected to recruit at least 6000 new soldiers each month while it has only been able to absorb 5000 soldiers per month last year. The attrition of the forces has contributed to the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan which in turn invoked the need for the new US administration to increase the number of US forces in the country.

While the 130$ monthly salary of Afghan Army members have been the main attraction for young Afghans to join the military, the increasing risks of serving in the army for the soldiers and their families, corruption, and the political confusion with regards to encountering terrorism and insurgency increasingly discourage new recruitment. Demoralised by the lack of political clarity on their role, uncertain about the logistical support in operations, and fearful of inadequate medical facilities and support in case of injury there remains no wonder the attrition rates are so alarmingly high in the Afghanistan army.

References:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/20/ghost-soldiers-too-many-u-s-trained-afghans-are-going-awol/

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/afghan-security-forces-struggle-just-to-maintain-stalemate.html

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/personnel.htm

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/world/middleeast/civilian-casualties-in-afghan-war-are-unabated-in-2016.html

The Taliban has been a constant source of insecurity in Afghanistan since the early 1990s when the group first emerged to bring peace and Islamic rule to the war-torn country. Having established their Islamic Emirate by 2000, the group turned Afghanistan into a haven for Islamist jihadist from around the world which included Usama Bin Laden, the mastermind of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Upon the intervention of the international community in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the group had to go underground to be able to operate and challenge the new Afghanistan government. The change in the nature of the Taliban and its mode of operation required and reflected a change in the types and sources of the group’s finances. The Taliban has been successful in bringing about this change which in addition to helping the group to sustain its operations financially, has helped it on other fronts as well. The Taliban’s successful diversification of its sources of income has been instrumental in its ability to maintain a degree of decision making independence, and a higher level of local integration that has in turn contributed to the group’s local popularity and legitimation.

Since the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001, the group has secured a stable flow of funds from a variety of sources. It has benefited from facilitating and partaking in drug trafficking; it has established a taxation system that collects taxes from the farmers and small business owners within its territory, and it has found private international sponsors in neighboring countries and wealthy Gulf nations. Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI) is another supplier of funds for the Taliban. More surprisingly, however, the US and the international allies in Afghanistan, too, have played an important role in funding the Taliban’s operations by purchasing security from the group for the local projects in the Taliban territory.

Although targeting the vast and varied sources of the Taliban’s estimated annual 2$ billion finances is not easily achievable, there are certain areas that Afghanistan’s international allies could make a difference in this regards. Development of Afghanistan’s infrastructure projects is one such area. Although the Taliban have been the greatest source of concern for Afghanistan’s security, the fact of the matter is that the group and its operations are primarily based in the southern and southwestern parts of the country. Ironically, the bulk of the infrastructure projects after 2001 have disproportionately been focused in those same regions even though the rest of the country suffers from a comparable infrastructure deficit. This pattern has been attributed to the dynamics of the ethnic politics in Afghanistan as the southern and southwestern regions are dominantly populated by Pashtuns who have been dominant in the Afghanistan politics in the past two centuries. For two reasons the international community can play a role in reducing the Taliban’s funds from the development projects in Afghanistan. Firstly, the international donors and supporters can determine where the distribution and investment of infrastructure funds. Secondly, any change in the patterns of infrastructure development in Afghanistan would not have any major adverse effect on the political stability of the country. 

Sources consulted:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/world/asia/19taliban.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8077301/Taliban-Britain-is-our-greatest-source-of-funding.html

http://www.dw.com/en/how-the-taliban-get-their-money/a-18995315

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/04/03/follow-the-money-the-talibans-growing-criminal-empire.html

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/how-the-taliban-gets-its_b_8551536.html

Access to clean water in Afghanistan is a challenge for the majority of the citizens. The situation in rural Afghanistan, however, is much direr. With approximately 80 percent of the country’s population living in rural areas, the fact that only 20 percent of this segment of the population, in contrast to 27 percent in the cities, has access to sanitary water supplies could shed some light on the scope of the challenge of providing access to clean water and sanitation in Afghanistan. From a myriad of factors that contribute to the problem of access to clean water and sanitation in Afghanistan, lack of adequate and efficient water infrastructure plays an important role. Unlike the urban environment which requires a more centralized and costly infrastructure planning, addressing the issue of insufficient water infrastructure through a relatively decentralized approach could make a tangible impact on the access to clean water for most Afghan citizens.

Decades of civil war and negligence has left Afghanistan with a huge water infrastructure deficit of 11 billion dollars. Lack of any comprehensive water management plan, or capacity for that matter, has further complicated the water situation in Afghanistan. While heavily reliant on rivers and the snow run-off from the mountains during spring and summer for agricultural purposes, no reservoir, water canals, or major dams have been developed to harness and control the country’s major source of water. Climate change’s impact on the geographical and timing patterns, as well as the quantity of the seasonal flow of water that manifest themselves in the form of flooding and droughts, have further intensified Afghanistan’s need for water infrastructure.

 Beyond these ecological impacts, not only do difficulties in having access to water supplies contribute to over 40 percent of local conflicts in rural Afghanistan, it does take a toll on the health and wellbeing of many Afghan citizens too. With over 20 percent of the rural population who deprived of any basic sanitary facilities practice open defecation, the alternative of traditional unsanitary latrines does not offer much relief considering the contamination risk they pose to the underground and surface sources of water that are commonly used by the rural population. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that 25 percent of the death of children under the age of 5 is attributed to water contamination and poor sanitation.

There is no doubt that addressing Afghanistan’s huge water infrastructure deficit requires a significant amount of financial resources and planning. Providing funds and designs for strategic water management projects such as dams, reservoir, sustainable and adequate irrigation systems are contingent on the central government’s political will and ability to negotiate with the international community and neighboring countries to achieve a workable arrangement for the region and the country. Addressing the most urgent aspects of Afghanistan’s clean water and sanitation crisis, however, does not require significant centralized and coordinated effort. Quite to the contrary, educational initiatives on basic sanitation and waste disposal does not require significant financial resources or equipment. Similarly, development of local water treatment facilities through decentralized and local collaboration that could be encouraged by government “water tariffs” in the supply of clean water in the rural Afghanistan would have an immediate impact on the scope and quality of water supply in the rural areas.

Sources consulted:

·       https://www.hydratelife.org/afghanistans-water-crisis/

·       https://borgenproject.org/water-quality-afghanistan/

·       https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/10/24/afghanistans-coming-water-crisis/

·       http://www.mintpressnews.com/MyMPN/afghans-lack-access-clean-water/

Described as “probably the most friendless people in the world” in a 2009 UN report, the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar have been for generations subject to systemic marginalization, mistreatment and violence by the country’s military government and the extremist Buddhist monks who view the Rohingya Muslims as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.[i] Rendered stateless after the loss of their citizenship as a result of changes in Myanmar’s citizenship laws in 1982, The violence against the Rohingya has ramped up since 2015 in the aftermath of a series of attacks on a number of Myanmar military and police posts by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) rebels associated with the Rohingya minority. In the latest wave of the military’s “clearing operations” which has reportedly involved rape, indiscriminate murder of civilians and burning of Rohingya villages, Bangladesh which shares a border with Rohingya’s home state of Rakhine has witnessed a new surge in the inflow of refugees who now approximately number 370,000.[ii]

Although the political and humanitarian response from the international community to the prosecution of Rohingya has been inadequate by many accounts, much of the criticism made mainly by Muslim countries and human rights activists have been directed at Aung Sun Suu Kyi, the Noble prize laureate who is leading Myanmar’s fledgling democracy since the 2015 election. Although Suu Kyi’s failure to speak out against the atrocities committed against the Rohingya is objectionable, the fact of the matter is that she has no real authority over the Myanmar military which exerts tremendous influence over the country’s governance and economic development.[iii]  On this basis, if international pressure is to have any tangible consequences on the ground, it must be focused on areas of interest to the Burmese military.

While communal ethnic and religious differences lie at the root of the tensions in Myanmar, natural resources development which require land appropriation by the government provide an added incentive for pursuing policies the contribute to the forceful movement of minorities such as the Rohingya. In achieving economic growth through developing mining, oil and gas, and agriculture sectors the Burmese military relies on the investment and collaboration of China, Korea and Japan as well as some multinational corporations and investors.[iv] Since these international partners are more vulnerable and responsive to criticism on humanitarian grounds, the Burmese military is more likely to change its approach to minorities such as the Rohingya, if it feels that international criticism could jeopardise the country’s long term economic prospect.

[i] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38168917

[ii] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41222210

[iii] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-41243635

[iv] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/14/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-rohingya-crisis-and-how-it-could-roil-southeast-asia/?utm_term=.4cef8a1367c1

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Policy Brief review
Case #1
“The Truth about Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan” (http://www.cips-cepi.ca/how-canada-failed-in-afghanistan/)
Roland Paris is the University Research Chair in International Security and Governance at the University of Ottawa and has served as a senior advisor for the Prime Minister of Canada and Global Affairs Canada. In this 2014 piece for the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS), Roland Paris assesses Canada’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan upon it’s then-anticipated end in March 2014.
After providing a brief context for Canada’s mission in Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Paris takes it upon himself to provide an objective evaluation of the mission which he claims, despite the positive assessments by the Canadian military and government officials, to have been a failure.
On the military front, Paris focuses his analysis on Canada’s major contribution to the war in Afghanistan in the province of Kandahar between 2006 and 2011. He claims that despite the consistently positive evaluation of achievements by the Canadian military, after the initial success of the Operation Medusa in September 2006 that resulted in a decisive defeat of the Taliban forces, the employment of unconventional military tactics by the Taliban led to continuous deterioration of security condition in the province until 2011 when the surge in the military presence of the US forces led to a temporary stabilisation of security in the province.
In evaluating Canada’s non-military involvement in Afghanistan, Paris maintains that the prospect for Canada’s major contributions in the rehabilitation of Dahla Dam, building of 50 schools and its support for polio immunization remained contingent upon its success on the security front.
Roland Paris draws on a variety of academic and related primary sources to make a persuasive case that despite the invaluable sacrifices of Canadian soldiers, Canada’s mission in Afghanistan has fallen far short of meeting its strategic objective of stabilizing the political and security situation in the country.
Case #2
Policy Brief: EU and Ukraine (https://d1pbog36rugm0t.cloudfront.net/-/media/eucentre/pdfs/policy-briefs/eu-and-ukraine-policy-brief.pdf)
University of Alberta’s European Union Center of Excellence (EUCE) is one of the three EUCE institutions in Canada that according to the centre’s website tries to provide Canadians with information about various aspect of European Union and its diverse relationship with Canada.
This 2015 policy brief looks at political and economic context, the dynamics and the prospects of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). Having reviewed the political challenges that DCFTA’s ratification and implementation had encountered in Ukraine, the policy brief goes on to discuss the significance of DCFTA under the reform agenda that AA outlines for the country’s relationship with the EU. The policy brief maintains that while under the framework of European Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), which guides EU’s relations with its neighbours, DCFTA offers no prospect of EU membership for Ukraine, the acknowledgement of Ukraine’s European status, the prospect of access to EU’s vast market, and the size of EU Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) package to Ukraine are great enough incentives for Ukraine to undertake implementation of the political, economic, and legal reforms that EU expects in return.
In the light of the developments such as the outbreak of a civil war and the de facto annexation of Crimea by Russia that have taken place in Ukraine since the composition of this policy brief, one has to acknowledge that the brief mention of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine’s politics in this policy brief fails to anticipate the degree of Russia’s reaction to the developments under study and the prospect of EU relations with Ukraine in general.
Case #3
On Iran, Canada should pick up where Obama left off (http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/navid-hassibi/canada-iran-relations_a_23020018/)
Navid Hassibi is the founding director of the Council on International Policy and a non-resident fellow with the Nuclear Security Working Group at the George Washington University. In this blog post for Huffington post Canada, Hassibi argues that with regards to relations with Iran, Canada’s economic and political interest would be best served, if Canada supports EU’s commitment to the nuclear deal it had reached with the Islamic regime with the agreement and collaboration of Obama administration in 2015.
Hassibi explains that the deal that was achieved after intense multilateral negotiations and under the pressure of economic sanctions on Iran has managed to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He points out that in the light of the development that were made possible through collaborative approach by the EU and the US under Obama, important economic prospects have opened up for western corporations that Canada could take advantage of them. Hassibi warns however that Trump administration’s more adversarial approach to Iran and its continuous threat to withdraw from the deal not only could undermine the economic prospect of relations with Iran, but also add more volatility in the Middle East, a region already embroiled in war and insecurity. Based on these concerns and observations, Hassibi suggests that Canada under Prime Minister Trudeau should continue to support the deal alongside the EU.
Hassibi’s analysis of the significance and the consequences of the failure of nuclear deal are well supported by evidence and data, I find, however, his estimation of Canada’s leverage on influencing the US foreign policy unrealistic.