While tailings ponds in Alberta—large basins designed for storing waste produced during the oil extraction process—are essential to the continued operation of bitumen mining, they have significant environmental impacts. Most recently, they have begun to leak into the Athabasca River: a major water source for plants, wildlife and large human populations alike. The ultimate power in dealing with these, and various other, impacts is held by the Alberta and Canadian government (Natural Resources Canada, 2015). They exclusively have the ability to strengthen, or weaken, regulations regarding the construction, maintenance and reclamation of tailings ponds and in turn hold the power to minimizing their environmental impacts and protecting the local ecosystem and communities.
Although the Canadian government is a signatory to numerous international agreements pertaining to environmental management, none affect the pollutants emitted by the tailings ponds into the soil (Environment Canada, 2013). While some of these agreements do concern themselves with the impacts of waste, one, the Stockholm Convention, focuses on household chemicals and agricultural pesticides (Stockholm Convention, 2013), while the other, Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management, is non-binding and makes few mentions of any specific substances (SAICM, 2006). Not only are Canadian international agreements largely irrelevant, but their other partnerships hold little sway as well. Earlier this year NAFTA attempted to launch an inquiry into the seepage of tailings ponds’ waste into the river system on the grounds that it is against the federal government’s own Fisheries Act, which prohibits toxic material from contaminating water (McDiarmid, 2015). This probe, however, was blocked by the federal government which further demonstrates how minimal the influence of these international organisations and agreements is in encouraging increased action to counter any environmental risks.
Within Canada itself, the government may be responsible for regulatory decisions with regards to tailings ponds management if they involve uranium tailings, navigable waters, fish bearing waters and fisheries, environmental matters of international and inter-provincial concern, and federal lands. However, despite this, Natural Resources Canada “does not have a mandate with respect to the regulations of tailings” (Natural Resources Canada, 2015). There is, however, more general yet still relevant legislation pertaining to rivers. The Fisheries Act is again a good example as it demonstrates the ineffectiveness of current self-imposed regulations. Amended by the Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act, it was weakened to address only fish that are part of a commercial, recreational or Aboriginal fishery, and allows for non-permanent damage to be done to fish habitat as well as assessment of this damage to be done by the proponent, with no requirement for government verification. (Miners, 2015). Thus, while there is legislation for protecting fish and their habitats, it is not extensive enough to adequately deal with the problem. More specific tailings ponds regulation is predominantly concentrated in the provincial government. Earlier this year the Alberta government released the “Tailings Management Framework for the Mineable Athabasca Oil Sands” which builds on existing legislation such as the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, which prohibits the “release of a substance into the environment in an amount, concentration or level or at a rate of release that is in excess of that expressly prescribed by an approval” (Alberta Government, 2015; Province of Alberta, 2014, p. 75). The “Tailings Management Framework” aims to reducing the risk of seepage by limiting the size of tailings ponds and the volume of fluids within them. Unfortunately, however, it does not include more direct approaches to fighting seepage, nor does it address potential actions with any existing seepage. This is nevertheless an important document because it creates a framework that helps expand on existing legislation in the absence of anything similar at the national level.
In addition to this, of course, there exists an informal cultural aspect relating to tailings ponds. There is a broad, overarching concern for the environment and existing regulations are meant to protect human populations the same as they also care for plant and animal life by attempting to minimise impacts on their habitats and to reduce the amount of toxins in their water and food supply. While in government these concerns may sometimes be compromised in the pursuit of private investment, they remain present in the minds of the people, and in particular in First Nations communities. Due perhaps to their greater reliance on nature, they have been instrumental in leading the fight against tailings pond mismanagement. For example, upon research that “found contaminants in traditional foods such as muskrat and moose,” the Mikisew Cree First Nation along with the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, both located downstream from the tailings ponds, called for a “greater say in the pace of development and environmental regulations” in order to be able to deal with the projects that they claim compromise the integrity of the environment and wildlife (McCarthy & Cryderman, 2014).
Due to all these regulations pertaining to the government, transparency, openness to public participation and accountability are crucial in determining that proper action is taken to make sure that tailings ponds are being dealt with in a responsible way. Transparency is indeed an issue, as new legislation is really only made available to the public upon completion. The process and reasoning in the creation of laws is largely hidden, and when explanations are given there is no guarantee that they were the true drivers behind the decision that was ultimately made. In more extreme cases, like the blocking of the NAFTA probe into the tailings ponds seepage, the federal government explicitly denied to be transparent by refusing the public to collect information on the government’s actions that the public may use against them. In doing so, the government is also creating barriers to public participation by withholding information and therefore preventing citizens from having a base on which to advocate on.
There is of course a level of consultative participation in that the government accepts comments and feedback, thereby allowing the public to have some sort of voice in what goes on. However, they are under no obligation to take any of this into account when making decisions and while they may provide the reasoning behind these decisions, it does not have to be something that the public agrees with.
This is relatively easy to do because of the low level of accountability that governments face. While citizens are free to voice their displeasure, it carries little consequence. In severe cases legal action may be an option, but this is a difficult and time consuming process that few can afford, and results are not guaranteed. Ultimately, government accountability comes in the form of elections where voters evaluate its general performance and decide whether to keep or replace it. The obvious problems with this approach are that these opportunities come relatively rarely and refuse voters the chance to voice displeasure with specific policies. That being said, the alleged “muzzling of scientists” by the federal Conservative party, which affected knowledge of the oil sands, was made to be quite a large issue in the recent election that saw their defeat, so while elections are not the most efficient form of accountability, they can still have an impact.
In conclusion, while there are many factors that come into governance’s treatment of tailings pond seepage, they have minimal effect. The international environmental agreements that Canada is a part of do not address water contamination specifically, while relevant domestic legislation has been significantly weakened. And though public pressure to improve regulation and reduce impacts exists, it faces the challenges of a largely opaque government that discourages public participation and is difficult to hold accountable. Of course, these issues are generic and exist with government in general. They can, however, be remedied, primarily through stronger, binding international agreements that encourage the government to set stricter regulations on itself and to create greater ties with local, affected citizens. If little accountability currently exists from the citizens below, it must come from the international community above. Starting with just one river, this external pressure would make a world of difference.
References
Alberta Government. (2015). Lower Athabasca region: Tailings management framework for the Mineable Athabasca oil sands. Retrieved from http://esrd.alberta.ca/focus/cumulative-effects/cumulative-effects- management/management-frameworks/documents/LARP-TailingsMgtAthabascaOilsands-Mar2015.pdf
Environment Canada. (2013). International activities. Retrieved from https://www.ec.gc.ca/gdd-mw/default.asp?lang=En&n=B9F17838-1
McCarthy, S., & Cryderman, K. (2014, July 7). Oil sands pollutants contaminate traditional First Nations’ foods: report. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/oil-sands-pollutants- affect-first-nations diets-according-to-study/article19484551/
McDiarmid, M. (2015, January 28). NAFTA probe of Alberta’s tailings ponds blocked by Canada. CBC News. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nafta-probe-of-alberta-s-tailings-ponds-blocked-by-canada- 1.2935004
Miners, J. (2015). A wicked problem? Land-use impacts in the Fraser Valley. Personal Collection of J. Miners, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC.
Natural Resources Canada. (2015). Tailings management at NRCan. Retrieved from http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/publications/13924
Province of Alberta. (2015). Environmental protection and enhancement act. Edmonton, AB: Alberta Queen’s Printer. Retrieved from http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Acts/E12.pdf
Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management. (2006). Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management. Geneva: United Nations Environment Programme. Available from http://www.saicm.org/
Stockholm Convention. (2013). Stockholm Convention. Available from http://chm.pops.int/Home/tabid/2121/Default.aspx
