Since learning of the WPS Agenda, I have always had mixed feelings and these readings demonstrated some of the key reasons why we should all have mixed feelings about it. All 3 articles posited that since resolution 1325 was adopted, the normative framework for the protection and promotion of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict settings has expanded dramatically….. yay!!! They all also noted that many of the consequent NAPs that were created pursuant to 1325 are ‘focused on process with neither mechanisms for accountability nor budgets for real implementation’….. not yay.
Lack of resource though seems like a very small (albeit crucial) part of the empirical puzzle of addressing the gendered experience of conflict and security. Firstly I think its important to note that the success of 1325 outlined vaguely as women’s participation in peace processes, protection from gender-based violence, and promotion of gender equality in conflict-affected settings, is shallow in nature and neglectful of broader structural issues that contribute to insecurity, such as poverty, inequality, and political repression. Despite this, an acknowledgement that gender has an effect on how an individual experiences conflict and insecurity (in all of its forms), leads to a promising way forward. Though I am not sure if that type of optimism is warranted almost 24 years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325.
Both True and Singh highlight norms, and ‘norm entrepreneurs’ as a main vehicle of success for 1325. Transfer of norms and practices related to women’s participation in peace processes, protection from gender-based violence, and promotion of gender equality in conflict-affected settings. States and organizations may be influenced to adopt WPS policies through learning from best practices, emulation of successful models, or pressure from international actors. George, and Shephard acknowledge that the implementation of 1325 would not have come this far without individuals (mostly women) and organizations (not for profit women’s organizations) work to change social norms and institutional practices by framing women’s inclusion and empowerment as crucial elements of peace and security. So, in essence, women have been working hard to earn their status of personhood, but the norms surrounding women and their experiences haven’t been altered enough that governments are willing to fund NAPs. Another mixed emotion has settled in.
Then I come to think about the effectiveness of women’s participation in the sense of… is that all that is required? If all it takes is women who are advocating for their own inclusion and empowerment, why are women still faced with horrific situations related to their security in and out of conflict zones? It is not a secret that women’s participation in peace and security processes is often tokenistic and does not translate into meaningful decision-making power. Women, particularly those from marginalized groups, often face barriers to participation and encounter discrimination and exclusion within male-dominated peacebuilding institutions. In terms of 1325, True argues that the proportion of women representatives in parliament has a major bearing on the adoption of a NAP, assumingly because they have positions in power. Norm adopting states have significantly higher levels of women’s representation. But how can an international drive for women’s involvement in peacekeeping and parliament happen while also fundamentally rejecting tokenization?
Also acknowledging that WPS agenda reflects Western-centric biases and priorities, often overlooking the diverse experiences and perspectives of women in non-Western contexts, what does the success of 1325 look like to marginalized women? Women most affected by conflict? Women who have been working hard to normalize their existence in these spaces?
This week’s reading touched on so many components of the past weeks. Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda intersects with so many topics: militarism, gender, religion, race, etc. There is a tendency to homogenize the experience of women, but as Singh argues, normative framework such as UN’s WPS agenda, there is a need to recognize that women’s experience is not homogenous. I especially was intrigued by the argument that the framework of women defines women as actors and agents; however, this sentiment places additional burden for women to bear. By falsely homogenizing women’s lives and experiences, it fails to recognize different factors that differentiates women’s experiences, which has been a common theme that we’ve explored throughout the past weeks. I agree with her argument that these normative global frameworks must also be regionalized and localized — this will allow for different experiences to be captured better. In this context, I appreciated her framing of women as being “controlled actors”, which recognizes that women’s capacity or agency to act is structurally and culturally controlled. Singh’s concept of “controlled actors” resonates deeply, emphasizing that women’s agency is often constrained by structural and cultural forces. This perspective prompts a reconsideration of the root causes of gender inequality, including patriarchal systems and militarized power dynamics. It underscores the necessity of a bottom-up approach to achieve genuine transformation. This was further explored in True’s article, where some of the National Action Plans have been superficial or lacking genuine effort where there have been no real intentions/efforts. Despite these shortcomings, the mainstreaming of gender in NAPs and the broader WPS agenda presents an opportunity for the normalization and recognition of women’s diverse roles and impacts, which is an optimistic view that mainstreaming of gender in NAPs and WPS can perhaps lead to normalization and realization of women’s different roles and impacts in this context.
In Singh’s article, she argues how the EU is a normative power playing a signficant role in between norm constitution and norm diffusion, which may play a role in its preconceived notions of WPS agenda and homogenization of women’s experiences. While I agree with this, I wonder if and how this would change — with the Western dominance at international levels, it is difficult to dismantle the norms and notions.
Recently, I saw OECD’s SIGI 2023 Global Report on Gender Equality in Times of Crisis. In there, it indicates that 30% of women think that it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife under certain circumstances. Even in Singh’s discussion about FHH, there were different reactions, even from women, to them — bad omens, etc. Of course, we often discuss the ways in which men instil patriarchal ideologies and practices, but also, women also play a part in patriarchy too.
How can policymakers and practitioners, when international organizations are led by the western countries, ensure that the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda remains inclusive and representative of the diverse experiences of women, particularly in regions with complex sociocultural contexts? How can we navigate this complex and diverse narratives to promote a nuanced understanding of WPS and have one international framework that all countries can agree on, or would this be multiple versions that countries would have to agree on? In order to have an agenda that all countries can agree on, while leaving room for different contextual background, how can we ensure that the agenda holds space for different contexts but still hold each countries accountable without it being too general?
Throughout the readings this week a few themes emerged for me. The first is that of (1) the pros/cons of norms setting and the question of what is possibly lost in the process of mainstreaming “norms” in global dialogue and the second is (2) the challenges of (good, meaningful, impactful) localization in implementation within international policy mechanisms.
George & Shepherd and True all bring up what feels like really important questions about norms setting, especially when we think about the specific structures of large international mechanisms such as UNSCR 1325 (or SDGs or NDCs under the UNFCCC, or implementation of UNDRIP, there’s a lot of common themes here…) and the emphasis placed on NAPs within. True’s exploration of how and why policies spread across states connect directly to some of the goals of the WPS Agenda, particularly in the area of representation of women in decision-making roles (which is linked to better policy outcomes for women across a variety of topics). And yet representation itself is not systems transformation, nor is it a guarantee of feminist outcomes. George & Shepherd are quick to probe if the “modest goals of gender representation” are in fact evidence of the WPS agenda being watered down or “moulded to harmonize with the goals of the liberal state building orthodoxy” (what a line.).
While standardization and mainstreaming of feminist goals are really important, I’m left wondering with these authors if the pressures to use specific language and conform to certain “ideals” are actually the most transformative for the women and gender-diverse individuals most impacted? Is this the best way to let regional expressions of justice and well-being emerge? Is it possible to both inspire global standards and solidarity while being actually grounded in the “material, historical, socio-cultural, and ideological priorities of specific places and peoples?
Singh further invites us to problematize neat categories of “conflict” or “post-conflict” and women as either “victims” or “agents of change”, because those binaries simply aren’t true for the complicated contexts of conflict (in all its stages) and all of the ways it impacts lives and communities. However, this disruption of categories also disrupts the neat categories of mainstreaming, which wants identities and lived experiences to fit into clean binaries – or at least survey checklists for specific funding priorities. It feels really sticky actually as evidenced by the example of Sri Lanka, to navigate the high-level standardization of things while trying to hold to the locally-driven and self-determined outcomes. And, clearly, the WPS agenda is still struggling to figure out what that looks like.
I also saw some connection here to what Ketty Anyeko presented a few weeks ago (with her presentation of multi-faceted justice as articulated by survivors in Uganda) when the article spoke about women in Sri Lanka expressing what they actually need and want in rebuilding after conflict (i.e. land rights, reparations), and yet that’s not what the WPS agenda – or any NAP – is prepared to actual offer.
Questions:
If effective localization of the WPS Agenda has been such a challenge because of capacity gaps, are there other models we could envision that might allow for robust regionalization and ownership that better understands and facilitates the needs of local communities?
Global agendas feel important for setting standards and increasing dialogue around important issues, but when they start to be utilized as pathways of mediocrity with binary categories (think pink-washing and green-washing, etc.), how can we revive more progressive, systems-disrupting intent?
The Singh article brought up an interesting commentary on the dichotomy of conflict and post-conflict settings. I had never really thought about this duality before and how countries such as Sri Lanka may not fit neatly into the box of totally at peace or totally at war. I believe the reason for this is that countries and international organizations can use the framing of a country not formally being at war to give them a reason to not have to supply as much support to those areas, or they can frame the issue as an internal problem and therefore is the responsibility of the state. This is reinforced in Singh’s discussion of how Sri Lanka’s military has no interest in adhering to UNSCR 1325 as they don’t have an incentive to. Therefore, this begs the question of how effective UNSCR can be, even if there are legal mechanisms and accountability safety nets in place if the agents of authority and power have no interest in fulfilling 1325’s mandate. Moreover, I enjoyed the point that 1325 potentially has homogenous consequences on framing women as victims and that this excludes intersecting factors that explain more of the story of women’s lived experiences in Sri Lanka. Ultimately, this highlights the need for solutions that go beyond UN frameworks and policy discourses, acknowledge the complexity of live experiences in areas of conflict, and state that we cannot simplify what people have endured during a conflict into solely a category of victim.
The True article points out how one large reason for the diffusion of the WPS agenda is that powerful donor agencies have set criteria for implementing the WPS agenda before loans and funding can be given to countries. This highlights both a positive action as countries are implementing the WPS, however it also is cause for concern that countries are only implementing these baseline moral and ethical practices due to money, which is to say that without money some countries would continue to do bad things. I thought the analogy of international organs being the “Teacher of norms” was effective. However, I think it’s important to note that when they are trying to influence or educate regions, they are effectively bribing countries to listen to them. Another issue that echoes in the article is the NAPs can be selective in what they focus on incorporating from the WPS agenda. So, ultimately, some countries can take on the perception of looking like they are doing everything when really they may only be hitting certain markers of success or doing the bare minimum to get by. But what’s more, there appears to be tension about what international organizations can do in these situations, for if you call a country out or sanction them, they risk reverting back to a Pre-WPS agenda stance and creating an environment where Women are even more at risk for violence and discrimination.
My question is, in what ways can we ensure that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda promotes gender equality and women’s empowerment in conflict resolution and addresses intersecting issues such as race, class, sexuality, and disability to create more inclusive and effective peacebuilding processes?
Reflecting on the readings for this week about the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, I was immersed in the intersection of feminist theory, international norms, and local realities. All three readings invite an exploration beyond academic analysis.
One concept that profoundly resonates with me is the portrayal of women as “controlled actors” in post-conflict settings, as highlighted by the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This pattern challenges the oversimplified binary of women as either victims or heroes. A concept we touched upon in our previous classes as well, if I am remembering correctly. If I look at the example of my own country, Pakistan, women’s roles in conflict and post-conflict situations are often shaped by deeply entrenched societal norms and political structures, which can severely limit their agency. This perspective disrupts my earlier perceptions of women’s roles in post-conflict societies, emphasizing how structural limitations impinge on women’s empowerment, even when they appear active in social, economic, or political realms.
The critique of UNSCR 1325’s universalizing approach to gender in the readings particularly strikes a chord when considering Pakistan’s context. The country’s diverse cultural fabric, intertwined with issues of class, caste, religion, and ethnicity, demands a more localized and culturally sensitive approach to women’s issues in post-conflict settings. This highlights the gap in global frameworks like UNSCR 1325, which may not fully capture the complexities of women’s experiences in countries like Pakistan.
For instance, in post-conflict settings within Pakistan, women’s participation in peacebuilding efforts may be limited by local customs that dictate their roles and voices in public life. As such, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Pakistan requires a careful and nuanced approach that acknowledges and respects these local dynamics.
Moreover, Pakistan’s history of military involvement in governance and ongoing issues with religious extremism further complicate the application of a uniform gender framework. Women activists and those working to implement UNSCR 1325 often face threats to their safety, and there is a complex negotiation between advocating for international norms and navigating local realities that can sometimes be hostile to such advocacy.
The dynamic interplay between global standards and local realities becomes particularly relevant when examining Pakistan’s engagement with the WPS agenda. Despite being a democratic nation, Pakistan’s approach to women’s rights and participation in peace processes often reflects a complex mix of international influence and deeply rooted cultural norms. This underscores the importance of understanding the nuances of how countries interpret and implement international norms within their distinct socio-political contexts.
The paradoxical use of feminist agendas in military and political contexts, as discussed by Laura Shepherd, is evident in Pakistan too. The instrumentalization of women’s roles in national security, often for strategic purposes, raises questions about the authenticity of feminist principles in such implementations.
Linking these insights to current events provides a practical dimension to the theoretical discussions in our readings. The struggle that most post-conflict nations face with gender-based violence and the underrepresentation of women in significant peace negotiations mirrors the broader challenges highlighted by the WPS agenda.
Questions:
– Considering the complexities and unique cultural dynamics, how can international frameworks like the WPS agenda be effectively adapted to ensure genuine empowerment of women and address the deep-seated structures of gender inequality, particularly in post-conflict settings?
– How does the WPS agenda address the intersectionality of gender with other forms of identity, such as race, class, and disability, in conflict and post-conflict situations?
Initially, I held the belief that countries directly affected by conflict prioritize WPS policies as part of their post-conflict reconstruction efforts, but going through the GP2 project I have learned this is not the case. There are so many issues, if I were a policy analyst, I myself wouldn’t know where to begin to pick up the pieces let alone have to fit it into a singular agenda. And I know that while conflict creates a heightened awareness of gender issues like the one in Rwanda and now in Palestine, especially with social media despite censorship, other influences such as international pressure and resource availability also play pivotal roles. I keep thinking about the health of women in climate disaster struck zones like Pakistan, Afghanistan with all its sanctions and how this might impact women undergoing their monthly menstrual cycles. It was such a problem during the 2022 floods let alone a full blown genocide, but then again they have far greater problems. Inadequate menstrual hygiene facilities and supplies can exacerbate vulnerabilities to gender-based violence, as women and girls may be forced to resort to risky coping mechanisms, such as transactional sex or rape as did occur during the 2022 floods. Besides, a lack of access can lead to increased risk of infections, reproductive health issues, and stigma, impacting women’s overall well-being. I cannot even wrap my head around these basic necessities for bodily security let alone losing loved ones and bodies, and blood, the screams, and memories. I suppose in such moment gender equality drops to the bottom of the list of priorities.
I also wonder why we place the burden of incorporating gender perspectives on women when men too can be of use. Why can’t we ever have shared responsibility? Gender equality is a collective endeavour that requires the engagement of both women and men. It can’t just be us. How else can we challenge gender norms and stereotypes when it becomes a women’s issue solely. This is so important and I don’t get why men cannot see or rather all of us cannot see that men have significant influence in many spheres of society, including politics, business, and community leadership. So, they can be agents of change. After all, don’t men play major roles in armed conflicts as combatants, decision-makers, peacekeepers, etc. I know that women’s meaningful participation in peace processes and decision-making is a central tenet of the WPS agenda but men need to participants, active and willing participants for inclusive and effective strategies for sustainable peace and security.
For the George reading, I think NAPs are a good mechanism for implementing WPS agendas globally. For instance, we see some countries trying this at ge peacekeeping level. Some countries prioritize the empowerment of women and their participation in peace processes (like Pakistan -still need for progress but a promising start), others adopt a more militaristic stance, focusing predominantly on women’s involvement in military operations (like Uruguay). We raised questions about the sincerity of these states’ commitment to the WPS agenda or potential danger of it evolving as tokenization.
It also sheds light on countries’ commitment to the WPS agenda. In Pakistan, legislative measures like the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2021, and other initiatives like having reserved seats for women in political assemblies contributes to advancing the WPS agenda domestically. This promotes gender equality and enhances women’s participation in decision-making processes. Additionally, efforts to empower women economically through programs like the Benazir Income Support Program and initiatives for access to justice, such as Violence Against Women centers, further help strengthen women’s security and rights within the country. Although it feels invisible or as though these don’t work perhaps it’s because there’s so many to help. How do we save and serve everyone?
Singh’s paper on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 offers valuable insights when comparing its application in Sri Lanka with countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan. I get Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Afghanistan each have distinct socio-political landscapes, but they share common challenges related to conflict, security, and gender equality. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, where ongoing conflicts and post-war transitions have significant implications for women’s security, the implementation of Resolution 1325 may face similar hurdles as in Sri Lanka. Also, it reminds me of the recent statement by the Afghan leader condoning the stoning of women in accordance with Sharia law, despite its clear contradiction with international human rights standards. This is some next level disregard for fundamental human rights principles. He basically said he doesn’t give 2 shits if their interpretation of the Shariah contradicts international human rights. What does one say in these cases? I often wonder how can we ensure the protection of women in these deeply conservative societies compared to our more modern communities like in Lahore as Muslim women ourselves, all while navigating the risk of being perceived as a Western Trojan horse?
I really enjoyed engaging with this week’s reading material. It helped me think about the impact of UNSCR 1325 on influencing state behaviour in various contexts. Moreover, the ways in which gendered discrimination can be exacerbated by local culture, religious and ethnic factors. I found it interesting that Sri Lanka experienced uptick towards budget allocation post-conflict. Indeed, it was intriguing to explore the perspective of viewing women’s experiences within post-conflict settings. Viewing them not solely as victims or agents, but rather controlled agents as they are influenced by cultural and structural factors.
From the Singh reading noted that the former female combatants often face double victimization, experiencing oppression from both state and community.
This made me think back to Evelyn’s story that we delved into earlier this class where she also experienced stigmatization when she had left the LRA from her community. Furthermore, the reading got me thinking about our GP2 project, underscoring the importance of shifting the existing narrative surrounding ex-combatants within the local community. Creating a supportive environment for them and addressing the stigma they encounter is imperative. Moreover, it will be important to acknowledge the necessity of providing medical and psychological assistance to child soldiers who have likely endured traumatic experiences.
A question worth considering is how can SAARC and similar regional bodies help achieve UNSCR 1325 goals, and what else can be done globally and locally to promote gender equality and empower women in conflict zones?
Another question that arose from the reading is what more is being done towards preventing the serious problem of SGBV occurring within the US military training?
Earlier this semester, we delved deep into militarism in the ways in which war-related activities seeps into social and political life. From the Sheppard reading, NAPs primarily tended to orient outwardly which I found interesting. One of the key takeaways from this reading is the WPS agenda, advocating for UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions to promote demilitarization and the advancement of peaceful, anti-militarist politics and not to legitimize or normalize war.
From the True reading, it was surprising to learn from the that a nations conflict status or recent history does not significantly influence its decision to adopt a WPS action plan. Another key takeaway from this reading is the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the level of democratic governance, and the presence of women in positions of power emerge as significant determinants. Moreover, that time periods such as milestones like the 10th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, could impact the membership in intergovernmental organizations.
This week’s readings sparked profound reflections on the multifaceted dynamics of international organizations, the roles of both international and local actors, and the efficacy of bottom-up versus top-down approaches. Delving into these topics prompts a critical examination of the influence and failures of global institutions, particularly in light of the colonial mindset ingrained in western countries. It is evident that this colonial legacy permeates resolutions and international development goals, shaping the interaction between global standards and local realities. And I cannot stress enough the harsh reality of the global failure to support women, particularly in the context of war and conflicts.
Jacqui’s article, underscores the multifaceted nature of WPS implementation, emphasizing the need for nuanced, inclusive approaches rooted in local realities to advance gender equality and peacebuilding globally. She delves into the intricate dynamics surrounding the adoption and implementation of the WPS agenda at both global and local levels. Originating from mandates like UNSCR 1325, the WPS agenda undergoes a complex process of adaptation influenced by factors such as conflict salience, international context, intergovernmental network, funding, etc. She highlighted that initially embraced by conflict-affected nations, the adoption of WPS action plans extends beyond direct conflict involvement, influenced by international norms and actors.
When reading this article, it made think again about the primary aim of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, which is to facilitate women’s equal and meaningful involvement in peace processes and security matters. Then I reflected on some of our previous readings and class discussion, particularly Dr. Ketty Anyeko’s research and talk about the idea of community and survivors’ centered approach. For WPS agenda, was this approach taken into consideration? How is peace and security defined and by whom? Is there a survivor-centered approach in shaping these definitions? Additionally, the understanding that peace encompasses more than just the absence of war deserves attention. Is this taken into account by WPS? Also, while I understand the pressure on post-conflict countries to adopt the WPS agenda, I firmly believe that it should be a global effort. This approach not only addresses post-conflict challenges but also prioritizes prevention. By embracing prevention strategies, we can mitigate the recurrence of conflict and cultivate enduring peace and security on a global scale, thereby embracing the true meaning of everyday peace.
Shepherd’s article, offers a critical analysis of the implementation of WPS agenda through NAPs, focusing on the tension between the objectives of the WPS agenda and militarism. Shepherd explores how NAPs of various countries orient their efforts outward, emphasizing international engagement over domestic priorities. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) serves as a poignant illustration of how the militarization of security practices undermines the WPS agenda’s core principles. Despite over 20 years of UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC, conflict persists and sexual violence against women is daunting. Even after the world’s attention was drawn to the epidemic of sexual violence when the UN envoy labeled the DRC the “rape capital,” the situation remains dire. This is a true example of how emphasis on military interventions in NAPs often sidelines efforts to address conflict root causes. Instead of challenging the dynamics of militarism, NAPs portray states as security experts, perpetuating the cycle of violence. To truly embody the WPS agenda, a paradigm shift is necessary. We must prioritize prevention alongside post-conflict recovery to achieve sustainable peace. The DRC’s situation underscores the urgency of adopting holistic approaches that tackle systemic issues. Only by addressing the structural challenges and investing in comprehensive prevention strategies can we begin to dismantle the entrenched cycle of conflict and sexual violence in conflict and post conflicts zones and beyond.
Singh Shweta’s article underscores the ongoing struggle of the WPS agenda to reconcile high-level standardization with locally driven outcomes. It emphasizes moving beyond simplistic classifications of conflict stages and women’s roles as either victims or agents of change. Instead, it suggests viewing women as controlled actors within complex structural and cultural constraints. It highlights the necessity of localizing and regionalizing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to truly reflect diverse women’s experiences while challenging universalizing normative notions of gender and conflict.
Discussion question: Reflecting on the importance of localizing gender concepts for effective outcomes, as highlighted in the articles, I wonder how we can balance prioritizing local experiences with addressing domestic agendas that hinder gender equity and women, peace, and security efforts.
My tangential thoughts on WPS:
Since learning of the WPS Agenda, I have always had mixed feelings and these readings demonstrated some of the key reasons why we should all have mixed feelings about it. All 3 articles posited that since resolution 1325 was adopted, the normative framework for the protection and promotion of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict settings has expanded dramatically….. yay!!! They all also noted that many of the consequent NAPs that were created pursuant to 1325 are ‘focused on process with neither mechanisms for accountability nor budgets for real implementation’….. not yay.
Lack of resource though seems like a very small (albeit crucial) part of the empirical puzzle of addressing the gendered experience of conflict and security. Firstly I think its important to note that the success of 1325 outlined vaguely as women’s participation in peace processes, protection from gender-based violence, and promotion of gender equality in conflict-affected settings, is shallow in nature and neglectful of broader structural issues that contribute to insecurity, such as poverty, inequality, and political repression. Despite this, an acknowledgement that gender has an effect on how an individual experiences conflict and insecurity (in all of its forms), leads to a promising way forward. Though I am not sure if that type of optimism is warranted almost 24 years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325.
Both True and Singh highlight norms, and ‘norm entrepreneurs’ as a main vehicle of success for 1325. Transfer of norms and practices related to women’s participation in peace processes, protection from gender-based violence, and promotion of gender equality in conflict-affected settings. States and organizations may be influenced to adopt WPS policies through learning from best practices, emulation of successful models, or pressure from international actors. George, and Shephard acknowledge that the implementation of 1325 would not have come this far without individuals (mostly women) and organizations (not for profit women’s organizations) work to change social norms and institutional practices by framing women’s inclusion and empowerment as crucial elements of peace and security. So, in essence, women have been working hard to earn their status of personhood, but the norms surrounding women and their experiences haven’t been altered enough that governments are willing to fund NAPs. Another mixed emotion has settled in.
Then I come to think about the effectiveness of women’s participation in the sense of… is that all that is required? If all it takes is women who are advocating for their own inclusion and empowerment, why are women still faced with horrific situations related to their security in and out of conflict zones? It is not a secret that women’s participation in peace and security processes is often tokenistic and does not translate into meaningful decision-making power. Women, particularly those from marginalized groups, often face barriers to participation and encounter discrimination and exclusion within male-dominated peacebuilding institutions. In terms of 1325, True argues that the proportion of women representatives in parliament has a major bearing on the adoption of a NAP, assumingly because they have positions in power. Norm adopting states have significantly higher levels of women’s representation. But how can an international drive for women’s involvement in peacekeeping and parliament happen while also fundamentally rejecting tokenization?
Also acknowledging that WPS agenda reflects Western-centric biases and priorities, often overlooking the diverse experiences and perspectives of women in non-Western contexts, what does the success of 1325 look like to marginalized women? Women most affected by conflict? Women who have been working hard to normalize their existence in these spaces?
This week’s reading touched on so many components of the past weeks. Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda intersects with so many topics: militarism, gender, religion, race, etc. There is a tendency to homogenize the experience of women, but as Singh argues, normative framework such as UN’s WPS agenda, there is a need to recognize that women’s experience is not homogenous. I especially was intrigued by the argument that the framework of women defines women as actors and agents; however, this sentiment places additional burden for women to bear. By falsely homogenizing women’s lives and experiences, it fails to recognize different factors that differentiates women’s experiences, which has been a common theme that we’ve explored throughout the past weeks. I agree with her argument that these normative global frameworks must also be regionalized and localized — this will allow for different experiences to be captured better. In this context, I appreciated her framing of women as being “controlled actors”, which recognizes that women’s capacity or agency to act is structurally and culturally controlled. Singh’s concept of “controlled actors” resonates deeply, emphasizing that women’s agency is often constrained by structural and cultural forces. This perspective prompts a reconsideration of the root causes of gender inequality, including patriarchal systems and militarized power dynamics. It underscores the necessity of a bottom-up approach to achieve genuine transformation. This was further explored in True’s article, where some of the National Action Plans have been superficial or lacking genuine effort where there have been no real intentions/efforts. Despite these shortcomings, the mainstreaming of gender in NAPs and the broader WPS agenda presents an opportunity for the normalization and recognition of women’s diverse roles and impacts, which is an optimistic view that mainstreaming of gender in NAPs and WPS can perhaps lead to normalization and realization of women’s different roles and impacts in this context.
In Singh’s article, she argues how the EU is a normative power playing a signficant role in between norm constitution and norm diffusion, which may play a role in its preconceived notions of WPS agenda and homogenization of women’s experiences. While I agree with this, I wonder if and how this would change — with the Western dominance at international levels, it is difficult to dismantle the norms and notions.
Recently, I saw OECD’s SIGI 2023 Global Report on Gender Equality in Times of Crisis. In there, it indicates that 30% of women think that it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife under certain circumstances. Even in Singh’s discussion about FHH, there were different reactions, even from women, to them — bad omens, etc. Of course, we often discuss the ways in which men instil patriarchal ideologies and practices, but also, women also play a part in patriarchy too.
How can policymakers and practitioners, when international organizations are led by the western countries, ensure that the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda remains inclusive and representative of the diverse experiences of women, particularly in regions with complex sociocultural contexts? How can we navigate this complex and diverse narratives to promote a nuanced understanding of WPS and have one international framework that all countries can agree on, or would this be multiple versions that countries would have to agree on? In order to have an agenda that all countries can agree on, while leaving room for different contextual background, how can we ensure that the agenda holds space for different contexts but still hold each countries accountable without it being too general?
Throughout the readings this week a few themes emerged for me. The first is that of (1) the pros/cons of norms setting and the question of what is possibly lost in the process of mainstreaming “norms” in global dialogue and the second is (2) the challenges of (good, meaningful, impactful) localization in implementation within international policy mechanisms.
George & Shepherd and True all bring up what feels like really important questions about norms setting, especially when we think about the specific structures of large international mechanisms such as UNSCR 1325 (or SDGs or NDCs under the UNFCCC, or implementation of UNDRIP, there’s a lot of common themes here…) and the emphasis placed on NAPs within. True’s exploration of how and why policies spread across states connect directly to some of the goals of the WPS Agenda, particularly in the area of representation of women in decision-making roles (which is linked to better policy outcomes for women across a variety of topics). And yet representation itself is not systems transformation, nor is it a guarantee of feminist outcomes. George & Shepherd are quick to probe if the “modest goals of gender representation” are in fact evidence of the WPS agenda being watered down or “moulded to harmonize with the goals of the liberal state building orthodoxy” (what a line.).
While standardization and mainstreaming of feminist goals are really important, I’m left wondering with these authors if the pressures to use specific language and conform to certain “ideals” are actually the most transformative for the women and gender-diverse individuals most impacted? Is this the best way to let regional expressions of justice and well-being emerge? Is it possible to both inspire global standards and solidarity while being actually grounded in the “material, historical, socio-cultural, and ideological priorities of specific places and peoples?
Singh further invites us to problematize neat categories of “conflict” or “post-conflict” and women as either “victims” or “agents of change”, because those binaries simply aren’t true for the complicated contexts of conflict (in all its stages) and all of the ways it impacts lives and communities. However, this disruption of categories also disrupts the neat categories of mainstreaming, which wants identities and lived experiences to fit into clean binaries – or at least survey checklists for specific funding priorities. It feels really sticky actually as evidenced by the example of Sri Lanka, to navigate the high-level standardization of things while trying to hold to the locally-driven and self-determined outcomes. And, clearly, the WPS agenda is still struggling to figure out what that looks like.
I also saw some connection here to what Ketty Anyeko presented a few weeks ago (with her presentation of multi-faceted justice as articulated by survivors in Uganda) when the article spoke about women in Sri Lanka expressing what they actually need and want in rebuilding after conflict (i.e. land rights, reparations), and yet that’s not what the WPS agenda – or any NAP – is prepared to actual offer.
Questions:
If effective localization of the WPS Agenda has been such a challenge because of capacity gaps, are there other models we could envision that might allow for robust regionalization and ownership that better understands and facilitates the needs of local communities?
Global agendas feel important for setting standards and increasing dialogue around important issues, but when they start to be utilized as pathways of mediocrity with binary categories (think pink-washing and green-washing, etc.), how can we revive more progressive, systems-disrupting intent?
The Singh article brought up an interesting commentary on the dichotomy of conflict and post-conflict settings. I had never really thought about this duality before and how countries such as Sri Lanka may not fit neatly into the box of totally at peace or totally at war. I believe the reason for this is that countries and international organizations can use the framing of a country not formally being at war to give them a reason to not have to supply as much support to those areas, or they can frame the issue as an internal problem and therefore is the responsibility of the state. This is reinforced in Singh’s discussion of how Sri Lanka’s military has no interest in adhering to UNSCR 1325 as they don’t have an incentive to. Therefore, this begs the question of how effective UNSCR can be, even if there are legal mechanisms and accountability safety nets in place if the agents of authority and power have no interest in fulfilling 1325’s mandate. Moreover, I enjoyed the point that 1325 potentially has homogenous consequences on framing women as victims and that this excludes intersecting factors that explain more of the story of women’s lived experiences in Sri Lanka. Ultimately, this highlights the need for solutions that go beyond UN frameworks and policy discourses, acknowledge the complexity of live experiences in areas of conflict, and state that we cannot simplify what people have endured during a conflict into solely a category of victim.
The True article points out how one large reason for the diffusion of the WPS agenda is that powerful donor agencies have set criteria for implementing the WPS agenda before loans and funding can be given to countries. This highlights both a positive action as countries are implementing the WPS, however it also is cause for concern that countries are only implementing these baseline moral and ethical practices due to money, which is to say that without money some countries would continue to do bad things. I thought the analogy of international organs being the “Teacher of norms” was effective. However, I think it’s important to note that when they are trying to influence or educate regions, they are effectively bribing countries to listen to them. Another issue that echoes in the article is the NAPs can be selective in what they focus on incorporating from the WPS agenda. So, ultimately, some countries can take on the perception of looking like they are doing everything when really they may only be hitting certain markers of success or doing the bare minimum to get by. But what’s more, there appears to be tension about what international organizations can do in these situations, for if you call a country out or sanction them, they risk reverting back to a Pre-WPS agenda stance and creating an environment where Women are even more at risk for violence and discrimination.
My question is, in what ways can we ensure that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda promotes gender equality and women’s empowerment in conflict resolution and addresses intersecting issues such as race, class, sexuality, and disability to create more inclusive and effective peacebuilding processes?
Reflecting on the readings for this week about the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, I was immersed in the intersection of feminist theory, international norms, and local realities. All three readings invite an exploration beyond academic analysis.
One concept that profoundly resonates with me is the portrayal of women as “controlled actors” in post-conflict settings, as highlighted by the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This pattern challenges the oversimplified binary of women as either victims or heroes. A concept we touched upon in our previous classes as well, if I am remembering correctly. If I look at the example of my own country, Pakistan, women’s roles in conflict and post-conflict situations are often shaped by deeply entrenched societal norms and political structures, which can severely limit their agency. This perspective disrupts my earlier perceptions of women’s roles in post-conflict societies, emphasizing how structural limitations impinge on women’s empowerment, even when they appear active in social, economic, or political realms.
The critique of UNSCR 1325’s universalizing approach to gender in the readings particularly strikes a chord when considering Pakistan’s context. The country’s diverse cultural fabric, intertwined with issues of class, caste, religion, and ethnicity, demands a more localized and culturally sensitive approach to women’s issues in post-conflict settings. This highlights the gap in global frameworks like UNSCR 1325, which may not fully capture the complexities of women’s experiences in countries like Pakistan.
For instance, in post-conflict settings within Pakistan, women’s participation in peacebuilding efforts may be limited by local customs that dictate their roles and voices in public life. As such, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Pakistan requires a careful and nuanced approach that acknowledges and respects these local dynamics.
Moreover, Pakistan’s history of military involvement in governance and ongoing issues with religious extremism further complicate the application of a uniform gender framework. Women activists and those working to implement UNSCR 1325 often face threats to their safety, and there is a complex negotiation between advocating for international norms and navigating local realities that can sometimes be hostile to such advocacy.
The dynamic interplay between global standards and local realities becomes particularly relevant when examining Pakistan’s engagement with the WPS agenda. Despite being a democratic nation, Pakistan’s approach to women’s rights and participation in peace processes often reflects a complex mix of international influence and deeply rooted cultural norms. This underscores the importance of understanding the nuances of how countries interpret and implement international norms within their distinct socio-political contexts.
The paradoxical use of feminist agendas in military and political contexts, as discussed by Laura Shepherd, is evident in Pakistan too. The instrumentalization of women’s roles in national security, often for strategic purposes, raises questions about the authenticity of feminist principles in such implementations.
Linking these insights to current events provides a practical dimension to the theoretical discussions in our readings. The struggle that most post-conflict nations face with gender-based violence and the underrepresentation of women in significant peace negotiations mirrors the broader challenges highlighted by the WPS agenda.
Questions:
– Considering the complexities and unique cultural dynamics, how can international frameworks like the WPS agenda be effectively adapted to ensure genuine empowerment of women and address the deep-seated structures of gender inequality, particularly in post-conflict settings?
– How does the WPS agenda address the intersectionality of gender with other forms of identity, such as race, class, and disability, in conflict and post-conflict situations?
Initially, I held the belief that countries directly affected by conflict prioritize WPS policies as part of their post-conflict reconstruction efforts, but going through the GP2 project I have learned this is not the case. There are so many issues, if I were a policy analyst, I myself wouldn’t know where to begin to pick up the pieces let alone have to fit it into a singular agenda. And I know that while conflict creates a heightened awareness of gender issues like the one in Rwanda and now in Palestine, especially with social media despite censorship, other influences such as international pressure and resource availability also play pivotal roles. I keep thinking about the health of women in climate disaster struck zones like Pakistan, Afghanistan with all its sanctions and how this might impact women undergoing their monthly menstrual cycles. It was such a problem during the 2022 floods let alone a full blown genocide, but then again they have far greater problems. Inadequate menstrual hygiene facilities and supplies can exacerbate vulnerabilities to gender-based violence, as women and girls may be forced to resort to risky coping mechanisms, such as transactional sex or rape as did occur during the 2022 floods. Besides, a lack of access can lead to increased risk of infections, reproductive health issues, and stigma, impacting women’s overall well-being. I cannot even wrap my head around these basic necessities for bodily security let alone losing loved ones and bodies, and blood, the screams, and memories. I suppose in such moment gender equality drops to the bottom of the list of priorities.
I also wonder why we place the burden of incorporating gender perspectives on women when men too can be of use. Why can’t we ever have shared responsibility? Gender equality is a collective endeavour that requires the engagement of both women and men. It can’t just be us. How else can we challenge gender norms and stereotypes when it becomes a women’s issue solely. This is so important and I don’t get why men cannot see or rather all of us cannot see that men have significant influence in many spheres of society, including politics, business, and community leadership. So, they can be agents of change. After all, don’t men play major roles in armed conflicts as combatants, decision-makers, peacekeepers, etc. I know that women’s meaningful participation in peace processes and decision-making is a central tenet of the WPS agenda but men need to participants, active and willing participants for inclusive and effective strategies for sustainable peace and security.
For the George reading, I think NAPs are a good mechanism for implementing WPS agendas globally. For instance, we see some countries trying this at ge peacekeeping level. Some countries prioritize the empowerment of women and their participation in peace processes (like Pakistan -still need for progress but a promising start), others adopt a more militaristic stance, focusing predominantly on women’s involvement in military operations (like Uruguay). We raised questions about the sincerity of these states’ commitment to the WPS agenda or potential danger of it evolving as tokenization.
It also sheds light on countries’ commitment to the WPS agenda. In Pakistan, legislative measures like the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2021, and other initiatives like having reserved seats for women in political assemblies contributes to advancing the WPS agenda domestically. This promotes gender equality and enhances women’s participation in decision-making processes. Additionally, efforts to empower women economically through programs like the Benazir Income Support Program and initiatives for access to justice, such as Violence Against Women centers, further help strengthen women’s security and rights within the country. Although it feels invisible or as though these don’t work perhaps it’s because there’s so many to help. How do we save and serve everyone?
Singh’s paper on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 offers valuable insights when comparing its application in Sri Lanka with countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan. I get Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Afghanistan each have distinct socio-political landscapes, but they share common challenges related to conflict, security, and gender equality. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, where ongoing conflicts and post-war transitions have significant implications for women’s security, the implementation of Resolution 1325 may face similar hurdles as in Sri Lanka. Also, it reminds me of the recent statement by the Afghan leader condoning the stoning of women in accordance with Sharia law, despite its clear contradiction with international human rights standards. This is some next level disregard for fundamental human rights principles. He basically said he doesn’t give 2 shits if their interpretation of the Shariah contradicts international human rights. What does one say in these cases? I often wonder how can we ensure the protection of women in these deeply conservative societies compared to our more modern communities like in Lahore as Muslim women ourselves, all while navigating the risk of being perceived as a Western Trojan horse?
I really enjoyed engaging with this week’s reading material. It helped me think about the impact of UNSCR 1325 on influencing state behaviour in various contexts. Moreover, the ways in which gendered discrimination can be exacerbated by local culture, religious and ethnic factors. I found it interesting that Sri Lanka experienced uptick towards budget allocation post-conflict. Indeed, it was intriguing to explore the perspective of viewing women’s experiences within post-conflict settings. Viewing them not solely as victims or agents, but rather controlled agents as they are influenced by cultural and structural factors.
From the Singh reading noted that the former female combatants often face double victimization, experiencing oppression from both state and community.
This made me think back to Evelyn’s story that we delved into earlier this class where she also experienced stigmatization when she had left the LRA from her community. Furthermore, the reading got me thinking about our GP2 project, underscoring the importance of shifting the existing narrative surrounding ex-combatants within the local community. Creating a supportive environment for them and addressing the stigma they encounter is imperative. Moreover, it will be important to acknowledge the necessity of providing medical and psychological assistance to child soldiers who have likely endured traumatic experiences.
A question worth considering is how can SAARC and similar regional bodies help achieve UNSCR 1325 goals, and what else can be done globally and locally to promote gender equality and empower women in conflict zones?
Another question that arose from the reading is what more is being done towards preventing the serious problem of SGBV occurring within the US military training?
Earlier this semester, we delved deep into militarism in the ways in which war-related activities seeps into social and political life. From the Sheppard reading, NAPs primarily tended to orient outwardly which I found interesting. One of the key takeaways from this reading is the WPS agenda, advocating for UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions to promote demilitarization and the advancement of peaceful, anti-militarist politics and not to legitimize or normalize war.
From the True reading, it was surprising to learn from the that a nations conflict status or recent history does not significantly influence its decision to adopt a WPS action plan. Another key takeaway from this reading is the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the level of democratic governance, and the presence of women in positions of power emerge as significant determinants. Moreover, that time periods such as milestones like the 10th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, could impact the membership in intergovernmental organizations.
This week’s readings sparked profound reflections on the multifaceted dynamics of international organizations, the roles of both international and local actors, and the efficacy of bottom-up versus top-down approaches. Delving into these topics prompts a critical examination of the influence and failures of global institutions, particularly in light of the colonial mindset ingrained in western countries. It is evident that this colonial legacy permeates resolutions and international development goals, shaping the interaction between global standards and local realities. And I cannot stress enough the harsh reality of the global failure to support women, particularly in the context of war and conflicts.
Jacqui’s article, underscores the multifaceted nature of WPS implementation, emphasizing the need for nuanced, inclusive approaches rooted in local realities to advance gender equality and peacebuilding globally. She delves into the intricate dynamics surrounding the adoption and implementation of the WPS agenda at both global and local levels. Originating from mandates like UNSCR 1325, the WPS agenda undergoes a complex process of adaptation influenced by factors such as conflict salience, international context, intergovernmental network, funding, etc. She highlighted that initially embraced by conflict-affected nations, the adoption of WPS action plans extends beyond direct conflict involvement, influenced by international norms and actors.
When reading this article, it made think again about the primary aim of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, which is to facilitate women’s equal and meaningful involvement in peace processes and security matters. Then I reflected on some of our previous readings and class discussion, particularly Dr. Ketty Anyeko’s research and talk about the idea of community and survivors’ centered approach. For WPS agenda, was this approach taken into consideration? How is peace and security defined and by whom? Is there a survivor-centered approach in shaping these definitions? Additionally, the understanding that peace encompasses more than just the absence of war deserves attention. Is this taken into account by WPS? Also, while I understand the pressure on post-conflict countries to adopt the WPS agenda, I firmly believe that it should be a global effort. This approach not only addresses post-conflict challenges but also prioritizes prevention. By embracing prevention strategies, we can mitigate the recurrence of conflict and cultivate enduring peace and security on a global scale, thereby embracing the true meaning of everyday peace.
Shepherd’s article, offers a critical analysis of the implementation of WPS agenda through NAPs, focusing on the tension between the objectives of the WPS agenda and militarism. Shepherd explores how NAPs of various countries orient their efforts outward, emphasizing international engagement over domestic priorities. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) serves as a poignant illustration of how the militarization of security practices undermines the WPS agenda’s core principles. Despite over 20 years of UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC, conflict persists and sexual violence against women is daunting. Even after the world’s attention was drawn to the epidemic of sexual violence when the UN envoy labeled the DRC the “rape capital,” the situation remains dire. This is a true example of how emphasis on military interventions in NAPs often sidelines efforts to address conflict root causes. Instead of challenging the dynamics of militarism, NAPs portray states as security experts, perpetuating the cycle of violence. To truly embody the WPS agenda, a paradigm shift is necessary. We must prioritize prevention alongside post-conflict recovery to achieve sustainable peace. The DRC’s situation underscores the urgency of adopting holistic approaches that tackle systemic issues. Only by addressing the structural challenges and investing in comprehensive prevention strategies can we begin to dismantle the entrenched cycle of conflict and sexual violence in conflict and post conflicts zones and beyond.
Singh Shweta’s article underscores the ongoing struggle of the WPS agenda to reconcile high-level standardization with locally driven outcomes. It emphasizes moving beyond simplistic classifications of conflict stages and women’s roles as either victims or agents of change. Instead, it suggests viewing women as controlled actors within complex structural and cultural constraints. It highlights the necessity of localizing and regionalizing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to truly reflect diverse women’s experiences while challenging universalizing normative notions of gender and conflict.
Discussion question: Reflecting on the importance of localizing gender concepts for effective outcomes, as highlighted in the articles, I wonder how we can balance prioritizing local experiences with addressing domestic agendas that hinder gender equity and women, peace, and security efforts.