democracy! or democracy?

#9 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tommy-stadlen/climate-revolutions_b_839444.html In Stadlen’s article, he links the revolution in Egypt to a record surge in food prices across the globe. To lend weight to this argument, Stadlen mentions similar riots breaking out in many developing countries in 2008, including Egypt. The figurehead of the Tunisian revolution, a young fruit-seller who self-immolated in protest against the brutality of local police may also be seen in this respect. Government responses to the immanent threat posed by protesters also reflected food’s critical role. In Tunisia, Ali attempted to reduce tension by promising to reduce food prices. In Algeria, the government promised to reduce duties on sugar and cooking oil. This was also seen in Yemen when the government offered to cap food prices. http://www.arbitragemagazine.com/topics/international-affairs/middle-east/root-revolution-egypt/ In Shaub’s article, he lists the most notable underlying cause of the revolution in Egypt as income disparity: one half of Egyptians live on $2/day or less. The minimum wage hasn’t risen in 25 years. “ Mubarak’s political environment has weakened the power of labor and kept down wages to the advantage of major employers, both foreign and domestic.” Each article, to be fair, touches on the same inherent problems that many countries in the Middle East face. In its own right each causal link is correct and has played off the other. In the latter example, increases in food prices would be less of an issue, although still problematic, in a wealthier country with higher wages. The evidence given for each is valid and considering the nature of the articles, it seems relevant to assume that both articles hold some value. With that said, it is problematic to simplify causal factors, especially in countries where numerous underlying problems exist. To give an example, why did the revolution in Tunisia succeed and the revolution in Bahrein fail?

Relating to the recent democracy reports, Vietnam, has introduced new laws recently that punish those who publish articles that do not reveal sources.

What this suggests is a desire by leaders to limit political dissent, internet access, and free speech perhaps, following in the footsteps of China in which freedom of speech and human rights continues to be longstanding issues.  According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Vietnam ranks as the sixth-worst country in the world to be a blogger, behind only, Burma, Iran, Syria, Cuba and Saudi Arabia.

This raises questions of the future of Vietnam which continues to see an increase in tourism, alongside massive trade deals bringing in billions of dollars in revenue which is slowly drawing many in the general populace out of poverty.

As the Middle East is showing, an increase in education and standard of living will undoubtedly bring a desire for freedom, in which case political conditions in the country may get dramatically worse when faced with protest or some democraticization may occur.

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In the midst of the impending civil war in Libya and protests that are spreading like wildfire( excuse the cliche), David Cameron, British PM, has this week completed a tour of the Middle East alongside defense industry executives. When asked how he could be committed to promoting democratic values in the region while at the same time selling weapons to the very regimes that continue to deny their people basic rights, Cameron told one reporter: ” I simply don’t understand how you can’t understand that democracies have a right to defend themselves”.

On a side note, this article notes that the British defense industry also happens to employee 300,000 + people and generates 35 billion a year in revenue for the UK, although this is, of course, secondary in importance to democraticization.

Perhaps more realistically, as the author makes a case for, recent British trips to the Middle East, have more to do with cementing Britain’s role in a world in which the role of America is becoming more and more diminished.

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/02/20112187102317748.html

The revolution has begun, but, it remains to be seen whether it will continue. Following the ousting of Egypt’s long-time leader last week, protesters are now mobilizing in Behrain, Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Djiboutia, Kuwait, and Palestine, among others. The question again remains, what happens next?

While many of the countries share similar cultural and religious beliefs and quasi-military dictatorships, it may be argued that not all of the actors involved can handle change: both in respect to internal problems, lack of infrastructure and rulers that are, perhaps, too comfortable with their current lifestyles. Iraq, for example, proves an interesting case and point. In recent years, the country’s infrastructure has been decimated and rebuilt from the ground up by American’s. Insurgency continues to be a problem alongside sectarian violence. Protests may push the country to the brink of civil war.

In Yemen, Jordan and Behrain, the military is increasingly resorting to violence to quell protests, the possibility of a repeat of the Burmese 8888 massacre or Chinese Tienanmen square massacre is very real. The inherent success and the multitude of actors involved in the region has, in effect, backed leaders into a corner. Should any one state cave to demands, the momentum of others will only increase.

This raises the question, what does it take for a revolution to succeed? In some branches of democratic theory, it has been argued that a strong middle class, education, infrastructure, the separation of military and state, and the relative coherence of civil society remain necessary for any democracy or transition to democracy to be sustainable. In the case of many of those countries now involved in protests, many of these things are not present. This makes success unlikely, although, it remains to be seen.

Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado’s article raises a few noteworthy points.

The inherent complexity of democracy, as a multifaceted concept, means that it must be simplified before measurement and analysis can take place.

Dahl’s two theoretical dimensions of democracy best fit this task and account for three-quarters of the variation captured by indicators.

While I agree with the necessity to create a minimal definition, I find it problematic that such a definition is used for all measurements. The obvious problem with this measurement, from my perspective, is that it assumes that the 25 percent that is not accounted for is less important than the rest. Perhaps, I am misunderstanding the article completely, but, in many relatively new democracies with less-stability, weaker infrastructure in place, or ethnic minority issues, the 25 percent or third/fourth dimensions could be far more influential in determining a degradated or dichotomous outcome than one might expect.

This week yet another violent attack took place in southern Thailand as a car bomb exploded injuring 18 people in Yala. The southern provinces bordering Malaysia have been a longstanding source of problems in Thailand: they remain unique because they are made up of a non-Buddhist, non-Thai majority which remains among the poorest in the country. While the Thai constitution, in theory, allows the free practice and protection of religion, Muslim-Malay insurgents have demonstrated an increasing willingness to resort to graphic acts of violence targeting women, children and monks among others, and, the military/government has responded with similarly heavy handed tactics: in some instances carrying out black-ops killings of Muslim leaders, hiring local militia, torture, and so on.

While little global attention is given to the turbulent situation in the South of Thailand, in lieu of Middle Eastern Islamicism, it remains an important underlying issue when looking at democracy in the region- specifically the treatment of minorities in emerging democracies. The alienation of a large minority that exists far from the capital and central command, the contrasting tactics of the previous and current government( one major criticism of former PM Thaksin was his indiscriminate use of police to crush separatist/ fundamentalist groups in the south- it remains highly contested whether the insurgency is religious or cultural).

Specifically, something that must be addressed within any democracy is the availability of political and civil space for opposition and minority groups. It could strongly be argued that these attacks continue to increase both in frequency and scope of violence, due in part, to the inability or unwillingness of the central government in Bangkok to address the needs of these groups through official, legitimate channels( An interesting piece of information regarding Islamic government in Thailand, should anyone care, is that most Islamic leaders in Bangkok practice a different branch of Islam than those in the South).

Although I enjoy wine, I have not made use of wine reviews, maybe some of the class might find this useful:

Wine ratings have been used for the last hundred or so years( maybe longer) to determine what is worth savouring and what is comparable to dish water. Ratings can differ depending on the critic, and the nature of the review which might be an avg of several ratings: they can be on a 50- 100 scale,0-20, or 0-5 using stars.

Wine critic Robert Parker is credited with creating the 50-100 scale, the rough equivalent of a school grade ranging from A-F. Something in the 80s or 90s would be deemed exceptional, something under 50 would be horrendous. In some ways this may be beneficial to find a really exceptional wine, but, it has the unintended effect of making everything less than A+ less appealing.In effect creating a dichotomous rating system. The 0-5, which is functionally little different, is used here. It can be argued however, that the smaller rating scale, somehow, makes the rating less significant than the larger number. The example being the difference in review of 93 compared to 95 is quite significant, whereas a rating of 3 compared to 4 appears less so.

Another website, CellarTracker,  has group ratings, taken from the many users on the site. This is a great idea as it allows users to compare reviews in a variety of conditions, without relying on a sole source of information.

Traditional 20-point scale- aroma, color, taste and finish assigned a maximum number of points. I really like the 20 point rating because of the way that points are allocated. A reader is able to gain a better understanding of how the wine was rated based on the points in each category. On a negative, it is limited because many of these qualities are subjective. This, unlike the 0-5 and 50-100 allows for a gradated review that may prove more useful to someone interested.

Critics of these systems have suggested that they are responsible for the commercialization and loss of “terroir” and individuality in wine making, being replaced, in kind, by uniform, but critic pleasing flavors. I agree, having experimented with both cheap and expensive wines, I am pleased to note that both, while tasting different to some extent, produce the same desired result.

In recent years, democracy in Thailand has continued to be called into question. Several years ago, former Thai PM and multi-billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, was forced from office by the military in a bloodless coup, who claimed that Shinawatra and his entourage were corrupt, and unfit to rule. The PM’s bank accounts were frozen, and he fled the country. An interim government was appointed and the case was closed. . . sort of.

Since then, protesters from both pro-Thaksin and pro-reform have clashed on a number of instances in Bangkok, and Thaksin has sought to regain influence in the region by taking up a consultant position within the Cambodian government( something that for most Thai’s is unthinkable given turbulent relations between the two countries) and improve his international influence through the purchase of a well-known English football team.

The nature of politics in the area, characterized by rural vote-buying in which “big-bosses” have effectively monopolized the political process by gifting money to individual Thai’s in a rural setting and the threat of Thaksin cronies regaining power in an election have created further problems both in regards to the military’s attempt to minimize participation by pro-Thaksin politicians and also, through the questionable nature of paid-out votes. Each presents a valid concern for pro-democracy advocates.

In an article published last week touching on the mass protests and military crackdowns in Bangkok, it has been put forward that not only was the military response pre-planned by a number of years, but, also the military attempted to cremate the bodies of protesters killed by the military to destroy evidence. This raises an entirely different level of concern for Thai democracy.

I have chosen to focus on the South East Asian region.
I guess having traveled in SE Asia, I have a particular liking for the region, but, also democratic transitions within the region are really interesting and diverse.

Herrera and Kapur make a number of interesting points regarding the pervasive nature of politics and its effect on data collection/ interpretation, and, the many inconsistencies that often seem to occur. The author’s mention the concept of a “supply chain of data production”(373) through which relevant information is filtered through a number of actors and its originally worth or meaning can, thus, be easily misconstrued. To help improve on the problems that stem from this, they offer five broad suggestions:

(1) encourage the production and dissemination of the growing literature on data quality and methods for improvement; (2) consider better ways to use data sets known to be flawed;( 3) consider incentives as an instrument for improving data quality; (4) consider ways to lower the costs of producing high-quality data; and (5) consider institutional solutions to solve certain collective action problems related to data quality.

While, the suggestions are clearly well thought out and evidently the way to go, I would agree with Foucault that politics, more often than not, pervades everything, and, as such, it is difficult and will continue to be difficult to separate ideological influence or bias within research.