While reading Che Guevara’s Bolivian Diary I kept coming back to something, but it wasn’t something Che wrote, it was something Fidel Castro wrote in the introduction. He wrote, “some may interpret our decision to publish [The Bolivian Diary] as an act of provocation that will give the enemies of the revolution–the Yankee imperialists and their allies, the Latin American oligarchs–arguments for redoubling their efforts to blockade, isolate and attack Cuba.” (pg. 11) I was intrigued by this admission because it seemed startlingly obvious once I read it but had not occurred to me until then. Not only could the publication of this text potentially support action like that, it also potentially allows enemies at the time and in the future a glimpse into the day-to-day mechanisms and strategies of this guerrilla group. One might wonder what could be gleaned from this text as it is often slow and mundane and any helpful information would surely have been obvious to their enemies anyways. It is a text that is preoccupied with many of the small aspects of guerrilla warfare that are often invisibilized within a larger, theatrical depiction of events (such as the Soderberg’s Che.) Che meticulously recounts events such as surveying land, patiently awaiting additional recruits, the weather and the precarious nature of communication amongst guerrilla soldiers. His entries do not hide or emphasize the sometimes disorganized state of his troops. What could their enemies learn from this text that they would not already know by virtue of being soldiers themselves? A lot, actually (I think.)
I think we often overestimate the intelligence of military apparatuses, especially large ones. I sometimes forget that funding/resources does not (actually almost never) equals competence. Hitler tried to invade Russia during the middle of winter, twice. Not only could their enemies, imperialist and oligarchs alike, stand to learn about them, they could also improve their own strategies against Che and his fighters. Che is often cited as inspirational by guerilla groups operating presently which suggests that this text has not lost its relevance of applicability today. Since it is still being used by guerrilla group it stands to reason that it could still be being used by their opponents as well. The people who published this text must have realized and assumed responsibility for that risk. Perhaps they assumed that the potential good that might arise from its circulation would outweigh the potentially negative ways it might be taken up and studied by some.