It’s been roughly three months now since the US and her allies began waging war against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, a campaign which has enjoyed the support of most Western populations.  Depending on what metric you use to measure effectiveness, most would say that thus far the airstrikes have been a success. It is suggested that as many as 746 ISIS fighters have been killed by coalition airstrikes, of which even Canada has participated in, using her aged CF-18s to bomb ISIS positions around a dam in Iraq. By looking strictly at the numbers it would appear that thus far the campaign against ISIS has been a success. For my final blog post I will argue that while this may be the case, we must question the ramifications of these successes, and whether or not we are willing to continue indirectly supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

It was August of 2012 when President Barack Obama warned the Assad regime against using chemical weapons for fear of crossing a “red line,” a statement which has proven both misguided and an embarrassment to Obama’s foreign policy. After proof emerged that chemical weapons had been used, and the West concluded that these weapons had been deployed by the Assad regime, the wheels began turning for an international intervention against Assad, one which had previously been blocked by Russia in the UN Security Council. Unfortunately for Obama, the public support for a war against Assad was not there, and through an agreement with Russia to destroy all chemical weapon stockpiles, the Assad regime was saved from foreign intervention.

A year later, we are now bombing the single largest group of all the Syrian rebel factions, indirectly assisting Assad in retaking lands previously lost in what began as a democratic uprising in the Arab Spring. How did this happen? Is Assad not a bad guy after all?  Or have we involved ourselves in a conflict in which there is no right side?

From the beginnings of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Bashar al-Assad made the strategic choice to focus his efforts in combating the more moderate rebels who had begun the revolution in the hopes of achieving a more democratic government. This included many of the various factions which constituted the Free Syrian Army. In doing so he created space for extremist groups such as ISIS to grow stronger and gain control of territory. In addition, the relatively little funding that the moderate groups received in comparison to the Islamist groups who received more funding by the Gulf States, the extremist factions were often better armed and better funded. Finally, their more extreme, religiously inspired ideologies drew more foreign fighters compared to those simply fighting for a more democratic future for Syria.

All these factors compound into a shift in the opposition over a three year period which saw the opposition become more heavily dominated by jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, the various factions in the Islamic Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and of course, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. By allowing for this transition to occur, and actively encouraging it by targeting moderate groups, Assad effectively legitimized his role in the war as “a battle against terrorists,” which is how many pro-Assad supporters will describe the current Syrian civil war. In doing so he made himself appear less as a bad guy and more as a legitimate leader in the eyes of Western populations.

Then in late 2013 ISIS began making rapid gains seizing territory in Iraq, capturing major cities such as Mosul, Fallujah, and Ramadi. With the support of previously oppressed Sunni populations, they moved rapidly onwards towards the capital, Baghdad, capturing the attention of Western powers, particularly the US, who had only recently withdrawn from Iraq after occupying it for nearly a decade. Through the clever use of social media, ISIS spread propaganda in a manner which both attracted thousands of foreign followers while simultaneously appalling the rest of the world. In what was arguably one of their most clever uses of social media, they beheaded several Western journalists and aid workers, leading to massive public outcry and strong support for a military campaign against ISIS. This, coupled with their declaration of an “Islamic Caliphate” and their attempted genocide of the Yazidi people and other ethnic minorities, effectively set the stage for the intervention that both ISIS and Assad wanted. And this is exactly what they got.

It would seem then that ISIS is the greatest evil in the Middle East right now, begging the question –  is Bashar really that bad? The simple answer is yes, he is.  This is a man who has oppressed Sunni populations in Syria for decades, just like his father before him, an oppression which lead to the eventual revolution during the Arab Spring. What sparked the uprising, in fact, was the torture of 15 school aged boys for writing anti-regime graffiti. After the peaceful demonstrations began, the Assad regime brutally cracked down, opening fire on demonstrators in well documented massacres. Through photographic proof smuggled out of Syria by a state photographer, it has been shown that the Assad regime has committed “industrial-scale killings” of anti-regime protesters who had been detained, whose bodies bore evidence of widespread torture by various methods.

Warning: GRAPHIC

Throughout most of the Syrian civil war the Syrian Air Force has used indiscriminate barrel bombings in Sunni populated or rebel held neighbourhoods, killing thousands of innocent civilians. Human Rights Watch described the actions of the Syrian military as having “used ballistic missiles, rockets, artillery shells, cluster bombs, incendiary weapons, fuel-air explosives, barrel bombs, and regular aerial bombardment, as well as chemical weapons to indiscriminately attack populated areas in opposition-held territory and sometimes to target functioning bakeries, medical facilities, schools, and other civilian structures.” In 2013, a suburb of Damascus was struck by rockets containing the chemical agent sarin, killing hundreds of civilians and injuring thousands more.  In the past month a video emerged showing the aftermath of a bombing (warning: GRAPHIC) which targeted a refugee center in Habeet Idlib, killing 65. These bombings and their effects are well documented as often times killing many more civilians than rebels, making them illegal under international law.

In addition, thousands of incidences of sexual violence against women have also been committed by Syrian security forces, both in detention centers and prisons, as well as in recaptured villages and cities. Throughout the Syrian civil war the Assad regime has committed numerous war crimes, and yet has largely not been held accountable.

Warning: GRAPHIC

More recently, there has been debate as to whether or not coalition airstrikes have directly aided the Assad regime in retaking ground previously lost to rebels. What is more certain is that many Syrians on the ground perceive this to be true, believing that the coalition has chosen to side with Assad. These views are not without just cause, as recently it was reported that the US actually provided the Assad regime with intelligence on jihadist positions. Interestingly the perceived collaboration between the coalition and the Assad regime has driven Syrians to consider joining ISIS, as they believe ISIS now holds their only hope for defeating the Assad regime. This includes Jabhat al-Nusra, previously known for their opposition to ISIS, who shortly after coalition strikes began, announced that they were considering amending relations with ISIS in the face of coalition attacks. Finally, due to the coalition’s involvement in combatting ISIS, more Syrian Air Force resources have been freed up, allowing them to focus more on cities such as Raqqa and Aleppo, leading to an increase in airstrikes which have led to reports of many civilian deaths.

So what is to be taken away from this blog post? I would like to make it clear that I am by no means arguing in favour of any of ISIS’ actions, nor am I suggesting that they are any less evil than they have been made out to be in the media. Rather, what I am suggesting is that as the Syrian civil war rages on, it is critical to be cognizant of the fact that there are no “right” sides in this war. If the trend of collaboration with the Assad regime continues, and as calls to even ally with him grow louder and louder, I would request that you, the reader, keep in mind who he is. Recall that he is a man whose regime has been complicit in widespread oppression, rape, torture, and execution. He is a man who uses indiscriminate barrel bombs and chemical weapons against his own population, as a means of punishment for rebelling against his rule. There is no justifiable application of “the lesser of two evils” argument when considering Assad and ISIS, because both are monumentally evil. It is for this reason that I described involvement in Syria as “a whole other can of worms” in my first blog post of the year, and it is why 4 months later, I stand firm in my beliefs that Western involvement in Iraq and Syria is both misguided and ill-advised.

Shadow Company was an informative movie on the topic of private military companies (PMC), focusing largely on their role in Iraq. I found it was reasonably objective in its approach, bringing in the opinion of ex-security contractors who believed strongly in their jobs, and journalists and historians who were critical of PMCs. It effectively covered what PMCs were, who worked in them, what they did, how big of an industry they form, and some of the controversy surrounding them. Shadow Company does not attempt to make any significant suggestions on the role of the future of private military companies, perhaps for the sake of objectivity. I believe that this is an important topic to discuss though, and will address the question in further detail.

When you consider that private military companies experienced a huge boom post-9/11 largely due to the Iraq war and U.S. foreign policy at the onset of the war, you might expect that I would be strongly opposed to the use of private military companies. This is a fair assumption, given my past criticisms of the U.S. mission in Iraq, and its involvement in the arms industry. You might expect that I would dismiss PMCs as some sort of reimagined form of Western imperialism , resulting in the perpetuation of war. However this is not the case, as I will argue today that private military companies serve a legitimate and necessary purpose in the future of international security.

In the late 1990s a U.S. Marine General named Charles Krulak described a concept he called the “Three Block War.” The Three Block War concept suggested that the variety of challenges that soldiers faced in modern conflict had evolved into 3 requirements- to conduct military action, to conduct peacekeeping operations, and to provide humanitarian aid. The concept was referenced by Canadian Lieutenant General Rick Hillier in 2005 and proved to be significant during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, although was later dismissed by American and Canadian forces as being too simplistic of the situation on the ground. Instead, they suggested additional blocks should be considered, such as “psychological and informational aspects of modern missions,” or “governance, reconstruction and economic development.”

It would seem then that regardless of how many blocks there are in the war, modern day conflict zones around the world are highly complex, and we are asking our troops to play the role of politician, police, doctor, charity worker, teacher, urban planner, and soldier all at once! In short we have tasked our troops with the impossible task of nation building, and perhaps overstretched our militaries in doing so.

In this requirement lies the reason for the rise of PMCs in Iraq, which arguably provided the first major study of the consequences of major private military industry involvement in a war zone. “We’re not going to be able to write the history of the Iraq war…without talking about private military companies. And that’s a huge difference from any prior war,” said Peter Singer in Shadow Company. From Iraq many hard lessons can be learned, the most critical of which is that there absolutely must be effective and constant oversight over the contracting, screening, and supervising of private military companies. In 2007 employees of Blackwater Security Consulting shot at Iraqi civilians, killing 17 and injuring 20. In the past few weeks, four were convicted in the U.S. of either first degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. While this somewhat counters the claims that security contractors operate with impunity, the fact that this was a watershed case speaks to the gross lack of international and domestic oversight of the actions of PMCs.

This is the first topic to be addressed then, the need for greater oversight when employing private military companies. The UN must come to a resolution governing their deployment and their operations, especially regarding their rules of engagement. Those who violate these rules, or any other laws regulating warfare, must be subject to the full extent of both international and domestic law the same way a soldier might be. It is interesting here to note that in Shadow Company, the instances in which force can used is when 1) it is required for self-defence, 2) when defending the “nouns” or 3) in defence of Iraqi civilians. Similar sentiments were echoed by Alan Bell when he presented to our class. What is interesting about these rules of engagement is that they are very similar to those of UN Peacekeeping forces, hinting at the possibility that their roles in international security aren’t always so different.

Human rights aside, in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq it seems that the implementation of PMCs has been less than successful, an argument which proves challenging to my suggestions. One of the largest issues here is that funds allocated for the development of the nations were not well managed, often being given to companies without any sort of bidding process for the contract. Millions were also wasted due to a lack of oversight by the government funders, who did not take the time to ensure contracts were properly and effectively completed. It should be clear that in order for private military companies to be genuinely effective, there must be competition for contracts in which the winner is carefully supervised and audited to ensure that they maintain a level of quality in whichever project they are undertaking.

But what sort of services should be contracted out? As wars increasingly become intrastate in nature, more expectations of nation-building and transitional governance are placed on troops. PMCs could provide logistical services such as shipping supplies and assisting with troop support, in a manner more secure than ordinary civilian services would be. They could also be employed to provide security for NGOs distributing aid and humanitarian assistance. In addition they could be tasked with protecting or developing infrastructure in the war torn nation. Or instead they could be contracted to train the police forces of the government experiencing conflict. However, I do not think it is best for PMCs to be used to establish widespread security in conflicted regions (that is to say they should be used to protect objectives, not establish zones of security). I also would strongly suggest against the use of PMCs in combat missions, as this delegitimizes their claim to being a defensive force, and also incorporates operations that I think are best left to legitimate militaries.

By employing PMCs to conduct these non-combat operations, Western forces can effectively outsource these roles, freeing up time for their militaries to focus on larger, “main goal” type objectives, such as dismantling a terrorist organization or preventing conflict between warring parties without falling victim to any sacrifices in other areas of security. In doing so, Western forces would more effectively address the issue of nation-building compared to the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq, while simultaneously achieving their combat directives. By employing the private sector in providing these services it would be hoped that there would also be an improvement in the quality of service provided, as privatization allows companies to specialize in each role required in a way the military would not be able to. If these programs were implemented successfully, and occurred in conjunction with increasing levels of security, it seems reasonable that the state would be less likely to return to violence compared to if it was entirely rebuilt by military powers.

To conclude, I believe that private military companies are now thoroughly entrenched in the way militaries conduct warfare today and that through effective evolution of their implementation, we can legitimately and ethically employ their services in operations at home, and in warzones abroad. This first and foremost requires greater development of international legislation regarding the means by which private military companies can use force, with the greatest emphasis on the maintenance of human rights.  Private military companies should expect to be subjected to close scrutiny by their employers to ensure their services are effective, professional and in accordance with international and domestic law. Second, more effort must be directed to ensuring that the method through which companies obtain contracts is significantly competitive. Here again, PMCs must fall under close scrutiny to ensure that all use of government resources is effective in achieving the desired goal. Finally, there must be debate within the political systems of those who employ PMCs as to what mission directives they might privatize, versus those which should continue to be considered of national interest and best handled by the military. In doing so, Western forces, and all else who employ PMCs, can more effectively streamline their military capacities, while also specializing their abilities to provide greater nation-building and state development assistance.

After all, when building a house does it not seem wiser to call on a plumber, an electrician, an architect, a construction worker, and a painter, to complete the required tasks?  Surely it would be more cost effective and less time consuming than asking one individual to fill all of these roles. Why should the same not be said for nation-building? Through the privatization of non-combat roles of development and security implementation, countries who employ PMCs can more effectively complete their missions in conflict zones abroad, in turn striving for more definitive and long-lasting peace.

It’s a familiar scene in classrooms and lecture halls across Canada. A teacher or professor keen to introduce a topic about Canada and its role in the world leads with the ever popular discussion question, “what values does the rest of the world associate with Canada?” Hands begin to go up, and classically Canadian ideals such as, “multiculturalism,” “acceptance,” and “igloos,” are suggested. More often than not, “peacekeeping” is also added in the mix. When this is suggested it elicits a patriotic response. Our heart swells imagining people around the world thinking fondly of Canada as the harbinger of peace, and lover of all things non-violent. They think of Canada, a country whose own Foreign Affairs Minister fathered the concept of peacekeeping. Canada, they imagine, a country who valiantly defends human rights in places of conflict worldwide. Canada, who specializes in apologies and just wants everyone to have a good time. In short, Canada the peacekeeper. Unfortunately this is no longer the case. Canada is no longer the peacekeeping force it once was, and for this we should be ashamed. Furthermore I argue that in face of these failures, Canada should revamp its efforts in peacekeeping and live up to our supposed reputation.

I’ll begin with a question. What do Rwanda, the DRC, and Congo have in common? Several things actually. All three are central African nations that have been ravaged by civil war. All three have GDPs that rank below $60 billion per year. All three have, at some point or other, hosted Canadian peacekeeping troops. And all three currently provide more troops to the UN peacekeeping force than Canada. Of the top ten contributors, six are African nations, with Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Nepal completing the group. In fact, Canada the peacekeeper doesn’t even break the top 50 contributors to UN peacekeeping forces. We rank 65^th, amongst other such military and economic forces as Zambia, Tunisia, and Sierra Leone. Our contribution? 84 police officers, 13 military experts, and 21 soldiers as of September 2014. Still feeling proud of our peacekeeping reputation now?

There are several reasons for the decline of Canadian peacekeeping participation. The first is the incidences of failures the UN experienced in peacekeeping missions during the mid-90s. Between the Rwandan genocide in the presence of Canadian-lead UNAMIR forces in 1994, or the torture of a Somali teenager by Canadian troops in 1993, the ‘90s provided strong disincentive for future Canadian participation in UN endeavours.

While this was happening, NATO began to rise to prominence as an instrument of humanitarian intervention, providing a second distracting factor. Since the 1990s Canada has chosen to participate more with NATO, fighting alongside the US and its allies in wars based on humanitarian intervention, a concept which it is important to note is fundamentally different than peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is dependent on the conflicted country’s consent, and uses lightly armed troops to enforce peace agreements, a practice which has been shown through statistics to decrease the likelihood of a return to violence. Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, is based off of military supremacy and the enforcement of peace using things like no fly zones, precision airstrikes, and offensive counterinsurgency operations.

The effects of these NATO led interventions have been felt greatly in Canada. Earlier this year Canada finally finished returning her troops home from a decade-long war that one would be hard pressed to call a success.  Thus the Afghanistan war is the third cause of the decline of Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations, as it consumed the majority of the Armed Forces’ resources and capacities. Due to the war Canada drastically scaled back its training and education for peacekeeping operations, and in 2013 closed the doors of the Pearson Center, a military training base intended to train foreign and Canadian military personnel in peacekeeping operations.

More recently decreases in peace support operation (PSO) training and contributions to UN Peacekeeping missions overall, can also be seen as a reflection of the Harper administration’s prioritization of missions that the US deems valuable, over those which the UN deems valuable. This can be seen recently in Libya, in which Canada assisted NATO in bombing runs meant to depose the Gaddafi regime, a mission which arguably destabilized the state and lead to the ongoing war today.  If my predictions hold true, we should have the example of Syria and Iraq to point to in a few years as another botched humanitarian intervention for Canada to be ashamed of.

So what should Canada do? I have two possible solutions to this question. The first is that we make a concerted effort to revamp our peacekeeping traditions. At one time, 1 in 3 Canadian Armed Forces members wore a blue beret (UN peacekeeping outfit), a goal which I believe we should attempt to return to. We should reopen the Pearson Center, and expand its budget to better train our forces in peacekeeping and nation-building.  We should realign our military interests with those which aim to preserve peace, as opposed to those which aim to make war. In doing this, Canada can return to its former role of being a leader in peacekeeping efforts, a role in which we can use institutions such as the Pearson Center and UN missions to spread our knowledge and peacekeeping ideals to other military forces worldwide.

It is interesting to note that in discussion, guest speaker Capt. Lisa Haveman noted that in Afghanistan, Canadian forces were more adept at nation-building endeavours than their American counterparts, a trend which bodes well for a Canadian return to peacekeeping practices. I don’t think it’s an unattainable goal for Canada, and her forces, to realign ourselves with more multilaterally supported peacekeeping missions, which are more likely to garner long term peace. Doing so would gain Canada greater prominence in the global security arena, and provide greater nation-building efforts to conflict-ridden states than bombs from a CF-18 ever could.

And the second option? The second option is one in which we maintain the status quo. We continue to train our military forces solely to make war, continue to bomb in the name of peace, and continue to follow Western interests into conflicts that are ill-advised. While I won’t judge anyone who prefers this option, I must insist that if we continue to go this route, we should stop patting ourselves on the back for peace we do not keep.

In my eyes, this is what Canadian peacekeeping in the 21^st century comes down to. We can return to the values that Pearson instilled in us, values that we pride ourselves on and enjoy presenting to the world. Or we can carry on with the realist attitude that all wars can be solved with bombs, and that all soldiers should be warriors, and in doing so forget our past peaceful ideals. Personally, I prefer the former.

I have a bit of a bone to pick with the Wu-Tang Clan- I think they were too simplistic when they wrote C.R.E.A.M. “Cash, Oil, and Guns Rule Everything Around Me” would have been more accurate, though perhaps less lyrically oriented, I must admit. When we look at the vast majority of global insecurity today, we can often pick either oil or guns as the fuel of the conflict, with blood money being the primary outcome. Oil is all the media talks about, so let’s spend some time on guns, or more broadly, “arms,” instead. This is a security studies class after all.

My argument for the week is thus- the UN Permanent Security Council is fundamentally flawed, because all five of its members benefit greatly from armed conflict. That is to say, those five great powers that we charge with making peace are the five who benefit most from making war. Let me tell you a bit about the arms industry, and why we’ve trusted the biggest thugs of all to throw away their strongest revenue generators and attempt to make world peace. I’ll begin by explaining the situation as it is today, and then applying it to the current conflict in Syria and Iraq.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the following- the US, the UK, China, Russia, and France. Would you care to hazard a guess at the five biggest arms dealers in the world? That’s right- the US, the UK, China, Russia, and France. Together they make up 79% of the world’s arms trade, which is valued at roughly $100 billion. The US on its own makes up more than half of this number, supplying the world with 44% of its weapons. I’m reluctant to use the term “military-industrial complex” for fear of sounding like a hemp-wearing hippy, but it’s hard to argue when there is so clearly so much to gain from waging war.

As noted by a classmate in an astute blog post entitled, “Veto the Veto in the UN Security Council,” the five permanent members hold veto powers on all UN Security Council resolutions, allowing them to shoot down any action intended to indicate wrongdoings or create peace in conflict zones worldwide. Recently, Russia has used its veto power to shoot down a condemnation of Crimea’s referendum as being illegal, one which could have set a precedent for an international intervention. Together Russia and China also vetoed sanctions against Syria in 2012, a move which could have slowed or prevented the conflict it has become today. In 2011, the US vetoed a resolution condemning Israeli settlements in the West Bank, allowing for the IDF to continue its violent persecution of the Palestinian people.

While it is easy to dismiss these vetoes as simple reflections of state allegiances, I suggest there is a (slightly) more hidden agenda. When you see these resolutions fail, ask yourself why? Who is Israel’s biggest military ally? Where does Israel buy its weapons from? Who are Syria’s primary allies, and with what is it arming itself? You don’t even have to ask yourself about Ukraine, because it’s agreed upon by most that Russia is arming the separatist rebels. In every case that the veto is used by one of the five permanent members, it is not hard to trace the money trail back to the “veto-ers” arms industries who stand to gain greatly from the continuation of the conflict in question.

On the note of conflict, let us now turn to the war in Syria and Iraq which I have written both of my past blog posts about. Before delving into these, let us first examine the Syrian civil war pre-US involvement, and pre-expansion into Iraq. As noted previously, China and Russia both vetoed sanctions against Syria. From 2004-2007, Russia and China supplied Syria with $6.2 billion worth of arms, and from 2008-2011 an additional $2.4 billion. The war began in 2011, and weapons have been in even higher demand ever since (Source). “Not fair,” says the US, the UK, and France, “I want in on this money cow.” This brings me to my own blog posts.

In “Why Obama is Doomed to Repeat the Mistakes of His Predecessor,” I outlined why Obama’s air campaign in Iraq was misguided and bound to fail in the long term. In “Why the Latest Face in the War on Terror is a Sham,” I explained why the Khorasan group was likely not real, and suggested instead that the US had hyped them up to create a façade by which they could legitimize their war in Syria.  In both, what I neglected to explain was why the US might want to be in Iraq and Syria in the first place.

When examining the “broad coalition” Obama spoke of, it is interesting to note the Arab allies who are taking part in the war- namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt and Jordan. These are some of the US’ strongest arms-trading partners in the Middle East, with trades from 2008-2011 (again, pre-war) totalling roughly $53 billion. These countries get to protect their interests in the region through warfare while the US benefits economically from every bomb they drop. In addition, the US and its coalition are arming various warring factions in the region, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iraqi military, and the increasingly mythical “moderate Syrian rebels.” It is also worth noting that the UK has recently begun airstrikes against ISIS, while France has also announced it would increase its support– now all five of the permanent “Security Council” members are in on this cash grab!

But enough about how the US is indirectly benefiting from the war in Iraq and Syria, let’s talk direct economic stimulation. A report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments announced that the war against ISIS has already come close to costing $1 billion. That’s $1 billion largely going into the American defense industry. Don’t believe me? Consider one very small case study- on September the 22^nd the US fired 47 Tomahawk missiles at various targets in Syria. These missiles cost $1.4 million each, bringing the day’s cost in Tomahawk missile launches alone to $65.8 million. That’s $65.8 million in missiles that will need to be replaced, putting $65.8 million right in the pockets of the American Raytheon Corp, who manufactures the Tomahawk. Not bad for a Monday. The Navy currently has roughly 4,000 Tomahawk missiles stockpiled and buys them at a rate of around 200 per year. From this very specific example, one which ignores the vast amount of other military technology currently being employed against ISIS, it should be clear that the US has effectively created an economic stimulus package via missile strike. Growth from destruction – it would be poetic if it weren’t for the fact that it comes at the cost of civilian lives.

By looking at the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, it should be clear that the idea that their mission is to make peace is a laughable one. These permanent members benefit greatly from conflict, from war, and from militant and civilian death alike. In short, the permanent members of the UN Security Council benefit most when the world is the exact opposite- insecure. And given their ability to veto all UNSC resolutions, I see no change in sight. So perhaps the term “military-industrial complex” isn’t so far-fetched after all. Perhaps the hemp-wearing hippies have been right all along.

As America began its air campaign in Syria earlier this week, it bombed numerous ISIS targets killing a large number of militants as well as multiple civilians. It also attacked another group located west of Aleppo, which it called “the Khorasan group.”  “Strikes were undertaken,’ the US Department of Defense said, “to disrupt imminent attack plotting against the United States and Western targets.”

So who is “the Khorasan group?” Khorasan, like “al-Sham” in ISIS’ name, is a historical geographical location that now comprises regions of modern day Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. It is from Khorasan that a Muslim army is prophesied to rise out of and conquer Jerusalem. From a Western perspective, it’s about as threatening as a historical name can be.

US officials say it is a small, al-Qaeda affiliated organization comprised of highly skilled al-Qaeda veterans, including experts in bomb-making from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It was suggested that they posed an imminent threat to the West, as they were in the final stages of plotting an attack, with what some hypothesize were new non-metallic explosives. The suggestion made by US officials is that Ayman al-Zawahiri (the leader of al-Qaeda) requested that Musin al-Fadhli (a confidante of Bin Laden and a veteran al-Qaeda leader) go to Syria to form an executive cell amidst Syria’s chaos, where Fadhli could embed among the Syrian rebel group Jabahat al-Nusra (JAN), another al-Qaeda affiliate, and recruit Western jihadists from its ranks to attack their homelands.

Forget selling newspaper headlines, let’s sell the movie rights to this story! A super-secret terrorist organization with al-Qaeda affiliations? Rooted in Islamic prophecies of Armageddon?! With new age plastic bombs that are going to be used to attack the West???

This has all the makings of the narratives that the West loves to fear. And that’s exactly what it is. Following Saddam’s WMDs, and more recently ISIS’ inflated threat to world peace, we now have “Khorasan,” the newest term of the day to toss around the kitchen table at home and the water cooler at work, evoking wide eyes and whispers of why we need to keep fighting the war on terror. Just try whispering it. Khorasan. Doesn’t it sound scary?

As someone who has been following the Syrian civil war since its beginning, I was surprised when I heard that the US had bombed targets of an organization I had never heard of. This was because no one had heard of Khorasan until a few weeks ago. Currently there is great debate as to whether or not they are a real organization. I suggest that they are not real, and that the US has simply renamed an old enemy for political gain.

By suggesting that Khorasan is an al-Qaeda affiliate which poses an imminent threat to America, Obama legitimizes his war in Syria, one which is argued by some as unconstitutional and illegal.

“Under the post-9/11 authorization provided by Congress in 2001,” says McLaughlin and Liebelson, “the president is allowed to use force against ‘those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.’ And senior administration officials contend that this authorization covers Khorasan, given its connection to Al Qaeda.”

Further reason to present Khorasan as an imminent threat is the guise it provides, under which the US can strike the terrorist organization it is imbedded within, Jabhat al-Nusra. An al-Qaeda affiliate that has been fairly successful in fighting the Assad regime in Syria, JAN’s Islamist views are too radical for the US’ view of a more Western-friendly future for Syria.

“[The JAN occupied region] is an area where the United States and its allies seek to support rival rebel forces, in order to gradually squeeze out the hardline jihadis and reshape the insurgency against Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad,” said Aaron Lund of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

My suggestion then is that Khorasan is simply JAN rebranded. Similarly the Washington Post says, “what’s disputed is whether the Khorasan group is really any different from Jabhat al-Nusra, or whether it can even constitute a distinct entity at all.”

This is supported by the fact that after the US airstrikes allegedly against Khorasan, Syrian opposition forces said as many as 50 JAN fighters were killed. In addition, al-Nusra itself reported that the same strikes had killed one of their leaders, Abu Yousef al-Turki.

“’Rebels, activists and the whole world knows that these positions (hit Tuesday) were Al-Nusra positions, and the fighters killed were Al-Nusra fighters,’ added Abdel Rahman,” quoted by Newsmax, “[Khorasan]… should not be considered a new or distinct group as such.”

Even if they did exist, Khorasan presents little to fear. In fact, the US has nearly said as much. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper said earlier, “in terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a threat as the Islamic State.” This is an odd statement in light of Barack Obama’s statement that, “there is “no credible information” that the militants of the Islamic State were planning to attack inside the United States.”

So there you have it – Khorosan is simply the West’s newest bogeyman. By applying a loaded name to a three year old al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, the US has created a new external threat that legitimizes its war in Syria, extends its permissible scope of targeted strikes, and sets the groundwork for an extended war in the Middle East. Khorosan is the newest player to fear in the Middle East, the new bad guy in the West’s epic fight against evil.

All of this and for what? Khorosan is not even real.

Note- I don’t expect these updates to be included in the marked work as they were made after the blog deadline, however they do provide interesting context from which to read my post.

Update: Two days later, an article by Greenwald and Hussain. 

Update 2: Three days later, an interview with Hussain on Democracy Now.

Update 3: Four days later, Al Aan TV finds documents at the site of the strike against alleged Khorasan facilities, listing 13 men as being Jabhat al-Nusra operatives. This includes Abu Yousef al-Turki, who I cited as proof that Khorasan was most likely just JAN.

When speaking about his strategy against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS or ISIL), there appears to be a common theme that President Barack Obama stresses – that he will not repeat the mistakes of his predecessor George W. Bush and be dragged into yet another bloody and lengthy war in the Middle East. However if you look closely at his supposedly different strategy, you realize that it is not so different where it counts.

In his Presidential Address on ISIL, Obama said the US military will wage an air campaign against ISIS targets through “a ‘steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever they exist using our airpower.” He goes on to say this would be done in co-operation with a number of other nations who would form a military alliance. While at first this may sound like a preferable alternative to returning US combat troops to Iraq, Barack Obama is mistaken if he thinks he has learned much of anything from the mistakes of his predecessor Bush when fighting terrorism.  Based on the strategy Obama has laid out, America is doomed to another loss in its battle in the War on Terror.

Obama’s most critical mistake is his reliance on air assault. In recent history America has proved to be very good at bombing things, sometimes using a “shock and awe” technique as a means of gaining military advantage (see the air assaults in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya for example). However in recent history America has also proved to be very poor at dealing with the outcomes of such air campaigns (see the air assaults in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya for example). These failures can be argued as one of the causal factors of the rise in ISIS over the last 5 years.

It is critical when combatting terrorist organizations that a state must not forget the role the local population plays. Terrorist organizations often depend on local populations for things such as, supplies needed to sustain battle, concealment from their attackers, and a source of new recruits. With this in mind it should be clear to many that bombing is one of the surest ways a counterterrorist entity can drive a populace to extremism. Again, the failed wars in Afghanistan and Iraq come to mind, or perhaps consider the state of Israel and its problem with extremism in the occupied territories.

And here rises an issue for America – bombing urban populations is going to become necessary when ISIS fighters congregate in them to shelter from the destruction of their rural bases and training centers. If Obama really wants to “degrade and destroy” ISIS, he will eventually have to strike areas such as Falluja and Mosul in Iraq, and possibly even Raqqa in Syria (this opens a whole other can of worms).

It is truly a shame that Western powers have yet to learn this important lesson – when fighting terrorists hiding in civilian populations, bombing becomes an act of terrorism, and you cannot fight terrorism with terrorism. For every bomb that is dropped, for every militant that is killed, a new one is born. It is laughable that Obama points to “successful” drone programs in Yemen and Somalia, two countries that are actually now seeing a rise in extremism.

Thus, several predictions can be made regarding the outcome of Obama’s air strategy in combatting ISIS. Foreign fighters streaming into the conflict will increase, as the inevitable death of innocent Muslims will boost extremist and anti-Western sentiment abroad. Foreign funding will increase, as Syria and Iraq becomes the next arena for wealthy radical elites to take their jabs at Western forces. Finally and most critically, a new generation of terrorists will be born amongst the rubble and dust of desecrated homes.

Based on his short sighted plan of bombing for peace, it should be clear that Obama is far less different from Bush than he might think. In both leaders’ strategies lies a key realist error in combatting extremism, one which misses the vital role soft power can play in fighting terrorism. America and its allies must wake up to the fact that they cannot solve extremism and fundamentalism by precision airstrike, which continues to breed, and proliferate foreign terrorist organizations.

Until this happens the only remaining question in the War on Terror is this- who do we bomb next?