It’s been roughly three months now since the US and her allies began waging war against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, a campaign which has enjoyed the support of most Western populations.  Depending on what metric you use to measure effectiveness, most would say that thus far the airstrikes have been a success. It is suggested that as many as 746 ISIS fighters have been killed by coalition airstrikes, of which even Canada has participated in, using her aged CF-18s to bomb ISIS positions around a dam in Iraq. By looking strictly at the numbers it would appear that thus far the campaign against ISIS has been a success. For my final blog post I will argue that while this may be the case, we must question the ramifications of these successes, and whether or not we are willing to continue indirectly supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

It was August of 2012 when President Barack Obama warned the Assad regime against using chemical weapons for fear of crossing a “red line,” a statement which has proven both misguided and an embarrassment to Obama’s foreign policy. After proof emerged that chemical weapons had been used, and the West concluded that these weapons had been deployed by the Assad regime, the wheels began turning for an international intervention against Assad, one which had previously been blocked by Russia in the UN Security Council. Unfortunately for Obama, the public support for a war against Assad was not there, and through an agreement with Russia to destroy all chemical weapon stockpiles, the Assad regime was saved from foreign intervention.

A year later, we are now bombing the single largest group of all the Syrian rebel factions, indirectly assisting Assad in retaking lands previously lost in what began as a democratic uprising in the Arab Spring. How did this happen? Is Assad not a bad guy after all?  Or have we involved ourselves in a conflict in which there is no right side?

From the beginnings of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Bashar al-Assad made the strategic choice to focus his efforts in combating the more moderate rebels who had begun the revolution in the hopes of achieving a more democratic government. This included many of the various factions which constituted the Free Syrian Army. In doing so he created space for extremist groups such as ISIS to grow stronger and gain control of territory. In addition, the relatively little funding that the moderate groups received in comparison to the Islamist groups who received more funding by the Gulf States, the extremist factions were often better armed and better funded. Finally, their more extreme, religiously inspired ideologies drew more foreign fighters compared to those simply fighting for a more democratic future for Syria.

All these factors compound into a shift in the opposition over a three year period which saw the opposition become more heavily dominated by jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, the various factions in the Islamic Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and of course, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. By allowing for this transition to occur, and actively encouraging it by targeting moderate groups, Assad effectively legitimized his role in the war as “a battle against terrorists,” which is how many pro-Assad supporters will describe the current Syrian civil war. In doing so he made himself appear less as a bad guy and more as a legitimate leader in the eyes of Western populations.

Then in late 2013 ISIS began making rapid gains seizing territory in Iraq, capturing major cities such as Mosul, Fallujah, and Ramadi. With the support of previously oppressed Sunni populations, they moved rapidly onwards towards the capital, Baghdad, capturing the attention of Western powers, particularly the US, who had only recently withdrawn from Iraq after occupying it for nearly a decade. Through the clever use of social media, ISIS spread propaganda in a manner which both attracted thousands of foreign followers while simultaneously appalling the rest of the world. In what was arguably one of their most clever uses of social media, they beheaded several Western journalists and aid workers, leading to massive public outcry and strong support for a military campaign against ISIS. This, coupled with their declaration of an “Islamic Caliphate” and their attempted genocide of the Yazidi people and other ethnic minorities, effectively set the stage for the intervention that both ISIS and Assad wanted. And this is exactly what they got.

It would seem then that ISIS is the greatest evil in the Middle East right now, begging the question –  is Bashar really that bad? The simple answer is yes, he is.  This is a man who has oppressed Sunni populations in Syria for decades, just like his father before him, an oppression which lead to the eventual revolution during the Arab Spring. What sparked the uprising, in fact, was the torture of 15 school aged boys for writing anti-regime graffiti. After the peaceful demonstrations began, the Assad regime brutally cracked down, opening fire on demonstrators in well documented massacres. Through photographic proof smuggled out of Syria by a state photographer, it has been shown that the Assad regime has committed “industrial-scale killings” of anti-regime protesters who had been detained, whose bodies bore evidence of widespread torture by various methods.

Warning: GRAPHIC

Throughout most of the Syrian civil war the Syrian Air Force has used indiscriminate barrel bombings in Sunni populated or rebel held neighbourhoods, killing thousands of innocent civilians. Human Rights Watch described the actions of the Syrian military as having “used ballistic missiles, rockets, artillery shells, cluster bombs, incendiary weapons, fuel-air explosives, barrel bombs, and regular aerial bombardment, as well as chemical weapons to indiscriminately attack populated areas in opposition-held territory and sometimes to target functioning bakeries, medical facilities, schools, and other civilian structures.” In 2013, a suburb of Damascus was struck by rockets containing the chemical agent sarin, killing hundreds of civilians and injuring thousands more.  In the past month a video emerged showing the aftermath of a bombing (warning: GRAPHIC) which targeted a refugee center in Habeet Idlib, killing 65. These bombings and their effects are well documented as often times killing many more civilians than rebels, making them illegal under international law.

In addition, thousands of incidences of sexual violence against women have also been committed by Syrian security forces, both in detention centers and prisons, as well as in recaptured villages and cities. Throughout the Syrian civil war the Assad regime has committed numerous war crimes, and yet has largely not been held accountable.

Warning: GRAPHIC

More recently, there has been debate as to whether or not coalition airstrikes have directly aided the Assad regime in retaking ground previously lost to rebels. What is more certain is that many Syrians on the ground perceive this to be true, believing that the coalition has chosen to side with Assad. These views are not without just cause, as recently it was reported that the US actually provided the Assad regime with intelligence on jihadist positions. Interestingly the perceived collaboration between the coalition and the Assad regime has driven Syrians to consider joining ISIS, as they believe ISIS now holds their only hope for defeating the Assad regime. This includes Jabhat al-Nusra, previously known for their opposition to ISIS, who shortly after coalition strikes began, announced that they were considering amending relations with ISIS in the face of coalition attacks. Finally, due to the coalition’s involvement in combatting ISIS, more Syrian Air Force resources have been freed up, allowing them to focus more on cities such as Raqqa and Aleppo, leading to an increase in airstrikes which have led to reports of many civilian deaths.

So what is to be taken away from this blog post? I would like to make it clear that I am by no means arguing in favour of any of ISIS’ actions, nor am I suggesting that they are any less evil than they have been made out to be in the media. Rather, what I am suggesting is that as the Syrian civil war rages on, it is critical to be cognizant of the fact that there are no “right” sides in this war. If the trend of collaboration with the Assad regime continues, and as calls to even ally with him grow louder and louder, I would request that you, the reader, keep in mind who he is. Recall that he is a man whose regime has been complicit in widespread oppression, rape, torture, and execution. He is a man who uses indiscriminate barrel bombs and chemical weapons against his own population, as a means of punishment for rebelling against his rule. There is no justifiable application of “the lesser of two evils” argument when considering Assad and ISIS, because both are monumentally evil. It is for this reason that I described involvement in Syria as “a whole other can of worms” in my first blog post of the year, and it is why 4 months later, I stand firm in my beliefs that Western involvement in Iraq and Syria is both misguided and ill-advised.

Shadow Company was an informative movie on the topic of private military companies (PMC), focusing largely on their role in Iraq. I found it was reasonably objective in its approach, bringing in the opinion of ex-security contractors who believed strongly in their jobs, and journalists and historians who were critical of PMCs. It effectively covered what PMCs were, who worked in them, what they did, how big of an industry they form, and some of the controversy surrounding them. Shadow Company does not attempt to make any significant suggestions on the role of the future of private military companies, perhaps for the sake of objectivity. I believe that this is an important topic to discuss though, and will address the question in further detail.

When you consider that private military companies experienced a huge boom post-9/11 largely due to the Iraq war and U.S. foreign policy at the onset of the war, you might expect that I would be strongly opposed to the use of private military companies. This is a fair assumption, given my past criticisms of the U.S. mission in Iraq, and its involvement in the arms industry. You might expect that I would dismiss PMCs as some sort of reimagined form of Western imperialism , resulting in the perpetuation of war. However this is not the case, as I will argue today that private military companies serve a legitimate and necessary purpose in the future of international security.

In the late 1990s a U.S. Marine General named Charles Krulak described a concept he called the “Three Block War.” The Three Block War concept suggested that the variety of challenges that soldiers faced in modern conflict had evolved into 3 requirements- to conduct military action, to conduct peacekeeping operations, and to provide humanitarian aid. The concept was referenced by Canadian Lieutenant General Rick Hillier in 2005 and proved to be significant during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, although was later dismissed by American and Canadian forces as being too simplistic of the situation on the ground. Instead, they suggested additional blocks should be considered, such as “psychological and informational aspects of modern missions,” or “governance, reconstruction and economic development.”

It would seem then that regardless of how many blocks there are in the war, modern day conflict zones around the world are highly complex, and we are asking our troops to play the role of politician, police, doctor, charity worker, teacher, urban planner, and soldier all at once! In short we have tasked our troops with the impossible task of nation building, and perhaps overstretched our militaries in doing so.

In this requirement lies the reason for the rise of PMCs in Iraq, which arguably provided the first major study of the consequences of major private military industry involvement in a war zone. “We’re not going to be able to write the history of the Iraq war…without talking about private military companies. And that’s a huge difference from any prior war,” said Peter Singer in Shadow Company. From Iraq many hard lessons can be learned, the most critical of which is that there absolutely must be effective and constant oversight over the contracting, screening, and supervising of private military companies. In 2007 employees of Blackwater Security Consulting shot at Iraqi civilians, killing 17 and injuring 20. In the past few weeks, four were convicted in the U.S. of either first degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. While this somewhat counters the claims that security contractors operate with impunity, the fact that this was a watershed case speaks to the gross lack of international and domestic oversight of the actions of PMCs.

This is the first topic to be addressed then, the need for greater oversight when employing private military companies. The UN must come to a resolution governing their deployment and their operations, especially regarding their rules of engagement. Those who violate these rules, or any other laws regulating warfare, must be subject to the full extent of both international and domestic law the same way a soldier might be. It is interesting here to note that in Shadow Company, the instances in which force can used is when 1) it is required for self-defence, 2) when defending the “nouns” or 3) in defence of Iraqi civilians. Similar sentiments were echoed by Alan Bell when he presented to our class. What is interesting about these rules of engagement is that they are very similar to those of UN Peacekeeping forces, hinting at the possibility that their roles in international security aren’t always so different.

Human rights aside, in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq it seems that the implementation of PMCs has been less than successful, an argument which proves challenging to my suggestions. One of the largest issues here is that funds allocated for the development of the nations were not well managed, often being given to companies without any sort of bidding process for the contract. Millions were also wasted due to a lack of oversight by the government funders, who did not take the time to ensure contracts were properly and effectively completed. It should be clear that in order for private military companies to be genuinely effective, there must be competition for contracts in which the winner is carefully supervised and audited to ensure that they maintain a level of quality in whichever project they are undertaking.

But what sort of services should be contracted out? As wars increasingly become intrastate in nature, more expectations of nation-building and transitional governance are placed on troops. PMCs could provide logistical services such as shipping supplies and assisting with troop support, in a manner more secure than ordinary civilian services would be. They could also be employed to provide security for NGOs distributing aid and humanitarian assistance. In addition they could be tasked with protecting or developing infrastructure in the war torn nation. Or instead they could be contracted to train the police forces of the government experiencing conflict. However, I do not think it is best for PMCs to be used to establish widespread security in conflicted regions (that is to say they should be used to protect objectives, not establish zones of security). I also would strongly suggest against the use of PMCs in combat missions, as this delegitimizes their claim to being a defensive force, and also incorporates operations that I think are best left to legitimate militaries.

By employing PMCs to conduct these non-combat operations, Western forces can effectively outsource these roles, freeing up time for their militaries to focus on larger, “main goal” type objectives, such as dismantling a terrorist organization or preventing conflict between warring parties without falling victim to any sacrifices in other areas of security. In doing so, Western forces would more effectively address the issue of nation-building compared to the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq, while simultaneously achieving their combat directives. By employing the private sector in providing these services it would be hoped that there would also be an improvement in the quality of service provided, as privatization allows companies to specialize in each role required in a way the military would not be able to. If these programs were implemented successfully, and occurred in conjunction with increasing levels of security, it seems reasonable that the state would be less likely to return to violence compared to if it was entirely rebuilt by military powers.

To conclude, I believe that private military companies are now thoroughly entrenched in the way militaries conduct warfare today and that through effective evolution of their implementation, we can legitimately and ethically employ their services in operations at home, and in warzones abroad. This first and foremost requires greater development of international legislation regarding the means by which private military companies can use force, with the greatest emphasis on the maintenance of human rights.  Private military companies should expect to be subjected to close scrutiny by their employers to ensure their services are effective, professional and in accordance with international and domestic law. Second, more effort must be directed to ensuring that the method through which companies obtain contracts is significantly competitive. Here again, PMCs must fall under close scrutiny to ensure that all use of government resources is effective in achieving the desired goal. Finally, there must be debate within the political systems of those who employ PMCs as to what mission directives they might privatize, versus those which should continue to be considered of national interest and best handled by the military. In doing so, Western forces, and all else who employ PMCs, can more effectively streamline their military capacities, while also specializing their abilities to provide greater nation-building and state development assistance.

After all, when building a house does it not seem wiser to call on a plumber, an electrician, an architect, a construction worker, and a painter, to complete the required tasks?  Surely it would be more cost effective and less time consuming than asking one individual to fill all of these roles. Why should the same not be said for nation-building? Through the privatization of non-combat roles of development and security implementation, countries who employ PMCs can more effectively complete their missions in conflict zones abroad, in turn striving for more definitive and long-lasting peace.