Borgesian

My aim was to write a post a week this semester about Borges, much as I did a few years ago for José María Arguedas. I'm behind, but hoping to catch up. Here is what I have written to date:



Also:

  • chance ("The Widow Ching--Pirate," "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote," "The South," and "The Library of Babel")


Related:

scenes

Historia universal de la infamia manifests Borges's interest in performance: the ways in which the self is not a given, but is rather a role that we play. Sometimes we play no other role than the one we are given, which is why perhaps it seems so true to us, and why we easily confuse what is after all mere habit with some kind of abiding essence. At other times, however, characters find themselves faced with a decision: will they act this way or that. This is a dramatic choice between the different selves that they could potentially be. Perhaps infamy itself is precisely the result of some such decision, a deviation from an allotted role in favor of some other performance.

Almost all the stories in the collection revolve around some kind of imposture. Most obviously, "El impostor inverosímil Tom Castro" ("The Improbable Impostor Tom Castro"), which is based on the Tichborne Case, a nineteenth-century cause célèbre in which one Arthur Orton claimed to be the long-lost Sir Roger Tichborne, heir to the Tichborne Baronetcy. Borges observes that Orton's performance gained credibility from the fact that he was in so many ways so different from the person he claimed to be: where Tichborne had been slim, dark-haired, reserved, and precise, Orton was fat, fair-haired, outspoken, and uncouth. Borges's point is that presumably an impostor would try to copy at least some elements of the original he was mimicking; the very fact that there was no such attempt at impersonation seemed to prove that Orton must be the real thing. The best disguise is no disguise at all; in the best performance there is no distance between the role being played and the person playing it.

"El impostor inverosímil" features an eminence grise in the shape of Orton's accomplice Ebenezer Bogle, who plays the part of Tichborne's manservant. When Bogle dies, Orton quite literally loses the plot and ends up "giving lectures in which he would alternately declare his innocence and confess his guilt" (40; Complete Fictions 18). Borges calls Orton Tichborne's "ghost," presumably in that he shows up after the latter's death, like some kind of strange revenant. But it is surely equally true that Orton himself is haunted by Tichborne. By the end he has spent so longer playing the role that it's as though he's know quite sure who he is, and he will let the public decide: "many nights he would begin by defending himself and wind up admitting all, depending on the inclinations of his audience" (40; 18).

In "El asesino desinterado Bill Harrigan" ("The Disinterested Killer Bill Harrigan"), there is no third party: neither the eminence grise nor the ghost that compelled Orton's transformation. Or rather, there is but it is impersonal, mechanistic: New York tenement boy Harrigan turns himself into the cowboy out West who will be Billy the Kid by acting out melodramatic models provided by the theater. In turn, he will become an iconic part of the myths of the Wild West propagated by Hollywood.

Borges suggests that the History he is telling us is a series of "discontinuous images" that he compares a movie. But it is even better described as a series of scenes in the cinematic sense: briefer than a theater scene but more dynamic than any single image, the filmic scene is a situation in a single space defined by mise-en-scène, a dramatic confrontation, and the position of camera angles or lines of sight. Indeed, the scene is very often the basic unit of Borges's fiction. (In this collection, think particularly of "Hombre de la Esquina Rosada" ["Man on Pink Corner"] or the ending of "El tintorero enmascarado Hákim de Merv" ["Hakim, the Masked Dyer of Merv"].)

Here the key scene is the moment of transformation of Harrigan into Billy: a notorious Mexican gunfighter named Belisario Villagrán enters a crowded saloon that is outlined with cinematic precision and visuality ("their elbows on the bar, tired hard-muscled men drink a belligerent alcohol and flash stacks of silver coins marked with a serpent and an eagle" [64; 32]); everyone stops dead except for Harrigan, who fells him with a single shot and for no apparent reason. Again, the visual detail as the Mexican's body is slow to register the indignity: "The glass falls from Villagrán's hand; then the entire body follows" (65; 33). In that moment, Billy the Kid is born "and the shifty Bill Harrigan buried" (66; 33).

But even if it is Bill's "disinterested" (unreflective, habitual) killing that turns him into a legend, there is always a gap between that legend and his behavior. He may learn "to sit a horse straight" or "the vagabond art of cattle driving" and he may find himself attracted to "the guitars and brothels of Mexico" (66, 67; 33, 34), but a few tics from his East Coast days remain: "Something of the New York hoodlum lived on in the cowboy" (66; 33). The task of replacing one set of habits (or habitus) with another is never quite complete. But it is not as though Harrigan were the "real" thing and Billy the Kid a mere mask. Rather, it is that the new performance is informed by the old one. As always in Borges, there is never anything entirely new under the sun, even the scorching sun of the arid Western desert.

scenes

Historia universal de la infamia manifests Borges's interest in performance: the ways in which the self is not a given, but is rather a role that we play. Sometimes we play no other role than the one we are given, which is why perhaps it seems so true to us, and why we easily confuse what is after all mere habit with some kind of abiding essence. At other times, however, characters find themselves faced with a decision: will they act this way or that. This is a dramatic choice between the different selves that they could potentially be. Perhaps infamy itself is precisely the result of some such decision, a deviation from an allotted role in favor of some other performance.

Almost all the stories in the collection revolve around some kind of imposture. Most obviously, "El impostor inverosímil Tom Castro" ("The Improbable Impostor Tom Castro"), which is based on the Tichborne Case, a nineteenth-century cause célèbre in which one Arthur Orton claimed to be the long-lost Sir Roger Tichborne, heir to the Tichborne Baronetcy. Borges observes that Orton's performance gained credibility from the fact that he was in so many ways so different from the person he claimed to be: where Tichborne had been slim, dark-haired, reserved, and precise, Orton was fat, fair-haired, outspoken, and uncouth. Borges's point is that presumably an impostor would try to copy at least some elements of the original he was mimicking; the very fact that there was no such attempt at impersonation seemed to prove that Orton must be the real thing. The best disguise is no disguise at all; in the best performance there is no distance between the role being played and the person playing it.

"El impostor inverosímil" features an eminence grise in the shape of Orton's accomplice Ebenezer Bogle, who plays the part of Tichborne's manservant. When Bogle dies, Orton quite literally loses the plot and ends up "giving lectures in which he would alternately declare his innocence and confess his guilt" (40; Complete Fictions 18). Borges calls Orton Tichborne's "ghost," presumably in that he shows up after the latter's death, like some kind of strange revenant. But it is surely equally true that Orton himself is haunted by Tichborne. By the end he has spent so longer playing the role that it's as though he's know quite sure who he is, and he will let the public decide: "many nights he would begin by defending himself and wind up admitting all, depending on the inclinations of his audience" (40; 18).

In "El asesino desinterado Bill Harrigan" ("The Disinterested Killer Bill Harrigan"), there is no third party: neither the eminence grise nor the ghost that compelled Orton's transformation. Or rather, there is but it is impersonal, mechanistic: New York tenement boy Harrigan turns himself into the cowboy out West who will be Billy the Kid by acting out melodramatic models provided by the theater. In turn, he will become an iconic part of the myths of the Wild West propagated by Hollywood.

Borges suggests that the History he is telling us is a series of "discontinuous images" that he compares a movie. But it is even better described as a series of scenes in the cinematic sense: briefer than a theater scene but more dynamic than any single image, the filmic scene is a situation in a single space defined by mise-en-scène, a dramatic confrontation, and the position of camera angles or lines of sight. Indeed, the scene is very often the basic unit of Borges's fiction. (In this collection, think particularly of "Hombre de la Esquina Rosada" ["Man on Pink Corner"] or the ending of "El tintorero enmascarado Hákim de Merv" ["Hakim, the Masked Dyer of Merv"].)

Here the key scene is the moment of transformation of Harrigan into Billy: a notorious Mexican gunfighter named Belisario Villagrán enters a crowded saloon that is outlined with cinematic precision and visuality ("their elbows on the bar, tired hard-muscled men drink a belligerent alcohol and flash stacks of silver coins marked with a serpent and an eagle" [64; 32]); everyone stops dead except for Harrigan, who fells him with a single shot and for no apparent reason. Again, the visual detail as the Mexican's body is slow to register the indignity: "The glass falls from Villagrán's hand; then the entire body follows" (65; 33). In that moment, Billy the Kid is born "and the shifty Bill Harrigan buried" (66; 33).

But even if it is Bill's "disinterested" (unreflective, habitual) killing that turns him into a legend, there is always a gap between that legend and his behavior. He may learn "to sit a horse straight" or "the vagabond art of cattle driving" and he may find himself attracted to "the guitars and brothels of Mexico" (66, 67; 33, 34), but a few tics from his East Coast days remain: "Something of the New York hoodlum lived on in the cowboy" (66; 33). The task of replacing one set of habits (or habitus) with another is never quite complete. But it is not as though Harrigan were the "real" thing and Billy the Kid a mere mask. Rather, it is that the new performance is informed by the old one. As always in Borges, there is never anything entirely new under the sun, even the scorching sun of the arid Western desert.

hatchet

Edwin Williamson's Borges: A Life is the standard biography in English. But it is, sadly, not a good book.

Williamson is frankly obsessed with Borges's sexual history. The irony is that there really isn't that much to be obsessed about: Borges had a whole series of crushes on various women, but so far as one can tell they were very seldom consummated; he didn't marry until he was almost 68; and both Borges himself and the women with which he was in one way or another involved were almost all very discreet and have left little in the way of written record of their relationships.

Inevitably, then, Williamson is reduced to conjecture. There is much talk about what "must have" or "may have" been the case: "the truth may have been that he needed to feel close to the woman he loved" in order to write his longest fiction, The Congress (279); "he may have blamed Perón for coming between him and" a woman he asked to marry but who refused (332); the violence of his reaction upon hearing that another former crush was to marry someone else "must surely have been due to the symbolic significance of the occasion" (358); the woman who would become his second wife "must have been a soothing presence" from the time he first met her (370). And so on and so forth.

More seriously still, and in lieu of any other evidence, Williamson turns to Borges's writing and reads it often as though it were almost directly confessional and autobiographical. So, for instance, almost any number of the earlier fictions are read as barely-disguised accounts of a putative love triangle between Borges and fellow writers Norah Lange and Oliverio Girondo. So Williamson has much to say about the "autobiographical subtext" of the novel outlined in "El Acercamiento a Almotásim," which "can be discerned without difficulty" and features "a woman--Norah Lange--[who] seemed to represent a higher truth" (180). Likewise, in "Hombres de las orillas," the protagonist's "mysterious passivity suggests that Borges himself was at a loss to explain why Norah Lange had left him for his rival" (172). Moreover, most of Borge's contributions to the newspaper Crítica are "a cryptic record of his feelings and attitudes to Norah Lange" (195). Meanwhile in "The Aleph" Williamson once again zooms in on an "autobiographical subtext" which, apparently, "alludes to his thwarted love for Norah Lange" (202). And reading the books described in "Examen de la obra de Herbert Quain" we are told that "as with everything Borges wrote, there was an autobiographical subtext [. . .], a grieving heart beating in the depths of the narrative, as it were" (215).

Admittedly, the biographer's bias may well be to read the work in biographical terms. But the problem is that, here, such reductive interpretations edge out any other possible reading. Williamson has little if any concern for the aesthetic dimensions to Borges's poetry or prose. Indeed, he evinces scarcely any interest in literature at all. Everything has always to shed light on the life. And yet, especially in the case of Borges, it should surely be the writing that counts. For, however you look at it, the life is frankly not that interesting. This was a man of habit and routine: he lived with his mother until her death at the age of ninety-nine, and with their maid for another nine years thereafter; for decades he dined two or three times a week with his friends Bioy Casares and Silvina Ocampo; though he travelled both when young and when old, for the middle 35 years of his life from 1924 to 1961 he never once left the River Plate. If his romantic life was, as it seems, characterized by a series of fantasies and self-delusions, then it is precisely the creative power of fantasy that is of interest, not the banal details of who didn't do what with whom.

Again and again, Williamson comes out with the notion that Borges was looking for a "new Beatrice" to enable a "Dantean vision" of literature as a "project of salvation through writing" (243). There may be many ways to read Borges, but this is surely among the least interesting, and least productive.

Or perhaps it is the second-least interesting and productive. For Williamson's other major idée fixe is even more ponderous. This is the theory that Borges's life and art were guided by the struggle between the "sword of honor" bequeathed him by his mother, with her anxiety about her criollo heritage and breeding, and what is either the "dagger of desire" (359) or the "dagger of rebellion" (463) inherited from his father, who was not particularly rebellious but who did once try to encourage his son's sexual initiation (via what seems to have been a rather traumatic encounter with a Geneva prostitute). Borges struggles between the choice either to live up to his somewhat invented patrician upbringing, an image carefully nurtured by the woman that Williamson simply calls "Mother," or to risk Mother's wrath with any number of possible personal or political betrayals of family and class. This is the "deep-seated conflict between sword and dagger" (144) that structures Williamson's biography.

In practice, the endless invocation of the "sword of honor" or the purported conflict between sword and dagger is a heavy-handed refrain, a blunt dichotomy that on the one hand steadily unravels (is it a dagger of desire or of rebellion, or is perhaps the opposing term to honor in fact "the solipsism fostered by his father's library" [435]) and, on the other, has to be endlessly restated precisely to ward of the threat of the unraveling. Frankly, by the end I was thoroughly sick both of "Borges's Dantean dream" (429) and of "the ancestor's sword of honor" (44), "the ancestral sword, associated with Mother" (145), "the oppressive authority of the ancestral sword of honor" (211), "the sword of honor his mother held dear" (286), "Mother's ancestral sword of honor" (318) and all the other slight repetitions of the same simplistic basic concept.

Ultimately, the most disappointing aspect of Williamson's book is the way in which it takes one of the most sophisticated and subtle writers of the twentieth century, a man whose writing is always alive to complication, ambiguity, allusion, uncertainty, and undecidability, and writes a Life that not only shows precious little curiosity about that writing (or about literature in general), but also precious little understanding of it. This is a book that might was well have been written with a sword or a dagger. It's a hatchet job, not in the sense that Williamson denigrates his subject (au contraire, he is if anything far too forgiving, not least about Borges's anti-democratic impulses and his many political mis-steps of the 1970s and 1980s), but because it is as crude as anything written with a hatchet has to be. And that, in the end, is the worst denigration one can offer to a writer as careful, as precise, as subtle, and as sophisticated as Borges.

hatchet

Edwin Williamson's Borges: A Life is the standard biography in English. But it is, sadly, not a good book.

Williamson is frankly obsessed with Borges's sexual history. The irony is that there really isn't that much to be obsessed about: Borges had a whole series of crushes on various women, but so far as one can tell they were very seldom consummated; he didn't marry until he was almost 68; and both Borges himself and the women with which he was in one way or another involved were almost all very discreet and have left little in the way of written record of their relationships.

Inevitably, then, Williamson is reduced to conjecture. There is much talk about what "must have" or "may have" been the case: "the truth may have been that he needed to feel close to the woman he loved" in order to write his longest fiction, The Congress (279); "he may have blamed Perón for coming between him and" a woman he asked to marry but who refused (332); the violence of his reaction upon hearing that another former crush was to marry someone else "must surely have been due to the symbolic significance of the occasion" (358); the woman who would become his second wife "must have been a soothing presence" from the time he first met her (370). And so on and so forth.

More seriously still, and in lieu of any other evidence, Williamson turns to Borges's writing and reads it often as though it were almost directly confessional and autobiographical. So, for instance, almost any number of the earlier fictions are read as barely-disguised accounts of a putative love triangle between Borges and fellow writers Norah Lange and Oliverio Girondo. So Williamson has much to say about the "autobiographical subtext" of the novel outlined in "El Acercamiento a Almotásim," which "can be discerned without difficulty" and features "a woman--Norah Lange--[who] seemed to represent a higher truth" (180). Likewise, in "Hombres de las orillas," the protagonist's "mysterious passivity suggests that Borges himself was at a loss to explain why Norah Lange had left him for his rival" (172). Moreover, most of Borge's contributions to the newspaper Crítica are "a cryptic record of his feelings and attitudes to Norah Lange" (195). Meanwhile in "The Aleph" Williamson once again zooms in on an "autobiographical subtext" which, apparently, "alludes to his thwarted love for Norah Lange" (202). And reading the books described in "Examen de la obra de Herbert Quain" we are told that "as with everything Borges wrote, there was an autobiographical subtext [. . .], a grieving heart beating in the depths of the narrative, as it were" (215).

Admittedly, the biographer's bias may well be to read the work in biographical terms. But the problem is that, here, such reductive interpretations edge out any other possible reading. Williamson has little if any concern for the aesthetic dimensions to Borges's poetry or prose. Indeed, he evinces scarcely any interest in literature at all. Everything has always to shed light on the life. And yet, especially in the case of Borges, it should surely be the writing that counts. For, however you look at it, the life is frankly not that interesting. This was a man of habit and routine: he lived with his mother until her death at the age of ninety-nine, and with their maid for another nine years thereafter; for decades he dined two or three times a week with his friends Bioy Casares and Silvina Ocampo; though he travelled both when young and when old, for the middle 35 years of his life from 1924 to 1961 he never once left the River Plate. If his romantic life was, as it seems, characterized by a series of fantasies and self-delusions, then it is precisely the creative power of fantasy that is of interest, not the banal details of who didn't do what with whom.

Again and again, Williamson comes out with the notion that Borges was looking for a "new Beatrice" to enable a "Dantean vision" of literature as a "project of salvation through writing" (243). There may be many ways to read Borges, but this is surely among the least interesting, and least productive.

Or perhaps it is the second-least interesting and productive. For Williamson's other major idée fixe is even more ponderous. This is the theory that Borges's life and art were guided by the struggle between the "sword of honor" bequeathed him by his mother, with her anxiety about her criollo heritage and breeding, and what is either the "dagger of desire" (359) or the "dagger of rebellion" (463) inherited from his father, who was not particularly rebellious but who did once try to encourage his son's sexual initiation (via what seems to have been a rather traumatic encounter with a Geneva prostitute). Borges struggles between the choice either to live up to his somewhat invented patrician upbringing, an image carefully nurtured by the woman that Williamson simply calls "Mother," or to risk Mother's wrath with any number of possible personal or political betrayals of family and class. This is the "deep-seated conflict between sword and dagger" (144) that structures Williamson's biography.

In practice, the endless invocation of the "sword of honor" or the purported conflict between sword and dagger is a heavy-handed refrain, a blunt dichotomy that on the one hand steadily unravels (is it a dagger of desire or of rebellion, or is perhaps the opposing term to honor in fact "the solipsism fostered by his father's library" [435]) and, on the other, has to be endlessly restated precisely to ward of the threat of the unraveling. Frankly, by the end I was thoroughly sick both of "Borges's Dantean dream" (429) and of "the ancestor's sword of honor" (44), "the ancestral sword, associated with Mother" (145), "the oppressive authority of the ancestral sword of honor" (211), "the sword of honor his mother held dear" (286), "Mother's ancestral sword of honor" (318) and all the other slight repetitions of the same simplistic basic concept.

Ultimately, the most disappointing aspect of Williamson's book is the way in which it takes one of the most sophisticated and subtle writers of the twentieth century, a man whose writing is always alive to complication, ambiguity, allusion, uncertainty, and undecidability, and writes a Life that not only shows precious little curiosity about that writing (or about literature in general), but also precious little understanding of it. This is a book that might was well have been written with a sword or a dagger. It's a hatchet job, not in the sense that Williamson denigrates his subject (au contraire, he is if anything far too forgiving, not least about Borges's anti-democratic impulses and his many political mis-steps of the 1970s and 1980s), but because it is as crude as anything written with a hatchet has to be. And that, in the end, is the worst denigration one can offer to a writer as careful, as precise, as subtle, and as sophisticated as Borges.

Borges, Paris y Hegel

Anotaciones
al 23 de Agosto, de 1944 y Hegel (Otras Inquisiciones, 1952)

En este pequeño relato-ensayo el narrador
analiza las fechas y sentimientos que acompañaron la caída y liberación de Paris,
así como también ofrece algunas ideas sobre Hitler. Es interesante comprar este
mini relato con el ‘Deutsches Requiem’ del Aleph (1944) Por ejemplo, hay en los
dos un sentimiento de grandeza nazi (como motores de la historia universal de
la infamia)  pero también un
reconocimiento de su intento fútil por conquistar el mundo…es decir, Hitler y
el supervisor del campo de concentración sabían que serían derrotados, e
incluso ellos mismo deseaban ser derrotados. Es un reconocimiento de la forma dialéctica
de la historia de producir monstruos sólo para que ésta misma pueda seguir moviéndose,
de lo contrario se paralizaría totalmente. Esto también lo vemos en Hegel, en
el que la antítesis es el verdadero catalizador de movimiento, para que después
venga la antítesis y otra vez la tesis, etc., así hasta el infinito, o al menos
hasta llegar al Absoluto, que es la idea de que Prusia-Alemania se identificara
con El Absoluto y La Historia misma de la humanidad. Lo vemos en las
revoluciones también, que se verían como síntesis, después viene la
descomposición social y corrupción, y viene después de la antítesis, es decir,
más revoluciones, etc. En pocas palabras, y siguiendo a Spinoza, Prusia y
Alemania no hacen sino lo que tienen que hacer…si no hubiera Alemana Nazi,
habría otra nación tratando de hacer la misma monstruosidad, como ya las hubo
en el pasado. El narrador sabe que esta posición cínica de la historia es a final
de cuentas la mejor posición, pues significa un reconocimiento del movimiento
de la Historia en el que estamos atrapados sin salida, en el que somos una pieza de una gran maquinaria ‘un cog in the machine’..

Historia de los ecos de un nombre:

Aproximación gramatical de La Respuesta

 El texto borgeano se elabora alrededor de la Respuesta de Dios a Moisés en el libro del Éxodo 3:14, “Soy El Que Soy”. Llama la atención el uso de mayúsculas en todas las palabras atribuidas a Dios, quizás como una forma de establecer que Dios es el lenguaje mismo, es decir, que cada palabra de Dios es La Palabra… Al comparar esta respuesta con la edición de La Biblia Reina-Valera 2009, encontramos lo siguiente: “YO SOY EL QUE SOY”. Las diferencias son primero que nada el uso del pronombre personal “yo” que reafirma la rotundidad de la presencia y la “persona” (por lo menos verbal) de Dios; y por el otro lado el uso de mayúsculas en todas las letras de las palabras que esta persona verbal pronuncia. Lo que nos insinúa la autoridad y la Propiedad del lenguaje de Dios. Es decir, cada partícula del discurso de dicha persona verbal adquiere cualidades de principio, cada letra Es el Inicio…

Las versiones anteriores nos remiten a unos de los temas borgeanos por excelencia entorno a la traducibilidad como una especie de espejo lingüístico que nos plantea la idea del vértigo y caos, a las deformaciones de los reflejos, etc. Continuando con la idea de dicho espejo babélico nos encontramos más adelante otra “posibilidad” del reflejo de las palabras de Dios: “Ehych asher ehych” traducidas como “Soy el que seré” lo que ya implica un ser presente y futuro a la vez, o una circularidad ontológica-temporal-lingüística*, para luego pasar al “Yo estaré donde yo estaré”  que indica la idea de Dios como presencia En…*. Así los reflejos continúan: “Ich bin der ich bin”, “Ego sum qui sum”, “I am that I am”, por lo que cada una de estas posibilidades genera necesariamente un vértigo que paradójicamente se incrementa con el multilingualismo…

Otras Inquisiciones

La verdad es que no sé si me gusta Otras Inquisiciones. Como pensé, es muy similar a Inquisiciones, tomando la forma de un ensayo y incorporando temas de filosofía y críticas de autores, géneros y de libros. Otra vez, no sabemos que es la realidad y que elementos Borges añadió. He visto algunos temas repetidos en este libro, como el tiempo, el espacio, lo infinito, etc. Al final, no sé lo que Borges quiere lograr con este libro, es decir, ¿cuál es la intención de combinar formas académicos, como el ensayo, con una mezcla de ficción y verdad? ¿Y hacerlo otra vez, en un otro libro? Además, ¿cuál es la intención de la aglomeración de todas estas ideas, autores, libros, filosofías? ¿Hay una idea central? No sé.

Sin embargo, una frase que me llamó la atención es la siguiente (y viene de Historia de los ecos de un nombre): “Basta saber el nombre de una divinidad o de una criatura divinizada para tenerla en su poder.”

Es interesante pensar sobre el vínculo con el nombre y la identidad (y también las relaciones de poder). Parece que esta frase nos está diciendo que si conoces el nombre de alguien, conoces a esta persona- es como conocer a alguien tiene un cierto poder sobre el individual. Pero, ¿es verdad? ¿El nombre es lo que engloba la persona o es solamente un sustantivo sin significación?

Parece que tengo muchas preguntas en este blog...

Otras Inquisiciones

La verdad es que no sé si me gusta Otras Inquisiciones. Como pensé, es muy similar a Inquisiciones, tomando la forma de un ensayo y incorporando temas de filosofía y críticas de autores, géneros y de libros. Otra vez, no sabemos que es la realidad y que elementos Borges añadió. He visto algunos temas repetidos en este libro, como el tiempo, el espacio, lo infinito, etc. Al final, no sé lo que Borges quiere lograr con este libro, es decir, ¿cuál es la intención de combinar formas académicos, como el ensayo, con una mezcla de ficción y verdad? ¿Y hacerlo otra vez, en un otro libro? Además, ¿cuál es la intención de la aglomeración de todas estas ideas, autores, libros, filosofías? ¿Hay una idea central? No sé.

Sin embargo, una frase que me llamó la atención es la siguiente (y viene de Historia de los ecos de un nombre): “Basta saber el nombre de una divinidad o de una criatura divinizada para tenerla en su poder.”

Es interesante pensar sobre el vínculo con el nombre y la identidad (y también las relaciones de poder). Parece que esta frase nos está diciendo que si conoces el nombre de alguien, conoces a esta persona- es como conocer a alguien tiene un cierto poder sobre el individual. Pero, ¿es verdad? ¿El nombre es lo que engloba la persona o es solamente un sustantivo sin significación?

Parece que tengo muchas preguntas en este blog...

La universalidad y la relatividad en "La esfera de Pascal"

Voy a examinar el ensayo "La esfera de Pascal" como un ejemplar típico dentro de esta colección en Otras Inquisiciones y de las obras de Borges en general. 

Primero, las listas abundan en esta colección de ensayos, y "La esfera de Pascal" no es excepción.  En este ensayo encontramos una lista de metáforas que describen la historia universal.  Al estilo Borgeano, recorremos  el tiempo y el espacio a un ritmo trepidante, empezando en Grecia seis siglos antes de la era cristiana con Jenófanes de Colofón, y siguiendo con Parménides, con Empédocles de Agrigento, con Hermes Trismegisto, con Giordano Bruno, y terminando en Francia en el siglo diecisiete con Pascal.  Dentro de las listas principales, hay listas secundarias.   Entre Giordano Bruno del siglo diez y seis, recorremos al siglo diecisiete con John Donne, Milton, Joseph Glanvill y Robert South antes de llegar a Pascal. 

Lo que une a todos estos filósofos es una metáfora universal.  La metáfora cambia pero el mensaje es esencialmente el mismo:  el universo es una esfera infinita, cuyo centro está en todas partes y la circunferencia en ninguna. La metáfora habla del ser humano y de su posición, de su punto de vista, frente al misterio del universo.  Borges vuelve a temas favoritos:  el universo, la religión, el panteísmo, la circularidad, la infinidad.

Como en Inquisiciones, estos ensayos reflejan los intereses, los pensamientos, las rumiaciónes de Borges.  Estos ensayos demuestran el extenso conocimiento de Borges como lector y su asombrosa habilidad y precisión como escritor de cubrir tanto material, tantos años de historia, tantos puntos de vista, tantos filósofos, tantos escritores en tan pocas palabras. 

El punto de vista se presenta como tema importante para Borges.   "La esfera de Pascal" habla de lo universal, pero hay una tensión constante entre lo relativo y lo universal.  Me hace recordar a "El Aleph", donde para ver el Aleph es necesario acostarse en un sitio exacto, en una posición exacta y contar exactamente diecinueve escalones. Es ahí, precisamente, donde se puede ver el universo.  En La esfera de Pascal, Borges subraya lo universal, pero también nos muestra lo frágil, lo preciso y a la vez lo precario, lo relativo, que puede ser el punto de vista.  La astronomía ptolemaica dominó la creencia humana y nuestra visión del cosmos, durante mil cuatrocientos años.  Así también, la esfera de Pascal, es un producto relativo a su punto de vista.  Para Pascal, el universo es effroyable: es una esfera espantosa.  Y así como el punto de vista es algo impreciso, algo universal y a la vez relativo, el universo es una esfera infinita, cuyo centro está en todas partes y la circunferencia en ninguna