UBC in Transition: Impact of ISI Enrolment Volatility

I am a candidate in the election for faculty representatives for the UBC Board of Governors. I previously served on the Board (2020 to 2023) and put time into understanding UBC’s budget and finances while serving on the Board’s Finance Committee. This blog post reflects on some elements of the current state of financial health, particularly from the perspective of the academic mission.

UBC is in a challenging financial situation that seems likely to transform the university substantially in spite of our relatively strong financial position going into the present period of uncertainty.

Although this uncertainty is shaped by broader global instability, many of the pressures on the core academic mission of UBC are acutely familiar. UBC is grappling with increasingly unpredictable international student demand, persistently tight limits on provincial funding for universities, limited external funding for capital projects, tightening national research budgets, and rising costs for both essential digital infrastructure and library resources. These financial pressures do not exist in isolation.

These constraints are also emerging at a time when broader cultural devaluing of academic expertise and reason is reshaping the environment in which we teach, conduct research, and govern our institution.

International Student Enrolment Trends, 2022 to 2025.

International student enrolment has become one of the most significant drivers of UBC’s financial position. When these enrolments were expanding steadily, this revenue stream appeared stable and allowed the University to support a wide range of academic activities. Over the past few years, however, international student demand has shifted rapidly and unpredictably, and the effects of this instability are now being felt across many faculties. UBC’s enrolment data illustrate how these changes have unfolded since 2022 and why they have become central to UBC’s current financial challenges.

To understand how we arrived at this point, it is worth recalling that in the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic, UBC ramped up its international student enrolment, alongside large increases in international tuition fees, thereby generating a large stream of revenue. Between 2010/11 and 2021/22, annual ISI tuition revenue had increased from about $76 million (~28% of tuition revenue) to about $600 million ( ~61% of tuition revenue). This rapid expansion created a structural financial dependence that now amplifies the impact of enrolment volatility.

What has changed in the past few years is the stability of ISI enrolment. Since 2023/24, many faculties have seen sharp decreases in international student numbers, largely due to factors outside of UBC’s control. As a result, several faculties have implemented major budget cuts, including effective faculty hiring freezes, and are struggling to maintain their academic programs with reduced resources.

UBC’s Tuition Allocation Model (TAM) plays a central role in determining how international tuition revenue flows to faculties, and therefore how enrolment volatility translates into budget pressures. When I examined the TAM’s structure and implications in a 2021 blog post, the model was already showing signs of strain; since then, it has undergone only modest adjustments, such as increasing the portion directed to student financial aid and adding a cap on the growth of the “excellence funds.” Built in an era of sustained expansion in international student enrolments, the TAM’s underlying assumptions have not been updated to reflect the far more unstable environment we now face. The Administration has acknowledged the need to consider modifications that better suit a period of limited or negative growth, and these discussions will be important for the University in the coming years.

The way tuition revenue is allocated has profound consequences for the academic mission, and faculty representatives on the Board must be prepared to engage deeply with this issue. As UBC considers adjustments to the TAM in response to changing enrolment patterns, faculty representatives on the Board will play a crucial role in ensuring that academic priorities guide these decisions.

These are not abstract concerns; the underlying enrolment trends are already affecting faculty budgets and academic capacity across the University.

I have plotted enrolment data for 2022 to 2025 (normalized so 2022=100) for the four largest ISI-enrolling faculties in Vancouver in Figure 1.

Figure 1. ISI Undergraduate Enrolment for the four largest enrolling faculties in Vancouver. Data are normalized so 2022 enrolment = 100. (Some other smaller faculties like Forestry and LFS have seen similar declines to Arts.) Based on 30-credit FTEs.

These recent trends can be compared to what UBC had originally planned for this period.

In March 2022, I wrote a blog post on UBC’s 5-year Vancouver campus enrolment plan and its implications for faculty finances. The plan anticipated a period of slower growth for the Vancouver campus, with intentional decreases in domestic enrolment across all faculties (as we had long been enrolling well above the provincial grant target). For international students, the plan projected a decline of more than 6% in ISI enrolment for Arts, an increase of more than 11% for Science, and a small decrease of less than 1% for Applied Science.

What actually happened to ISI enrolments during this period is seen in Figure 2, which plots both the predicted ISI enrolments and the actual ISI enrolments for Applied Science, Arts, and Science for 2022 to 2025 (normalized so 2022=100).

Figure 2. Predicted and actual ISI enrolment data for Vancouver Applied Science, Arts, and Science. Data are normalized so 2022 enrolments = 100. This plot uses Normal FTEs, which account for the variation in standard FTE course loads between faculties.

The situation at UBC Okanagan is even more severe. The campus has experienced very large relative decreases in ISI enrolments across most faculties, as shown in Figure 3. When combined with the fact that domestic students at UBCO are funded by the Province at roughly 60% of the Vancouver rate (a holdover from the Okanagan’s pre-UBC history), the result is a full financial crisis. The campus will likely need to restructure to reduce the number of faculties and programs. One of the major constraints on any such restructuring is the strong set of protections for faculty in our Collective Agreement; for example, the financial exigency provisions beginning on page 144 of Part 9 of the UBC–UBCFA Collective Agreement.

Figure 3. Relative change (%) of ISI enrolment for the set of Okanagan faculties corresponding to the set of Vancouver faculties reported in Figures 1 and 2.

The academic implications of any restructuring at UBC Okanagan fall squarely within the authority of the Okanagan Senate, which will have a central role in determining what academic changes are possible. Because the Board is responsible for the administration of the University, it also has a duty to ensure that the Senate is engaged at the earliest stages of this process, in support of the Senate’s statutory role. The 2012 Morden Report emphasized that governing bodies must be consulted during critical decision points; at UBC, this means that both the Board and the Senates must be involved from the outset, and faculty representatives on the Board need to be attentive to this requirement.

Because UBC Okanagan is part of the same institutional and financial structure overseen by the Board, its financial circumstances affect the University as a whole. Any notion of an impenetrable budgetary firewall between the campuses is inconsistent with the Board’s statutory duty to consider the interests of the entire University, and that duty does not permit UBC Okanagan to be left to address this financial crisis on its own.

Elected Governors: Representatives of Whom?

I have been thinking about an interesting parallel between elected faculty governors on UBC’s Board of Governors and elected municipal councillors.

The parallel arises from a question that has troubled me for some time: what does it mean to elect someone to a university governing board and then tell them they are not there to represent those who elected them?

Under BC’s University Act, faculty, staff, and students elect members to the Board of Governors. The Act also requires all governors to act in the best interests of the university.

There is no obvious contradiction between these two provisions, although some approaches to university governance seem to imagine one.

Consider municipal councillors. They are elected by residents of a municipality, but their responsibilities extend to the municipality as a whole. A councillor cannot simply follow instructions from constituents about how to vote. They must exercise independent judgment.

Does this mean councillors should distance themselves from the people who elected them? Of course not. We expect councillors to engage with their communities, understand their concerns, and advocate for their interests while exercising their responsibilities to the municipality as a whole.

We also expect them to disagree with each other, sometimes publicly and vigorously.

Why should elected faculty governors be understood so differently?

University governance has an additional dimension. Universities have long traditions of collegial governance in which faculty participate in the governance of their institutions, rather than simply working as employees under the direction of university administrators.

The University Act reflects these traditions through its provisions for Faculties, Senates, and elected members of the Board of Governors.

The legislature has made a deliberate choice to include the university community in the governance of its own institution. Faculty governors are not on the Board as a courtesy extended by the administration or by appointed governors. Their positions exist because the legislature decided they should.

UBC’s Board Code of Conduct says governors must not act as delegates or representatives of particular groups. I have no difficulty with the proposition that governors must exercise independent judgment, free from instructions from those who elected them.

However, I wonder about the consequences of interpreting this requirement more broadly.

If elected governors are expected to set aside their relationships with their electors, or to avoid advocating perspectives that arise from those relationships, what purpose does their election serve? Why not simply appoint more governors?

There is another aspect of this analogy worth considering.

The Code requires governors to respect Board decisions and avoid undermining them, even when they disagree with those decisions. Municipal councillors are not ordinarily expected to refrain from criticizing decisions of their councils. We recognize that disagreement, including public disagreement, can be an important part of good democratic governance.

There is an important distinction between respecting the authority of a governing body to make decisions and being obliged to agree with those decisions. A municipal councillor who votes against a decision is expected to respect its legal effect, but is not expected to abandon their disagreement or refrain from expressing it publicly. Why should we expect something different of elected university governors? Surely, the obligation to act in the best interests of the university does not require a governor to set aside their independent judgment simply because a majority of the Board has reached a different conclusion.

I also wonder how we should interpret the obligation to act in the best interests of the university. Surely, reasonable people can disagree about what those interests are. They are not necessarily the interests of the administration, nor are they simply whatever a majority of governors decides them to be.

In my experience, these distinctions matter.

The elected governor holds a statutory office, with responsibilities established by legislation. The Board has considerable authority over its own procedures, but that authority should not be understood as allowing it to diminish the purposes of the elected positions created by the legislature.

I think we need to examine more carefully whether the corporate governance models increasingly applied to universities adequately recognize the distinctive character of our institutions and the place of their communities in governing them.

After all, if we believe elected representation contributes to good university governance, shouldn’t our governance practices reflect that belief?

What kind of relationship do universities want with their students?

Universities devote considerable attention to understanding their students. We study enrolment patterns, academic performance, retention, graduation rates, and student satisfaction. We invest in programs and services intended to support students, their experiences, their development, and their success.

I think there are some more fundamental questions we should be asking about our relationships with students, academic or otherwise. What do we believe our value propositions to students are? What do students believe those value propositions should be? To what extent are we meeting their expectations, and how well do we understand the differences between our perspectives and theirs?

These questions also invite us to consider how we understand students’ place within the university. We have substantial responsibilities for the quality of the education students pursue and the services on which they rely. However, students are also members of an academic community, contributing to its intellectual and social life and helping to shape its character. How well do our institutional practices reflect these different dimensions of our relationships with students?

Understanding our changing relationships with students

How well do we understand the ways in which students engage with the university beyond their formal academic obligations? How have their patterns of participation in campus life changed, and what is driving these changes?

Consider commuter students. What value is there for them in spending time on campus beyond attending scheduled classes? Are we providing opportunities for engagement with other students, faculty, and the wider university community that make this time meaningful and worthwhile?

These are not simply questions about student satisfaction or the delivery of services. They reach deeply into our academic mission, our understanding of the student experience, and the relationships that give a university community its character.

We need institutional conversations, informed by evidence and genuine engagement with students, that help us understand how their experiences and expectations are evolving and how our universities should respond.

Bringing together academic and student affairs expertise

The relationship between what we often call the student experience and the student academic experience remains an important institutional challenge. Students do not experience these as separate aspects of their university lives, even though we often organize our work as if they were.

Students benefit enormously when the professional expertise of student affairs staff and the academic expertise of faculty are brought together through strong, productive partnerships.

Consider two examples.

Career development includes helping students understand the stories of their university experiences and learn how to tell those stories. These necessarily integrate their academic and co-curricular lives, including their intellectual development, relationships, and emerging interests and aspirations. Faculty members and career professionals bring complementary expertise to this work. How effectively are we developing partnerships that allow students to benefit from both?

Similarly, supporting disabled students in their academic lives necessarily includes supporting the faculty who teach them. Faculty understand the academic purposes and contexts of their courses, while accessibility professionals bring expertise in disability, accessibility, and accommodations. Both need opportunities to learn from one another, and to engage students in understanding the barriers they encounter and developing effective responses.

These examples illustrate why effective services require more than good administrative processes. They require relationships grounded in mutual understanding, respect for expertise, and shared responsibility for students.

Building and sustaining these relationships can be challenging, particularly in large, decentralized universities. Relationships among senior academic and administrative leaders are essential, but they cannot substitute for meaningful engagement among the students, faculty, and staff whose experiences and expertise inform the work itself.

Artificial intelligence and our relationships with students

Artificial intelligence is changing students’ academic and personal lives, while also presenting significant opportunities and challenges for how universities provide services and interact with students.

How will AI change students’ expectations, the ways they seek assistance, and their interactions with staff and faculty? How might it improve the accessibility and effectiveness of our services, or allow staff to devote more attention to students with complex needs? Students themselves increasingly use AI to navigate university processes, potentially changing the nature of their interactions with us.

We must also understand the risks involving reliability, privacy, and equity. Equally important is the risk that, in seeking greater efficiency, we diminish the human relationships that are central to students’ experiences of university. Personal attention, professional judgment, and opportunities to develop relationships with staff, faculty, and other students are important parts of university life.

However, we should also be asking how AI might help us strengthen these relationships. Can we use these technologies to reduce routine work and create more opportunities for meaningful engagement with students? How do we ensure that the human dimensions of our work are not simply preserved, but actively supported and nurtured?

The central question is not simply how we adopt new technologies, but how we use them to strengthen our work with students and the relationships through which that work is accomplished.

A shared institutional responsibility

Almost everything a university does affects students. Supporting their learning, development, and wellbeing necessarily involves faculty, staff, students, and academic and administrative leaders across the institution.

Much of this work takes place within shared, and sometimes contested, institutional spaces. Different groups bring important expertise, responsibilities, and priorities to their work. Developing successful and sustainable approaches to supporting students requires relationships that allow these contributions to be brought together around shared purposes.

We also need the curiosity and humility to learn from our experiences, including initiatives that have not worked as intended. What can we learn from our successes, and what might our failures tell us about the assumptions we make concerning students and their relationships with the university?

Ultimately, I think we need to understand our responsibilities to students not simply in terms of what we provide for them, but also in terms of what we make possible for them to do and become. This includes creating and sustaining opportunities for students to participate meaningfully in the intellectual and social life of the university, developing relationships and contributing to the communities of which they are members.

Students change universities, just as universities change students.

Be Less Autistic

A few weeks ago, during a phone call between the autistic drag artist Zuri and a senior drag artist, the conversation shifted sharply.

What could have been a genuine exchange turned into a monologue in which Zuri was berated. Every attempt by Zuri to talk about their actual lived experience of autism in the situation being discussed was cut off. Their words did not matter. The other person wasn’t listening. Instead, they were performing certainty.

The call left Zuri shaken and traumatized. It was a familiar script: an autistic person is told, explicitly or implicitly, that their reality is wrong, their reactions are wrong, and the fix is simple: be less autistic.

In human rights law, we work from an effects-based perspective. We don’t have to do the impossible task of getting inside someone’s mind to figure out what they “meant” to say or what their intentions were. We look at what their words and actions actually do. And the effects here — silencing, shaming, and reinforcing exclusion — are damaging.

The Spectrum Isn’t a Volume Control

The popular image of autism as a spectrum encourages the idea that some people are “mildly autistic” and others “highly autistic,” as if there were a single volume knob you could turn up or down.

This is inaccurate. Autism is not a linear scale. It is a set of differences across multiple areas: sensory processing, communication, movement, emotional regulation, attention, and more. Two autistic people can have entirely different profiles of strengths and challenges, and those can vary with context.

Some recent remarkable research published in Nature Genetics (Litman et al., 2025) reinforces this point. Studying a large autism cohort, the authors identified four distinct phenotypic classes, each representing a different pattern of traits rather than a point on a single scale:

    • Social/behavioural: high scores in social communication challenges and restricted/repetitive behaviours, along with disruptive behaviour, attention deficit, and anxiety, but without significant developmental delays.

    • Mixed ASD with DD: strong enrichment of developmental delays (DD) alongside social challenges, repetitive behaviours, and self-injury, but with lower rates of ADHD, anxiety, and depression.

    • Moderate challenges: consistently fewer difficulties than the other groups across all measured domains, though still differing significantly from non-autistic profiles.

    • Broadly affected: high scores across most domains, with elevated rates of co-occurring conditions and developmental delays.

These clusters are driven by different genetic programs, showing that there is no single biological pathway for autism. This research shows it is not “more” or “less” autism, but instead it is different autism.

When we cling to labels like high-functioning / low-functioning, we collapse this complexity into a single dimension and erase the realities of autistic people’s lives.

Masking and Its Costs

Many autistic people mask. They suppress natural behaviours, copy neurotypical social cues, and rehearse conversations. Masking is learned early, often as a survival strategy in environments that punish visible difference.

Pearson and Rose (2021) describe masking as both conscious and unconscious. It is a set of strategies to suppress natural autistic responses and replace them with alternatives in order to be accepted or to avoid negative treatment. They place masking firmly in the context of stigma: a predictable response to a deficit narrative about autism.

Seen in this light, masking is not a quirk of personality or a harmless bit of social polish. Masking is a learned survival skill in a world that often refuses to make space for autistic ways of being. And it comes at a cost: delayed or missed diagnosis, deteriorating mental health, burnout, even suicide attempts.

Masking can make someone appear “less autistic” to others, leading to the dangerous assumption that they could “try harder” and pass as “normal” more often. What goes unseen is the constant energy drain and the erosion of authentic self-expression, creating a burden carried for the comfort of others.

The “Try Harder” Expectation

When someone says “you just need to try harder,” they rarely see how much effort is already being expended. Autistic people work continuously to interpret unclear social signals, manage sensory input, and recover from meltdowns or shutdowns.

A meltdown, which is a state of extreme emotional and behavioural dysregulation, is not a failure of willpower. It is a physiological event, often ballistic in trajectory, and it can take hours to recover from. Afterward, there may be shame, embarrassment, and the emotional labour of explaining autism yet again.

Expecting an autistic person to “work harder” in these circumstances is to misunderstand both the nature of autism and the toll of constant adaptation.

Shifting the Responsibility

The challenge here is not to make autistic people less autistic. The challenge is to make the world less disabling. That means creating environments where masking is not required for participation, where sensory differences are accommodated, and where communication is clear and respectful.

It means valuing ethical clarity and difference of thought rather than seeing them as obstacles. Hartman & Hartman (2024) note that autistic people in workplaces are less prone to moral disengagement, meaning they are more likely to speak up when something is wrong. In environments that value conformity over truth, that integrity is too often misread as being “difficult.”

The demand to “be less autistic” is a demand to carry the entire burden of adaptation. Ethically, that burden must be shared in a community.

Final Thought

From a human rights perspective, we don’t need to prove that someone intended to exclude or silence an autistic person. We only need to see the exclusion and silencing happening and recognize the harm those effects cause.

If we are serious about inclusion, we have to stop treating autism as a volume to be turned down. We must start treating it as a difference to be understood, respected, and accommodated.

Because here’s the truth: in that phone conversation, Zuri didn’t need to be “less autistic.” They needed the space to speak and to be heard. They needed someone willing to set aside their assumptions and listen to what living with autism is really like.

Until that happens, the harm will keep happening. And autistic people will keep paying the cost for other people’s comfort.


References

  • Litman, A., Sauerwald, N., Snyder, L.G., Foss-Feig, J., Park, C.Y., Hao, Y., Dinstein, I., Theesfeld, C.L., & Troyanskaya, O.G. (2025). Decomposition of phenotypic heterogeneity in autism reveals underlying genetic programs. Nature Genetics, 57, 1611–1619. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41588-025-02224-z
  • Hartman, L., & Hartman, B. (2024). An ethical advantage of autistic employees in the workplace. Frontiers in Psychology, 15, 1364691. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1364691
  • Pearson, A., & Rose, K. (2021). A conceptual analysis of autistic masking: Understanding the narrative of stigma and the illusion of choice. Autism in Adulthood, 3(1), 52–60. https://doi.org/10.1089/aut.2020.0043

A Calculus of Ignorance

Imagine you believe something to be true and make a decision based on that belief, a decision that has an enormous negative impact on someone else.

Now imagine you later discover the truth is something quite different from what you believed. How would you correct your mistake?

Sometimes we can feel certain of our decisions because we feel certain of the “facts” we used to make them. That certainty can come from trusting the person who is the source of the “facts” or because the “facts” align with our existing beliefs and biases. In neither case have we actually verified the “facts.”

This flawed reasoning is an example of what I call a calculus of ignorance.

A calculus of ignorance is a method of reasoning or decision-making that operates on false, incomplete, or unverified information. Even if the logical steps are internally consistent, the conclusions can be deeply flawed because the framework relies on premises shaped by misinformation, bias, or misplaced trust. The danger lies in the certainty such a system can inspire, masking the fragility of its foundations and amplifying the harm of the decisions it produces.

As a mathematician, I am a creature of logic, and as such, I am acutely aware of the importance of verifying the truth of anything I use as a basis for my decisions.

In the real world, the desire to verify truth underpins the legal and ethical principle of natural justice, which requires decisions affecting someone’s rights or legitimate interests to be made fairly.

Natural justice is framed around two important rules:

  1. The right to be heard: Before a decision is made that could negatively affect you, you must be told the case against you and be given a fair opportunity to respond, to address the evidence, make arguments, and bring forward your own information.

  2. The right to an unbiased decision-maker: No one should decide a matter if they have a personal interest in the outcome, have prejudged the issue, or could reasonably be perceived as lacking impartiality. This standard includes not only actual bias but also the reasonable apprehension of bias.

A calculus of ignorance is antithetical to natural justice. Natural justice requires open, impartial processes in which allegations are disclosed, evidence is tested, and those affected are given a meaningful opportunity to respond.

In the case I described in my previous post, an autistic drag artist I called Zuri was excluded by one of Vancouver’s oldest charitable societies (‘the Society’) through a closed and opaque process. The Society refused to disclose the alleged concerns, withheld the identities of many of the individuals the decision-makers claimed to have “consulted,” and declined to engage with Zuri in any way. The result was a decision untethered from tested fact and based in a calculus of ignorance built entirely on unverified and undisclosed premises, yet carried out with complete certainty and producing a profound, damaging outcome.

For autistic people, the dangers of such an unfair process are amplified. Autistic individuals are often judged not on the substance of their concerns, but on their affect, which is the visible ways they express emotion, on their autistic perceptions and ways of understanding the world, and on their autonomic storms (commonly called “meltdowns”), which are involuntary responses to intense stress. These responses, rooted in neurology rather than intent, are frequently misinterpreted as evidence of unreliability, unreasonableness, or bad character. This is particularly true for autistic people who are high-masking, so exhausting themselves by trying to hide the true nature of their autism. When such misinterpretations form the unexamined “facts” in a calculus of ignorance, they serve to dismiss the autistic person’s truth and to undermine their credibility without ever addressing the real issues at hand.

Layered into this is a persistent form of ableism: the accusation that autistic people are “using their autism as an excuse.” Such claims distort reality. When autistic people speak about their autism in these contexts, they are not evading responsibility. They are attempting to foster understanding by explaining how they perceive, process, and respond to the world, and how these differences can affect interactions. Framing these efforts as “excuses” dismisses the legitimacy of their experiences, erases the impact of disability, and shuts down the very dialogue needed to build mutual respect and equitable participation.

Beyond the Society’s formal decision, there has been a sustained whisper campaign, including the spreading of so-called “facts” that are untrue, believed to be carried out by individuals closely associated with the Society, some of whom operate their own drag-related businesses. This conduct amplifies the harm far beyond the initial exclusion. It undermines Zuri’s professional reputation, creates a chilling effect on future performance opportunities, and entrenches false and prejudicial narratives within the broader drag community, including in venues that regularly host drag shows in Vancouver. Those engaging in this behaviour may feel justified, but that justification rests on a calculus of ignorance and therefore lacks any sound foundation.

The BC Human Rights Code is directly engaged. Unfounded and ableist narratives have taken root, entrenching discriminatory stereotypes, undermining the credibility of autistic self-advocacy, and causing tangible harm to dignity, self-respect, and professional opportunity.

At its core, this is not only about one exclusion or one individual from Vancouver’s drag community. It is about the dangers of allowing decisions to be made using a calculus of ignorance, where secrecy replaces transparency, assumption replaces fact, and bias replaces fairness. Natural justice exists to prevent precisely these kinds of harms, and the BC Human Rights Code reinforces that protection when discrimination is at play. When we fail to confront unfounded narratives and ableist stereotypes, we do more than harm one person: we damage the integrity of our communities. The work of building fair, inclusive spaces requires that we replace ignorance with truth, suspicion with dialogue, and prejudice with respect.

Struggles of an Autistic Drag Artist

I am neurodivergent. This affects me in ways that are invisible to others, mostly because I choose to hide it.

Publicly, I  appear successful given I am a senior professor at a top university.

Privately, I struggle everyday with my neurodivergence.

I act as the disability advocate for one of Vancouver’s drag artists, whom I will call Zuri (not their real name or drag name).  They have autism spectrum disorder, ADHD, and generalized anxiety disorder, all of which combine to make their life a struggle.

Because they are highly intelligent, mask most of the time, and do not hide from the world (most of the time), most people in the drag community do not have an appreciation for how much their disabilities affect their life.

Autism is a neurological and developmental disability that affects the ways autistic persons experience and process the constant flood of input they face. Imagine an open firehose trained on you all the time.

Autism affects every encounter they have with others, and so colours every relationship in their lives.

The world can feel overwhelming when you are autistic.

Profound — often willful — ignorance of autism creates a hostile world constantly pushing persons with autism to mask and deny their autistic self any expression as a prerequisite for being included in society.

Constantly masking contributes to a deterioration of mental health, but, hey, it is important for the rest of us not to have to live with your autism, so please don’t let us see it.

Most people do not understand the reality of living with autism. While they may pay lip service to acknowledging this disability, through their actions, they trivialize and minimize it, especially in people they view as “high-functioning,” They discount the experiences of an autistic person when they don’t match the narrative they have come to accept about this person.

Surprisingly, many people feel comfortable, or even justified, in excluding autistic persons based on their autistic affect and responses, which they find “too extreme” or “too weird.” It is too much work for such people to have autistic persons be a part of their community so they actively shun them.

While they don’t understand the way an autistic person may think in general, they are particularly put off by the autonomic storms (“meltdowns”) autistic persons can experience as the result of unexpected or stressful stimuli.

These meltdowns are events of emotional/behavioural dysregulation, which can often result in highly agitated behaviour and extreme language being used.

Meltdowns are generally ballistic in their trajectories, meaning it is extremely hard for an autistic person experiencing one to regain control of their emotions in the moment. This means there is little opportunity for resolution until the storm has passed, which can take hours for major meltdowns.

After such a meltdown, an autistic person is likely to feel embarrassment and shame, which adds to the toll on their mental health. They will then spend time resolving the impacts of their meltdown, which is exhausting because it comes with the intense emotional labour of educating people about their autism and trying to make them comfortable with it. (Neither of these should really be the responsibility of someone with autism, but, alas, who else will do it?)

A meltdown can also place the autistic person at a disadvantage when it comes to the having the harm that triggered it taken seriously. Many people will quickly judge them to be at fault for what happened, or believe they over-reacted so the harm has been mitigated. More ableism.

Why am I writing this blog post?

Over the past couple of years, I have learned about Vancouver’s extensive and diverse drag community, and I have come to believe people who do drag want to build an inclusive community that is accepting of the great diversity of drag artists.  I have come to believe they are largely committed to this inclusiveness.

Now I am not so sure.

This week some of the senior “leaders” in Vancouver’s drag community appeared to forget the principle of natural justice, and acted in the name of one of Vancouver’s oldest charitable societies to exclude Zuri without ever talking to them. There has been no real communication with Zuri about any concerns, but I speculate they are centred around Zuri’s autism and this group’s perceptions of its impacts on others.

The harm done by this group to Zuri is profound. Beyond ignoring the principle of natural justice, they have triggered a severe autistic crisis by disregarding Zuri’s human dignity. I am deeply concerned about the path this crisis is taking.

Will those responsible hold themselves accountable for the harm they are doing?

 

 

UBC Board Governance: Elected Governors – Appointed Governors

This is one of a series of posts on my thoughts and experiences as an elected faculty governor on UBC’s Board of Governors. My opinions are my own and do not represent the opinions of other governors or of the Board itself. 

In my last post, I presented some perspectives on board governance issues that affect the participation of the elected governors in the business of the Board of Governors.

The issues I raised arise from sharp differences between the way the elected governors view their role on the Board and the way some of the appointed governors (and some members of the administration) view the role of elected governors on the Board.

It would be an easy trap to fall into to try to interpret these differences by making assumptions about the intentions of those involved in the disagreements. I think it would be a mistake to do so because I believe this is about resolving a difference of visions of how the university community participates in its own governance, and, as such, this is not simply connected to the intentions of the individual governors. (It would be safest to assume everyone is well-intentioned, if one felt the need to ascribe intentions to others at all.)

I (and other elected governors) have strong disagreements with the perspectives of some of the appointed governors in leadership roles on the Board over how elected governors are to participate in the Board’s business and over how matters pertaining to elected governors should be discussed by the Board. These are not personal disagreements.

The indoctrination of governors when they come onto the Board seems heavily influenced by the ideas and philosophies of organizations like the AGB, a US-based organization, when it comes to building perspectives on the elected governors’ role on the Board. The AGB pushes the idea that students, staff, and faculty on boards cannot be sufficiently “independent” to participate in making good board decisions.  In effect, the AGB rejects the idea that a university community has the right to participate in its own governance.  (I would expect the AGB to object to my characterization of their position, but I tend to effects-based analyses, and the effects I see lead me to conclude their approach acts to limit the participation of community-elected members on boards.)

The University Act puts us on the Board, which means the government has decided a university can be well-governed when members of its own community participate as members of the Board of Governors.  The AGB generally works in contexts where the founding legislation of universities does not provide for faculty, staff, or student representation on boards. (For example, the University of Michigan Board of Regents has no faculty, staff, or students on it, and its members are elected in statewide elections.)

The idea that elected governors are not “independent” is relied on heavily in many of the arguments I hear to limit elected governor participation in Board business. These ideas appear in many of the documents or books on governance members of the Board receive as part of our “education” on being better governors, materials that are hardly unbiased in some cases. (Some members of the administration also hold to the idea elected governors should not participate in some Board business, which influences the views of some of the appointed governors.)

Given the influence and perceived authority of established organizations like the AGB, and the influence of members of the administration, it is not surprising some appointed governors would hold to the position that it is reasonable to limit the participation of elected governors in board business.

That said, acting on this belief to exclude elected governors without engaging with the elected governors to discuss the issue does not make for good board governance.

A few comments on the appointed governors.

As a general rule, I avoid mentioning individual governors (or administrators) in my posts, though I occasionally refer to the chair of a committee or the board by their position. It is usually not relevant who the individuals are when I write about matters on my mind as an elected faculty representative on the UBC Board of Governors, and this is also the case with the present issue.

The provincial government has appointed some excellent people to the UBC Board of Governors. They are dedicated, talented individuals who are genuinely committed to UBC. In my experience, they are persons of high integrity. They certainly work hard on the University’s behalf, and for no compensation.

While a few appointed governors are active members of the BC NDP, I am unaware of the political affiliations, if any, of most of the governors. I do not imagine the provincial government unduly influencing the Board in our meetings through the appointed governors.

The Board’s main contact with the government is through the required regular meetings between the Board Chair (and usually Vice Chairs) and the Ministry of Advanced Education. The University’s primary working engagement with government is through the Office of the VP External Relations.

Government certainly has an influence on matters at UBC, and I will be highlighting this in some of my future posts on specific issues (e.g. COVID).

 

UBC Board Governance: Elected Governor Participation in Board Business

This will be one of a series of posts on my thoughts and experiences as an elected faculty governor on UBC’s Board of Governors. My opinions are my own and do not represent the opinions of other governors or of the Board itself. 

British Columbia’s original University Act of 1908 created a Board of Governors consisting of the Chancellor, who acted as chair, the President, and nine persons appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.  Faculty and staff were explicitly excluded from being appointed to the Board (Section 35, with reference to Section 39(f)). Students are not mentioned at all, but in 1908, no one would imagine students being appointed to any university governing body.

Professors, including Deans, were involved in university governance through the Senate and their Faculties. Students were excluded from participation in the governance of their university.

The current University Act (from 1996, but with subsequent legislative changes) provides for 8 elected governors on UBC’s Board of Governors, including 3 faculty members, 3 students, and 2 staff members. The Chancellor and the President are still ex-officio members, but the Chancellor no longer chairs the Board of Governors. There are now 11 governors appointed by the government, and the Act requires the board chair to be chosen from these 11 members.1 Other than this exclusion from becoming chair of the board, there are no other restrictions in the University Act on elected governor participation in board business. 

Given the absence of any restrictions in the legislation, one expects the elected governors to participate in every aspect of board business unless they are in conflict of interest for a matter on the board’s agenda. This implies they are eligible for membership on any committee or even to chair many of the committees, with the decisions for such assignments based entirely on their suitability given their skill sets and experiences. The Committee Rules and Practices (Section 4) of UBC’s Board of Governors confirm this by listing no restrictions based on whether a governor is elected or appointed.  The terms of reference of the Board’s committees do set the composition of each committee, but they do not restrict any governor from being appointed as chair of a committee based on whether they are elected or appointed governors.

In practice, it is likely the chair of the board’s finance committee, for example, will be chosen from among the appointed governors given the need for an expert financial qualification and background as basic competencies to lead these committees. (The government office that appoints people to the boards of crown agencies takes into consideration the needs of a board for certain skills sets.)  In theory, however, an elected faculty governor from the Sauder School’s Finance Division or Accounting Division, say, would be qualified to chair this committee.

How is conflict of interest (COI) considered in these committee assignments and the subsequent work these committees do?

UBC’s Board of Governors operates under the Code of Conduct and Conflict of Interest Guidelines (“the Code“) approved by the Board and last updated in 2017. Section 6 of the Code defines conflict of interest in terms of “private interests” and “private duties.”  The Code is consistent with the University Act in not placing restrictions on governors’ participation in the board based on their category of elected or appointment.

Some people bristle at the lack of such restrictions as they imagine constant conflicts of interest for students, staff, and faculty to even be on the Board of Governors.  Indeed, it has long been the position of the Association of Governing Boards (AGB), a US organization, that faculty, staff, and students should not be on university boards: “It is AGB’s view that faculty, staff, and students ordinarily should not serve as voting members of their own institution’s governing board because such involvement runs counter to the principle of independence of judgment required of board members” (from PDF p. 7 of  the AGB’s Statement on Board Responsibility for Institutional Governance.)

The AGB has had great influence at UBC in recent years. While much of the work of the AGB is valuable, their position that elected governors should not be on university boards has been problematical in my experience.  Our Board leadership seems to have consulted with them on issues where there is a clash of opinions with the elected governors about our roles on the Board. This is in spite of feedback from some of the elected governors, myself included, that we object to using the advice and services of an organization that believes we should not be on the Board in the first place.

Of course, the University Act statutorily settles the legitimacy of faculty, student, and staff representatives on boards for BC universities. This statutory legitimacy means decisions that would limit or exclude these elected representatives from participating in the business of the university must clear a high bar before being made. Here in BC (and the rest of Canada), we have clearly decided there are advantages to having the university community participate in its own governance.

Issues 1:  Committee Composition and Assignments.

Just as I came on the Board, new terms of reference for the Board’s committees had been passed by the Board after a review of the committees. These changes included changes to the composition of the committees, which resulted in reducing the representation of elected governors below proportional representation based on our prevalence on the Board (a ratio of 8 elected governors to 11 appointed governors) on some key committees.

The Chancellor, the President, and the Board Chair are ex officio members of all committees. Because the Board Chair is also an appointed governor, I could make an argument the working ratio for committees should be consistent with the ratio of 8 elected governors to 10 appointed governors.

When the updated committee assignments came out just 3 months after I came onto the Board, I learned I had been removed from the Finance Committee and the Governance Committee. Eventually the Chair of the Finance Committee (who seemed as surprised as I was that I had been removed from the committee) used his power as Chair to invite me (and another elected governor who had been removed from the Committee) to participate as a non-voting member of the committee, including in closed and in camera sessions. The Chair of the Board told me the new rules at the time had reduced the number of elected governors on the Finance Committee to 2, one of whom must be a student. There are 5 appointed governors on the Finance Committee.  (This made the ratio of elected to appointed governors equivalent to 8 to 20 instead of 8 to 10.)

In response to a request to reconsider the composition of the Finance Committee, the Board changed the rules again to include 3 elected governors on the Finance Committee, one student, one staff, and one faculty governor, and I was assigned to be on the Finance Committee again. There remain 5 appointed governors on this committee. This 3 to 5 ratio is not the 4 to 5 ratio of elected governors to appointed governors on the Board. This change took several months to happen, during which UBC’s faculty did not have a voting representative on one of the most important committees of the Board.

The Governance Committee also has a reduced ratio of 3 elected to 5 appointed governors instead of a 4 to 5 ratio. Several elected governors raised concerns about this in September, but no changes have been made so far.

The Property Committee has equal numbers of elected and appointed governors ( 4 to 4), as does the People, Community, and International Committee (4 to 4).

The Executive Committee, which is composed of the chairs of the Board’s committees, has 2 elected governors and 7 appointed governors. Note there are only 2 committees chaired by elected governors. A student is invited to participate in a non-voting capacity on the Executive Committee and this role is rotated between the student governors. Given this committee’s powers, particular during periods between regular Board meetings, I believe the membership of this committee should be rebalanced to better reflect the proportion of elected governors on the Board and to ensure there is a student member.

Given the increasing delegation of the Board’s work to its committees, and the increasing use of the consent agenda in Board meetings, it is important to ensure the perspectives of elected governors, and hence the university community, are well-represented on all the Board’s committees, including in the leadership of these committees.  In theory, even though few elected governors chair a committee, elected governors can also take the role of vice-chair on some committees. However, the role of vice chair is not well-defined and so the participation of vice chairs in the leadership of the committees is highly dependent on the committee chairs’ engagement with their vice chairs.

Issues  2: Committee Assignments and Accountability to the Board

By the current rules of the Board (Section 4), the committee assignments are made by the Board Chair with the assistance of the President. The Board Chair then decides who to assign as chairs of each committee in consultation with the Board’s Vice Chair (we have 2 Vice Chairs at this time).   These assignments are not subject to final approval by the Board.

This process provides the President with great influence over the committee assignments. And this influence is invisible, even to the Board itself.

In my opinion, this practice does not allow for  transparency and accountability to the Board, and hence to the university community and the general public.

UBC’s Board of Governors should create a nominating committee to recommend committee assignments to the Board. Queen’s University’s Board of Trustee’s, for example, has successfully used this approach for some time through its Governance and Nominating Committee.

Issue 3:  COI and Exclusion of Elected Governors

A governor with a conflict of interest (COI) connected to an agenda item for a Board committee or the Board itself needs to declare their conflict and a decision is made as to how it will be handled. In some cases, it is appropriate to recuse oneself from the discussion and deliberation on that item. A governor should also raise a potential COI matter related to another governor when they believe one may exist. The Board has encoded its approach to COI in the Code, which provides guidance on how to proceed when COI is raised.

Recall that COI is defined in terms of a governor’s private interests and private duties. This means any COI conversation must engage the individual governor as part of the process to consider their private interests and private duties. The Code (Section 7.6, e.g.) is clear on this point.

The Code does not anticipate COI decisions based solely on whether a governor is an elected governor.

In March 2022, the Board Chair communicated to faculty and staff governors that we would be excluded from Board decisions about compensation and terms and conditions in contracts when the Board appoints senior administrators based on a determination that we would be in conflict of interest as employees of the University. In this determination, we would not just be asked to abstain from voting, but we would be denied access to relevant documents and be asked to recuse ourselves from the discussion and deliberations.

It is worth noting that the compensation of all senior administrators in BC universities is publicly released each year, as required by law. Contracts are available to the public through a Freedom of Information request.

This sudden exclusion was a surprise to me since I had already participated fully in appointments and reappointments since joining the Board, including in the reappointment of the President.

Contrary to the Code, I had not even been informed any COI question had been raised involving me, and I certainly had not participated in any process to examine my private interests and private duties in relation to this matter.

I raised my concerns and objections to the Board Chair immediately and received no response until after the Board meeting in June, when the matter was referred to the Governance Committee.

Eventually, an interim decision was made between Board meetings to allow faculty governors to participate fully in the appointments of non-academic administrators and staff governors to participate fully in the appointments of academic administrators.  Faculty governors could participate fully in the appointment of the VP Finance and Operations, for example, but could not participate fully in the appointment of the VP Academic and Provost or a Dean.

Naturally, I asked whether the faculty governors would be allowed to participate fully in the appointment of the President, the most senior academic administrator appointment in the University. (The President’s contract is published online, so it seemed absurd to me that faculty governors would be denied this document.)

In the end, the Governance Committee decided that COI is to be assessed with respect to the private interests and private duties of governors, as the Code says, and so faculty and staff governors could participate in these decisions unless there was a conflict arising from a private interest or private duty.

I had thought this decision had settled the way in which COI matters involving elected governors would be managed.

In October, another situation arose in which a COI determination was made that affected how the elected faculty and staff governors will participate in Board business and, again, it was made without engaging the faculty governors in the discussion.  Since the matter is still to be resolved, I will not provide any details here.

To be clear, I am not arguing that faculty and staff governors could not have conflicts of interest that arise from our other relationships to the University, including our employment relationships. I am simply saying that a governor (elected or appointed) should be provided with an opportunity to be engaged with the matter before they are excluded from Board business.  The Board should follow the Code.

 

 

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1  At UBC, the process of electing a chair of the board is overseen by the Chancellor, who consults with all governors, and all governors are eligible to vote on the appointment of the chair of the board.

 

UBC Budget 2022: Impact of the Vancouver Five-Year Enrolment Plan on Faculty Finances

At the Vancouver Senate meeting of February 9, 2022, the enrolment targets for 2022/23 were put forward for approval. The accompanying documents (p. 94ff) give a 5-year forecast for FTE degree program enrolments in each faculty on the Vancouver campus to 2026/27. I have taken these forecasts and run them through the Tuition Allocation Model (TAM) to see what faculties might expect over the next 5 years.  In this post, I present some of the results of this analysis along with some commentary.  I have used publicly available data only.  The enrolment targets for 2022/23 for the Okanagan campus were presented on February 24, 2022 (pp. 21ff), but a 5-year forecast for the Okanagan campus was not included in this report to the Okanagan Senate. 

The UBC Administration has presented a 5-year forecast for enrolments in degree programs in the Vancouver faculties to the Vancouver Senate as part the documents supporting approval of the enrolment targets for 2022/23.  Table 2 in this report (p. 97 of the linked document) gives forecasts for UBCV Normal Load FTE by Faculty/School and Fiscal Year for all programs.  I will focus primarily on the three largest first-degree undergraduate faculties, namely Applied Science, Arts, and Science and apply the TAM based on their forecasted enrolments to see the effects of this plan on undergraduate tuition revenues. (Faculties also have tuition revenues for graduate students and non-degree students.  I do not consider these. Nor do I consider other sources of revenue faculties may have.)

I will also discuss the key parameter in the TAM that determines how much is allocated to the Academic Excellence Funds (AEF) and how it affects the overall allocation outcomes.

My first caveat for the reader is the enrolment forecasts are given for undergraduate degree registrants, not course enrolments. One way to look at the faculty tuition revenue I present is to imagine it as base income for a faculty, but then a faculty has both accounts payable (for its students taking courses in other faculties) and accounts receivable (for students from other faculties taking its courses). For some faculties, there is a net gain, but not for others. Unfortunately, I have not found any public data giving direct and detailed data on inter-faculty “service teaching.” While I could make estimates of these variations based on degree requirements, I have chosen not to do so, though I will make a few comments on the variations as we proceed.

These inter-faculty exchanges of tuition revenue do not affect the Central Administration’s allocation from the TAM.

A quick review of the TAM

Last year, I wrote a detailed post about the Tuition Allocation Model (TAM), so I will give only a brief summary of it here. I will encourage the reader to look at the section on the Academic Excellence Funds in this previous blog post, however.

The TAM determines how much of the tuition revenue goes to each faculty, and how much to funds controlled by the Central Administration (`the Centre’).  It differentially treats tuition paid by domestic  (DOM) students  and tuition paid by international (ISI) students.

The Centre gets ~7.5% of gross tuition revenues off-the-top to put towards student financial aid (SFA) and to manage bad debt.

The remainder of the tuition revenues is then allocated as follows.

For DOM tuition, the Centre gets 25% and the Faculties get 75%.

For ISI tuition, there is a differential treatment for tuition fees up to a 2016 base rate and the tuition fee increment over that 2016 base rate.

For the ISI 2016 base tuition fees, the Centre gets 35% and the Faculties get 65%.

For the ISI incremental tuition above the 2016 base rate, the Centre gets 2/3 of this incremental tuition for the Academic Excellence Funds (AEF).

(Note, the key parameter I mentioned earlier is the fraction 2/3 in this part of the model.)

The remaining 1/3 of this incremental tuition is split 35% to The Centre and 65% to the Faculties.

Enrolment Forecasts 2022/23 to 2026/27

There are two key features of the overall 5-year enrolment plan for Vancouver campus:  (1) UBC will stop taking more domestic students than the BC Provincial Government funds by the end of this plan, and (2) overall international student enrolments do not grow over this 5-year period. There are significant changes in some individual faculties, however. As a consequence, UBC will leave its recent phase of enrolment growth, which may reduce some of the pressures on the faculties’ teaching missions, amongst other things.

The Normal FTE enrolment forecasts for Applied Science, Arts, and Science are in Table 1 (data from Table 2 on p. 97 of the Senate report).  One Normal FTE is 1 student taking a normal full credit load.  In Applied Science, a normal load is 37 credits, while in Arts and Science, it is 30 credits.

Faculty DOM/ISI 2022/23 2023/24 2024/25 2025/26 2026/27 5-year change 5-year %change
AppSci Domestic 3,985 4,015 4,005 3,982 3,965 -20 -0.50%
AppSci ISI 1,595 1,598 1,602 1,592 1,584 -11 -0.69%
Arts Domestic 8,486 8,199 8,026 7,928 7,890 -596 -7.02%
Arts ISI 4,226 4,123 4,037 3,981 3,956 -270 -6.39%
Science Domestic 7,155 7,067 6,976 6,916 6,887 -268 -3.75%
Science ISI 2,151 2,250 2,321 2,369 2,393 242 11.25%

Table 1.  Normal FTE enrolment forecasts 2022/23 to 2026/27.

Note that Applied Science has small reductions in both domestic and international enrolment, so is forecast to have stable enrolment over this 5-year period.

Arts, however, is forecast to have large reductions in both domestic and international student enrolment over this 5-year period. The reduction in domestic enrolment is expected given the goal of reducing enrolments to funded levels, but it is unclear to me what is driving the decision to reduce international student enrolment in Arts as well.  The Senate documents do not provide any rationale.

Science shows relatively flat enrolment over this 5-year period, but the almost one-for-one trade of domestic students for international students has a large impact on tuition revenues, as we will see later.  Again, the reduction in domestic enrolment is in keeping with the over goal to keep to funded enrolment levels.  The increase in international student enrolment will mean the percentage of international students in Science degrees will increase to 26.6%, which is still below that of Applied Science (28.9%) and Arts (32.7%) (pp. 104 and 105 of the Feb. 9th Senate docket).

Tuition Revenues over the years 2022/23 to 2026/27

As a member of the Board of Governors Finance Committee, I started this exercise to try to understand the financial impacts on the academic mission of the Vancouver 5-year enrolment forecasts. While the budget coming to the Board at the end of March is only for 2022/23, it will include significant financial commitments that will affect the university’s finances for many years to come.  It seems prudent to assess how well the faculties will fare under this enrolment plan: can UBC afford to spend on large-ticket items outside of faculties and continue to grow as a leading research and teaching institution?

To do tuition revenue calculations over a 5-year period, I have chosen to evolve tuition fee rates using the same model the Board of Governors has passed in recent years: a 2% increase in domestic tuition, a 2% increase in continuing ISI tuition, and a 4% increase in tuition for new ISI students. The Administration has not proposed any such 5-year tuition plan, but I think the assumed increases are reasonable for the exercise at hand.

First, let’s consider undergraduate programs in the Faculty of Applied Science, but excluding the School of Nursing. Table 2 has three sections: (1) basic data, (2) the TAM allocation to the faculty and its breakdown, and (2) the TAM allocation to the Centre and its breakdown.  The large growth in the ISI tuition increment over the 2016 base is noteworthy and is driven primarily by tuition rate growth in this case.  (Changes to ISI enrolment also affect this quantity, though for Applied Science, there is little change in ISI enrolment over this period.)

The overall growth in the TAM allocation to Applied Science is 7.2% over 5 years, which would be less than inflationary growth in expenses over this time period if the current rate of inflation persists. (Collective agreements are in play this year and the outcomes of these negotiations will determine substantially the inflation rate of UBC’s payroll. As well, inflation rates for many goods and services are high, which affects UBC’s purchasing power and also asserts pressure in collective bargaining.)

The tuition revenue for cross-faculty course enrolment is evenly shared by the two faculties involved. Undergraduate students in Applied Science degrees take courses in other faculties and fewer students from other faculties take courses in Applied Science, so the net inter-faculty exchange of tuition revenues is likely negative for Applied Science. 

2022/23 2026/27 % change
Gross Tuition $112,010,799 $127,670,451 14.0%
ISI Tuition differential over 2016 $16,261.25 $23,407.62 43.9%
ISI enrolment 1,595 1,584 -0.7%
DOM enrolment 3,985 3,965 -0.5%
Faculty TAM $56,461,441 $60,526,376 7.2%
Breakdown DOM $19,165,963.18 $20,755,394.61 8.3%
2016 base ISI $31,034,124.61 $30,820,096.16 -0.7%
Faculty share ISI increment over 2016 $6,261,353 $8,950,886 43.0%
Total ISI to Faculty $37,295,478 $39,770,9822 6.7%
Centre TAM $58,619,186 $68,773,938 22.3%
Breakdown DOM $6,388,654 $6,918,465 8.3%
2016 base ISI $16,710,682 $16,595,436 -0.7%
Centre share ISI increment over 2016 $3,371,498 $4,819,708 43.0%
Total ISI to Centre $20,082,180 $21,415,144 6.7%
AEF $19,557,606 $27,958,477 43.0%
Student Financial Aid (SFA) $9,520,918 $10,851,988 14.0%

Table 2.  Estimates for the tuition revenue allocation for students in undergraduate degrees in the Faculty of Applied Science, excluding the School of Nursing.

The outcome for the Faculty of Arts, captured in Table 3, is interesting due to the large charges in both domestic and international student enrolments. The TAM allocation to the faculty grows less than 1% over this 5-year period, which would be far less than the expected inflationary growth of expenses over this period. (I wrote about some of the budget pressures on faculties last year.)

Of course, Arts will receive tuition revenue from other faculties for students taking courses in the Faculty of Arts — for example, students in the BSC in Science are required to take at least 12 credits in Arts.  On the other hand, Arts students also take credits in other faculties  — for example, there are BA degree programs in Science disciplines, and the BA has a 6-credit science requirement for courses that can be taken from a number of other faculties. Tuition revenue for cross-faculty registration is split evenly by the two faculties, and while some individual departments may see large enrolments of students from other faculties, the net inter-faculty exchange of revenue may be relatively small.

2022/23 2026/27 % change
Gross Tuition $229,473,066 $246,750,129 7.5%
ISI Tuition differential over 2016 $16,261.25 $23,407.62 43.9%
ISI enrolment 4,226 3,956 -6.4%
DOM enrolment 8,486 7,890 -7.0%
Faculty TAM $113,519,610 $114,332,053 0.7%
Breakdown DOM $33,181,823 $33,578,377 1.2%
2016 base ISI $66,850,274 $62,579,197 -6.4%
Faculty share ISI increment over 2016 $13,487,513 $18,174,480 34.8%
Total ISI to faculty $80,337,787 $80,753,677 0.5%
Centre TAM $115,953,456 $132,418,075 14.2%
Breakdown DOM $11,060,608 $11,192,792 1.2%
2016 base ISI $35,996,302 $33,696,491 -6.4%
Centre share ISI increment over 2016 $7,262,507 $9,786,259 34.8%
AEF $42,128,829 $56,768,773 34.8%
Student Financial Aid (SFA) $19,505,211 $20,973,761 7.5%

Table 3. Estimates for the tuition revenue allocation for students in undergraduate degrees in the Faculty of Arts.

The situation for the Faculty of Science is shown in Table 4.  Here we see the impact of what is, in effect, a trade of domestic student seats for international student seats. (Remember that domestic enrolment is being reduced to the level actually funded by the BC Provincial Government across UBCV.) Since the ratio of the ISI tuition rate to the DOM tuition rate is ~8, this change will result in a large increase in the TAM allocation to Science over this 5-year period.

The Faculty of Science would see a 13.5% increase in the TAM allocation, which may or may not a reasonable match for the inflation rate for the faculty’s expenses given the uncertainties in predicting inflation at this time. (There are also other revenues beyond undergraduate tuition fees, of course.)

While Science students take courses in other faculties (primarily in Arts), a large number of students in other faculties take Science courses.  For example, Applied Science students take Science courses, and about 40% of the students in large enrolment MATH courses are from faculties other than Science. As with Arts, while some individual departments may see large enrolments of students from other faculties, the net inter-faculty exchange of revenue may be relatively small for Science.

2022/23 2026/27 % change
Gross Tuition $132,957,448 $162,372,114 22.1%
ISI Tuition differential over 2016 $16,261.25 $23,407.62 44.0%
ISI enrolment 2,151 2,393 11.3%
DOM enrolment 7115 6887 -3.2%
Faculty TAM $68,868,655 $78,158,012 13.5%
Breakdown DOM $27,977,368 $29,309,795 4.8%
2016 base ISI $34,026,252 $37,854,403 11.3%
Faculty share ISI increment over 2016 $6,865,036 $10,993,815 60.1%
Total ISI to faculty $40,891,287 $48,848,218 19.5%
Centre TAM $64,088,793 $84,214,102 31.4%
Breakdown DOM $9,325,789 $9,769,932 4.8%
2016 base ISI $18,321,828 $20,383,140 11.3%
Centre share ISI increment over 2016 $3,696,558 $5,919,746 60.1%
AEF $21,443,235 $34,339,655 60.1%
Student Financial Aid (SFA) $11,301,383 $13,801,630 22.1%

Table 4. Estimates for the tuition revenue allocation for students in undergraduate degrees in the Faculty of Science.

The ISI tuition increment over 2016 base and the AEF

In doing calculations using the TAM, is is clear that one of the key driving factors in the model is the size of the tuition differential relative to the 2016 base. The tuition revenue increment this generates is growing at a fast rate and the Centre is allocated 2/3 of this increment for the AEF under the current TAM.  The TAM also allocates to the Centre 35% of the remaining 1/3 of this incremental revenue.  As a result, the portion of tuition revenues allocated to the Centre by the TAM grows at a comparatively healthy rate even as individual faculties see  smaller growth rates for their overall allocations.

We are entering a period where revenue growth will be driven primarily through tuition fee rate increases without the added boost from enrolment increases. Should UBC reduce the allocation to the AEF to ensure the core academic functions of the university are well-supported, especially in the face of increased inflation and the potential for tighter university budgets?

If we were to reduce the fraction 2/3 in the model to 1/2 or even 1/3, then faculties would be in a better place to address many of their issues, including some of their academic building needs.  The AEF would still show healthy growth and be a substantial tool in the Centre’s efforts to support improvements in the university. The Centre would sill receive substantial allocations into its general fund through the rest of the allocations in the TAM.  Some of the things funded by the AEF could be funded by general funds instead, but the Centre would also need to be more discerning about what it would fund through a reduced AEF.  The Centre would do less, but the faculties would be able to do more to support the heart of the academic mission.

One of the things the AEF does is redistribute revenue to faculties with limited ability to have international students through the Revenue Sharing Fund. This seems reasonable in a university so heavily dependent on international tuition revenues that institutional decisions affecting faculties are taken with ISI revenues as a built-in assumption.  Even if one adjusts the TAM to allocate more money to the faculties (as I am suggesting), there would still be a need for such redistribution of revenue.

 

Mind the Vaccination Gap. Mind the Trust Gap.

(While I am one of the Vancouver faculty representatives on the UBC Board of Governors, nothing I write should be taken to represent the Board or its deliberations. Opinions, such as they are, are entirely my own. )

 

We are fortunate to have effective vaccines to help protect us against the worst outcomes from COVID-19.  We are also fortunate such a large percentage of Canadians are willing to get vaccinated, which helps protect them and their communities.

But, we are still working towards achieving the high vaccination rates we need to reasonably protect the population, and especially those who are unable to be effectively vaccinated, from hospitalizations for serious COVID illness or death.

Many of the questions and concerns I hear from members of the UBC community arise from the uncertainty about the vaccination status of the UBC community when thousands of students arrive on our campuses in September from across BC, Alberta, the rest of Canada, and, indeed, much of the rest of the world.  Many of these students will not have had the opportunity to be fully vaccinated before arriving at UBC, and while we know UBC and the BC Government will provide vaccines for these students, we also believe it will take time for these students to be fully vaccinated.

In addition to concerns about vaccination rates, I hear concerns in response to the current surges of the pandemic involving the highly infectious Delta variant, including in the Central Okanagan where one of UBC’s campuses is located.(*) Some, who are public scholars in relevant disciplines, suggest we should continue to support our vaccination program with other mitigations such as mask wearing to reduce the risks of serious consequences and help minimize any 4th wave here in BC.

Two of my UBC colleagues, Dr Joanna McGrenere (UBCV Computer Science) and Dr Karen Bakker (UBCV Geography) recently shared a blog post on some of their thoughts on UBC’s return-to-campus in September.  They did not present a criticism of UBC’s Administration, nor of the Public Health Officer, nor of the BC Government in presenting the recommendations in this post. Instead, they stated: “Our goal is to provide helpful, constructive suggestions to support our collegial discussions.”  Collegial discussions are the bedrock of good university governance and unstated in their post is whether we are still able to engage in collegial conversations at UBC when it comes to the University’s return-to-campus plans.

Drs McGrenere and Bakker present the notion of a “vaccination gap,” which captures the important idea there may be significant (and generally unknown) differences between the ambient rates of vaccination in the health authorities containing our two campuses and the initial rates of vaccination amongst UBC students on arrival to their campuses from across BC, across Canada, and across the globe.

They ask how this vaccination gap might affect the UBC community in September.

This simple question should be considered in decisions related to the application of the COVID-19 Return-to-Campus Guidelines university administrators in BC have been given to follow.

Around the same time my colleagues made their blog post, the AMS presented the UBC Administration and Board of Governors with a letter asking UBC to mandate vaccinations for students living in UBC student residences and to mandate masks in lecture halls.

The Administration’s first response to the letter from the AMS fell flat.

There was further correspondence from the AMS to the UBC Administration pressing student concerns about the return-to-campus plans. The AMS Vice President University and Academic Affairs has posted on Twitter the most recent response from UBC, a letter from President Ono.  The President’s letter is remarkable and I will leave it to the reader to draw their own conclusions from it.

I am not an expert on COVID-19 nor on vaccination mandates, but from my conversations with colleagues engaged in such research, there seem to be two general approaches to vaccination policy: (1) make vaccines mandatory and enforce compliance, and (2) ask and campaign for community commitment and make vaccines readily available. I’m told the efficacy of each of these approaches is well-established in the literature, and choosing which is best for UBC depends on the state of willingness of our community to be vaccinated, amongst other things. The second approach is certainly the one chosen by BC’s PHO as the general approach for the province, and it is also the one described by President Ono in his latest letter to the AMS.  Neither the PHO nor UBC have provided any reasons why this approach is a reasonable one for students living in UBC’s student residences, or for the general UBC community, particularly given the potential vaccination gap, the increased virulence of the Delta variant over previous ones, and the serious and undiscussed equity and inclusion issues connected to this approach. (The background rate of infections is also a factor, of course.)

As for mask mandates, some of the aforementioned colleagues doing COVID-19 related research have suggested we start with a mask mandate for our classrooms in September and then reassess the need for it at the end of September based on available data and against some predetermined criteria, renewing the mandate until conditions allow for it to end.  Is this a good idea for UBC? Again, it seems consideration of the vaccination gap,  the impacts of the infectiousness of the Delta variant, and equity and inclusions considerations would seem relevant to this decision. (Again, the background rate of infections is also a factor.)

UBC isn’t the only university in Canada considering how to respond to such uncertainty in planning for a return-to-campus in September.

The University of Toronto, for example, is requiring all students, faculty, staff, and librarians who participate in activities with high risk of COVID transmission to be vaccinated, and they are requiring all community members to declare their vaccination status.

McGill University has also announced a set of mitigations against COVID-19 for their return-t0-campus, including mandatory masks in classrooms and vaccination requirements for participation in extracurricular activities. Some of these measures are mandated by a new plan from the Quebec government in response to concerns about the Delta variant.

There are other examples, particularly in Ontario, where universities are able to implement additional measures above the basic ones set by the provincial government. This naturally leads to questions from members of the UBC community about UBC’s return-to-campus plans and why UBC has not been permitted by the government to include additional measures related to identified high risk situations and activities in the university.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resultant impacts experienced by so many in the UBC community, our government is asking members of the UBC community to trust the PHO and The Guidelines set for postsecondary institutions in BC for the return-to-campus in September.

Trust is the willingness to risk being vulnerable.

Expecting the more than 80 000 UBC faculty, students, and staff to trust given the present circumstances is a lot to ask. They simply have too many unanswered questions and concerns.

 

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(*) The surge in the Central Okanagan reached a level that triggered new orders from the PHO on August 6th placing restrictions on many activities; the PHO has not specifically spoken to how this will affect postsecondary campuses in this region, but the re-imposed restrictions on indoor gatherings will have an impact on operations at UBCO and its ability to conduct classes if this outbreak continues into September.