Monthly Archives: November 2019

Reflections Week 13: The Release of Ovidio Guzmán

Hi all. For this week’s reflections, I will be commenting on the release of Ovidio Guzmán, commonly known as one of El Chapo’s sons. More specifically, I will be comparing two responses to the incident, and give my own personal take on it.

To give more background to the incident, a few weeks ago, the town of Culiacan, in the state of Sinaloa in Mexico, was attacked by cartel members and sympathizers as a direct response to the arrest of Ovidio Guzmán by the government of Mexico. Armed military and police personnel was then sent by the Mexican government, although they were overrun by the cartel forces. In fact, many government agents and officers were killed and taken hostage by the cartels. This gave the possibility to the cartels to threaten the Mexican government with mass slaughter against the town Culiacan, as the civilians were now left stranded without arms or defences. This thus prompted President AMLO to issue the release of Ovidio Guzmán, to prevent further bloodshed.

There have been different responses to this event. One of them, as outlined in Daniel Tenreiro’s article in the conservative magazine National Review, has been to condemn AMLO’s decision, instead calling for a reversal of his “hugs, not bullets” policy, and to instead heighten the militarization of the country by bringing more United States armed forces in. He also calls for a modernization and strengthening process of the local and state police forces, to fight the corruption currently present within them. This, in my view, is a deeply flawed solution to the problem, as it has been tried for more than a decade before, and has continuously made drug cartels stronger, while only serving to heighten the tensions and violence between the two camps. This has also resulted in a “decapitation” policy, based on arresting or killing heads of cartel syndicates in Mexico, which has only served to create more turf wars and increase polarization and the number of warring factions in the country. This has notably shown in the continuous growth in the number of deaths per capita in Mexico, now at 29 per 100,000 people. According to Tenreiro, the AMLO administration is to blame for this, saying the policy has been tried and has not worked, although not even a full year has passed since AMLO took office, while the previous militarization policies have been tried for 13 years, to no avail. This has, nonetheless, been a very popular response among the Mexican people, albeit a highly emotional one.

A second response to the situation has been to endorse AMLO’s response. This is my response, and that which is also voiced by one of my favourite political commentators, Kyle Kulinski, founder of the Justice Democrats currently hosting The Kyle Kulinski Show. Kulinski rightly points out, as does the AMLO administration, that this was done to prevent further slaughter, and perhaps even a genocide against the Culiacan population. There was no choice given to the government, as the lives of the innocent were worth much more than the arrest of one kingpin’s son, regardless of the will of the DEA or the US government. Kulinski also correctly argues that militarization and heightened violence and enforcement is not the appropriate response to the crisis, but rather drug legalization, taxation and regulation. This is based on the true premise that drug cartels currently have a monopoly over the drugs they sell in the black market. Pursuing a legalization, taxation and regulation of drugs policy would thus force the cartels to compete with legitimate business in the marketplace, and would, through time, make them go out of business and lose their profits. Another temporary solution, though not mentioned by Kulinski, might be to offer self-defence training to local populations in regions affected by the drug war, until the policy is fully enacted. The former policy, incredibly enough, as been considered by the AMLO government.

Joseph

Reflections Week 12: Disappearances in Latin America

Leave a reply

Hi all. For this week’s reflections, I will be commenting on a video posted for week 12, entitled “Dictatorship and Resistance”.

In it, Professor Rita de Grandis speaks about the military junta in Argentina between 1976 and 1983, which was supported by the United States through Operation Condor, though the exact extent of the American role remains unknown. During this period of repressive rule, tens of thousands, accused of being left-leaning or Communists/Socialists/Bolshevists, were jailed, tortured or simply vanished from public life without a trace. Most of them were public intellectuals, labour rights activists, and young people associated with anti-establishment or leftist causes. This prompted a public outcry from the “mothers of the disappeared”, standing up to the regime for the rights and humanity of their sons lost in the incident.

This is, as history shows us, far from the first nor the last instance of mothers revolting against their governments for their rights and that of their families. Allusions to the French revolution may be made, as tens of thousands of wives and mothers marched down to Versailles to claim their economic and political rights, mostly related to food and labour rights, although I will mostly talk about the Mexican case. In fact, since the start of the War on Drugs, led by the United States since the Reagan administration, women, and mothers in particular, have taken on a very important role in the public perception of the slaughter associated with the drug cartels.

As President Calderon heightened tensions between the American and Mexican military apparatus and the drug cartels by increasing the level of militarism and police enforcement in the country, hundreds of thousands have died at the hands of the Mexican Drug War. This has primarily affected civilians and families, who are caught in the middle of the trade and of the violence. Mothers and family members of the victims, which have been primarily consisting of military-aged men and boys, have taken to the streets in great numbers, month after month, to protest the inaction of their government and the ineffectiveness of the policies enacted. A great portion of them, enraged by the great injustice and trauma caused by this catastrophe, are protesting in search of their husbands and sons, as many of them have disappeared as a result to kidnappings and mass burials, in part enabled or even done through the Mexican government and the military. Therefore, the disappearances in Argentina during the Dirty War, and the public reaction to them, bear great resemblance to that of the Mexican Drug War.

Joseph

Short Writing and Research Assignment: Part 2

Leave a reply

Second Source: Guatemala and the United Fruit Company: Office of the Historian – United States Department of State. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala.” September 11, 1953.

This public document, redacted by the United States Department of State in 1953, outlines in great detail the sentiment towards Guatemala and the Arbenz government taken by the United States government right before it covertly invaded Guatemala in 1954. This is notably voiced right at the start of the memorandum, as it pins to Arbenz and his government the labels of “anti-US” and “Communist” (twice in the case of the latter). Similar to the Nicaraguan case 26 years earlier, the U.S. government tries to justify the invasion of Guatemala through moral and political motives, invoking “hemispheric solidarity”, “security” and Cold War-esque tropes throughout the text. In total, the word “communist” or “Communism” is invoked 20 times. Guatemala is, additionally, referred to as a “primitive country”. Besides the political rhetoric, of particular interest is the detailed plan of action and budget proposed within the memorandum, which outlines the different tactics which would be used by the CIA to deal with the Guatemalan case. This includes, among others, isolation and intimidation through sending military aid to neighbouring countries, psychological warfare, para-military operations, and applying economic pressure. This memorandum is thus trying to justify a coup orchestrated and backed by the CIA in Guatemala to topple the current Arbenz government.

This text will be of particular use to the video project in that it will allow us to contend that Guatemala indicates American intervention in Latin American long before the Aguida vs. Chevron/Texaco legal case. It will also allow us to detail the political rhetoric used to justify these interventions, which, as we will see in greater detail later on with the coup in Brazil, revolves heavily around the American fight against Communism and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. We will also observe how such anti-Communist rhetoric was incited and encouraged by the American corporations who had interests in the interventions. This will be demonstrated with the case of the United Fruit Company (UFC), which took on tremendous lobbying efforts to label Arbenz’s government as a Communist. As we will see, this is primarily because Arbenz had undertaken land reforms that massively threatened the UFC’s investments and interests in the region. Finally, this specific text will be helpful to our project in that it will outline the methods and tactics used by the United States government to topple governments in Latin America. Other CIA declassified documents subsequent to the memorandum will also be referenced to put such methods in tactics in further detail.

Joseph

Short Writing and Research Assignment: Part 1

Leave a reply

First Source: Banana Wars in Central America: U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Frank Billings Kellogg). “Memorandum submitted January 12, 1927, to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” 12 January, 1927.

This primary source, written in 1927 at the height of the Banana Wars, outlines a memorandum delivered by then-United States Secretary of State Frank Billings Kellogg. In it, Kellogg outlines how the United States government should look into perpetuating its occupation of Nicaragua, which it had stopped two years prior. Though there were multiple previous military interventions on the United States’ part in the 1890s and early 1900s in Nicaragua specifically to protect business and economic interests in the region, Secretary of State Kellogg insists that this is a political endeavour of moral importance. In fact, Kellogg argues that the resurgence of Communism, Bolshevism and anti-American sentiment in the neighbouring Mexico country through the influence of the Soviet Union is a threat to the United States. Kellogg, by the same token, argues that this is a struggle that has proven effective for the enemy, as this has allowed the Communist and Bolshevist leaders in the United States to rise to prominence. Due to this, Kellogg argues that the United States must continue to preserve its interests and supremacy in Nicaragua. Therefore, Kellogg’s reasoning for occupation and intervention seems to be purely moral and political.

Not mentioned by Kellogg is the fact that at the time, and since the first U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in the 1890s, American imperialism had allowed U.S. companies to thrive in the Central American region. Most of the region’s vital industries, including that of agriculture (especially bananas), infrastructure and railroad construction and maintenance, the mining sector, and banking, were dominated by American companies. American investments in the region were also heavily threatened by civilian and political unrest in the region. Thus, using this primary source will leave us to argue that not only was American interventionism in Latin American (in this case, in Nicaragua) based on preserving its own economic and financial interests, but that such interventionism was also hidden by a veneer of underlying political rhetoric. This primary source will be instrumental in building this argument, which will then be referenced in other American interventions later on, such as in the case of the U.S.-backed coup in Brazil in the 1960s. Kellogg’s address will help us argue that there are many cases involving the United States engaging in foreign meddling in Latin American countries’ affair before the Aguida vs. Chevron/Texaco case, as the Banana Wars show. To construct this point, this source will also be contrasted with other historical facts about the Banana Wars, including the broader context to the wars, the specific companies benefiting from the occupation, and the repercussions of the war on the region’s political and economic landscape.

Joseph

Reflections Week 11: Disruption in Peru

1 Reply

Hi all. Since there is no video lecture for this week’s material, I will be writing comments on a video entitled “Peru’s Civil War”, with Maxwell Cameron.

One thing I found very interesting which can also be applied in the Peruvian context is that many (and one could argue even most) revolutionary movements praising social and economic change start from the bottom, with labour unions, students and “radical” intellectuals who separate themselves from the establishment of their time. This has been true in many cases throughout Latin America, including the 1968 protests against political and military repression and poor economic opportunity, which started in Mexico City with UNAM students and brave professors and academics. This is partly the reason why so many authoritarian and fascistic regimes, when entering the arena of power, begin their crusade of repression by censoring, jailing or even killing those in labour and student movements. Many examples come to mind, including Nazi Germany, Turkey, Russia, and Cuba. This is a notion which can be applied to the Peruvian context, as, as Maxwell Cameron points out, with the Communist Party of Peru and the APRA Party leading the charge in the revolts. It is also interesting to point out that when leftist revolutionary movements take power, like was the case in Peru, they often focus on “paying back” those who started and helped the struggle for power, by taking on educational, labour and land reforms.

Another interesting thing that I shall comment on is the Shining Path. The thing that caught my attention with this series of events is that although the Peruvian government and elite intended to appease the peasantry with land reform policies, that only served to exacerbate tensions and growing pains. This is, in part, other than for the reason that Professor Cameron mentions, is due to the fact that the reforms were not far-reaching enough, and demonstrated the lack of understanding of the elites and the powerful of the daily difficulties experienced by labourers and workers in the countryside. Too often, this situation repeated itself, where those in power, who were elected to represent a certain group of elites, could not properly serve the interests of the remaining portions of the population. This poses a fascinating question, which is what should have been done to remedy this conflict and avoid a full-scale uprising and insurgency. Two possible answers might be consultation with or surrendering to the opposition forces, although the first one is much more plausible and much less detrimental.

Joseph

Reflections Week 10: Comments on the Peronist Philosophy

Leave a reply

Hi all. For this week’s reflections, I will be commenting on a video, entitled ’’Power to the People: Peronism’’, as well as on the broader Peronist movement.

Firstly, the first part of the video outlines Peron as an opportunist who only saw this rise of the labour movement as an opportunity for him to gain political power. This is not only inaccurate but also based on speculation. This is also reinforced by the fact that he was a civil servant for a long time, being a Lt. General for over 30 years in the Argentine military, as well as serving in different high-ranking senior government positions, including that of Secretary of Labour and Social Security, and Minister of War. Although I do not fully agree with the Peronist philosophy, painting this picture without stating facts to back it up can appear dishonest.

Additionally, as the video rightly points out, the Peronist movement was originating from a need of representation from the labour and working class, which had just seen a tremendous influx of people from Europe, mostly in relation to the Great War. In a way, Peron was seen as the cure to the ill that had plagued Argentine politics for long, with a long line of political and military insiders and leaders with fascist or corporatist ideological leanings preceding him. This was, however, not entirely accurate, as he was himself a military general and a member of the political class. Despite this, his charisma, political stances and discourse made him appealing to the Argentine people, and made him one of the first popular populists in history.

This is a theme that is still very much true in modern politics, whether in Latin American politics or otherwise. Indeed, in the United States, people like Ross Perot, famous multi billionaire oil tycoon who ran for President twice as an independent, Tea Party politicians, Donald Trump, and others, although being part of the political and financial elite, adopt populist rhetoric and are portrayed as ’’men of the people’’, even though their policies often times do not reflect this portrayal. Similarly, in Latin America, self-described ’’populists’’, including the Perons, as well as others, including Vargas in Brazil, Ibarra in Ecuador, and Chavez in Venezuela, are characterized as leaders of the people and populists although they had militaristic, authoritarian or even dictatorial and fascistic tendencies as rulers. We in Canada, for now, have been spared of this dichotomy, and have not had our share of authoritarian populist rulers. Some exception may be made with Quebec, which was ruled by Maurice Duplessis, whose time in office was accurately characterized as La grande noirceur (The Great Darkness) due to his crackdown on left-leaning ideology, trade unions, civil liberties and his promotion of a heavily Catholic State.

Joseph