Peru Election 2006

From left to right: Max Cameron, Fabi Bazo, Taylor Boas, Henry Dietz,
Cynthia McClintock, Aldo Panfichi, Alberto Vergara, Bruno Seminario
POST-ELECTION WORKSHOP:
“Diagnosis of the First Round and Prognosis for the Second Round”
Rapporteur: Maxwell A. Cameron
Universidad del Pacifico
Lima, 12 April 2006
Author’s Note: This report was written with helpful input from Cynthia McClintock, Cynthia Sanborn, Aldo Panfichi and Fabiola Bazo. The author assumes full responsibility for any errors.
Under the auspices of the Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico (CIUP), a workshop was held to analyze the results of the April 9 general elections and to consider the results in light of the second round of the presidential elections to be held at the end of May or early June. What follows is a report of the main observations made by the participants in the workshop.
OVERVIEW
At the time of writing, Ollanta Humala had just won about 30 percent of the vote in the first round of Peru’s presidential election. Alan Garcia held a small lead over Lourdes Flores, with 24.4 percent to 23.4 percent. Of the remaining candidates, none came close to the front-runners. As of Friday, April 14, 2006, Most of the 250,000 votes from abroad had not yet been counted, and returns from over 7,000 polling booths were under dispute. As a result, it was impossible to say who would place in the second round runoff against Humala.
With this caveat in mind, participants in the workshop ventured a number of important observations. The speakers tended to agree that the second round would be a bitterly-fought contest. If APRA makes it into the second round, it will be at the fulcrum of politics in Peru, for two reasons. First, voters who do not necessarily like Alan Garcia will have nowhere else to go if they want to prevent Humala from coming to power. In other words, if there is an “Anyone but Humala” coalition, it will benefit APRA. Second, APRA will be a pivotal party in congress. It could govern from the center, appealing to the UN for votes from the right, or to UPP for votes from the left. A contest between Garcia and Humala will also be a contest between a party and a candidate without a party—or perhaps, as a couple of participants noted, a candidate of Peru’s oldest party, the armed forces. The APRA will play a critical role in defining Peru’s destiny over the next few weeks. It brings tremendous political baggage, however, and it will not be easy to convince voters it deserves a “second chance.”
A contest between Flores and Humala would result in a highly polarized campaign pitting Lima (and voters abroad) against the provinces, rich against the poor, left against right. Peruvian voters have demonstrated a mood of protest, which Ollanta Humala successfully exploited. While this mood is not angry enough to produce a landslide victory for Humala, it appears to have caught the right by surprise. Flores seemed unable to shake the impression that she is tied to intransigent advocates of the current economic model, including technocrats in power. The inability of the leaders around Flores to move toward a more centrist position, due largely to internal constraints, prevented a broader alliance that might have encompassed Accion Popular. Current projections suggest few or no gains in congress for Unidad Nacional. At the same time, the left has proven unable to overcome its history of factionalism and its lack of organic connections to the classes and sectors it seeks to represent.
In a second round Ollanta Humala faces a major challenge. He will have to continue to tap into the mood of protest of his core supporters while projecting an image of moderation to the median voter. He may have a harder time competing for that space with Alan Garcia than he would against Flores. He has to add 20 points to his current margin of victory. If Garcia is the contender, Humala will emphasize the Garcia record in power in 1985-1990. He will also have to project some sense of an ability to offer a good government of his own. In some respects, the choice facing voters could be between the option of a Hugo Chavez-style government without the oil rents versus a Lula style social democratic option, complete with the corruption and governance problems that includes. If the contest is with Flores, Humala will still have a tough time competing with Flores for voters who, in the first round, cast ballots for Paniagua’s Frente de Centro or for the Fujimorista Alianza para el Futuro. There is strong antipathy to Humala in both camps.

SUMMARY OF THE PRESENTATIONS
Cynthia McClintock, of George Washington University, said she was surprised at how quickly the campaign became a race between the top three candidates. In spite of the fact that there were 19 candidates for the presidency, and some dissatisfaction with the top three candidates, media attention was focused on the front-runners who became the most recognizable candidates, and this reinforced the media’s attention on them, creating a vicious circle. Perhaps in part as a result, but probably also for a variety of reasons that should be explored in further detail, none of the parties of the democratic left met the threshold necessary to win seats in congress.
McClintock also noted the importance of party alliances, and non-alliances, in the election. If there had been an alliance between Flores’s Unidad Nacional and Valentin Paniagua’s Frente de Centro, Unidad Nacional would probably have reached the runoff. Acción Popular, the most important party within the Frente de Centro, might be considered closer to the UN than to other parties; in the past, AP has formed alliances with the Partido Popular Cristiano. Clearly, Lourdes Flores wanted Valentin Paniagua to step aside in this election. However, he did not, and his decision probably had to do in part with pressures from within his party by members who hoped to win seats in congress. (Without a presidential candidate, their chances would probably have been lower.) According to McClintock, this raises the issue of whether, in an effort to reduce party fragmentation in Peru, congressional elections should be scheduled not at the same time as presidential elections, but later.
Another issue raised by McClintock was the status of parties in Peru. Clearly, APRA has come through this election as the best example of an organized political party. With regard to parties of the right, McClintock argued against the conclusion advanced by some scholars at the recent meetings of the Latin American Studies Association that the UN is nothing more than Lourdes Flores. In McClintock’s view, although Lourdes Flores did better in the presidential race than her congressional list and although the UN remains relatively weak outside of Lima, the right is at least as strong a force in the party system as it was twenty-five years ago.
Also, McClintock believes that it will be very interesting to analyze in greater depth Ollanta Humala’s UPP. On the one hand, McClintock suggested that, ideologically, UPP’s congressional representation is diverse and many candidates joined his list opportunistically at the last minute; if Humala does not win in the second round, a good number of UPP representatives are likely to be co-opted by other groups. At the same time, McClintock pointed out Humala has mobilized behind him large numbers of men from the Peruvian military; rather than an “outsider,” Humala might be considered the leader of Peru’s “oldest political party,” the military.
According to McClintock, Humala may have thought he would get more votes than he actually did. Had he not gotten into the second round (and if he does not win the runoff) she doubted that he would have accepted the result. Peru may suffersome tough moments in the next months, because either Flores or Garcia have a good chance to beat Humala. In a recent poll by APOYO, most APRA supporters said they would vote for Lourdes Flores in a second round, and most UN supporters said they would vote for APRA (though, in the latter case, almost as many would cast blank or spoiled ballots). Flores would draw support from the Paniagua’s supporters and the Fujimoristas. APRA can expect to get some votes from Paniagua supporters and some other smaller candidates.
McClintock also argued that Humala has been damaged by a barrage of criticisms. The combination of the Madre Mia allegations and his ties with Montesinos, plus the statements made by his parents (especially his mother’s comment about executing homosexuals), have led many Peruvians to the conclusion that, in general, Humala is too radical and violent. Some voters may want a rebel to support, but most seem to find Humala too much.
Henry Dietz, University of Texas at Austin, said that he thought Garcia would be a tough rival for Humala to beat. Alan Garcia has behind him a party organization with greater strength outside Lima than UN. Garcia has flaws. His performance in government in 1985-1990 will continue to be a liability. However, should Garcia make it into the second round, he will attempt to present himself as a candidate of the center. Humala would have a harder time paining Garcia as a right-wing candidate, as he can be expected to do should Flores be proclaimed the runner-up.
Professor Dietz warned that the second round could be dirty and brutal. It will not be a polite affair, not something for the faint-of-heart, and both the candidates and the public should prepare themselves for this. Dietz also agreed that Humala has not performed as well as he might have hoped. For example, the Humala camp talked a lot about winning in the first round, yet they came nowhere near this. His challenge will be to find the additional 20 percent he needs to win the runoff. That said, he is obviously a candidate with substantial appeal, especially in the provinces and the south.
Aldo Panfichi, Universidad Catolica del Peru, made four points. First, the economic context of Peru today has changed. The context is not 1989, a time of crisis and economic collapse, when the seizure of power by the Shining Path seemed imminent. The election has occurred in a context of economic growth, and this has taken strength from what could have been an Humala landslide. That is why he did not reach 50 percent. The people around Humala may have overestimated the anti-system sentiment in Peru. Of course, the benefits of economic growth have been unevenly distributed and some zones have gained more than others. One of the areas that gained is Lima, and another is where there is an agricultural export boom. In these areas, Humala has been weaker. It is the more traditional regions of Peru where Humala has his greatest strength.
Professor Panfichi’s second point was to agree with McClintock that Humala is an “outsider” who is part of what has been called the most traditional political party in Peru—the armed forces. This is a force that has been present in the republic since its beginning. According to Panfichi, analysts have been too quick to separate the armed forces from civil society. We think of civil society as being necessarily civilian. In fact, there are strong linkages between the military and society. For example, the military has always been a vehicle for social mobility in Peru. In certain regions of the country, especially since the 1970s, it formed an important part of collective identity.
Many indigenous men have done military service (forced until recently) and now form part of associations of former recruits that meet regularly and perform various civic and security functions. These men formed part of the peasant self-defense squads against the Shining Path in the 1980s and 1990s, which are also important nuclei of identity. In interviews that Panfichi has done in conflict zones, he found that the ties between the armed forces and society are lasting and important. Numerous former recruits are now community leaders, mayors and city council members, and they also appear to be a key element of Humala’s movement, which explains in part his appeal to these populations.
The third point made by Panfichi was to note that the attack on Humala in his polling station on April 9 was not an entirely isolated incident. Flores has also been attacked by supporters of Humala who have thrown urine, rocks, and other objects. Panfichi noted that there have been three events involving Humala that revealed beneath the apparent calm a deeper level of social antagonism in Peruvian society.
First, there was the attack on Humala at his polling station. This may have been spontaneous, planned or both. Second, there was another moment when Humala received a sort of spontaneous rejection, and that was when a motorized parachutist dropped onto the playing field in a Classic soccer game between two major clubs – the Alianza Lima and Universitario. Supporters of the two teams, which are historic rivals, were temporarily united as they turned against an area of box seats in which prominent members of Humala’s inner circle were watching the game. Projectiles accompanied the verbal aggression. What was striking was the instantaneity of the aggressiveness. In this case, the reaction was from people of all social groups, including those who might be expected to support Humala—the low income fans or barras bravas (hooligans). Yet the political content of this reaction was minimal. The reaction was more of a repudiation of this fairly traditional effort to utilize a game for political purposes. The third event was when Humala had tomatoes and lettuce thrown at him in the La Parada market place. Again, this was a case of reaction from the urban poor.
Finally, Panfichi noted that the Shining Path has been a missing actor in this election. Not only has there been little violence by the Shining Path aimed at disrupting the election, there has also been little violence in the troubled coca producing areas. The latter could well be a result of the fact that leaders from the associations of coca-growing peasants were running in this election on the Humala ticket, and are likely to win one or two seats in Congress, hence incorporating these interests into the electoral system.
Alberto Vergara, who teaches in the Universidad Catolica del Peru and the Universidad del Pacifico, argued that a battle between Flores and Humala would be one that pits Lima and the Peruvian voters abroad (the two groups where Flores has the most support) against the rest of Peru. By contrast, Garcia would try to occupy the center, which historically has been where elections are won. Most voters locate themselves at the center, so Humala will have to try to move from the left to the center, transforming himself from “rebel” into “nice guy.”
Vergara argued that one should not overstate the importance of political parties at this time. The anti-party cycle that opened in 1989 with Ricardo Belmont has not come to an end, and the Humala supporters in the UPP are unlikely to endure beyond the few months until the municipal and regional elections later this year. The process of ideological disarticulation has not come to an end with the collapse of the Fujimori regime.
Aldo Panfichi disagreed, saying that the cycle begun in 1989 has ended. We are witnessing alluvional parties, parties as franchises, media-based parties, and the army as a party. The anti-politics of the 1990s is over. The electorate is divided into thirds and there are new forms of representation emerging within and outside parties. There are party militants who are searching for whom to throw their support behind, what train they can attach their coach to. He gave an example of how groups formed spontaneously in Iquitos to support Valentin Paniagua. Committees popped up like mushrooms, seeking to articulate themselves in some way with a party that could link them to the center of power. A new cycle is beginning.
Taylor Boas, of the University of California, asked whether there are true parties in the Peruvian party system. He answered this question at two levels. Parties can be thought of as organizations that convene activists to run meetings and campaigns and so forth. Parties, especially mass parties, often have some level of organization between elections, which creates identification between supporters and the party. The PPC has people who participated in Flores’ meetings and formed part of her security cordon. There are locales in particular villages that supported the campaign (although it is not always clear whether these pertain to the PPC or UN). However, strong partisan identification with the PPC does not exist, or is weak.
Boas provided an example of a voter he met who was torn between supporting Flores or Humala. He liked Flores, and this was the first choice of his family. At the same time, he had served in the military and therefore leaned toward Humala. In this case, there is more identification with the military than with a partisan organization. Boas noted that there are not only floating voters, but also floating organizational bases. There are people for hire who organize youth, plan trip to the provinces, and do other business for the party. These same people, who may have worked for Peru Posible in a previous election, might today be working with Humala or another candidate.
Concerning the second round, Boas judges the candidates to be very close, and agreed that in some ways a competition between Humala and Garcia would be more interesting. Whereas we know what a debate between Humala and Flores would be like, the dispute between Humala and Garcia will revolve in part around authoritarianism vs. democracy (this, at least, will be Garcia’s spin) and left vs. center. Humala will focus on Garcia’s record in power in 1985-1990. The problem for Humala is that, without much by way of specific proposals, he will have a hard time conveying a promise of good government. Garcia will focus on such specific policies as upholding the eight-hour day and elimination of contractual “services.”
Bruno Seminario, Universidad del Pacifico, said that APRA has two possible options for governing: alliance with UN or with UPP, and this puts it in the fulcrum of Peruvian politics. Whereas a UN government under Flores would need APRA, APRA under Garcia would not necessarily need UN support as it could play UN off against UPP. In this sense, APRA might offer more stability and governability than Flores.
Humala and Flores can be expected to continue the same campaign strategies they pursued in the first round, though Humala will have to move toward APRA’s territory. Seminario doubted that APRA supporters would overwhelmingly support Flores in a second round, and he noted that in one way the polls were inaccurate: they underestimated APRA’s support.
Turning to the economic situation, Seminario said that the economy is robust because it is riding on high prices for exports and these prices can be expected to endure. Would a Garcia government lead to capital outflows? There is not a lot of short-term capital in Peru in the first place, and APRA would probably know how to control such flows. The capital flows to worry about would not necessarily be international, much of which is invested in government bonds and debt, so much as domestic. That is, local business might be tempted to leave. National capital needs liquidity, however, and might be retained by raising interest rates in the short term.
Seminario noted that the current process of economic growth has resulted in expansion mainly in Lima, in the northern coast, as well as south of Lima (around Ica), and it resembles in some way the early process of industrialization that favored the emergence of APRA in the 1930s. APRA has an opportunity to organize the process. With regard to the highlands, APRA could lead a project of integration based on road building and infrastructure to reduce the cost of transportation.
Beyond APRA, Humala has little competition in the provinces. The PPC has always had problems with election campaigns outside Lima; Valentin Paniagua, a candidate from the provinces, allowed himself to be isolated and his votes passed to Humala.
As an aside, Seminario also asked why Ollanta Humala does not think like his father, when all the other brothers do? And he suggested the entourage around Humala resembles the heterogeneous group that rose with Fujimori.
There is a perception that the people around Lourdes Flores do not want to give up power. The biggest losers in this election may be economic technocrats around Toledo who wanted Flores to win and who certainly would have remained players under a Flores government. They prevented her from moving more clearly away from the current policy orientation toward a more interventionist posture.
Garcia would not repeat the mistakes of the 1980s, in Seminario’s opinion. APRA could either make an alliance with UN and govern from the center-right, or it could work with the UPP and govern from the left. It occupies a position analogous to the Socialist Party in Chile. The model would be something more like Kirschner in Argentina or Lula in Brazil, rather than Chavez. With Humala in power, the economic panorama would be more difficult, but not impossible, provided he gets people who can administer the economy.
Cynthia Sanborn, Universidad del Pacifico, remarked that more analysts are not only thinking that Alan Garcia has a good chance in the second round, but that a Garcia government would be an attractive alternative to either Humala or Flores. APRA, in this view, is seen as the modern social democratic force Peru needs. In terms reminiscent of the 1985 election, which pitted Garcia against a candidate of the Marxist left (Izquierda Unidad, or IU), the markets may come to see APRA as capable of maintaining economic stability as well as reducing social tensions. Today Alan Garcia is also seen as more mature, and with a better understanding of the economy – or so many business and financial people are arguing, as they begin to accommodate to the new political context.
In the face of this, Prof. Sanborn asked how different a Garcia government would be this time, and what precisely should give us confidence that it would be better than before? Are we to believe Garcia has seen the light and wants to be responsible? To delegate power and govern in a more balanced manner? In the annals of Latin American political history we can think of examples of such transformations, but something about this argument is not right, said Sanborn. Garcia had direct responsibility for many of the problems of his previous government, not only in terms of bad economic and social policy but also how power was exercised. His appointment of Admiral Giampietri as a running mate is also a slap in the face to those who would like to believe that an APRA government would have respect for human rights and the rule of law, and not promote impunity.
Sanborn also asked what has happened to political potential and ethical posture of the Peruvian left? Why was the democratic left, those most associated with defense of human rights and the fight against corruption, unable to make alliances and overcome personal differences for this race? There is some truth to the phrase “caviar left,” used by critics on the right, in the sense that much of what remains of the left leadership is remote from the social sectors they purport to represent. Is there another possible left, or is APRA and Humala all that is “left”?
Alberto Vergara argued that the Peruvian left represents only itself, and its presence is due more to the ability of prominent leftist elites to access the media, which is disproportionate to their actual social bases. He also said he was not optimistic about Ollanta Humala governing like a Lula or Kirschner.
DISCUSSION
Much of the discussion revolved around the lessons from this election for the right.
Gustavo Yamada, Universidad del Pacifico, emphasized that in Peruvian elections, the center always wins. It is hard to be on the right and win an election in Peru. This has historically been the problem with the right since Bedoya. Prof. Yamada further suggested that the fall of Flores began with the appointment of Arturo Woodman as vice presidential candidate.
Fabiola Bazo, of the “Peru Election 2006” Blog, suggested the problem was less the leadership of Lourdes Flores and more the people in her entourage who did not have her common touch. Moreover, there was a lack of articulation between Flores’ leadership and her congressional slate. Her own message did not “trickle down” to her supporters in UN.
Taylor Boas responded that the right has to show it cares about the plight of the poor. He reminded everyone that Lourdes Flores has come close and may still make it into the second round (indeed, the votes are still being counted) with her “hyper-personal” campaign. She has been more of a protagonist in this campaign, and unlike 1990 when Mario Vargas Llosa was unable to restrain his supporters, in this election Flores cannot blame her entourage. Especially when compared with the circus surrounding Ollanta Humala.
Alberto Vergara pointed to the incredible punishment that Peru Posible has taken in this election, and he suggested that there was a big protest component in this vote. This spirit took many people by surprise, especially conservative sectors that have been assuming that conservatism was part of the “common sense” of the nation, that much of the country had moved to the right.
Another controversial issue was the mass media and its relationship with Ollanta Humala.
Vergara said he was surprised and how Humala had no supporters in the media. The avalanch against him was without precedent, even considering the attacks on Fujimori in 1990. In Vergara’s view, Humala had no champions in the media.
Taylor Boas, University of California, noted that in all countries people complain of media bias, including other countries in the region like Chile; yet here in Peru the bias is more striking. Not only is there the ideological bias of the media, or the support of the media for candidates within against the system, which might be the case of a newspaper like El Comercio, for example. There is also a direct fight between certain journalists and Humala. The journalists who cover Humala are often attacked by the Humala camp. Humala tends to demonize the media, and this can result in fights with specific individuals. Some of the journalists who have followed Humala complain about the way they are treated by his security detail.
For further discussion see:
Una elección y dos ejes
Por Alberto Vergara
La República, 16 de abril del 2006
Aunque los resultados de la elección del domingo no son aún definitivos, las tendencias manifestadas por la población pueden comenzar a ser observadas. Ya se oyen algunas interpretaciones que valdría la pena analizar. De un lado (y mayoritariamente aceptada), la lectura economicista: una clara sanción contra una forma de crecimiento económico que alimenta las billeteras de arriba y sólo los monederos de abajo. De otro lado, la lectura política: se ha respaldado a la democracia o se ha respaldado algún proyecto autoritario.
Para entender estas interpretaciones construyamos un doble eje con cuatro cuadrantes y coloquemos en ellos a cada candidato según el discurso utilizado en la campaña y sus antecedentes. Grosso modo, obtenemos una figura como la que se muestra aquí abajo (el caso de Martha Chávez es complicado pues al ser representante del gobierno de Fujimori –con mucha privatización hacia arriba y mucho asistencialismo hacia abajo– se hace difícil la tarea de situarla, aún así he optado por hacerlo del lado del libre mercado aunque cercana a la línea divisoria con el Estado).
Intentemos sacar algunas conclusiones. La primera y evidente es que todos los espectros políticos han quedado representados en la reciente elección. Para ir más allá debemos considerar las votaciones obtenidas por cada alternativa. Así, una segunda conclusión es que las opciones autoritarias reciben un apoyo de alrededor de 39% y las democráticas 52%. De otro lado, los discursos que se inclinan hacia el mercado reciben 35% y aquellos orientados a una participación estatal mayor 55%. Entonces, es preocupante que casi el 40% de la gente prefiera un discurso alejado del Estado de Derecho (datos coincidentes con el último informe del PNUD al respecto) y resulta innegable que una mayoría absoluta pide, si no un cambio radical de modelo económico, una clara reorientación.
Son notorias dos ausencias: De un lado, el gobierno ha desaparecido. Perú Posible y el FIM son, sin duda, los grandes derrotados del proceso. Habrá quien lo celebre, habrá quien les lleve flores al camposanto… ese es otro tema. En segundo lugar, la izquierda. En un ambiente de crítica frontal al modelo económico, la llamada izquierda apenas ha recibido algo más del 1% de los votos (en realidad se hace necesario rebautizar a un grupo de personas que no representan sino a algo más de cien mil personas de un padrón con más de 16 millones de votantes). Y ya no hay Fujimori ni Sendero a quien culpar. Desde luego, siempre queda la idea que repite Nicolás Lynch regularmente en estas páginas: los medios reaccionarios impiden la diversidad de opciones y el neoliberalismo monopoliza los reflectores impidiendo que la gente se dé cuenta de las opciones que en realidad le convienen. Concederé que esto era posible de afirmar respecto de los años noventa pero en los últimos seis la izquierda ha tenido una exposición mediática mucho mayor que en toda su historia. Y me remito a una prueba muy cercana: el domingo último canal 4 tuvo en algún momento una mesa en la que los comentaristas eran Gino Costa, Alberto Adrianzén, Enrique Bernales, Carlos Tapia y Santiago Pedraglio. Por un momento pensé que transmitían en vivo un directorio de Desco! Bromas aparte, estas ausencias forman parte de un mismo castigo popular importante de analizar.
El cuadro que hemos presentado permite más conclusiones que el espacio no permite desarrollar, además, podría ser modificado con distintas variables. También puede ser adaptado al Congreso donde el sistema electoral (con la novedosa valla) engorda las opciones autoritarias y controlistas. Pero todo esto será materia de otro artículo.
Note: the original essay by Vergara included a useful figure which was not published in La Republica. To see his article in its original form with the figure included download the file.