Maxwell A. Cameron
April 21, 2006
In an interview with La Republica, Pedro Francke offered a number of interesting observations with regard to the sources of Ollanta Humala’s support. The first question he was asked was: if Humala’s support comes from the poor, who represent 52 percent of the total population of Peru, why did Humala win only about 30 percent of the vote? To this, Francke replied that “I don’t believe there is a direct correlation between poverty and the vote for Ollanta Humala.” Humala, said Francke, has strong support in some poor regions, like Puno, Cusco, and Huancavelica, but not in others like the jungle and Cajamarca.
I thought this was an intriguing observation, so I went to the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informacion (http://www.inei.gob.pe/) to look at poverty numbers. One of the tables provides statistics on poverty by region in 2001 and 2004. The first thing that even a casual glance suggests is that it is simply not true to say there has been no trickle-down from economic growth in the past few years. There has been poverty reduction, but it is uneven.
Overall, poverty has declined in Peru from about 54.3 to 51.6 percent between 2001-04. In some areas, like Lima, poverty has actually increased. Poverty has declined significantly along the coast of Peru, such as in Ica (where it has declined from 46.7 to 29.2) and in Tumbes (where it has declined from 44.4 to 21.6), but it has also declined in some of the highland areas like Cusco (from 72.7 to 59.2) and in the jungle departments of Ucayali (70.8 to 55.8) and Madre de Dios (48.7 to 20.4).
When we look at the distribution of poverty in Peru, it matches the vote for Humala only imperfectly. Download file. Thus, for example, Humala has done best in the poorest departments like Huancavelica, Puno and Ayacucho, but he has also done well in Arequipa, Tacna, and Madre de Dios. On the other hand, he has not done so well in certain poor departments like Cajamarca or Pasco. There is a rough correlation between poverty and the vote for Humala, but it weaker than one might expect. Nor is there an obvious relationship between changes in poverty and the vote for Humala. Humala has done well in places where poverty has declined (like Tacna and Madre de Dios) as well as in places here it has remained unchanged (Huancavelica and Huanuco).
Pedro Francke’s conclusion is that there is more to the vote for Humala than poverty. “Poverty is combined with marginalization but also with an element of ethnic identification. It is striking how similar the results are with those obtained by Alejandro Toledo in 2001.” This is indeed true. Toledo did best in places like Cusco and Puno, but he also did well in places like Loreto and Ancash where Humala has not done so well. Toledo did better in Lima, Cajamarca, and Lambayeque; Humala has done better in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac.
Violence is another factor that probably plays a role. Humala does well wherever there was major conflict (Ayacucho, Huanuco, Junin) , but he also does well in places where there was no conflict (Moquegua and Tacna).
So what is driving the vote for Humala? I’d have to say that the most interesting exercise in looking at these numbers is simply ranking departments according to support for Humala. What comes up? Basically, Peru is divided north/south. Draw a line from Lima east to Madre de Dios. Take everything below except Ica, and exclude everything above except Huanuco and Junin, and you have over 50 percent support for Humala in what is left over. Take the north of Peru, add Ica and subtract Huanuco and Junin, and Humala’s support falls to 28 percent. The lesson for the second round is clear: a fight between Garcia and Humala is likely to become a fight between north and south.
Pedro Francke: “Los inversionistas son prácticos”
Por Sheilla Díaz
La República, 20 de abril del 2006
• Especialista en temas de pobreza, Francke analiza el apoyo electoral logrado por los candidatos en los últimos comicios del 9 de abril. Asegura también que si bien el candidato de UPP capitalizó algunos discursos de izquierda, no necesariamente representa esos ideales.
–Muchos analistas han coincidido en que el apoyo a Ollanta Humala proviene de los sectores menos favorecidos económicamente. Hasta el momento Humala solo alcanza el 30% de la votación nacional, mientras que la pobreza en nuestro país bordea el 52%. ¿Cómo compatibilizar estas cifras?
–Si bien la distribución geográfica del voto muestra que Ollanta Humala ha alcanzado gran apoyo en las zonas pobres, como Puno Cusco, Huancavelica y Puno, además de la Selva o el caso de Cajamarca, que son regiones bastante pobres, en realidad su votación no es tan alta. No creo que haya una correlación directa entre pobreza y la votación de Ollanta Humala.
–Lo cierto, sin embargo, es que Humala ha superado el 50% de votos en muchas regiones del sur andino, que son a la vez las históricamente marginadas de la atención del Estado.
–Creo que existen muchos factores que no solo se reducen al factor pobreza. Se combina el fenómeno de pobreza y el de marginación pero también hay un elemento de identificación étnica. Llama mucho la atención el parecido entre estos resultados y los obtenidos en el 2001 con Alejandro Toledo.
–En Lima, mientras tanto, la elección ha sido más dividida, a pesar de que hay distritos de la periferia bastante pobres.
–Son sectores descontentos con el sistema político. Es el voto de los que no están integrados al sistema, político, económico y social; la gente que ha sido excluida. Se mezcla el tema de la pobreza, la dicotomía de lo rural y lo urbano.
–Tenemos un mapa electoral más o menos definido. Tanto Humala como Lourdes Flores y Alan García han conseguido apoyos determinados por zonas geográficas…
–Eso puede traducirse a lo que ha ocurrido en los últimos años en estas zonas. El crecimiento económico, empezando por la industria de textiles en Lima, ha llevado a que esta zona sea beneficiada; así también en la agroexportación, en algunas zonas de la costa. Mientras tanto, están las minas en la sierra, con exportaciones millonarias que bordean los 2 mil y 3 mil millones de dólares. Sin embargo este auge no se ha visto reflejado en un mejor nivel de vida de las comunidades donde operan estas compañías. Esa es la gran contradicción, y es la gran crítica al modelo económico que se ha expresado en la votación. Las zonas de sierra y selva no se incorporan al crecimiento.
–La cuestión ahora es cómo lograr este cambio de modelo económico hacia uno en el que la mayoría de la población, y en especial los más pobres, se vean beneficiados. ¿Cuál es la fórmula para que este crecimiento económico llegue a las mayorías?
–El cambio del modelo económico debe incluir necesariamente la reforma tributaria, y eso significa revisar cómo el Estado debe captar recursos, y cómo se reparte mejor esa riqueza en servicios de salud y educación, así como el desafío de promover aún más la creación de industria, de empleo.
–¿Alguno de los tres candidatos propone alternativas viables para salir de esa situación?
–La propuesta de Ollanta tiene cosas interesantes por el lado de los contratos y las regalías mineras, así como en la redistribución de la renta. En el caso del Apra, el tocar el tema de los derechos laborales ha sido relevante, del mismo modo que los temas de justicia social y la distribución económica; no obstante, falta mayor precisión y exposición de ambos.
–Además del necesario gasto social del Estado, la generación de empleo debe ser también una prioridad.
– ¿Qué modelo puede aplicarse para generar más fuentes de trabajo? ¿Cómo convencer a los capitales extranjeros a invertir si es que se dice que se cambiarán las reglas del juego?
–Creo que los inversionistas quieren reglas justas. Las empresas mineras están llanas a renegociar los contratos porque están sacando ganancias millonarias.Ellos son pragmáticos. Lo que más asusta a los inversionistas es una situación de inestabilidad política y social, o que los conflictos internos se vayan agudizando.
“Ollanta capitalizó los discursos de izquierda”.
-Usted ha sido militante de izquierda. ¿Qué opina de que Concertación Descentralista, el Partido Socialista y el MNI, todos partidos de izquierda, apenas superen el 1% de la votación nacional?
–Creo que ha habido un trato injusto, y se evidencia que hay desconfianza en cualquier figura política. Sin embargo, las ideas de izquierda han sido tomadas por otros candidatos.
–Humala ha capitalizado muy bien los discursos de la izquierda.
–Claro, el nacionalismo, el tema de la redistribución de la riqueza, el de la renegociación de los contratos, el tema del TLC. La gente está buscando un caudillo, no quiere partidos políticos; y eso se evidenció con Fujimori, con Toledo, y ahora con Humala.
–Si bien un sector acoge varios temas de izquierda capitalizados por Ollanta, se rechaza a sus representantes. ¿Contradictorio, no?
-El discurso de la izquierda ha calado en ciertos temas, como el de la redistribución de la riqueza, pero no en otros como democracia y defensa de los derechos humanos.
–¿Cree que Ollanta puede representar los ideales de izquierda?
–Pensar en un salvador de la patria, o en un caudillo que resuelva los problemas, es la negación misma de la izquierda.
Estrategias para ganar en segunda vuelta
Inés Flores
La Republica
domingo, 23 de abril de 2006
No pocos han señalado que una segunda vuelta entre Ollanta Humala con Alan García pondrá mucha adrenalina a la campaña electoral. Son dos candidatos que tienen una masa de electores similar, la de las zonas empobrecidas, así como propuestas de gobierno parecidas.
Y ya están listos para enfrentarse en el segundo round, aunque García prefiere aclarar que aún espera el resultado oficial de la ONPE.
Para ello han fortalecido sus equipos de campaña. En el partido nacionalista es el mismo Ollanta Humala quien dirige la estrategia electoral. Su esposa Nadine Heredia cumple un papel muy activo en lo que es comunicación. El candidato a la primera vicepresidencia y su jefe del Plan de Gobierno, Gonzalo García Núñez, ve el tema de imagen. Y el publicista Martín Belaunde se encarga de contratar la publicidad, y de producirla.
Aparte, los coordinadores de cada región y los parlamentarios electos han recibido trabajo específico para ejecutarlo en todo el país.
En las filas apristas trabajan unas 14 personas. García encabeza el comando de campaña. Hernán Garrido Lecca sigue siendo jefe de campaña, Gastón Benza es una especie de gerente general que ve todo el tema operativo y financiero, Hugo Otero es responsable de la publicidad. También tiene un papel muy activo la Comisión Política y, entre sus integrantes, Jorge del Castillo.
Estrategias
Ambos grupos guardan un as bajo la manga sobre el mensaje que dirigirán a los electores.
“Lo principal va a ser el debate de ideas. Nuestra propuesta de desarrollo tiene varios ejes y uno es la oposición al modelo neoliberal, por tanto estamos desafiando el Consenso de Washington”, anota García Núñez.
No descarta que Humala viaje a Estados Unidos para atender compromisos que pueden incluir reuniones con funcionarios de organismos multilaterales.
Incisivo, Del Castillo dice por su parte que su candidato mantendrá su discurso en la segunda vuelta, contrariamente al cambio que observa en Humala cuando este decide reunirse con el cardenal Juan Luis Cipriani y los miembros del Consejo de la Prensa.
El dirigente aprista asegura que el candidato de la estrella tiene ventaja en su mensaje sobre el “trabajo decente” que ha calado en los centros mineros.
Dura pelea
El publicista Alfonso Salcedo dice que será “una dura pelea y más interesante que la primera vuelta”. Anota que García apunta al elector campesino que le es familiar.
“Debe seguir por los mismos carriles de la primera vuelta y acrecentar su entusiasmo a una sierra que desarrolle, modernice y se convierta en exportadora”, indica.
En el caso de Humala, dice que su potencialidad es haber ganado en la primera vuelta y las expectativas de los sectores olvidados y menos influidos por el Apra.
Hugo Otero, publicista del equipo aprista, no duda de que habrá un componente emotivo.
“Hay razones para saber cómo nos enfrentamos, y éstas deben ir envueltas de emociones para que la gente las escuche y las entienda”, subraya.
Daniel Abugattás. Virtual congresista de UPP:
“Ahora Alan es candidato de los ricos”
Reapareció con garra. Acusó a Alan García de “ser ahora el candidato de los ricos” y de estar negociando con la derecha. Sustentó esta aseveración en el hecho de que el jefe del gabinete Pedro Pablo Kuczynski haya lanzado elogios al candidato aprista a un medio informativo. “Ese abrazo del oso maravilloso que se dieron (Xavier) Barrón con (Jorge) del Castillo me parece bien, pero creo que por el momento político las señales han sido evidentes”.
Mauricio Mulder: Secretario general del partido Aprista:
“No hay alianzas con nadie”
Mulder señaló: “Con Abugattás uno no sabe si le contesta a él, a UPP o al Partido Nacionalista. Una persona que dura solo un mes como vocero político, ya no tiene mucha autoridad para seguir opinando. Sobre lo dicho, yo puedo decir que no hay ninguna conversación formal con ninguna fuerza política y lo único que está haciendo ahora el Apra es esperar el resultado electoral y está llano a conversar con cualquier partido político, incluido el humalismo”.
Debate
Hay consenso entre UPP y el Apra para que se realicen varios debates descentralizados entre los equipos de planes de gobierno, antes del esperado debate de los candidatos presidenciales. Solo falta fijar los lugares y fechas.
22 replies on “Peru’s New Cleavage: North versus South”
Hi Maxwell, very interesting post, thanks.
What I’ve found fascinating is how my friends have voted and intend to vote. No matter who they voted for in the first round, NONE will be voting for Garcia but rather for Humala, no matter the “class” from which they come – poor, middle and well off. This could change of course but it’s where they are today.
It appears to me that despite the fears of some re Humala, everyone I know would prefer anyone to Garcia. At least in my communities, there is NO trust felt for Garcia.
I’d be more interested in seeing the correlation between education and voting results.
this is in deed very interesting. great work, Max.
What strikes me most is the poverty decline in Madre de Dios and despite the accusations of human right violations, it is an area where Humala garners some of his strongest support.
I hope we’re not in for a remake of this Orry Main/George Hazard mini TV-series … oh wait, they actually were friends despite the civil war. Never mind.
Yes, Sasha. The APRA vote is very low abroad. I suspect that many Peruvians who left the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s, rightly or wrongly, hold Garcia accountable for the economic collapse of 1987-89.
Inka, Huanuco (where Humala commanded a base called Madre Mia) is an area that experienced a lot of violence and which remains very poor. It is also an area that Humala has done well. — Max
P.S. You’ll have to explain the mini-series reference to me!
Dear Max,
thanks for treking down to the inei and getting all the poverty numbers for us, I think there is a lot of thinking still needed on the Humala phenomenon.
The north and south divide is as old as Peru itself. It was the case during independence when the north and Lima sided with the troops of San Martin and declared for independence, while the south remained in royalists hands, supported by the locals until 1824.
The north-south divide was again very evident in the 1830s during the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, when the north sided with Chile and the south supported the union with Bolivia.
During the civil wars of the nineteenth century the south was constantly in opposition to Lima and most of the regime change in XIX and XX Peru has originated in the south particularly, but not exclusively Arequipa.
In the XXc two great and influential ideologies developed in each region, in the south it was indigenismo and the in the north Apra.
What I would ask in this context is why has this cleavage managed to be so resilient in Peru and why is it now reemerging so strongly.
I also have a long term theory on why many departments opposed the regionalization process, but that would be besides the point now.
I agree that the cleavage is as old as Peru. I probably should not have called it new, but as you say it has really come into focus with this first round of the election. I haven’t gone back to look at earlier elections yet, but in comparison with 2001 it seems to me the cleavage is sharper now. So what I am thinking is that the economic growth model has exacerbated the cleavage. This would make Peru similar to Mexico, in the sense that people have been arguing for some time that one of the biggest effects of NAFTA has been to increase the distinction between the north (Monterrey and the maquiladora areas) and the south (especially places like Chiapas). Neoliberal growth probably reinforces these divisions that can be traced to the colonial era, and, in the process, provokes this kind of political reaction. What do you think? Do we have a panel here?
max,
check this link:
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0088583/
aaah, sorry Max, I am experiencing same brain cramps lately.. 🙂
Madre Mia – Madre de Dios… tsk tsk
I think there is a problem with the premise of the question: “if Humala’s support comes from the poor..”
How do we know that’s true? Because the polls said that? Before making correlations between poverty and voting patterns we need to be sure that the premise is correct. So far the article shows no evidence of that…at least to me.
Interesting Post
As usual great work and additional thanks to the other contributors for filling me in on the long existing cleavage between north and south. As regards Mexico I have a few friends from the north, generally lighter in complexion and more mediterranean in their features. When weve discussed the ethnic make up of mexico wev’e generally drawn the conclusion that the south is more indigenous and mestizo en complexion– e.g., Chiapas, Oaxaca, the Yucatan States, Puebla, although their is variantion. The same might be the case with peru with the south more indigenous and mestizo in complexion. However, I am not well versed on the north– aside from old war stories from a grandfather from Santiago de Chuco who claims to have been a labor organizer for APRA in its more radical hey day. Might part of the difference also be topographical? I’ve heard references to the Andean massive in terms of being a natural geographical barrier to change. Lastly the distinction between the two great ideas that of Aprismo in the north and Indigenismo in the south might reflect the respective needs and context of both regions– the south in terms of ethnic resurgency and the north in terms of labor organizing in an area with large plantations.
Please fill me anyone with more input. Interesting stuff.
Folks,
I don’t want it to seem like everyone is ganging up on Javier because he represents old and hard line misconceptions (okay, maybe I do :)). But who gets educated is wholly determined by the government and people. It’s like keeping chocolate bars and cake around the house and yelling at your kids for being fat. Or not feeding your children and calling them too skinny. You get what you put into it.
Here is Rici’s quote.
“All I’m saying is that the Perú of today is the result of systematic neglect of social infrastructure over a long time. Had those with wealth and power been less mesquina over those decades, things would be a lot better. But, as in the rest of South America, they (aided and abetted by foreign capital) simply lived high off the hog, leaving the vast majority to scratch out whatever living they could. So a certain amount of resentment is understandable, whether or not it is likely to improve the situation.
So I hear people in Miraflorina cafes saying the same thing you do, that Humala’s support is uneducated, that they don’t know what is good for them. And I ask, then why didn’t you spend more money on schools? How do you expect people to be educated if you deny them access to education? Would it really have hurt your lifestyle that much to pay a bit more in taxes, to create a state that actually provided services instead of shifting money from one bank account to another?”
Maxwell,
Not sure if it’s available, but I’m far more interested in seeing Humala’s support by age and gender.
Max,
Humala has tended to appeal more to men than women; Flores appealed more to women than men. APRA is more “gender balanced.”
Humala’s supporters tend to be older. That is, his support increases with age. Flores tended to appeal to younger voters. Her support declined with age. APRA tends to appeal across the board, with some bias toward the older.
A bunch of the polls we have saved on this site contain this information if you want to look at the actual numbers. Most of the APOYO polls, for example, break down the vote intentions by age and gender.
Your question raises for me an interesting issue. Is the female vote also up for grabs, now that Flores is out of the race? Who will better capture the younger females who voted for Flores in the second round?
— Max
I think the voting dynamic is more different than north vs south or poor vs rich. Voting probably was something like this:
Everything stolen by Velasco – anyone but Humula
Everything stolen by APRA – anyone but Garcia
didn’t have anything to steal – anyone but Flores
Victor,
I am sure you are right. One of the most important distinctions in the comparative study of Latin America is between those regions that were central to the colonial enterprise, and those that were peripheral.
The closer you get to Mexico City and Lima, for example, the more you encounter the legacies of colonialism. Colonial centers of power were greatest where there were large indigenous populations and natural resources.
There are a lot of commonalities between Peru and Mexico, in part because they were both critical to the Spanish empire. By contrast, countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica–small peripheral countries with relatively homogeneous populations–have tended to follow different trajectories of development and democratization.
In particular (and to relate to the point made by Max), smaller, peripheral countries have tended to invest in human development and citizenship early and in a sustained manner. They produced public, secular schools earlier (at the end of the 19th century, or in the early part of the 20th century), as well as clinic and hospitals. In general, they have solid public sector institutions.
All this very much in contrast to the absence of strong state institutions and the lower levels of human development in the Andes, Southern Mexico, and Central America (especially Guatemala).
— Max
Javier sounds like a an old woman I knew in Peru in Lima when she was afraid her servants were stealing her silver. God rest her soul. Everybody is stealing. Surely people must work somewhere in Peru.
Mr. Cameron,
Do you think any of these disparities have anything in particular to do with a reticence to spend or direct development towards to indigenous areas of the country either out of a desire–implicit or otherwise– not to have to content with an educated, viable and numerous ethnic presence.
Maxwell, I wasn’t referring to the vote from communities abroad but across the spectrum of communities IN Peru.
Are YOU seeing this at all?
I tip my Pisco Sour to you for your prediction success posted today!
Dear Dr Cameron,
The north-south split you and your correspondents note is likely even older than Peru. Consider this simplistic summary of pre-Colombian cultural trajectories:
Dominant polities with pan-Andean influence arose in the highlands of southern Peru during the Middle Horizon (c. 800-1,000 AD), originating in Ayacucho; and the Late Horizon (the Inca), originating in Cusco. Although these southern sierra based polities enjoyed great spatial extent they did not endure for long periods (the Inca were of course truncated by Spanish arrival but were already emboiled in civil war and disintergration).
Outside of these so-called Horizons the most complex polities were based on the north and central coasts: Moche (c. 0-800 AD), about the Moche Valley and Chimor (c. 1,100-1450 AD), in the same place and further south almost to Lima.
Partly this can be explained by geography: the north/central coast comprising of rich wide, delta-shaped alluvial valleys, in contrast to the small valleys of the south coast. In the south where the coastal plain is very narrow and the Andes rise almost straight from the sea, economic resources were concentrated in the inter-montane valleys of the sierra and the great Titicaca basin.
One can best test this overall summary by reference to its exceptions and the detail of your analysis: one thinks of the valleys of Chincha/Pisco/Ica on the south coast and Huaraz and the Callejon de Huaylas in the sorthern sierra. Though far smaller and more scattered than the contemporary north coast Moche, the Nasca cultural florescence on the south coast was centred in Ica and Nazca.
Andean archaeologists are fond of using evidence for past El Nino events to explain the various switches in influence between north coast and south sierra. Perhaps the 1998/9 El Nino event will be invoked in a similar way in the future? (here I jest of course).
Yours –
David
Sasha, sorry, I presumptuously thought you were talking about Peruvians abroad. Yes, I am sure what you are detecting is real. I know at least one person who voted for Paniagua in the first round who is going to vote Humala in the second round. The reason: she would never vote for Alan Garcia (too many memories of sewage coming through the kitchen taps, car bombs, paper money not worth the paper it was printed on, and so forth). One question, though. Is this true mainly of older Peruvians, those who remember Garcia from 1985-1990? It may be less true of the younger generation. Enjoy your Pisco sour while we’re still not on “ley seca.”
On Jorge’s question about Humala’s support from the poor: There is no doubt that Humala’s support is stronger among the poor than the rich, and all the public opinion polls show this. That does not mean he has all the support of the poor. In fact, his level of support in the poorest neighborhoods of Lima was surprisingly modest, in my view.
Victor, no doubt about it. Racism underpins the refusal to invest in human development. Simon Rodriguez warned about this, and yet criollo elites have persistently refused to make the social investments that create inclusive citizenship. If you read Chapter V of the Plan de Gobierno of Ollanta Humala, which is devoted to the construction of a social and democratic state, there is an analysis of the failure of the aristocratic and criollo republic which draws heavily, I would say, on great Peruvian thinkers like Jose Carlos Mariategui, Haya de la Torre, as well as contemporary analysts like Jose Matos Mar. All these authors would agree that an educated, organized, and assertive indigenous majority would make life difficult, to say the least, for the culturally European and privileged members of the political class.
David, this is amazing stuff. As a political scientist, I read these lines with awe and fascination. Do you think the spatial bias of the Incas had anything to do with their quipus? I am thinking of Harold Innis’ idea of the bias of communication: light weight media of communication contributing to spatial distribution but also impermanence. Did Moche and coastal cultures write on clay? In other words (and this is a totally naive question), can differences in social organization between these cultures be attributed to the media of communication they used?
In my view the 1973 Nino contributed to the collapse of the Velasco regime. It resulted in a crisis in the fishing industry, protests in Chimbote, the abandonment of SINAMOS, and was followed by internal regime divisions that culminated in the rise of Morales Bermudez in 1975. ☺
Dear Maxwell,
No, I don’t believe that this perceived pre-Colombian split between: long-duration, north-central coastal cultures, and; short-duration, expansive, southern highland based cultures, can be explained by differences in media of communication.
There is no evidence that ‘writing’ was developed in pre-Colombian South America (although it was by the Maya in Mesoamerica). Inca period quipus were special sets of knotted strings had their knots arranged to encode information and performed a manner of bookkeeping function in the hands of specialists (quipucamayos) able to use and read them. According to the early Spanish chroniclers quipus were hierarchically arranged for use in accounting, the recording of history and in the law. We have only limited understanding of how quipus functioned because their use was severely suppressed by the Spanish for obvious reasons of control. Although the numbers represented in Inca quipus can be read, what the numbers represent cannot yet be identified.
Nevertheless, it seems certain that quipus do not represent evidence of ‘writing’ however broadly that might be defined. Although there is some evidence that quipus as a media of communication predate the Incas, there is no evidence for their use by the Moche or any other north-central coast cultures.
However, William Conklin makes the point very elegantly that, because we come from a tradition in which visual imagery is secondary to written communication this has obscured our appreciation of the fact that the central communicative medium of pre-Colombian Andean thought was not written language(s) but weaving. Quipus represent part of that tradition, but it was one shared across space and time in pre-Colombian Peru.
Instead, I repeat that it seems to me that at least part of the explanation of these deeper-time cultural differences between the north and south of Peru is inherent in the significant geographic distinctions between the north-centre ‘coastal bias’ (rich, wide alluvial valleys) and the southern ‘sierra bias’ (rich intermontane valleys and the huge Titicaca basin – with its lacustrine microclimate, tuber cultivation and rich camelid pastures).
Yours –
Dr. David Beresford-Jones
Dept. of Archaeology
University of Cambridge
Hey Maxwell,
Interesting post. From the perspective of somebody with no particular knowledge on the whole topic (but the eagerness to learn), it is certainly very enlightening.
One quetswion thoug: when adressing the poverty figures, are migrations due to poverty also taken into account. i can imagine that in Peru (like elsewhere) poorer rural areas are depopulating in favour of the city. Those more wealthy tend to stay in place. This could explain in some part why poverty figures _seem_ to be dropping in rural areas, while in fact the poverty is on the move.
Cheers,
Sebastian.