Rebellion in the Nazi Concentration Camps

In his essay, A Plea for the Dead, Eli Wiesel comments on how “many people are beginning to raise questions about the problem of the incomprehensible if not enigmatic behavior of Jews” (Wiesel 139) in the concentration camps. Specifically, in recent times, people have begun to wonder why the Jews marched to their death “the way cattle go to the slaughterhouse” (Wiesel 139)? The problematic nature of this question stems from a misunderstanding of the true nature of the camps and Jewish resistance. Maher notes the common misconception that the concentration camps were “chaotic and tyrannical places” which lacked rules or regulations (Maher 42). In reality, camp structure was highly organized and an extensive framework was established by the Nazi’s to prevent rebellions.1 Firstly, this paper shatters the myth that Jewish prisoners did not rebel in the concentration camps. Secondly, this paper aims to contextualize these rebellions and thus analyze the efficacy of the methods employed by Nazi authorities to prevent rebellion. The methods discussed in this paper are the use of informers, fostering disunity, deterrence, secrecy and preventing evasion. Collectively, I term these factors determinants of failure. I will argue that these factors were crucial elements of the Nazi framework which prevented uprisings from being successful. Therefore, I hope to provide a contextualized answer to the question of Jewish rebellion in the camps.

The context
In understanding why certain rebellions failed, it is important to consider the conditions in which the resistance arose. Rebellions often occurred when prisoners feared their imminent death (Dunin 182); which led to premature outbreaks, unorganized fighting and plans not being carried out in their entirety.3 This is evidenced during an Auschwitz uprising where the leaders continued to delay the execution of their escape. Langbein reasons that they were willing to wait because “they did not feel they were in immediate danger of being exterminated” (Langbein 287). The situation changed drastically when the camp administration arbitrarily began to send prisoners to be gassed. As a consequence, the rebellion broke out 10 days earlier but it was “spontaneous and not organized” (Langbein 287). In another Auschwitz rebellion, a group of Jews were sent to an undressing room before being gassed. According to Langbein, the Jews were “not ignorant of their fate” and the prisoners wrestled the weapons from the guards, stabbed an SS guard to death and a shoot-out ensued (Langbein 280). The prisoners were quickly overpowered and all of the inmates in the dressing room were swiftly killed. This event once again demonstrates that when prisoners realized their death was imminent, they saw no choice but to resist. In the small and confined quarters of the dressing room, the prisoners were able to overpower the guards but reinforcing SS authorities quickly quelled the rebellion (Langbein 280).
It should also be noted that such rebellions occurred in the face the of the superior military might of SS forces. Although the Jewish prisoners outnumbered the SS guards, an analysis of the Treblinka extermination camp rebellions reveals that the SS authorities had the weaponry and means of

preventing escape. In one example, Jews who were transported from Grodno attempted to overpower their SS guards with “knives and bottles” (Langbein 289). The SS men they attacked were hospitalized however all of the dissenting Jews (approximately 2000) were immediately executed by gunfire (Langbein 289). This event demonstrates that in the face of certain death, the Jews did rebel however despite inferior numbers, the camp authorities had the means of quelling the uprising.
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Use of Informers
Regarding the Jewish population, the primary goal of the Nazi camp machinery was extermination. Given this pretext, it is reasonable to surmise that camp authorities accounted for instances of rebellion and uprising. One of the primary methods employed by the Nazi authorities was the use of informers in order to detect and sabotage resistance movements. Dunin outlines how the establishment of the concentrations camps “was accompanied by the simultaneous formation of a system of stool pigeons” (organized by a branch of the Gestapo) whose duty was to report any dissenting activity to camp officers (137). This is corroborated by Vrba’s memoir where he states that in Auschwitz “there existed a complex network of informers among prisoners” whose main purpose was “to prevent a revolt in the camp or escape from it” (393). In a letter to camp commandants dated March 31 1944, the head of Section D at WHVA (SS main economic and administrative office) wrote that “it has been proved to be unconditionally necessary and extremely important that the prisoners in the concentration camps be kept under the surveillance of suitable fellow inmates” (Dunin 137). It can be concluded that rebellions and sabotage were “the main target of the SS” (Dunin 138).

Dunin alludes to the efficacy of the system of informers when he states that “as a result of informers’ activities and repression by the SS, resistance movements suffered heavy losses” (138). This statement holds true on two levels. On one hand, the system of informers prevented rebellions from occurring. To evidence this claim, one can consider the Mathausen rebellion where three Russian officers incarcerated in the death block of Mathausen planned a break out. A few days before the plan could be executed, 25 inmates in the block (including the orchestrators of the escape) were taken out and shot without reason. Langbein suggests that the evidence invariably points to an informer; but the traitor was never identified (Langbein 282).
In the cases where the uprising did occur, the threat of informers hindered the success of the escape; mainly due to premature outbreaks. For instance, one factor that led to the premature outbreak of the Auschwitz uprising was the threat of a German criminal informer who had overheard a conversation regarding the uprising. He was killed but the event nonetheless “forced them to start the action sooner than planned” (Langbein 287). Evidently, the efficacy of the rebellion was hindered due to the rushed attack. For example, the initial plan had envisioned a higher participation by cutting the barbed wire which separated the women’s camp from the crematories; but the plan was not carried out to the fullest extent. As a result, there were no reports of a successful escape. (Langbein 285). In another example, an informer was particularly detrimental during the Treblinka camp uprising. The plan itself was meticulously organized and the prisoners had even accrued weaponry by bribing corrupt Ukrainian policeman. However, the beginning of the uprising “had to be advanced because there was reason to fear treason, and that is why not all the weapons could be distributed” (Langbein 292). Survivor testimony by Richard Glazar supports this claim. He argues that an informer “had been responsible for the premature outbreak of the rebellion which was not entirely successful for that reason” (Langbein 293). Willenberg, another survivor of the camp, corroborates this claim and argues that “only the

premature outbreak of the rebellion, necessitated by an informer, prevented the prisoners from distributing all weapons” (Langbein 293) (as planned). Langbein emphasizes that “since the rebels did not manage to destroy the telephone wires, presumably another consequence of the premature break-out” the SS could quickly alert units in the vicinity. As a consequence, the escapees were unable to reach the Polish Penal Camp, a crucial element of their escape plan (Langbein 294).
Fostering disunity
Arguably, the Nazi authorities feared a unified front by the prisoners; therefore, their camp policies aimed at fostering disunity in the camps. Through sowing conflicts within the prisoner population, the Nazis accelerated a process of “de-solidarization” between Jews and gentiles (Wunschmann 578). It is important to consider the context in which Jewish prisoners were imprisoned in the camps. The camps were organized such that they operated as a “pseudo-penal institution” aimed at isolating Jews specifically (Wunschmann 578). All prisoners were cut off from society, however the Jews “held the status of outcasts among the outcast” (Wunschmann 579). Wunschmann clarifies that other “community aliens” such as gypsies, Jehovah’s Witnesses and homosexuals were viewed as having the possibility of reintegrating into Nazi society (579). However, the Jews had no prospects for returning to the Nazi racial state which deemed them subhuman and unable to be reformed or re-educated. In other words, for most prisoner categories, the camps served as a medium of re-education; but for the Jewish prisoners, they were “excluded, deported and finally exterminated (Wunschmann 579).
To promulgate disunity, the camps enforced a prisoner hierarchy as demonstrated by their extensive prisoner identification markers. The SS guards used ethnicity as a marker for the distribution of power and privilege among inmates in the camps. In doing so, the guards erected an ethnic hierarchy system to “divide and conquer” (Maher 66) prisoners where Jews were “at the very bottom” of the camp hierarchy (Maher 66) (Dunin 49). Through fostering ethnic divisions and isolating the Jewish

prisoners, the Nazis were able to sow “distrust and competition amongst prisoners struggling to survive” (Maher 69). The efficacy of this method of isolation can be observed in Sobibor where a Jewish chief Capo named Mosche planned an uprising. Before the plan could be executed he was betrayed by another Jew. Mosche along with three co-conspirators were killed and the informer received Mosche’s position as a reward (Langbein 295).
Wunschmann’s account of disunity is corroborated by Buber-Neumann’s memoir which recounts how the Nazi policies of dehumanization, physical and emotional abuse sowed disunity within the inmates. In her memoir, Buber-Neumann highlights how Nazi violence and depravity centered around the dehumanization of the inmates. This is exemplified by her account of a medical examination which she describes as a “pitiful travesty” where naked women “without a hair left” tried to “cover themselves like Venus” but their “feeble attempts at modesty had to be abandoned” (168). Later during the examination, the SS doctor smacks her bare leg with a riding whip (Buber-Neumann 168). In another instance, Buber-Neumann comments on how the Camp Commandant Kogel enjoyed administering the floggings himself because they were his “little pleasure” (179). Buber-Neumann’s experience with the medical examination coupled with her observations of the Camp Commandant demonstrates how sexual abuse, sadism and physical violence were interwoven with one another as a normalized part of daily life in the camps
As per Buber-Neumann’s memoir, the dehumanization of the inmates due to the physical and emotional abuse administered by the SS and fellow prisoners had a profound effect on their psyche. Buber-Neumann states that “blows are bad, but there are worse things-constant provocations and constant humiliation” (185). She is commenting on how the humiliation and degradation of their emotional integrity (such as the medical examination) trumps the physical abuse they suffer. She elaborates that the prisoners had “lost all human rights” and they began to envision themselves as “just

a living being with a number” (Buber-Neumann 185). By viewing themselves only in terms of their camp identification (their number and patch), Buber-Neumann underscores how the prisoners began to internalize their own abuse and dehumanization. The effects of this internalization are referenced by Buber-Neumann later in the memoir when she states that “unconsciously you were tempted to revenge yourself on your fellow prisoners for the injuries you suffered” (185). In other words, through experiencing violence by the SS officers, the prisoners felt inclined to beat their fellow inmates thus generating a cycle of violence, abuse and division.
The relevance of Buber-Neumann’s account to the research at hand is limited because it does not deal exclusively with the Jewish population whose end goal by the Nazi authority was extermination as opposed to re-education. Nonetheless, Buber-Neumann’s narrative of Nazi violence show the trajectory of Nazi thinking regarding the purpose of camp policies. It demonstrates the Nazi predisposition of using the camps as a means of social death and ‘de-solidarization’ aimed at preventing a unified front by the prisoners. However, beyond just disunity, Buber Neumann’s memoir explicitly illustrates the Nazi policy of dehumanization as a means of destroying the prisoner’s spirit; and by extension their will to dissent.
Deterrence by the threat of third party violence
The Nazi’s used various modes of deterrence in order to prevent dissent. Two acts of resistance at the Treblinka extermination camp exemplify how the Nazi’s used third party violence to deter resistance. In one instance, a Ukranian policeman prevented a young Jew from saying goodbye to his mother and in retaliation, he wounded the policeman. Consequently, “he and everyone else on the transport was shot” (Langbein 289). In another case, a young Jew named Meir Berliner was selected for labor whereupon he attacked a SS squad leader fatally with a knife. In response, Berliner was forced to watch his wife and child enter a gas chamber and “more than 100 Jews of his labor detail were cruelly

killed” (289). According to the Hagen court that dealt with the Sobibor camp, “acts of violence applied a constant paralyzing pressure on the majority of the inmates” (Langbein 295). Dunin also suggests this method of deterrence was to some extent effective when he argues that “the decision to escape [from Auschwitz] was rendered more difficult by awareness of possible reprisals afterwards against those caught, their colleagues and families” (199). In other words, many Jewish prisoners may have had the will to rebel; however, they chose not to out of concern for the consequences for their fellow inmates.
By the same token, prisoners were incentivized not to resist out of fear for the retribution from other inmates. As discussed above, an act of resistance from one prisoner often entailed a punishment for the entire block or work detail in which the rebelling prisoner was engaged. Vrba recalls a conversation he had with an SS man who “told [him] that Jews from this detachment tried to escape and, as a result, the survivors had to work with chains on their legs” (Vrba 68). Through administering punishment to others, the Nazi’s were further able to incite violence among the prisoners. One striking example of prisoner brutality can be seen in Buber-Neumann’s memoir when a gypsy woman, Weitz, attempted an escape. Upon her recapture and return to the camp, the prisoners knew that her attempt had “cost them three days’ food” and thus “the majority of the prisoners rushed at her, kicking her, striking her with their fists” (Buber-Neumann 182). Buber-Neumann later reflects that through this act of prisoner brutality, the SS was successful in making an “example of her”; thus demonstrating how the violence administered by the prisoners aided the SS in their efforts of dehumanization and maintaining control of the camp.
Secrecy/instantaneous extermination
It should not be negated that one reason Jewish prisoners might not have rebelled is because they were ignorant to the extremity of their situation. Vrba is one such example when he tells a fellow prisoner he was excited to be transferred to Auschwitz because “anywhere is better than this dump

(Maidenek)… Auschwitz couldn’t be any worse” (Vrba 66). Vrba argues that “secrecy as to the true purpose of Auschwitz and of the industry of death practiced there” was crucial for the “continuing business of Auschwitz” (Vrba 388). Strikingly, Vrba highlights how he “never met a single prisoner who had known anything about the gas chambers of Auschwitz before he arrived” (Vrba 388). In addition, it is important to consider the barriers to communication that existed among the prisoners. Richard Glazar recalls an experience in the Treblinka camp where he “not in words, but in signs” attempted to ask a fellow prisoners what was happening. The prisoner responded with a gesture but he “didn’t really pay much attention to him” because he “couldn’t figure out what he meant” (Lanzmann). In essence, the diversity of languages and dialects among the prisoners further hindered attempts to organize resistance.
The secrecy of the Jewish extermination was coupled with the Nazi policy of instantaneous extermination. 95% of Jews arriving to extermination camps (such as Treblinka and Sobibor) were sent to gas chambers immediately (Dunin 37). The “functions of instantaneous extermination centers” were a shared commonality among the death camps (Dunin 37). They served to provide almost no opportunity for Jewish prisoners to organize or coordinate a revolt. Any rebellion that occurred was further hindered by the other factors discussed in this paper.
Preventing evasion
Interestingly, some large scale uprisings (such as Treblinka and Mathausen) did result in a large number of prisoners escaping the camp vicinity. However these rebellions ultimately failed because the prisoners could not evade pursuing SS forces. This is largely because the Nazi’s had policies aimed at capturing prisoners if they did manage to escape. Firstly, if a camp (such as Auschwitz and Maidanek) was situated in Polish territory, the authorities would initially try to evacuate the local Polish population (Dunin 183); and replace them with compliant Nazi sympathizers. The area around the camps were also

heavily influenced by Nazi propaganda “which ensured that the local population had a hostile attitude to escaped prisoners and [they] often helped to apprehend them” (Dunin 183). Secondly, camps were situated in areas with a “difficult terrain”, sometimes ensuring that in order for a prisoner to successfully escape, they would need to swim across numerous rivers or canals (Dunin 183). In the case of Auschwitz, the camp was purposefully situated in a “marshy tract” where “it was necessary to swim across the river” to escape (Dunin 183). Finally, it should be noted that prisoners were “not familiar with the area surrounding the camp and did not know much about the distances involved or the transportation network” (Dunin 183).
The extent to which these policies hampered the escape attempts of Jewish prisoners can be surmised from the Mathausen rebellion where 419 prisoners (out of the 500 who participated in the uprising) were able to escape the camp vicinity. However, the inmates were ultimately unable to evade the pursuing SS forces who had mobilized the Wehrmacht and all military and paramilitary forces in the area including the Hitler youth. On the first day after the escape, 300 inmates were captured and by the end of the search, only 17 inmates had evaded recapture. The high rate of capture can be partially attributed to the compliance of the civilian population surrounding the camp. Langbein notes that “only a few farmers in the vicinity dared to give the fugitives food and not betray them to search parties” (Langbein 282). While the rebellion succeeded in the initial breakout, it failed due to a lack of resources along with the lack of ability and support to secure an escape from pursuing SS forces.
In conclusion, the Nazi’s consciously established a framework of camp organization which was aimed at preventing escape from the camps. The Nazis created a system of informers, maintained a monopoly over information, and used third party violence as a deterrent; which served to prevent rebellions from occurring. In the cases where uprisings did occur, the Nazis had methods of quelling these uprisings. Through sowing disunity in the population and preventing escape from the surrounding

area of the camp, the Nazis condemned these uprisings to fail. By understanding the context in which Jewish rebellions occurred, it is easier to understand why more rebellions didn’t transpire and how the extermination of the Jewish people was possible. My hope is that this paper combats the misconception that Jewish prisoners allowed themselves to passively be led to the slaughterhouse.

Works Cited

Buber-Neumann, Margarete. Under Two Dictators: Prisoner of Stalin and Hitler. London: Pimlico, 2009. Print.

Dunin-Wasowicz, Krzysztof. Resistance in the Nazi Concentration Camps 1933-1945. Warszawa: Polish Scientific, 1982. Print.

Langbein. Against All Hope. London: Constable, 1995. Print.

Langer, Lawrence L., and Eli Wiesel. Art from the Ashes: A Holocaust Anthology. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. Print.

Lanzmann, Claude. Shoah: An Oral History of the Holocaust: The Complete Text of the Film. New York: Pantheon, 1995. Print.

Maher, Thomas Vernon. Chaos, Coercion and Organized Resistance; An Organizational Analysis of the Nazi Concentration Camps. Diss. Ohio State U, 2013. N.p.: Proquest, 2015. Print.

Vrba, Rudolf. I Escaped from Auschwitz. London: Robson, 2006. Print.

Wunschmann, K. “Cementing the Enemy Category: Arrest and Imprisonment of German Jews in Nazi Concentration Camps, 1933-8/9.” Journal of Contemporary History 45.3 (2010): 576-600. Web.