Peru Election 2006

Maxwell A. Cameron
The Guardian, Comment is free…
July 31, 2006
On July 28, 2006, Alan García Pérez, leader of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), assumed the presidency of Peru for the second time. The sight of the now middle-aged politician wearing the presidential sash fills many Peruvians with a weird sense of déjà vu. Having decided to give him a second chance, voters now wonder whether he has changed.
García is the kind of politician who, as one wag put it, needs to be the bride in every wedding, the corpse in every funeral. He must control the need to eclipse everyone around him if he wants to govern effectively.
García’s inauguration speech this July 28 suggests that he has learned some hard lessons from his previous term in office (1985-1990). (For a summary of the inauguration speech, in Spanish, see Adonde.com). He argued that the emphasis on macroeconomic stability and privatisation under the so-called Washington Consensus were insufficient to address social exclusion and unemployment, but he also appointed a conservative minister of finance who has the confidence of the international financial community. He will walk a fine line between striving to make Peru an investment grade economy while redressing the social causes that produced the massive protest vote in this election.
The speech also exposed García’s troubling urge to be the protagonist in too many policy areas. Many words were devoted to detailing a wide range of specific measures, rather than laying out the general principles that would guide his government (leaving the details to be fleshed out by cabinet, lawmakers, and senior bureaucrats). García has left little room for initiative to his prime minister, Jorge del Castillo. His stupendous ego does not allow him to delegate powers that he believes should be monopolized by the president.
In his first term, García turned Peru into what Argentine political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell called a delegative democracy. In a delegative democracy presidents do their best, and often succeed, to suppress constitutional checks and balances.
According to this conception of rule, says O’Donnell, “whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office.” The president is the “embodiment of the nation” and courts and legislatures are treated as mere nuisances.
In 1985, García came to power in the midst of a severe economic crisis, with the economy in recession and the public sector staggering under a massive external debt burden. The Shining Path revolutionary movement was on the rise, moving increasingly from Ayacucho into urban areas – especially Lima. The young leader responded with an ambitious policy agenda that involved placing a cap on debt service, controlling prices, and stimulating growth through public spending.
It worked for about 18 months. After an initial boom, however, the economy slumped. García attacked the business community, which he denounced as disloyal for refusing to invest to sustain the recovery he had stimulated. The 1987 decision to attempt to nationalize the banks led to a collapse of business confidence, capital flight, and a massive recession. The collapse was accompanied by hyperinflation as the government continued to print money to cover costs. Corruption ran rampant as APRA party members plundered the state in an end-of-term piñata.
Whatever the errors inherent in García’s management of the economy, one of the most important political errors in his administration was his own tendency to dominate policymaking initiatives while weakening mechanisms of accountability. The effort to nationalize the banks, for example, was a decision taken by García and a handful of advisers. Yet he abdicated democratic responsibility in the management of coordinated prison uprising in 1986, turning the matter over to the armed forces. The military bombarded the prisons and executed dozens of Shining Path prisoners who had surrendered. The matter was investigated by congress, but to this day Peru’s backlogged judiciary has refused to touch the case.
O’Donnell argues that delegative democracies tend to go through cycles. Presidents begin their term with the appearance of omnipotence but, unable to overcome opportunism based on skepticism about whether the delegative leader can deliver the goods, they fall prey to impotence and policy failure. García’s failures set the stage for the rise of the autocratic government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and the erosion of Peru’s democracy.
Today’s García is not the impetuous bête noire of 1985. A frequent theme in his recent speeches is the importance of the separation and independence of powers. He pledges to respect the jurisdictional independence of the judiciary. This is positive, as is his announcement that the anti-corruption tsar and comptroller general would not be members of the APRA party. Similarly, it is reassuring to hear his support for regional and municipal governments, and his desire to continue the process of decentralization.
At the same time, García was vague about what he calls the need to rebuild the political system. How will his government work with congress? Apart from calling for a reduction of salaries for the president and congress, he said little to indicate how he would work with congress to carry out his policy agenda. That agenda seems to come exclusively from the president and his inner circle; congress may have a subordinate role. This could set the stage for confrontations between the executive and legislature in the future, something that García hinted at during the election campaign. With regard to the bureaucracy, García emphasized austerity and an end to frivolous expenses, but reducing salaries and firing unnecessary employees does not necessarily alter the way the bureaucracy functions.
Another key issue will be García’s ability to work with and control his own party. APRA is the only well-organized party in Peru. García has a chance to govern with APRA, giving it real power while seeking to ensure that it does not become a source of corruption and scandal as it did in the 1980s.
García takes power today under conditions radically different from 1985, and far more auspicious for policy success. If his inaugural speech is an indicator, however, he will have to watch his tendency to rule by executive fiat. He more than anyone else should know how quickly the omnipotent powers of the presidency can evaporate.

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John Crabtree
28 July 2006
Alan Garcia returns to the presidency of Peru as a far less radical figure than in the 1980s, but the political and institutional challenges facing him are just as great, reports John Crabtree.
Alan García Perez – someone who most Peruvians never imagined would regain the sash of office, after his first period as head of state (1985-90) ended in hyperinflation and political crisis – was sworn in as president on 28 July 2006, among all the pomp and ceremony of his country’s independence day. However, he seems a very different Alan García to the figure sworn in twenty-one years ago, when he used his inaugural speech as a platform to announce Peru’s unilateral moratorium on debt-service payments. Today, he pledges to follow orthodox economic policies, and is keen to avoid the mistakes that led to his leaving office in 1990 in disgrace, amid a shambolic, unsustainable economy.
The new cabinet
García’s appointment of a sixteen-member cabinet, announced on 27 July, underscores this point in three ways. First, he selected the conservative banker Luis Carranza as minister of economy and finance. Carranza returns to Peru from Spain, where he held a senior position at the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). Before this, he was one of the key confidants of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, the prime minister (and former finance minister) of outgoing president, Alejandro Toledo. Kuzcynski’s imprimatur on Peru’s economic policy during 2001-06 has been seen by the international financial community as a guarantee of fiscal and monetary rectitude.
It is precisely García’s former heterodoxy (which included the ill-fated attempt to nationalise Peru’s private banks in 1987) that makes him determined to take every step to convince the outside world that he has learned the errors of his former ways. In practical terms, he and Carranza will follow economic policies that are close to those of the Toledo administration. As always in Peru, however, there will be tension between the economy ministry and those in government who would like to see more public spending. In the short term, at least, the new economy minister will seek to maintain a tight grip on the public purse.
Second, García is determined to show that he is not going to pack his government with party loyalists as he did in his first term, when these became widely viewed as the beneficiaries of institutionalised corruption. Card-carrying members of the centre-left Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Apra) are in a distinct minority in the new cabinet. García has gone out of his way to bring in independent technocrats. He has even reserved a seat round the cabinet table for the far-right Opus Dei militant, Rafael Rey, who becomes minister with responsibility for production. Apra militants privately feel rebuffed by García’s initial choice of ministers, though at least prime minister Jorge Del Castillo is one of their number.
A third criterion that has prevailed in the selection of the new cabinet is the number of women represented. García has strained to comply with a campaign promise – perhaps reflecting a concern not to be outdone in this respect by Chile’s new president Michelle Bachelet – to have a fifty-fifty split between men and women ministers. But to honour this commitment as far as possible (in the event only six women are included in the cabinet, including Mercedes Araoz as trade minister and Pilar Mazzetti as interior minister), there had to be last-minute changes which left one or two highly eligible males out in the cold.
The party landscape
The composition of García’s government also reflects new political realities arising from the results of the 2006 presidential contest. This saw the leftwing nationalist Ollanta Humala win more votes (just over 30% of ballots cast) in the first round on 9 April, with García only beating third-placed Lourdes Flores of the right-of-centre Unidad Nacional (UN) by the narrowest of margins. In order to win in the second round on 6 June, García had to appeal to conservative voters who had previously supported Flores. This meant that Apra found itself pushed to the right.
Humala’s party, Unión Por el Perú-Partido Nacionalista Peruano (UPP-PNP), is also the largest (with forty-five representatives) in the new 120-seat congress sworn in for a five-year term on 25 July; Apra (with thirty-six representatives) is the second-largest grouping. García could expect little support from Humala’s deputies who have no sympathy with neo-liberal economics and want a radical shift in Peru’s foreign and social policies. He therefore had little alternative but to seek collaboration where he could find it, on the right, and Unidad Nacional was the first port of call.
Although not prepared to enter any formal coalition with Apra, UN has made clear that it will support the government’s legislative agenda for the time being, so long as it roughly corresponds to policies that the right finds acceptable. Since Apra and the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), the senior partner in UN, are both reasonably disciplined parties, this should mean that the government can rely on majority support in the single-chamber congress. And even if it suffers defections, there are others from smaller parties that can probably be relied upon for help when needed. Moreover, Humala’s opposition UPP-PNP is proving extremely flaky, with early signs of internal schism.
The foreign-policy picture
If in its economic policies, Peru under García will seek to play by the established rules of the “Washington consensus”, in its foreign policy it is also likely to fall in closely with the United States in contraposition to countries like Venezuela and Bolivia that reject Washington’s tutelage in Latin America.
An early sign here is García’s apparent willingness to go along with the free-trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, negotiated by Toledo and signed in December 2005. During the presidential campaign, he argued the need for changes in the text agreed by Toledo, but these doubts seem to have dissipated in the face of Realpolitik. Although ratified by the outgoing Peruvian congress, it now seems unlikely that the FTA will be considered by the United States congress before the US’s mid-term elections in November 2006.
The pattern of García’s pre-inauguration travels – which have included trips to Brasilia, Santiago and Bogotá – suggest the flavour of likely alliances within Latin America. Peru will seek to align itself with governments that are moderate in their economic policies and prepared to do business with Washington. García has been particularly effusive towards Bachelet, promising détente in the prickly relationship between Peru and Chile in recent years. The Peruvian military regards the military balance as being stacked in Chile’s favour and regards rapprochement with suspicion; perhaps it is partly for this reason that García has chosen a retired general as his first vice-president.
The acrimonious war of words between Venezuela and Peru in recent months, heightened by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s open support for Humala in the Peruvian presidential race, is set to diminish. However, García is not inclined to cultivate friendship in Caracas if it means alienating Washington, and Chávez was conspicuously absent from the heads of state attending García’s inauguration.
In the case of Bolivia, the Peruvian position may be more accommodating. But, as in the past, the bottom line may prove to be Peruvian reluctance to go along with any territorial arrangement along its southern frontier that affords Bolivia some sort of access to the Pacific.
The social agenda
Peru has been among Latin America’s fastest growing economies in recent years, but a major challenge for the García government will be whether it has any more success than its predecessor in extending the benefits of this growth to the majority of the population officially classified as “poor”.
One of the main reasons for deep public disillusionment with the Toledo administration, which began with high hopes in 2001, was its abject failure to honour its campaign slogan of más trabajo (more work). More than half of the workforce continues to labour in the so-called “informal sector” where remuneration is low, employment unstable and where social benefits (such as pensions) are nil.
Alan García has promised to maintain Toledo’s flagship social programme, called Juntos. Like Bolsa Familiar in Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico, this is a scheme for making direct payments to poor households where families accept the conditions attached by sending their children to school and having the stipulated health injections. The main problem here is that the programme (if implemented throughout the country) is fiscally expensive and is dependent on the highly deficient educational and health provision offered by the relevant ministries. Many families complain, for example, that there is little point in sending their children to school when there are not adequate numbers of qualified teachers and when children can earn money for the family by going to work.
The problem of poverty in Peru is most acute in the Andean highlands, especially in rural areas. Here García has promised to introduce a scheme known as the sierra exportadora whereby peasant farmers are encouraged to produce for niche export markets. For instance, there has been some success in exporting broccoli from the highland valleys, echoing Peru’s previous success as an exporter of asparagus. However, it is most unlikely that this will benefit more than a tiny fraction of Peru’s highland farmers, while many producing for the domestic urban market face the prospect of disabling competition from subsidised United States producers due to the FTA.
The scale of discontent among low-income households, especially in rural areas, was made clear by a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report released in March 2006 which showed a clear rejection of the way in which democratic institutions work in Peru. The elections themselves showed voters dividing along clear lines of class and income, with lower-income Peruvians (especially those of indigenous origin) voting massively for Humala. If García wants to avoid growing social tension and possibly political conflict, he will need to show that he can do something concrete for the millions of poor Peruvians who expressed confidence not in him but in Humala.
The next elections
Even before Peru’s new president and congress were installed, politicians’ minds were turning to the next electoral hurdle: municipal and regional elections scheduled for November. This will be the first major pointer as to whether Alan García can hold on to his newfound popularity or whether Humala and his friends will take advantage of a mood of disillusion and discontent at the sub-national level.
The last time regional elections were held, Apra won in nearly half of Peru’s twenty-five departments. This time, especially in light of their relegation to second place in the congressional elections, the party will be on the defensive. A weak result in the November elections could prove a major psychological blow for the country’s new government and its ruling party. Alan García has work to do.

This article originally appeared on openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons licence. To view the original article, please click here.

John Crabtree is a research associate at Oxford University’s Centre for Latin American Studies. He is the author of Peru under Garcia: Opportunity Lost (Macmillan, 1992), Fujimori’s Peru (ILAS, 1998), and Patterns of Protest: Politics and Social Movements in Bolivia (Latin America Bureau, 2005). He is the editor of Making Institutions Work in Peru: Democracy, Development and Inequality since 1980 (Institute for the Study of the Americas, London University, April 2006).

Coverage of the inauguration of President Alan Garcia is being provided in English by Living in Peru.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
June 11, 2006

Photos: M.A. Cameron
In a meeting with the foreign press on Friday, June 9, Alan Garcia was asked about his admiration for François Mitterrand. The reporter mentioned that Ollanta Humala professes admiration for Napoleon Bonaparte and Charles De Gaulle, and he wondered whether Garcia would reflect on the tension between military men and social democrats.
Garcia said that military commanders tend to give commands and orders; they value order and “verticalize” society. Since the public rejects the tendency of democratic decision-making to be slow, the challenge is to demonstrate that democracy can operate within an authoritative and efficient state.

But Garcia said that it does not take a military man to govern with authority and energy, and this is why he admired Mitterrand. In addition to being an egalitarian republican and a socialist, Mitterrand also had superior tactical and strategic capacity. That Garcia identified closely with Mitterrand in this respect was made manifest in his statement that “a civilian can be a better tactician than a military man”—an obvious allusion to Humala.
Asked about the nature of power, Garcia said that power equals blame. Whoever has power is immediately blamed for everything. Therefore, who shares power also shares blame. Power never belongs to a single person or party. He cited political scientist Robert Dahl’s Who Governs? to make the case that in all democratic decisions power is distributed across a wide range of institutions. The politicians who have known how to share power, such as Mitterrand and Bill Clinton, have completed their terms as winners. “Whoever shares power, ends up winning” he said.

Concerning the challenges of governability facing the country, Garcia rejected the idea that he has to privilege the southern highlands where voters rejected him in favour of Humala. He insisted that he has won 7 million votes and is not going in “Humalize” himself (“no me voy a humalizar”). “Let us not forget the majoritarian message of the electorate. My first commitment is to my program and my electorate.”
Garcia also had harsh words for Humala for refusing to accept defeat gracefully. “He does not know how to lose. If one does not have greatness, one cannot lose with greatness. I regret that so many Peruvians have given their votes to people who don’t know how to lose.”
“The waters have returned to their normal level,” said Garcia with respect to the outcome of the election. That is, in spite of fears of an “irruption of something irrational” during the election, the result has been sealed without any disorder. If Humala persists in intransigent opposition Garcia said he would respond with the law. He called Humala someone who has recently left the barracks and needs to learn democratic habits.

John Crabtree, Comment is free… The Guardian, June 5, 2006 03:55 PM
Second-time round Peru’s new president favours ‘liberal economics’. Washington is happy; less so are other Latin American leaders.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
May 21, 2006
Overall Assessment
The presidential debate between Alan Garcia and Ollanta Humala will probably do little to help Peru’s undecided voters. Garcia won on substance, while Humala won on style. The overall effect is unlikely to be decisive.
The 31 percent of the electorate who voted for Humala in the first round will probably be pleased with their candidate’s performance. In the face of a formidable rhetorician, Humala not only held his own ground, he conveyed a sense of sincerity and passion. His words often came out in a harsh, staccato manner, but he spoke directly to the audience, making solid eye contact with the camera. His hand gestures and body language were consistent with his words. Although he sometimes looked a little spooked about being face-to-face with Garcia, his overall attitude was pugnacious and confident. Humala’s informality was reinforced by his dress. He wore a white shirt, open at the collar, under a brown sports jacket.
The 24 percent of the electorate who voted for Garcia in the first round may be confident that Garcia struck the right balance between appealing to his core supporters and offering reassurances to the new voters he must attract. He wore a blue suit and tie and struck poses that seemed designed to convey authority. He came across as knowledgeable on matters of policy, and his statements were full of concrete policies and proposals aimed at specific audiences. At the same time, Garcia seemed tired and distant. He often looks more shifty than earnest, more calculating than thoughtful, and this reinforces the tendency of voters to see him as untrustworthy.
Given that there were no knock-out blows, and no egregious errors, Garcia may have won a victory by default. Polls conducted prior to the debate showed Garcia ahead by a substantial margin. APOYO gave Garcia the lead by 56 to 44 percent, while the University of Lima gave Garcia an advantage over Humala of 62 to 38 percent. The same polls suggest that about 1 in 5 voters are either undecided, or inclined to cast blank or spoiled ballots. In other words, Humala has an uphill battle to catch up with Garcia. His performance in the debate was strong, but probably insufficient to revert the advantage held by Garcia.
A Strange Beginning
The drama began even before the debate with a delay caused by Humala. Just a few minutes before 8 pm, I was standing in a crowd of journalists in the patio in front of the National Museum of Archeology, Anthropology, and History of Peru in Pueblo Libre where the debate was held. A silver SUV pulled up in front of a nearby canteen called “El Libertador.” Within seconds, the assembled reporters recognized Humala and surrounded him.

Chaos outside El Libertador
Inexplicably, rather than heading for the Museum, Humala entered the bodega and ordered a bottle of mineral water. He then left and rather than getting back in his vehicle, he walked three blocks to the rear entrance of the museum. The walk took over 10 minutes because Humala was mobbed by unruly press. A block away in the background one could hear the chants of APRA supporters who had assembled outside the police perimeter.

Press mobs Humala as he walks to Museum
The debate began almost 20 minutes late, and Garcia, who arrived 20 minutes early, complained that Humala’s behavior showed a lack of respect for the country. Humala denied responsibility for the delay, and blamed it on a “reception” that he had been given by APRA supporters. In fact, the APRA crowd was never anywhere near Humala, and the delay was entirely due to his inexplicable behavior. Garcia responded that stopping for 15 minutes for a “sandwich in the Queirolo” was not a good reason for delaying the debate.
Human Rights and Governability
The most notable aspect of the first part of the debate, which dealt with the topic of human rights and governability, was what was not said. Humala did not mention the massacre at El Fronton, which occurred under Alan Garcia’s government in 1986, nor did Garcia raise allegations about human rights abuses that Humala is accused of having committed when he commanded a military base in Madre Mia.

The press room in the Museum
Garcia opened by calling for a social democracy based on liberty, tolerance, and the respect for the separation of powers as an impediment to the abuse of power. He dismissed the need for a constituent assembly. Humala said Peru’s democracy does not represent the Peruvian people or serve national interests, but rather economically powerful groups and transnationalized interests. He said that governability must be based on social peace, and this requires attending to the needs of the poor.
In his reply, Garcia attempted to cast Humala as a representative of Peru’s long tradition of military involvement in politics. He also alluded to Chavez, saying Peru’s sovereignty would not be threatened by a petroleum power in the Caribbean. Humala insisted that his vision of governability requires recovering control over natural resources. He compared the current regime of control over resources, in which the resource belongs to the nation until it is extracted, as being like saying a child belongs to its mother until it is born, and then it is taken away.
Garcia responded by saying he favors renegotiating with foreign capital, but not by taking a leap into the void, along the lines of the Bolivian government of Evo Morales, which would result in capital flight, and unemployment. Garcia acknowledged that Humala has won votes in the south of Peru, but said that the inter-oceanic highway that he wants to see built would not be possible under such conditions.
The Economy
Humala rejected the economic model based on the export of natural resources, which has led to the growth of inequalities, and he used the contrast between the beaches of Asia and Ventanilla to make the point. He argued for development based on internal markets, within a framework of macroeconomic stability. Humala asked why Peru, a country that exports oil and gas, has the most expensive petroleum in the region. He made a specific, and quite dramatic promise: to reduce the price of petrol and gas by 30 and 25 percent respectively.
Garcia rejected this promise, saying that a sharp cut in the cost of petrol and gas would deprive the state of income needed to support a range of programs such as pensions. At the same time, he also made a series of specific proposals like building more ports and roads; promoting agriculture and microenterprises; providing water for 50,000 low-income inhabitants of Lima; and reducing fees for services.
Humala asked Garcia whether he was in favor or opposed to the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Garcia did not answer, but limited himself to saying that he would provide compensation for groups affected by foreign competition.
Education, Health, Decentralization…and Corruption
On education and health, the candidates largely repeated themes they have been hammering away at throughout much of the campaign. It was during this exchange, however, that the toughest words were exchanged on the issue of corruption. Garcia criticized Humala for receiving $300,000 in salary as a military attaché in South Korea and France. Humala responded by saying that he would reopen a hard-labor camp in the jungle for former presidents who had committed acts of corruption, including those who ended their terms with numerous properties.
Garcia complained that the level of the debate was being lowered, but did not defend himself. Humala persisted, mentioning the recent statements by Vladimiro Montesinos and asking “if he could, for whom would Montesinos vote?” He also asked Garcia if he would release Montesinos. Garcia replied saying Humala was imprudent in asking this question, since he had already released Montesinos. This was an allusion to Humala’s “semi-uprising” in Locumba. Humala responded by pointing to links between APRA and Montesinos, beginning with Agustin Mantilla, who was caught on a Vladivideo taking money from Montesinos. He reiterated that Montesinos’s statement was a “missile” aimed at destroying his candidacy, he restated the question “for whom would Montesinos vote?” and he insisted he would not release Montesinos.
Garcia reproached Humala for asking whether he would pardon Montesinos. The matter is in the hands of the judiciary, and it is not up to the president to make such decisions said Garcia. He said the notion that the president could decide whether or not to pardon a prisoner reflects the sort of non-democratic style of government epitomized by Hugo Chavez. Humala insisted that presidents can offer pardons.
Security for Citizens
The final segment of the debate dealt with security for citizens. Garcia attacked Humala for wanting to place the police under the control of municipalities, saying this would destroy the police force by breaking it up into 1,800 micro units. Humala rejected this claim, saying that the police should be under the control of democratically elected authorities, and that this in no way would involved breaking up the force.
Garcia insisted that mayors are not police chiefs, and said Humala’s plan was dangerous. He then thrust the knife in deeper: “we defend the police, we do not kill them.” This was an allusion to the uprising in Andahuaylas led by Ollanta Humala’s brother, Antauro. Humala seemed shaken by Garcia’s statement about killing police; momentarily, he seemed to lose focus. He responded saying that he had fought for the honor of his country, but he did not address the charge directly. Garcia joked that Humala reminded him of the popular phrase (attributed to the brother of a Peruvian gangster) “I am his brother but I don’t know anything.”
Closing Thoughts
Humala had by far the stronger closing statement. He swore he would renounce his presidential salary and only collect his military pension; he would get rid of the 1993 constitution and convene a constituent assembly; he would fight corruption and uphold the rule of law; he would implement the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and that he would recover control over natural resources and protect national interests. Garcia had a weaker closing statement in which he rejected hatred and confrontation, called for unity and peace, and emphasized the world of opportunities open to Peru. He asked for God’s blessing on all homes and illuminate Peru’s path.

Torres Caro repeats claim that Humala was late because of Apristas
On the way home I asked my taxi driver what he thought of the debate. He confessed that he was a Fujimori supporter who had voted for Martha Chavez for president, APRA for congress, and Rafael Rey Rey for the Andean parliament. He said he was still undecided for whom to vote in the second round, but he seemed very impressed with how well Humala had stood up the Garcia. He also liked the promise of cheaper gas. His assessment of the debate: it was “a tie.”

El Libertador

According to journalist Gustavo Gorriti, “Alan García could not be a dictator even if he wanted; Ollanta Humala could not be a democrat even if he tried.”

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Maxwell A. Cameron
April 30, 2006
Alan Garcia wants to take the dispute with Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez to the bank.
The candidate for APRA says that the choice in this election is between Chavez and Peru. Alluding to Ollanta Humala, Garcia said: “I believe we now have a candidate, that of Mr. Chavez, and we must choose between Chavez and Peru, nothing more; we must choose between interference and the right of the Peruvian people to self-determination.”
Garcia criticized the passivity of Ollanta Humala in the face of the most recent interference of Chavez in Peruvian politics. Humala, he said, subscribes to a “false nationalism.”
Garcia warned that Chavez has an imperial appetite, but he has made a mistake by picking on Peru. Perhaps Chavez can intimidate leaders in other places, he said, but “I am not someone to submit to yelling and insults.” He pointed out that the Peruvian constitution says that the president personifies the nation. By calling President Alejandro Toledo and Alan Garcia “alligators from the same well” Chavez offends the Peruvian people, said Garcia.
Garcia also said he has not provoked Chavez. All he has done, he said, is to clearly define the differences between his own positions and the statements made by the Venezuelan president concerning Peru. “I did not attack him. For some time Chavez has interfered in Peruvian politics. He has become a person accustomed to barbarism, to insults against he who personifies Peru, which is Mr. Toledo, against the Peruvian people, against a candidate, and finally against me.”

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Maxwell A. Cameron
April 29, 2006
Alan Garcia has been doing everything possible to pick a fight with Hugo Chavez, and, in the end, Chavez could not resist responding to Garcia’s attacks. The enmity between the two leaders goes back a long way. Accion Democratica (AD) is APRA’s counterpart in Venezuela. Hugo Chavez led a coup attempt against the AD government of President Carlos Andres Perez in 1992. Alan Garcia and Carlos Andres Perez are compadres.
Garcia has been launching torpedoes at Chavez for the better part of a fortnight. First, he attacked Chavez for pulling out of the Andean Community. On Thursday, April 20, Garcia called Chavez “Anti-Bolivarian.” “This is the second time in Latin American history that a Venezuelan government has broken the unity that the Liberator Simon Bolivar sought for our Andean republics” he said. According to Garcia, Chavez was following the footsteps of the dictator José Antonio Páez who separated Venezuela from the “Gran Colombia” in the 19th century. “The tomb of the Liberator Simon Bolivar in Santa Martha must be suffering certain commotions at this moment.”
Chavez did not respond. So, two days later, Garcia renewed his attack. “It hurts me that Venezuela proposes to abandon the Andean Community when it was a Venezuelan, the Liberator Simon Bolivar, who called for a union of Andean republics.” He then said that Chavez “is not only killing Bolivar, he is causing his country to go backward economically.”
Still, there was no response from Chavez. However, Evo Morales joined Chavez in criticizing Peru’s negotiation of a free trade agreement, calling outgoing President Alejandro Toledo a “traitor.” Garcia responded on Monday, April 24, criticizing the “grave error” of Chavez and his “pupils” in the rest of South America, including Evo Morales and Ollanta Humala, for undermining the Andean Community. He called Morales’ comments “feverish.” Garcia also said Humala should not try to avoid a debate by proposing, instead, a series of debates between the members of the teams of each party. “If he does not want to debate, it would be simpler to debate with the person who inspires and leads him” said Garcia in allusion to Chavez.
Finally, on April 28, Chavez blasted back. “We will not have relations with a president of this nature, with a thief, a cardsharp. Imagine in one of these summits, he might come and steal my money!” Chávez compared Garcia with Carlos Andres Perez. “It would be a curse for this robber to return. Look what happened when Carlos Andres Perez returned. He [Garcia] is the Carlos Andres Perez of Peru.” [Note: CAP was impeached for corruption]. Chavez went on to exhort Ollanta Humala to win. “God free Peru from a bandit such as this president,” he said of Garcia.
Chavez’s open endorsement of Humala and his attacks on Garcia are likely to benefit Garcia. Humala said Chavez’s comments were lamentable, but that Garcia had been looking for a fight with Chavez. He said the dispute is between Garcia and Chavez. This reaction was taken by editorialists as tepid.
The attacks by Chavez gave Garcia a chance to play victim while shifting the media spotlight off Humala. “I reject in the name of the Peruvian people the permanent interference of this person, Hugo Chavez, in the politics of Peru and I think he is doing a lot of damage to his protégé Ollanta Humala” said Garcia. He then pointed out the hypocrisy of not wanting countries like Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia to trade with other nations while Venezuela’s biggest customer is the United States. He said Venezuela sells $40 billion dollars in petroleum to the US, and has 17,000 gas pumps in its northern neighbour. “With what moral authority, after selling all his petroleum to the US, does he come to tell us: you are traitors if you trade with the US.” Concerning the accusations of corruption, Garcia said: “He responds in the only way that a primitive being like he knows how. Insulting and treating me in the worst manner.”
For more background, see Gran Combo Club: Entre Chávez al norte y Morales al sur (2) and Entre Chávez al norte y Morales al sur (3)

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Natalia Sobrevilla Perea
12 de abril del 2006
Hace unas cuantas semanas me encontré con un amigo que me dijo que prefería el demonio antes que Lourdes Flores. Hoy cuando va quedando cada vez mas claro que no será ella quien pase a la segunda vuelta, muchos en el Perú se sienten en la necesidad de decidir quien será este ‘demonio’ a elegir en la segunda vuelta. Bryce Echenique ha descrito esta decisión como tener que escoger entre morir de sida o de cáncer, y otros como Susana Villarán han optado por el voto en blanco o viciado.
La pregunta que nos hacemos muchos en estas circunstancias, es si Alan García se merece una segunda oportunidad. El nos asegura que ha cambiado, que ha reflexionado, que la vida le ha mostrado sus errores, pero para quienes vivimos su gobierno de 1985 a 1990 el recuerdo de esos tiempos nos hace muy difícil confiar en la misma persona que ya una vez nos dijo que en política no hay que ser ingenuos. Muchos éramos bastante jóvenes en esos años pero no olvidamos como el país, pasó de estar moderadamente en crisis a una crisis tan profunda en que las posibilidades de futuro nos parecían imposibles. Quienes hemos vivido la hiperinflación, la estatización de la banca, el dólar MUC, los que hemos tenido que hacer cola para comprar azúcar, aceite y arroz, para después intercambiar con los vecinos, los que crecimos con el pan popular, el cuaderno popular y la leche Enci, encontramos muy difícil pensar en García en términos abstractos. Esto sin considerar además que durante su gobierno el terrorismo dejó el campo y pasó a la ciudad, vivimos paros armados, apagones, falta de agua, toque de queda y por primera vez tuvimos un poco del sabor de lo que sucedía en el resto del país.
A pesar de todo esto, muchos de quienes se han pasado los últimos quince años denunciando a García como el peor gobernante del Perú, un hombre corrupto que pasó de tener un departamento mediano en Miraflores a las mansiones de Naplo, Camacho y París, un inepto que llevo al Perú a ser inelegible por el FMI, un violador de los derechos humanos que lleva como vicepresidente a un general acusado de la matanza de los penales, han comenzado a pensar que quizás en estas circunstancias el líder Aprista sea el mal menor. Nadie le ha hecho una mejor campaña a Alan García que Ollanta Humala. Su discurso violentista y radical, sumado a las graves acusaciones en su contra han logrado en las ultimas semanas algo que pensé que nunca llegaría a ver: muchos de aquellos que juraron que todos menos Alan, de los que gritaron en su momento ¡Y va a caer y va a caer caballo loco va a caer!, están ahora pensando que ante las circunstancias es mejor darle una segunda oportunidad.
García sabe que para derrotar a Humala necesita del apoyo de la derecha, que la coalición debe ser con Unidad Nacional, además de con el Frente de Centro, Lay y todos los ‘pitufos’ que pueda sumarse. De alguna manera el dirigente de la olla le ha hecho el trabajo aun más fácil definiendo el espectro político como ‘todos contra Ollanta’. Pero lo que queda por verse es quien transara con Alianza para el Futuro, sus quince escaños en el Congreso les dan una posición privilegiada desde donde negociar el posible regreso y rehabilitación política de su líder. Humala ha dicho que no negociara con corruptos, mientras que García ha declarado que el fujimorismo no es una fuerza dictatorial en este momento, que han sido elegidos por el pueblo y que esta dispuesto a ‘darle la mano hasta a su peor enemigo’.
¿Será darle a Alan García una segunda oportunidad, abrirle la puerta a Fujimori para su segunda oportunidad? ¿Será esta una oportunidad mediada por la derecha, pactada con los representantes de Unidad Nacional? Opciones dicho sea de paso que no son mutuamente excluyentes, ya que solo basta ver a algunos de los acompañantes de Lourdes Flores para que eso sea evidente. El mapa político de los próximos años se esta reconfigurando en estos días y dependiendo de cómo se tejan las alianzas, como se presente Humala y como se establezcan los posibles pactos los que no votaron ni por Alan ni Ollanta en la primera vuelta decidirán cada uno si es mejor malo conocido o quien sabe que por conocer.
Natalia Sobrevilla Perea is an historian who teaches at Yale University.