My current research focuses on the dynamics of innovation, models of entry, and competition policy. I have, however, a broad interest in Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, and Applied Theory.
 Sequential Innovation and Patent Policy [pdf] (draft: February 2017)
Briefing: In a world that inventions build upon each other, patents that protect inventors for too long, or grant too much forward protection are detrimental to the economy’s innovation rate. In other words, this paper challenges the view that the only cost associated with strong patent policy is the lost to consumer surplus associated with the monopoly that the patent grants.
 Mergers in Innovation Markets: The Role of Product Market Competition [with Guillermo Marshall] [pdf] (draft: May 2017)
Briefing: We study how changes competition in the product market affects innovation outcomes. We give sufficient conditions when rejecting a merger using static guidelines implies rejecting it using dynamic criteria. We also provide sufficient conditions, based on static market measures, for a merger to improve welfare in a dynamic sense.
 Second Price Auction with Entry Costs [with José Espín-Sanchez](New draft coming soon) [pdf]
Briefing: We characterize equilibrium in a completely asymmetric second price auction with entry cost. We provide general existence result, characterize uniqueness of equilibrium and discuss welfare.
 Mergers in Innovative Industries: A Dynamic Framework [with Guillermo Marshall] [pdf] (New draft coming soon)
Briefing: We investigate how a merger with R&D efficiencies affects market outcomes over time. To this end, we propose a dynamic framework based on a patent race model of sequential innovations with endogenous market structure. We show that timely (but costly) entry into the patent race is sufficient to guarantee that mergers are welfare improving. These results hold for all efficiency levels and despite the fact that mergers may reduce the number of firms performing R&D by more than one.
WORK IN PROGRESS
 Costly Entry into Oligopolistic Markets [with José Espín-Sanchez]
 Spillovers in Patent Races
Briefing: Depending on market conditions, spillovers may not benefit firms racing for an innovation. In some markets, firms will try to avoid spillovers and in others foster them.
 When to License Sequential Inventions
Briefing: Patent policy and market conditions not only affect the decision of whether to grant a license. They also affect when, throughout the patent life, a license will be granted.