Tag Archives: Derrida

Jacques Derrida and Tim Ingold: Making Through Blindness

Image of Jacques Derrida

Introduction

What does sight and hand inform us about making? Through Jacques Derrida’s own theories regarding our use of sight and hand, Ingold supports his own arguments while also challenging Derrida via his book Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins. Throughout this work, we will analyze how Derrida’s philosophies on sight (and its contrast with blindness) alongside the hand (and drawing with it) has been cited to articulate its importance in making as argued by Ingold.

Derrida’s Background

Derrida is a French philosopher whose works involve theories regarding the humanities, which we have seen references of in class through the language and writing chapters of Critical Terms for Media Studies. With his background in philosophy, he puts forward his thesis with terms such as “deconstruction,” where he analyzes the flawed nature of Western philosophy and viewing concepts in opposition (e.g. culture and nature, speech and writing, mind and body, etc.). This sort of “deconstruction” of seemingly oppositional ideas is what will inform Derrida’s arguments, as we will see in his analysis of “sight and blindness” as well as “drawing and the hand” (“Jacques Derrida”). 

Sight, Blindness, and Weeping

Derrida’s hypothesis of sight postulates that it is “always set on convincing you” and is the “grafting of one point of view onto another”(2). Through this hypothesis, the definitions of blindness and sight develop ambiguity. Sight is both what we believe to be true, and an imparting of our personal perspective onto another, influencing them with our interpretation. Derrida discusses the space of blind as one that conjugates the “tenses and times of memory”: foreseeing “there where they do not see, no longer see, or do not yet see”(5, 6). Ingold furthers this temporal approach to considering sight when he describes it as “an activity of seeing forward” and a way to stay one step ahead of the material (69).

While Derrida’s discussion of sight concerns itself more with the metaphysical, distinguishing between “believing [what one sees], and seeing between” and explaining that the root of skepsis lies in the eyes and visual perception, Ingold applies his concepts to the process of making (Derrida 2). Ingold discusses drawing as a way to “look back on lines already drawn” to open our eyes, effectively making ourselves the “master of truth… who sees and guides the other towards the spiritual light” as Derrida describes it (Ingold 131, Derrida 6).

Derrida’s study of blindness eventually expands to a discussion of the eye itself. He defines eyes as the essence of the man and, as Ingold cites, its ultimate destiny is “not to see but to weep”(Derrida 125, Ingold 111). As such, the eye simultaneously veils sight and reveals the truth of the eyes (Derrida 126). In essence, the eye’s truth and what they observe is revealed as the world is covered, allowing a person to properly digest what they have seen. 

Similar to how Ingold claims technology is what separates humans from animals, Derrida differentiates between us in that we are the only ones who weep as an emotional response (126). Through weeping, humans “go beyond seeing and knowing”, using our eyes in both functions of telling: we understand the world around us through sight, and can convey our emotions through weeping (Derrida 126). Though we can not effectively observe our surroundings and openly weep congruently, Derrida’s emphasis on this dual use for eyes opposes Ingold’s theories of the individuality of the hand. However, Ingold stresses that the hand is distinct as it combines both aspects of telling, effectively clarifying any argument potential.

Drawing and the Hand

In Memoirs of the Blind, Jacques Derrida argues that “drawing is blind” (2) and that the act of drawing is dependent on blindness. To Derrida, drawing is an anticipating act, predicting what is to come. He describes how the hand moves across a surface before the eye can register what is being inscribed. He sees this process as taking initiative or “to take (capere) in advance (ante)”(4). The moment in which the artist first makes the first trace (trait), they are opening the path to invention. This trace is neither visible nor predetermined by what is already present. Even if there’s a model in front of an artist, the outcome is not predetermined. As there’s always a gap between the subject and the drawing, no matter how similar the deception of the subject is, a distance always remains.

As someone draws, their hands move ahead of their sight, meaning that they cannot see the entire line until it unfolds on the page. He argues that drawing “escapes the field of vision”(45) and rejects spectacular objectivity, which is the realm of everything visible and knowable. Derrida critiques the West’s dependence on this spectacle, holding onto the idea that vision provides truth. Drawing lives outside of this spectacle, as it goes against the idea that sight is all-encompassing, as it’s not a reproduction of what’s seen, because it occurs outside of visibility. Derrida’s overarching argument is that drawing is a process of touch, memory, and invention that isn’t beholden to vision.

Building on Derrida’s work, Tim Ingold’s Making reinforces his argument that making is a process of discovery rather than something representative. He rethinks the relation between drawing and writing, emphasizing that both originate from the hand, which he says works to tell the stories of the world. The hand is active as it probes and caresses; these actions precede visions and representation. In accordance with Derrida, Ingold argues that a mark is not in the realm of visibility but a lived movement: the practice of making. To Derrida, vision is haunted by blindness, but Ingold sees this haunting as fundamental to creativity. He sees the separation of sight and drawing as something that hinders how intertwined touch, memory, and perception actually are.

Conclusion

As media theorists, both Ingold and Derrida pose crucial questions and ideas that pertain to our relationship with the media. Much like drawing, when we produce media, there is a sense of “blindness” where we are obfuscated by the process of production itself. The notion that creating as a process is seen in both Derrida and Ingold’s arguments, where we see them discuss products as an unfinished, ongoing process. Ingold uses Derrida’s work to reinforce his main argument that making is a correspondence between the maker and the material. Both scholars argue that making is not a process determined by preconceived notions of reality but rather a relation between body and material. However, Derrida highlights this through his philosophies on the hand and blindness, revealing that the artist “creates or makes” without full knowledge of what will be the outcome. Ingold builds on this perspective and focuses on materiality. He describes the lived experience of making and how the maker and material are constantly working with one another. Just with the artefacts and buildings that Ingold puts forth his analyses on, media, too, are unfinished products constantly being reshaped with what is unseen (blind) as well as the hands that create them under new contexts. We see this often with how media are constantly edited, adapted into different forms of media, and also recontextualized under new perspectives. As academics, understanding each medium, not as its own standalone finished project, but in a perpetual state of change, is what guides us and our studies in the media landscape.

Citations

Britannica Editors. “Jacques Derrida”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 4 Oct. 2025, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jacques-Derrida. Accessed 17 October 2025.

Derrida, Jacques. Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins. University of Chicago Press, 1993. 

Ingold, Tim. Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture. Routledge, 2013. 

Written by:

Molly Kingsley, Christine Choi, Aminata Chipembere

The Ambiguity of Language

Introduction

When one thinks about one of the many human languages, it may be easy to look at words as fixed in their meaning, regardless of what tongue is being spoken. Words can be translated and retain their meaning, so why not assume that they can each be neatly defined once and for all? Critical Terms for Media Studies and its chapter concerning language challenges this notion as it spotlights various theorists that emphasize the importance of context that supports language. They assert that meaning does not exist inside words themselves, rather it emerges through the contexts in which words are used. Whether it is a colloquialism shifting over time, systems of communication shaping interpretation, or theories that emphasize the instability of meaning – there exists a strong argument that language only makes sense when placed in relation to a wider social, and perhaps psychological frame. Theorists like Saussure, Luhmann, Derida, and Bateson each highlight this principle with different beliefs, reasoning, and specifications. In this blog post, we will delve into their ideas and examine the significance of context in the realm of language.

Saussure

While Cary Wolfe–our chapter’s author–cites many theorists, he describes Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics as “arguably the most important [linguistic text] of the twentieth century”(233). Saussure’s describes language as comprised of “two fundamental dimensions: the abstract system of rules that constitutes any language system at a given moment in time (langue), and the heterogeneous utterances and speech acts in which individual speakers engage (parole)”(Wolfe, 234). Additionally, Saussure explains how language systems are developed over time, existing solely through the instances of their use while only remaining meaningful because of the context of rules in which they are situated (Wolfe 234). 

This philosophy of language arguably mirrors John Locke’s two-headed approach to communication studies (Communication Presentation, Slide 4). The social aspect of intentionally exchanging ideas that partially defines communication is largely made possible through instances of parole, while the ideas that this communication embodies would not be properly transmittable without the structural understanding of langue. Essentially, Saussure’s two dimensions of language coexist with Locke’s dimensions of communication.

The relationship between language structures and their use is reciprocal. Without parole there would be no use for langue, and without langue there would be no basis for parole. This relationship makes differentiating between the individual and social aspects of language difficult. To do so, Saussure emphasizes the importance of langue, as it is “the norm of all other manifestations of speech” and consequently attributes order to systems that are otherwise relatively ambiguous (Wolfe 234). He objects to an object-centred approach to language–which views words as “derived from their referents”–arguing that if words were to stand for pre-existing concepts, they would directly translate across different languages (Wolfe 234). Instead he proposes a “relational understanding” of language–viewing it as established and dictated by social conventions–and theorizing that language is not complete in, or determined by, any one speaker (Wolfe 234). 

A prime example of this social approach to understanding language is the everchanging meanings of words in slang dialects and colloquialisms. The efficacy of slang lies in the extent to which it is adopted in parole. Our society emphasizes langue, setting semi-stagnant definitions and uses for its words and rules. As such, if only some people are using words intending to mean something outside of their understandings in langue, others will not understand their potential alternate meanings in parole. In this way, the developments of colloquialisms and slang perfectly encapsulate both the functions of langue in everyday life, and Saussure’s idea that language is not complete in any one speaker, but instead a collective effort to reinterpret the meanings of words. 

Ultimately, Saussure highlights the ambiguity of language through his breakdown of its dimensions. By defining language systems through their occurrence in parole, he delineates these systems by the contexts in which they are used. A sentence could mean one thing according to langue, yet have its meaning completely altered in a different instance of parole.

Derrida

Derrida, too, subscribes to the idea of signifiers or “concepts” being referred only as a system of signs, in which it “refers to one another,” hence, being a “chain” of sorts (1982, 11). This, in relation to context, provides evidence for how the necessary context of the chain of concepts is required for the referential nature of language. Unlike Saussure, Derrida insists on the inseparable and “unmediated” existence of “consciousness” and “conceptuality,” largely rejecting the purely psychic perspective of language. For Derrida, the context arguably cannot be taken out of the signified itself. In such discussions regarding the mediation of “psychological” and “communicational” aspects of language, examining Luhmann’s theories will support our exploration of language in its necessary context. 

Infographic created by Christine Choi (made on Canva)

Luhmann’s Theory on Systems of Communication

When examining Cary Wolfe’s chapter on Language, an overarching argument emerges: 

meaning is inherently tied to context; hence, language does not exist in isolation but is shaped by surrounding systems. Language is regulated by the structures in which it operates. Wolfe analyzes the work of Nikolas Luhmann, a German sociologist who developed a theory on systems of communication. Luhmann distinguishes between two systems: the psychic system and the social system. The psychic system is a self regulating system that reproduces itself through perceptions and consciousness. The social system reproduces itself through communication with language serving as its primary medium. He argues that both systems are closed off, meaning that the mind cannot directly transfer thoughts into society, and society cannot directly communicate meaning into one’s consciousness. Within his framework, language does not transmit ideas within a system but works as a medium that makes communication possible through context. 

These ideas are further developed in Bruce Clarke’s chapter on Communication, which 

was touched upon during the presentations. Clarke expands on the connection between Luhmann’s system theory and language. Luhmann claims that  “Communication… takes place only when a difference of utterance and information is first understood. This distinguishes it from a mere perception of others’ behavior.”(Luhmann 2002, 157). In other words, communication does not depend on the transmission of perceptions but on shared ideas of meaning and the context surrounding them. Meaning is seen as a form in which“the actual and the possible can appear simultaneously.”( Luhmann 1995, 63). He argues that language operates through codes, differences, and context that allow humans to have a sense of understanding. For language to function as a medium of communication, humans must depend on the codes that provide the system with meaning.

Luhmann’s work helps reiterate that context provides meaning to language. His work 

states that the psychic system and social system are closed off, which means humans are unable to transfer ideas. Due to this, meaning cannot simply exist in words or be communicated directly. It has to be interpreted within context, which Luhmann refers to as codes and distinctions that are utilized by each system. Luhmann’s argument raises important questions surrounding the media. If these systems are closed off, then the media cannot assure the transmission of an artist’s internal thoughts or intentions. This challenges the idea that the media allows the audience to perceive an artist’s intentionality. It suggests that the media functions more as a medium, similarly to language, having the ability to shape communication, but never fully bridging the gap between internal and external systems. This leaves us with the question: when we create media, are we truly able to express our perceptions, or will these internal thoughts always be reshaped by the context in which they are received? 

Bateson (/Kac)

This brings us back to a broader point: what theorists like Bateson remind us is that language only exists through context, and contemporary artworks like Eduardo Kac’s Genesis make that insight visible in surprising ways. Gregory Bateson defines context as essential by referring to communication via language as “the difference that makes a difference” (Bateson 235). Essentially, he explains that a word or sign only really carries meaning when placed within a specific frame of context that allows humans to interpret it. For example, a phrase that is spoken ironically will communicate something entirely different than the same phrase spoken earnestly. Bateson reminds us that language does not exist in a vacuum – it is always dependent on the situation that surrounds it. Eduardo Kac’s artwork Genesis is a great representation of this idea. Kac began with a biblical verse, translated it into Morse code, then converted it again into genetic code and implanted it into living bacteria. Visitors online could then manipulate the bacteria, which in result, altered the biblical text itself. What began as a scripture became a coded message, then a biological sequence, then an interactive artwork. Its meaning shifted at every stage because of the context in which it appeared. Genesis embodies the central argument that language, whether in everyday conversation or in art form, can only be truly understood within the context it exists in.

Citations

Bateson, Gregory. “Language”, Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp 235. 

Clarke, Bruce. “Communciation”, Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp 132-144. 

Wolfe, Cary. “Language”,  Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 233-248.

Written by: Molly Kingsley, Lea Lavalley, Christine Choi, Aminata Chipembere

Featured Graphic created by Molly Kingsley