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General Media Theory

The (Not-So) Secret Double Lives of Mormon Wives: Digital Subcultures on Reality Television

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Reality television’s low cost and high entertainment value make it appealing to both producers and audiences, and overwhelmingly saturates today’s television options. Hulu’s reality television series, The Secret Lives of Mormon Wives, follows the personal and professional lives of a Utah-based group of young mother influencers known as ‘MomTok’. MomTok interestingly exemplifies Pablo Santaolalla-Rueda and Cristóbal Fernández-Muñoz’s definition of digital subcultures, and its transformation into a reality television series represents a monumental shift in modern reality television’s media landscape. 

The Digital Subculture of MomTok

The cast of The Secret Lives of Mormon Wives initially gained internet fame by documenting their lives as modern Mormon ‘housewives’, establishing a digital subculture (MomTok) of financially independent young mothers aiming to subvert the oppressive standards the Church of Latter-Day Saints (LDS) imposes on women. MomTok primarily uses TikTok to share their message and experiences, capitalizing on social media’s availability and audience to “offer [an alternative model] of organisation that [challenges] dominant structures” and ideologies like those associated with organized religion (Santaolalla-Rueda and Fernández-Muñoz 11). 

Santaolalla-Rueda and Fernández-Muñoz posit that digital subcultures are partially defined by their content revolving “around a central figure” which “becomes crucial for community building”(2). Similarly, while supposedly unscripted, reality television revolves around compelling narratives to retain audience attention. The Secret Lives of Mormon Wives centres Taylor Frankie Paul–co-creator of MomTok–whose personal relationship became the cornerstone for the show’s first season’s narrative arc.

MomTok’s transition from online platforms to produced television, offers these influencers opportunities at more mainstream fame. The allure behind traditional reality television lies in its capacity to offer “the ‘ordinary’ person a chance to become ‘known’” and often “[proves] a springboard for the successful few to ‘cross-over’ into mainstream fame”(Deller 376). MomTok’s personalities are unique as they already had a following and were no longer among the ‘ordinary’, yet their debut as reality television stars brought a new element to their public personas and by effect, the subculture they created. 

Public Identity Online and On-Camera

Compared to fictional narrative television, reality television relies on real identites, rather than those adopted by actors. As such, personal identity is crucial to the medium regardless of the degree of authenticity reality television performers retain because the audience assumes that their personalities are genuine. In truth, reality television stars construct their identities through processes akin to curating online personas using “a dynamic process that involves constant negotiation between the individual and the social environment”(Santaolalla-Rueda and Fernández-Muñoz 10). MomTok’s member’s public identities shift in tandem with both their online platforms and the narrative of their show. Digital subcultures, including MomTok, “[highlight] how young people use digital technologies to explore and affirm their identities, challenging and redefining cultural norms”(Santaolalla-Rueda and Fernández-Muñoz 10). The cast of The Secret Lives of Mormon Wives use their platforms to explore their identities as young mother’s within the LDS community, challenging many of the outdated values it promotes. However, the performativity associated with social media personas, connotes a pressure to be entertaining that is only exacerbated when their personas are translated into reality television.

Reality television addresses this pressure through creating prolonged drama, resulting in controversy. The Secret Lives of Mormon Wives provides its cast a forum to mediate their public images and “ensure the public [sees] them as who they now were and not as their former public identities” while following a narrative (Deller 381). Being centred around a distinct digital subculture, MomTok’s member’s have further opportunities to moderate their public personas, exemplifying the changing nature of reality television and its stars by relying on the origins of their notoriety: social media. MomTok’s member’s use their platforms simultaneously, interacting online outside of their show, effectively continuing the show’s narratives beyond the show itself. This genre of celebrity is entirely unique to the digital age, and results in a new type of fame for those who experience it. 

Fame in the Digital Age

Ruth Deller describes the fame cycle, categorizing famous personalities depending on the stage of the notoriety. However, with the rise of social media and digital subcultures, anyone can gain influence from anywhere, demanding theorizations of fame and celebrity be  reworked. MomTok’s members gained notoriety through sharing their opinions surrounding ordinary and relatable experiences: motherhood, friendship, and relationships. Nonetheless, Deller’s principles of celebrity remain applicable to the progression of MomTok’s members’ public personas.

Deller defines proto-celebrity as “personalities who might have a certain degree of recognition but are not ‘famous’ beyond a particular niche” who are generally in their fame’s early stages and often seek “to extend their brief moment of fame”(375). As influencers, the women of MomTok fell within this categorization of celebrity, representing a well-known but extremely targeted sector of the internet. However, their reality show’s production transformed their platforms, publicising their personalities and stories to a larger audience who may have been previously unfamiliar. 

With the internet’s ever-increasing presence in our lives, “subcultures [become] exploited by brands and companies to sell products”(Santaolalla-Rueda and Fernández-Muñoz 12). Allegedly, the original purpose of MomTok was to challenge the strict moral and lifestyle codes that the church of Latter-Day Saints imposes on its female members. Meanwhile, their portrayal in reality television, The Secret Lives of Mormon Wives, sees Momtok’s members consistently fighting and keeping secrets. While the commodification of subcultures is not inherently insidious, it can dilute “the subculture’s original values and meanings, reducing it to a mere commercial product”(Santaolalla-Rueda and Fernández-Muñoz 13). The drama of the reality show quickly eclipses any empowering message these women initially want to convey, effectively prioritizing the commercial gain of the television show over the original message of the subculture. 

The reality show’s introduction graduated several MomTok members from proto-celebrities to promotional celebrities. Promotional celebrities seek to “[boost] their personal brand and [gain] recognition” from a larger audience while “promoting the brand of the programme, organisation or team they work for”(Deller 375). Interestingly, another defining characteristic of promotional celebrities is their identities as working professionals (Deller 375). While many MomTok members own businesses, their primary profession is online content creation. They use the personas attached to their digital subculture to promote other endeavors, further representing this new-age method of garnering fame, one largely constructed on presenting personal identity, similar to the draw of reality television shows. Promotional celebrities are “(somewhat) well known and active, and their role in the show is to expand audiences” encouraging “fans of the reality show to follow their other work”(Deller 379). MomTok members’ Jen Affleck and Whitney Leavitt’s recent appearances on Dancing With The Stars–a celebrity dancing competition that relies heavily on popular reception and viewer voting–embodies this concept, expanding their presences in media while promoting their original claim to fame.

Conclusion

Digital subcultures (including MomTok) are methods of self-expression and community construction but are susceptible to losing meaning in favour of economical gain. The different facets of MomTok’s members’ platforms and personas exist simultaneously, forming dynamic relationships between their representations on online platforms, and those on reality television. The Secret Lives of Mormon Wives and its association with MomTok epitomizes how social media is changing the entertainment industry and celebrity, particularly the performer-audience relationship and interactions. Ultimately, MomTok’s co-optation by reality television exemplifies both a prioritization of commercial gain over ideology, and represents an irrevocable shift in how reality television and its stars function within today’s media landscape, and how we as audiences understand and perceive them. 

Works Cited

Deller, Ruth A. “Star image, celebrity reality television and the fame cycle.” Celebrity Studies, 2016, vol. 7, no. 3, 373-389, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19392397.2015.1133313. 

Santaolalla-Rueda, Pablo and Cristóbal Fernández-Muñoz. “Potaxies and Fifes: The Formation of New Subcultures on TikTok.” Societies, 2024, vol. 14, no. 12, https://doi.org/10.3390/soc14120265. 

The Secret Lives of Mormon Wives, by Jeff Jenkins, Jeff Jenkins Productions, 2024. Hulu, www.disneyplus.com. 

Written by Molly Kingsley

Image created by Molly Kingsley using material from ABC News

Critical Comparison

Morality and Materiality in Digital Technology and Cognition

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Introduction

Peter-Paul Verbeek’s examination of the ethics and materiality of digital media in his book, Materilizing Morality, coincides with Grant Bollmer’s seventh thesis as described in Materialist Media Theory: 

“Media transforms cognition and thought. This is either a direct transformation, extending the body beyond the limits of the skin into body-brain-world assemblages, or an indirect one, through technological metaphors that remake how a body is understood”(174).

Verbeek discusses the ethical quandaries surrounding digital media, examining how immaterial modern technologies shape human action, ultimately affecting the material world. Bollmer correspondingly emphasizes media’s significance as an active participant in its consumption, noting how media’s materiality influences its overall message. Furthermore, Bollmer and Verbeek’s works highlight the complex material dynamics of digital media and cognitive processes to understand it. Both are immaterial, yet require material mediators to function effectively and ultimately have material impacts on physical reality. The moral implications and physical responses to immaterial digital media urge consideration of the material consequences of media, regardless of its original form and representation.

Materiality, Representation & Ethics: 

Bollmer challenges the assumption that media and technology are neutral and immaterial forces arguing that media is not passive; rather, it serves as a material infrastructure that mediates and influences the user. He critiques past scholarship that views materiality as self-evident; he states sarcastically that “media are material, period”(16). This satire critiques the notion that materiality simply refers to physicality. For Bollmer, materiality is a more complex concept that encompasses embodiment and representation stating that, “the belief that media is immaterial and detached from physical devices—a popular belief in 1990s’ discussions of cyberspace that persists today—is simply false”(18). This statement clarifies Bollmer’s views, as he sees media as material agents interconnected with physical means. Bollmer’s main argument is that the media shapes the conditions in which the world can be understood. A screen is not just a physical tool but an interface that affects human behavior through how users consume information. To Bollmer, materiality is not separate from meaning but embedded in it, providing a medium for representation to take shape. 

These ideas parallel Verbeek’s theories, similarly rejecting the idea that technology is morally neutral and that ethics exist separate from materiality. Verbeek argues that technology “coshape human action, [giving] material answers to ethical questions of how to act”(361). This perspective views media and technology as material as they mediate human action, ethics, and perception. This is evident with his example about medical imaging devices, as these tools shape how doctors interpret the human body. This example demonstrates how morality is not only about human intention but is shaped by technological design. Verbeek introduces the idea of “scripts,” which indicate how “technologies prescribe human actions”(361). Scripts are the “inscriptions” left by designers, who anticipate how users will interact with a product. To Verbeek, scripts are not merely physical, as technology goes beyond their “function” and influences human action (362). Scripts work as a framework to understanding how technology works to connect humans and materiality. This concept ties into Verbeek’s argument that ethics are embedded within materiality and that design itself is a moral act. Verbeek connects ethics with materiality by showing that technology does not merely carry morality but embodies it. 

Bollmer and Verbeek’s work grounds the argument that media should be viewed as material and reinforces the idea that technology is not neutral. Both theorists show that materiality is intertwined with morality and representation. Bill Brown’s writing Materiality strengthens this argument by demonstrating that materiality is simply about the physicality of an object, but the way objects influence how we experience life, media, and reality. Brown argues that debate on material/immaterial is often misconcluding, as objects that are often viewed as “immaterial,” like scripts or digital communities, still shape how we interact with the world. He points out that material is not solely limited to what is tangible or visible. This correlates with Bollmer’s argument that the materiality of any medium, whether physical (hardware) or digital  (e.g., the internet), shapes how people understand social, political, and cultural norms. Verbeek’s work extends this argument through his concept of “scripts”, demonstrating how technology shapes human action and moral decisions. He reminds the audience that the design of a device carries ethical consequences, as they impact how users perceive the world around them. Together, these viewpoints cause us to reconsider the importance of understanding media’s materiality. If media is seen as immaterial or neutral, we overlook its influence on reality. Treating media as immaterial ignores the political, ethical, and represented work embedded within technology. Bollmer and Verbeek’s theories, with the support of Brown, demonstrate how the media is not a neutral agent of information but a material being that mediates the world around us. 

 

The (Im)Materiality of Digital Media and Cognition

The materiality of digital technology is comparable to that of cognition. Materialist approaches to human cognition view the essence of thought as “[existing] in organizational structure rather than physical matter” and assume that human thoughts can be adequately translated into computational systems, provided they are designed to mimic human brains (Bollmer 127). This conceptualization of thought investigates the very nature of humanity and poses, if our thoughts are equally applicable to digital technologies, what exactly makes us human? 

Viewing our thoughts as finished, tangible materials to be moved and translated results in existentialist ideologies surrounding humanity and technology in the modern age. Instead, we should consider our bodies as materials, not our cognition. Bollmer describes the body–and by extension, the brain–as mediums that “[negotiate] external world and internal sensation” that are both made and modified by the outside world, aligning with Tim Ingold’s concept of transducers: the means through which a message is communicated and understood (Bollmer 118; Ingold 102). By effect, our thoughts are products of, and effectively embody, the experiences of our bodies. Embodiment, within the context of media, is “the cognitive possibility of a body and envisioning technology not as itself but as a mediational extension of the body”(Bollmer 131). Similarly, an embodying relationship with media sees users understanding technologies not as themselves, but as tools to further perceive environments, also using them as extensions of the human body (Verbeek 365). Essentially, embodiment is using media to extend one’s body, effectively incorporating these medias into a material role regardless of their original physicality.

Bollmer defines cognition as an immaterial process that “interprets information within contexts that connect it with meaning”, paralleling Verbeek’s definition of hermeneutic relationship with media (132). Hermeneutic media provides a representation of reality which requires interpretation, establishing a relationship between humans and reality by “[amplifying] specific aspects of reality while reducing other aspects” much like the aforementioned definition of representation (Verbeek 363). The experiences of our physical body dictate our sensory relationship with reality, transforming how we perceive it. Our brains facilitate cognition influenced by physical circumstance and experience, mediating our ultimate conclusions. Likewise, hermeneutic media mediates the world around us, influencing its users’ perceptions and subsequently the cognitive processes they undergo to form understandings.

This relationship between the material brain and immaterial cognition translates to that between digital media and what it communicates. Similar to our bodies, technological artifacts “[facilitate] people’s involvement with reality, and in doing so, [coshape] how humans can be present in their world”(Verbeek 363). Virtual media presents information akin to that presented by our senses, influencing perceptions of reality and therefore physical actions. Both phones and bodies are material, each presenting immaterial media to be processed in our cognition. This immaterial media’s impact grows as it integrates further within our societies, ultimately urging us to reconsider the boundaries of what is deemed material. While our cognition is biased through our own lived experiences, digital media is imbued with the biases of their creators. Consequently, “technologies have “intentions,” they are not neutral instruments but play an active role in the relationship between humans and their world”(Verbeek 365). The structures presenting digital media are saturated with their creators’ biases, influencing their purpose and overall effect, affecting how users interpret them, the conclusions users come to, and their actions in response.

The material definition of cognition and digital media is complex and nuanced. While our phones and brains are decidedly physical, our thoughts and virtual worlds are not, yet digital technologies influence how we act in the material world and how we cognitively process media. Overall, regardless of their immateriality, digital technologies have material effects and should be handled accordingly.

Conclusion

As media students, understanding different lenses on materiality helps us recognize that media does more than just carry information; they reshape how we interact with the world around us. Bollmer and Verbeek show that media are intertwined with materiality, influencing how people think and decide. Media works alongside cognitive processes by mediating our senses and structuring how meaning is formed. This hermeneutic and embodiment view on cognition demonstrates how digital technologies go beyond physicality and influence our experience with reality. For Media students, it’s crucial that we understand that media has material effects: they shape power structures, ethics, and thought processes. Understanding this view on materiality trains us to identify the hidden biases and ethical decisions embedded in technology designs. This framework allows us to expand our ideas of materiality and understand that media matters because of what they “do” and how they “act” within society. 

Works Cited

Bollmer, Grant. “Conclusion: Ten Theses on the Materiality of Media.” Materialist Media Theory: An Introduction. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. 173–176. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 15 Nov. 2025. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781501337086.0009. 

Brown, Bill. “Materiality.” Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 49-63.

Ingold, Tim. Making. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

Verbeek, Peter-Paul. “Materializing Morality: Design Ethics and Technological Mediation,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, 2006, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 361-380. 10.1177/0162243905285847. 

Written by Molly Kingsley and Aminata Chipembere

Image by Molly Kingsley

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Hey! I Saw Them Live*

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Introduction

Alison Landsberg’s discussion of prosthetic memory and Yoni Van Den Eede’s concept of mediational extensions form a comprehensive analysis of how we interact with media in the modern day, and how this media ultimately impacts us and our sense of identities. This dynamic relationship, and the complexities it introduces into our lives, is applicable in our modern entertainment scene, particularly through studying how concerts and live performances have been transformed with the introduction of smartphones and personal digital recording devices. Laura Glitsos delineates the role of documentation in live music, and how this aspect of concerts has mutated as technology develops. These sources work together to provide an explanation for how these concepts work with one another and how they can be applied to situations in our modern world.

Media Extensions and Prosthetic Memories

Landsberg’s writing centres on memory and its place in our lives. Memories “validate our experiences” as by simply having a memory, one logically has the experience that it represents (176). However, Landsberg contradicts this notion of memory through her article’s primary focus: prosthetic memory. Prosthetic memories “do not come from a person’s lived experience in any strict sense”, and are instead the product of reliance on third-party influence to create the illusion of experience and memory (Landsberg 175). These third-parties are often technologies or media used as extensions of a person’s selfhood. Van Den Eede’s writings support Landsberg’s definition of prosthetic memory, explicitly describing technology as “an extension of the human being, of human organs, body parts, senses, capabilities, and so on”(153). As an extension of humanity, technology immediately becomes a form of prosthesis and, by effect, an integral asset in creating prosthetic memories. These “technologies [that] structure and circumscribe experience” texturize and dramaticize the contents of prosthetic memories, and are, at their core, vessels for communication (Landsberg 176).

In his discussion of media as an extension of humans, Van Den Eede continuously cites Marshall McLuhan. McLuhan emphasizes the roles of “rhetoric, grammar, and logic”, arguing that media “are linguistic entities that “translate one thing, that is, a human function, into another, that is, an artifact”(Van Den Eede 159). This theory corroborates both the process of mediation described in Tim Ingold’s, Making, and Gregory Bateson’s definition of language as a structure dependent on its context. As dictated by McLuhan, media communicates rhetoric using grammar that is understood through logic, mirroring the semiotic processes Tim Ingold uses to describe the process of making. Like Ingold, McLuhan views media as a sort of transducer, representing ideas in material form, enabling communication in our societies, and effectively acting as “the glue that binds our human reality together”(Ingold 102, Van Den Eede 159). Memories are the base of our realities, making this communication indescribably important in our lives.

Building off this semiotic model, McLuhan further describes media as “translations of us, the users, from one form into another form: metaphors”(Van Den Eede 159). He implores us to reconsider what language is, evoking Bateson’s definition of language as a “digital system” wherein “signs have no correspondence of magnitude” and thus the differences between these signs can only hold meaning “determined by reference to a larger system of rules within which that difference functions”(Wolfe 235). Per Bateson, language only holds meaning because of its structure, just as McLuhan’s definition of media holds that the true impact or meaning of media can only be understood within the larger context in which it is situated. Similarly, without context, our memories–natural and prosthetic–would be unintelligible and meaningless.

Effectively, prosthetic memories cannot exist without considering technology and media as an extension of ourselves, just as language is arguably an extension of ourselves. Landsberg and Van Den Eede’s works form a reciprocal relationship in the theories they espouse: as an extension of humanity, media becomes a vessel for prosthetic memory, while the creation of prosthetic memories give these media extensions a purpose.

Our Memories and Time

An interesting instance of Landsberg and Van Den Eede’s theories in practice is the increasing prevalence of digital recording technology in concert and live music spaces. Recording has long been an integral aspect of live music performances, to the extent that “the live performance is produced through the processes of recording” defining it as a cultural artefact “entwined with the aspects of that production”(Glitsos 35). However, the advent of the smartphone revolutionizes this aspect of concerts as users “not only view moving images but also [create] them”(Glitsos 36). This provides the viewer total agency over the narration of their experience, and thus the memories they create.

Landsberg categorizes memories as “a domain of the present” whose primary purpose is to construct strategies in the now through which someone can live in the future (176). In practice, concert-goers record videos and photographs as a precursor to potential memory lapse, effectively visuallizing a future wherein they forget the experience of the concert. However, in that process, we corrupt the experience of the concert with the documentation of the videos. The memories of the experience take precedence over the experience itself.

Related to this phenomenon, Fredric Jameson declared that we see “the waning of our historicity, of our lived possibility of experiencing history in some active way”(Landsberg 177). Essentially, in the age of post-modernity–increasingly so as the digital age progresses–true experience is dead. Instead, prosthetic memory has so thoroughly complicated the relationship between memory and experience that media is used to record our experiences to an extent that effectively transforms potential ‘real’ memories into prosthetic ones. Instead of watching the artists live and living truly in the present, we concern ourselves with the future, opting to watch the show through the screen of whatever recording device we brought.

A Dependance on Documentation

A byproduct of this relationship between extensions and prosthetic memories is the “unsettled boundaries between real and simulated [memories]” and the subsequent disruption “of the human body” and “its subjective autonomy”(Landsberg 175). Van Den Eede notes these disruptions, expanding on how “the technological extension of a human function produces a heightening of intensity within that function, body part or sense”(158). By exacerbating the strength of a human function, these technologies highlight the fallacies of the organic human form, including our ability to retain memories. Technology expedites the act of recording–a process that has traditionally been performed by a person and their memory–making it a readily available form of memory prosthesis. This immediacy of personal technologies facilitates a reliance on them, one that would ultimately be both a cause and effect of a general decline to our organic memories. For example, “the camera phone augments the drive to collect and save live music experiences” with the recordings’ ultimate purpose is to act as a preservation of the experience that can be repeated (Glitsos 37). We have access to our phones, so we use them in place of our eyes, experiencing a concert through a screen instead of in real-time.

Essentially: if there is an opportunity to record memories elsewhere, why would we rely on our fallible minds?  

Prosthetic Emotions 

Despite the questionable ways in which they are ultimately experienced, live music and concerts remain popular, speaking to a “popular longing to experience history in a personal and even bodily way”(Landsberg 178). Evidently, people still have a desire to create these memories of experiences even if their authenticity is debateable. This desire to “create experiences and to implant memories” of “[experiences] of which we have never lived” is motivated by how these memories become experiences that “consumers both possess and feel possessed by”(Landsberg 176). Prosthetic memories have a comparable impact on our selfhoods and identities to ‘real’ memories. Regardless of how they were ultimately created and recorded, the experiences feel real, and impact us accordingly. Though Landsberg’s example of films differentiates more distinctly between the prosthetic and the truly experienced, her concept is applicable to live performances as well. Concert-goers watch through their phones, corrupting the true experience, but the ultimate emotional impact of the experience “might be as significant in constructing, or deconstructing, the spectator’s identity as any experience that s/he actually lived through”(Landsberg 180).

The proportional impact that prosthetic memories have on our selves when compared to traditional memories suggests an eventual era when “we might no longer be able to distinguish prosthetic or ‘unnatural’ memories from ‘real’ ones”(Landsberg 180). Evidently, Landsberg views us and our media extensions as two distinctly separate entities. By contrast, Van Den Eede specifies that technology and media compensate for our own deficiencies “by taking action, more specifically by deploying tools and prostheses”(154). This definition is complicit in establishing a reliance on media that facilitates a codependent relationship between humans and their mediational extensions, yet the intended purpose of these extensions is to achieve things that we cannot perform organically. Through this relationship, the era of differentiation between prosthetic and ‘real’ memories has arguably already come to an end.

The allure of media extensions and their impact on the creation of memories is explicitly displayed in their superfluous use in live performance settings. Through our smartphones–the extensions and facilitators of prosthetic memories in this context–concert-goers become “both hero and narrator of their own epic”(Glitsos 40). The aforementioned agency provided by smartphones offers their users a form through which they can insert themselves into the recorded moment. This particular concept is ironic considering someone must be present to an experience to properly record it. However, these recordings give the user a point through which they can insert themselves once more in the moment once it has passed, further reinforcing Landsberg’s emphasis of memory as a function of the present.

Conclusion

Landsberg and Van Den Eede indirectly highlight a reciprocal relationship between the media extensions we use, and the prosthetic memories their use creates. These sources reformulate concepts we have discussed in class, further exemplifying language as defined by Bateson, and offering another layer of complexity to the theories proposed by Ingold through their dual citation of McLuhan. The complicated relationship between humans and their media extensions represent a transition into a new media era, and the prosthetic memories created through this relationship are symbols of the potential obsolescence of ‘real’ memory. These relationships and their consequences can be observed through our habitual use of smartphones in concerts and how they reflect many of the concepts that both Landsberg and Van Den Eede describe.

Works Cited

Glitsos, Laura. “The Camera Phoen in the Concert Space: Live Music and Moving Images on the Screen.” Music, Sound, and the Moving Image, vol. 12, no. 1, 2018, pp. 33-52. https://doi.org/10.3828/msmi.2018.2. 

Ingold, Tim. Making. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

Landsberg, Alison. “Prosthetic Memory: Total Recall and Blade Runner.” Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment, edited by Mike Featherstone and Roger Burrows, SAGE Publications, 1995, pp. 175-189.

Van Den Eede, Yoni. “Extending “Extension”: A Reappraisal of the Technology-as-Extension idea through the Case of Self-Tracking Technologies.” Design Mediation & The Posthuman, Lexington Books, 2014, pp. 151-172.

Wolfe, Cary. “Language.” Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 233-248.

Image by Molly Kingsley

Written by Molly Kingsley

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Making MDIA 300: How Ingold’s Making Applies to Our Class

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In his book Making, Tim Ingold proposes a full re-evaluation of how we approach media, product, process and how we interact with them. Much of his theory clearly reflects Marshall McLuhan’s understanding of media, namely that the “media is the message”, not a product that is separate from its intended purpose (McLuhan 2).

Ingold’s propositions reflect an arguably more realistic way of examining the world. The world and what it contains (including us as audiences) are irrevocably intertwined, simultaneously affecting and being affected by one another. Not only is the world an ever-fluctuating, ineffable entity where nothing is ever concrete, every perception of the world is unique. Ingold proposes that the relationships between media and audience, including those that we form within MDIA300, can be divided through three main lenses: learning, making, and telling. 

Learning

Ingold first mentions restructuring our approach to media in the book’s introduction, prompting the reader to examine how they learn. He cites Gregory Bateson’s concept of deuterolearning, a method that aims to provide us with “facts about the world as to enable us to be taught by it”(Ingold 2). This concept lays the foundation for a more communicative viewpoint of learning, using the world as an active asset used to enrich our knowledge rather than an object whose information remains stagnant and separate from its contexts. 

Ingold relies heavily on the distinction between anthropology and ethnography to effectively convey how his definition of learning differs from its academic understanding. Similar to anthropology, Ingold claims we must “learn from” the subject of our interests instead of solely documenting our findings, which is otherwise known as ethnography (2-3). Despite these distinctions, anthropology and ethnography customarily work in tandem, providing different elements that together create a more beneficial learning experience. The documentarian process of ethnography provides the information needed to effectively conduct an anthropological study.

Ingold’s concepts of learning are directly applicable to MDIA300 overall. We are instructed to further our understanding of our readings by considering what the information they contain can tell us about how they are situated in the world. This class facilitates inter-exchange between media and audience by forcing us to reflect on these ‘finished’ media products and how they relate to one another and the world as we understand it. Moreover, we are encouraged to discuss our understanding of this media, expanding our perspectives and learning from one another. The collaborative nature of this class allows us to partake in what Ingold defines as an effective learning process. 

Our work on the class blog mirrors Ingold’s discussion of anthropology and ethnography. The assignments that are published to the blog act as an ethnographic documentation of our learning, while our discussion and comments fulfill the anthropological acts of learning with one another, instead of taking what we say at face value.

Making

Building off his discussion of learning, Ingold transitions to defining the titular concept of the book: making. Ingold constantly redefines making, weaving complex layers through his definition of the word. Initially, he defines making as “a process of growth”(Ingold 21). Expanding on this, Ingold invokes hylomorphism, explaining the concept while comparing a maker’s intentions. A maker working with a hylomorphic worldview–looking to inflect their image onto material–has more egocentric intentions than one who is observing making as a process of growth, focusing on the process rather than the ‘product’ (Ingold 21). 

To further reinforce his definitions, Ingold relies on artistic examples to effectively analyze the process and products of making. Ingold’s example of the Ancheluen handaxe prompts the reader to reexamine how they understand the ‘final’ products they encounter. He warns us against “conflating the final form of an artefact, as it is recovered from an archaeological site, with the ‘final form’ as it might have been envisaged by its erstwhile maker”(Ingold 39). In class, we study media in a way that highlights its different interpretations. Therefore, no media can have a ‘final form’ as we are constantly reexamining it and what it means. Similarly, Ingold uses a pottery wheel to more accurately describe how we should view our relationship with making media. He views making not as “an imposition of form on matter but a contraposition of equal and opposed forces immanent respectively”(101). In essence, we must work in tandem with media, respecting its place in the making process, and acknowledging different affordances.

The assignments we make for class adhere to these definitions. For example, the Critical Terms chapters we covered at the beginning of the term continue to be relevant as we move onto new subjects, rendering the assignments we created in response to them dynamic documentations of our learning. The analyses are a comprehensive foundation for the more complex applications this material has been used for in the many posts that are now on the blog. Our making is a byproduct of our learning, and because our learning is a dynamic and conversational process, the analogies, comparisons, and connections that we make are dynamic and conversational as well.

Telling

Ingold further develops his theories of dynamically approaching media through his discussion of telling. He separates the term ‘telling’ into its two definitions: being “able to recount the stories of the world” and being “able to recognise subtle cues in one’s environment and to respond to them with judgement and precision”(Ingold 110). He emphasizes that the act of telling is not only “a vector of projection” meant to impute an image into reality but an active member of the relationship between image, maker, and material world. In effect, telling is a “process of thinking” versus a “projection of thought”(Ingold 128). In this way it is the act of co-operating with one’s work, invoking Ingold’s philosophies of making and learning in the process.

These definitions of telling integrate themselves with Ingold’s definitions of making and learning and are implemented in our course’s workload, including our study of Sherry Turkle’s Evocative Objects. Without Ingold’s methods of learning, we could not fully understand the scope of the material we observe. We would not be capable of forming a relationship between ourselves and Evocative Objects, failing to fully contextualize each objects’ message both in its creation and in our understanding. In essence, we would not be able to tell what meaning lies in the media. Without Ingold’s multi-faceted approach to making media, we would not reach the full capacity of our ability to tell others our message, including applying Turkle’s theories to objects in our own lives. We worked with the text to fully understand it. In that understanding, we told each other our findings, exhibiting the interconnectivity between Ingold’s concepts of learning, making, and telling. 

Conclusion

Ingold’s theories concerning learning, making, and telling are applicable to how we have observed media throughout our study in MDIA300 thus far. We use the media we study as an active participant in our learning, making connections that continue to develop even after the publication of our assignments, and using the skills and understanding we gain through these methods to effectively tell our stories and points to our peers.

Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010.

Ingold, Tim. Making, Routledge, 2013.

McLuhan, Marshall. “The Medium is the Message,” Understanding of Media: The Extensinos of Man, New York, NY, 1964. 

Turkle, Sherry. Evocative Objects: things we think with, MIT Press, 2007.

Image by Molly Kingsley

Written by Molly Kingsley

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The Test of Time: Media and Memory Through Eco and Ingold

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Davide Ferrario’s film, Umberto Eco: A Library of the World memorializes many of Eco’s theories, particularly the relationship between media and memory, which works through its connection to history. Eco himself is staunchly committed to physical media, blatantly exhibited through his sprawling library which is featured in the film’s opening credits. These themes of media and memory pervade throughout the film and are evident through the glimpses Eco gives the viewer of his own personal philosophy and conduct. His emphasis on physical media and the unique qualities he attributes to it align with the philosophies that Tim Ingold describes in his book Making. Ingold’s propositions recommending a re-evaluation of how we approach the concepts of learning and making are complementary to Eco’s valuation of physical media. Both theorists approach media in the same way, just from two directions: Eco reflects on a ‘finished’ product, while Ingold proposes restructuring our understanding of media from its inception. 

Physical Media and Memory

Eco espouses the benefits of physical media’s permanence. There are books that are hundreds of years old which can still be read and observed, yet “today’s computers are unable to read what we recorded two decades ago”(Ferrario 21:00-21:20). This longevity sustains physical media’s connection to history–and subsequently memory–in a way that is impossible for digital media.

The immediacy of the digital, while convenient, is not conducive to creating longlasting media that is tied to memory. By lacking memory, digital media offers little learning opportunity in the way that Ingold defines it: the process of accruing knowledge by being taught by the world rather than simply intaking information about it (2). Though the easy discussion forums presented by online media appear to help the flow and interexchange of knowledge, they primarily orchestrate an excessive influx of information that is designed to be consumed quickly and easily, not to facilitate effective and educational discussion. These discussion forums then become performative opportunities for interaction that are dictated by algorithms designed to cater information based on its audience.

Physical media, like Eco’s books, is a published thing. The source information cannot be changed on the same whim as that online, yet it’s this stagnation that allows for further reflection and change of perception over time. This temporal aspect of physical media is what truly makes it a conduct of memory. By remaining the same, the information is the finished object within the dynamic thing of the book (Ingold 85). The book can be altered physically, and through correspondence, because its information is not adapting to the audience.

Physical Media vs. Digital Media

During an interview featured in the film, Umberto Eco is discussing his own digital media habits and how he recently downloaded a copy of Proust’s Recherche onto his iPad. He then expresses frustration that he “could not underline any passage, [he] could not make dog-ears, [he] didn’t smear the pages with [his] dirty thumb”(Ferrario12:18-12:37). Evidently, Eco wants to alter his books as he reads them. He wants to impart his own thoughts onto the already published media, which is a far more dynamic process than simply absorbing the information that the book’s words offer. In this desire, Eco aligns himself with both Ingold’s philosophies of learning, and his views on the treatment of art. Ingold deems the role of students–or in this case readers–is not to mindlessly consume the information offered by an established source, but to “collaborate in the shared pursuit of understanding”(13). Similarly, he encourages us to view art as things that give “direct correspondence [to] the creative processes that give rise to them” rather than simply as “works to be analyzed”(Ingold 7).

Books: An Object or a Thing?

A pillar of Making is Ingold’s discernment between objects and things. An object “is complete in itself” and we cannot “join with it in the process of its formation”(85). Conversely, things are “with us” and allow us to correspond with their materials (Ingold 85). This distinction mirrors that of Eco’s explanation of bibliophiles versus bibliomaniacs. A bibliomaniac reserves his books to himself “because he would fear thieves from all over the world would flock to steal it”, while a bibliophile would “share his wonder with everybody and they’d be proud they knew it was his”(Ferrario 16:52-17:00). 

By this definition, bibliomaniacs view books as prized assets of information, to be hoarded and kept away, effectively rendering them stagnant objects of observation and considering them complete, despite this state of futility. If no one is around to read the books, there is no further knowledge to be gained than that which is printed on their pages. Meanwhile, bibliophiles share the information in their collections, inviting discussion and utilizing books as vessels to obtain further knowledge. Eco’s definition of bibliophile is one that exists harmoniously within Ingold’s definition of learning.

Eco deems books as “irreplaceable”(Ferrario 12:45). Books, and any other physical media, are inherently unique. Walter Benjamin defines this uniqueness using the concept of aura, which is congruent to the memory instilled into a physical medium and is not present in its replications as it is “embedded in the fabric of tradition”(6). The physical process of making a book, and its distribution to its eventual owners, is entirely distinct to another printing of that same book. The initial individuality and aura of physical media again cooperates with Ingold’s definition of making. 

Per Ingold, the process of making does not end with its finished ‘product’, as other factors will continue to act upon it over time (22). In this way, making is “a process of correspondence: not the imposition of preconceived form on raw material substance, but the drawing out or bringing forth of potentials immanent in a world of becoming”(Ingold 31). These ideas readily translate to Eco’s beloved physical media. No two books are affected by the world around them in the same way, but a pdf of a text will remain generally unchanged no matter whose device it is on. Furthermore, Ingold defines making as a “process of growth” wherein artists and other forces–in this case, the books’ audiences–work in tandem with the materials they are manipulating/experiencing (21). This approach to making and artistry is synonymous to the way Eco creates a reciprocal relationship between his books and his thoughts.

Mass Media 

The concept of mass media provides an interesting nuance to these theories. It, like any other form of media, must be made. Ingold further defines making as a process of correspondence, where transducers allow interaction between the kinaesthesia and material flow until they become indistinguishable, parallelling John Durham Peters’ definition of media as “symbolic connectors” between messages, means, and agents (Ingold 102, Peters 266). By these definitions the means/transducer creates a bridge from the kinaesthesia/message to the material flow/agents, ultimately creating the media that is observed or discussed. However, a defining characteristic of mass media is the distance and distinction between the senders and receivers, rather than each party taking on an interchangeable role (Peters, 267).

This differentiation of author and audience intrinsically opposes Ingold’s aforementioned definition of learning. The purpose behind mass media is to communicate to the masses (Peters, 268). With this purpose, the process of making is centred around the dissemination of the final product and any discussion that this media spurs is generally between two receivers, not the sender. In this way, mass media features something consumable, not collaborative. 

Mass media as consumption is far more relevant when considering digital mass media versus physical mass media. With the sheer amount of content created and its potential for profit, digital media often becomes a transaction. It attempts to balance its message with enough ease of digestibility, often diluting or changing its message in the name of profit. Through this, digital media becomes a stagnant object because of its dynamic form. The message gradually changes for its audience so it is always meant to be consumed at face value, not discussed at length. In our modern digital media landscape, everything is meant to attract our attention instantly. This quickens the pace at which we consume digital media and the extent to which it is mechanically reproduced effectively removes any aura or memory that was once attached to it, reinforcing Benjamin’s relative disdain for mechanical reproduction (4). Finally, the ease of mechanical reproduction works against the integration of memory into digital media. Umberto Eco says it best: “when everything is recorded, we don’t feel the need to remember it”(Ferrario 22:49-22:53).

Conclusion

Umberto Eco loved his books and, considering Ingold’s theories on making and learning, the opposing affordances between physical and digital media, and Benjamin’s resolution in the plight that is mechanical reproduction, it’s easy to see why. 

Citations

Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Reproduction”, Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt, Schocken Books, 1969.

Ingold, Tim. Making. Routledge, 2013.

Peters, John Durham. “Mass Media”,  Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 266-279.

Umberto Eco: A Library of the World. Directed by Davide Ferrario. Performance by Umberto Eco, Zoe Tavarelli, and Giuseppe Cederna. 2022.

Photo by Molly Kingsley

Written by Molly Kingsley

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Analyzing My Perspective

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Introduction

Everyday, when I wake up, the world is a little blurred. Beside my head, on my windowsill, are the frames of plastic that fix that. 

I have had glasses since I was nine years old and since then they have been the windows through which I have quite literally watched my entire life. Without my glasses, I would not have the same memories that I do today, namely because lots of the details would be missing. Nothing is more subjective than a person’s perspective, and in that, their perception of the world. By watching the world through my glasses, my perception has been permanently altered by them. It would otherwise be lacking image and depth as I literally would not be able to see the bigger picture. Unless I decide to wear contacts, or get surgery to fix my eyesight, my entire world will always be mediated through these pieces of plastic and because of that, they are the root from which all of my memories, perceptions, and opinions grow.

By clarifying the world around men, mechanically fixing the way that my eyes focus the light in the world they watch, my glasses have mediated my experience and memory since I got them.

Affordances

The main affordance of my glasses is pretty clear: they help me see. Without them, and assuming there was no alternative to fixing my vision, my everyday life would be significantly impaired. I would not be able to see properly beyond a foot from my nose, which would make things including–but not limited to–reading signs and whiteboards, driving, and recognizing faces pretty difficult. Though they are crucial to my easy access to the world around me, the function of my glasses reaches beyond what they do to the light as it enters my eye.

Each pair of glasses that I have means something different to me. I have a purple and green glow-in-the-dark pair from when I was a kid, pairs that were too small, pairs that gave me a headache and, most importantly, pairs that I love and feel myself in. In addition to helping me see, my glasses are a mode of self-expression. Just because they are functionally necessary to my everyday life, does not mean I can not use them to a further effect and have fun with them. I also deliberately avoid wearing contacts. Frankly, I hate them. Though I do not mind sticking a piece of plastic in my eye, they are far too finicky for my taste, and when I do wear them, they always really dry out my eyes. Additionally, because I have had my glasses for so long, I have gotten used to them, and feel more myself when I wear them than when I go without.

I rarely change my everyday glasses. All of these frames are distinctly associated to different periods of my life, and by that effect, are irrevocably linked to the memories I have within those periods. By mediating my world so thoroughly, my glasses can be studied within the context of many of the critical terms we discussed in class, most notably, Body and Senses.

Body

Growing up with glasses, they have become incorporated into my own sense of identity. This is interesting to consider in the context of McLuhan’s theory of media as “extensions of man” and it should be understood as “continuous with the human nervous system”(Wegenstein 29). My glasses are an extension of my eyes by necessity, altering the way my eyes receive light, and focusing the world around me. By affecting my vision so concretely, there is very little distinction between the “inside and outside” of the media and myself, greatly conflating my perspective with the perspective of the glasses. Theoretically, the glasses still mediate when they are not on my face, they still function off my face, there just is not anyone to perceive the perspective they create. 

McLuhan defines a dual function of media, one that is both an extension and amputation of the body (Wegenstein 29). They are an extension of my eyes and mediate my world through their lenses, yet they are also physically separate from my face, focusing the light in the world whether or not they are on my face. 

Senses

Obviously, my glasses pretty heavily impact my own sense of sight, however, what is more significant is how reliant I am on my glasses.

The concept of Plato’s cave is interesting to consider in relation to my reliance on my glasses. The basis for Plato’s cave is the division between “knowing and mere existence” in that the prisoners–bound to simply watching the world–only exist, while philosophers–who experience the full dimensions of the world and understand its mediation of reality–are in the know (Jones 89). This distinction between watching and knowing is applicable to my perception of the world with and without my glasses. Without them, my ability to see and move through the physical world is inherently altered, but I am still able to see. However, the lack of depth and detail that impedes my ability to see the bigger picture could be compared to the simple existence of the prisoners in the cave who simply watch without knowing.

By correcting my vision, my glasses afford me an effective sense of sight, allowing me the context and depth of details, and affording me the knowledge associated. The construct of the cave completely dictates the prisoners’ experiences of reality, forming “a system of representation and deception with which the blindered sense of sight colludes”(Jones 89). Similarly, my glasses completely mediate my perception of the world. Though the reliance between me and my glasses is far less absolute than that of the prisoners and the cave featured in Plato’s cave analogy, and most of the things I do in my everyday life are possible without sight, there is a similar reliance on media to fully experience the world and the full extent of knowledge it offers.

Exploring these parallels further, the concept of true vision–“turning away from spectacle… closing one’s eyes to the visible world—or its mediated image—to question what one sees”–is also interesting to consider. Associated with this notion, and Plato’s analogy, are two tropes of blindness:“the ignorant blindness of the prisoners and the volitional blindness of the philosopher”(Jones 89). These ideas of different blindness parallel the function of glasses. I can consciously take off my glasses, turning away from the spectacle and engaging in a form of volitional blindness, thus un-mediating the world and returning it to the state that my own eyes and brain have decided is right for me (as inconvenient as that may be). But it also renders me ignorant to the details of my physical surroundings.

Conclusion

It is intriguing to study my glasses as they have become such a routine and unremarkable part of my life. By looking at them through the lens of the theories discussed in these chapters, I found a new appreciation for my frames. By looking at the functional and everyday objects in our lives in these ways, we can appreciate how the more menial objects mediate us and how we perceive the world. 

(Note: Obviously there are ways to navigate the world without being able to see, I wrote this post in the context of the knowledge I have as someone whose vision is correctable with prescription lenses.)

Sources

Jones, Caroline. “Senses”, Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 88-100. 

Wegenstein, Bernadette. “Body”, Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 19-34. 

Blog post written by Molly Kingsley

Image by Molly Kingsley

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The Ambiguity of Language

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Introduction

When one thinks about one of the many human languages, it may be easy to look at words as fixed in their meaning, regardless of what tongue is being spoken. Words can be translated and retain their meaning, so why not assume that they can each be neatly defined once and for all? Critical Terms for Media Studies and its chapter concerning language challenges this notion as it spotlights various theorists that emphasize the importance of context that supports language. They assert that meaning does not exist inside words themselves, rather it emerges through the contexts in which words are used. Whether it is a colloquialism shifting over time, systems of communication shaping interpretation, or theories that emphasize the instability of meaning – there exists a strong argument that language only makes sense when placed in relation to a wider social, and perhaps psychological frame. Theorists like Saussure, Luhmann, Derida, and Bateson each highlight this principle with different beliefs, reasoning, and specifications. In this blog post, we will delve into their ideas and examine the significance of context in the realm of language.

Saussure

While Cary Wolfe–our chapter’s author–cites many theorists, he describes Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics as “arguably the most important [linguistic text] of the twentieth century”(233). Saussure’s describes language as comprised of “two fundamental dimensions: the abstract system of rules that constitutes any language system at a given moment in time (langue), and the heterogeneous utterances and speech acts in which individual speakers engage (parole)”(Wolfe, 234). Additionally, Saussure explains how language systems are developed over time, existing solely through the instances of their use while only remaining meaningful because of the context of rules in which they are situated (Wolfe 234). 

This philosophy of language arguably mirrors John Locke’s two-headed approach to communication studies (Communication Presentation, Slide 4). The social aspect of intentionally exchanging ideas that partially defines communication is largely made possible through instances of parole, while the ideas that this communication embodies would not be properly transmittable without the structural understanding of langue. Essentially, Saussure’s two dimensions of language coexist with Locke’s dimensions of communication.

The relationship between language structures and their use is reciprocal. Without parole there would be no use for langue, and without langue there would be no basis for parole. This relationship makes differentiating between the individual and social aspects of language difficult. To do so, Saussure emphasizes the importance of langue, as it is “the norm of all other manifestations of speech” and consequently attributes order to systems that are otherwise relatively ambiguous (Wolfe 234). He objects to an object-centred approach to language–which views words as “derived from their referents”–arguing that if words were to stand for pre-existing concepts, they would directly translate across different languages (Wolfe 234). Instead he proposes a “relational understanding” of language–viewing it as established and dictated by social conventions–and theorizing that language is not complete in, or determined by, any one speaker (Wolfe 234). 

A prime example of this social approach to understanding language is the everchanging meanings of words in slang dialects and colloquialisms. The efficacy of slang lies in the extent to which it is adopted in parole. Our society emphasizes langue, setting semi-stagnant definitions and uses for its words and rules. As such, if only some people are using words intending to mean something outside of their understandings in langue, others will not understand their potential alternate meanings in parole. In this way, the developments of colloquialisms and slang perfectly encapsulate both the functions of langue in everyday life, and Saussure’s idea that language is not complete in any one speaker, but instead a collective effort to reinterpret the meanings of words. 

Ultimately, Saussure highlights the ambiguity of language through his breakdown of its dimensions. By defining language systems through their occurrence in parole, he delineates these systems by the contexts in which they are used. A sentence could mean one thing according to langue, yet have its meaning completely altered in a different instance of parole.

Derrida

Derrida, too, subscribes to the idea of signifiers or “concepts” being referred only as a system of signs, in which it “refers to one another,” hence, being a “chain” of sorts (1982, 11). This, in relation to context, provides evidence for how the necessary context of the chain of concepts is required for the referential nature of language. Unlike Saussure, Derrida insists on the inseparable and “unmediated” existence of “consciousness” and “conceptuality,” largely rejecting the purely psychic perspective of language. For Derrida, the context arguably cannot be taken out of the signified itself. In such discussions regarding the mediation of “psychological” and “communicational” aspects of language, examining Luhmann’s theories will support our exploration of language in its necessary context. 

Infographic created by Christine Choi (made on Canva)

Luhmann’s Theory on Systems of Communication

When examining Cary Wolfe’s chapter on Language, an overarching argument emerges: 

meaning is inherently tied to context; hence, language does not exist in isolation but is shaped by surrounding systems. Language is regulated by the structures in which it operates. Wolfe analyzes the work of Nikolas Luhmann, a German sociologist who developed a theory on systems of communication. Luhmann distinguishes between two systems: the psychic system and the social system. The psychic system is a self regulating system that reproduces itself through perceptions and consciousness. The social system reproduces itself through communication with language serving as its primary medium. He argues that both systems are closed off, meaning that the mind cannot directly transfer thoughts into society, and society cannot directly communicate meaning into one’s consciousness. Within his framework, language does not transmit ideas within a system but works as a medium that makes communication possible through context. 

These ideas are further developed in Bruce Clarke’s chapter on Communication, which 

was touched upon during the presentations. Clarke expands on the connection between Luhmann’s system theory and language. Luhmann claims that  “Communication… takes place only when a difference of utterance and information is first understood. This distinguishes it from a mere perception of others’ behavior.”(Luhmann 2002, 157). In other words, communication does not depend on the transmission of perceptions but on shared ideas of meaning and the context surrounding them. Meaning is seen as a form in which“the actual and the possible can appear simultaneously.”( Luhmann 1995, 63). He argues that language operates through codes, differences, and context that allow humans to have a sense of understanding. For language to function as a medium of communication, humans must depend on the codes that provide the system with meaning.

Luhmann’s work helps reiterate that context provides meaning to language. His work 

states that the psychic system and social system are closed off, which means humans are unable to transfer ideas. Due to this, meaning cannot simply exist in words or be communicated directly. It has to be interpreted within context, which Luhmann refers to as codes and distinctions that are utilized by each system. Luhmann’s argument raises important questions surrounding the media. If these systems are closed off, then the media cannot assure the transmission of an artist’s internal thoughts or intentions. This challenges the idea that the media allows the audience to perceive an artist’s intentionality. It suggests that the media functions more as a medium, similarly to language, having the ability to shape communication, but never fully bridging the gap between internal and external systems. This leaves us with the question: when we create media, are we truly able to express our perceptions, or will these internal thoughts always be reshaped by the context in which they are received? 

Bateson (/Kac)

This brings us back to a broader point: what theorists like Bateson remind us is that language only exists through context, and contemporary artworks like Eduardo Kac’s Genesis make that insight visible in surprising ways. Gregory Bateson defines context as essential by referring to communication via language as “the difference that makes a difference” (Bateson 235). Essentially, he explains that a word or sign only really carries meaning when placed within a specific frame of context that allows humans to interpret it. For example, a phrase that is spoken ironically will communicate something entirely different than the same phrase spoken earnestly. Bateson reminds us that language does not exist in a vacuum – it is always dependent on the situation that surrounds it. Eduardo Kac’s artwork Genesis is a great representation of this idea. Kac began with a biblical verse, translated it into Morse code, then converted it again into genetic code and implanted it into living bacteria. Visitors online could then manipulate the bacteria, which in result, altered the biblical text itself. What began as a scripture became a coded message, then a biological sequence, then an interactive artwork. Its meaning shifted at every stage because of the context in which it appeared. Genesis embodies the central argument that language, whether in everyday conversation or in art form, can only be truly understood within the context it exists in.

Citations

Bateson, Gregory. “Language”, Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp 235. 

Clarke, Bruce. “Communciation”, Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp 132-144. 

Wolfe, Cary. “Language”,  Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 233-248.

Written by: Molly Kingsley, Lea Lavalley, Christine Choi, Aminata Chipembere

Featured Graphic created by Molly Kingsley