Tag Archives: security

A Model-based Intrusion Detection System for Smart Meters

Farid Tabrizi and Karthik Pattabiraman, To appear in the Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on High-Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE), 2014.
[PDF | Talk ]
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A Model for Security Analysis of Smart Meters

Farid M. Tabrizi and Karthik Pattabiraman, To appear in the Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Tolerance and reSilience (WRAITS), 2012.
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Yarra: An Extension to C for Data Integrity and Partial Safety

Cole Schlesinger, Karthik Pattabiraman, Nikhil Swamy, David Walker and Benjamin Zorn, Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2011. [ PDF | Talk ]
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Discovering Application-level Insider Attacks Using Symbolic Execution

Karthik Pattabiraman, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and Ravishankar Iyer, Proceedings of the IFIP International Conference on Information Security (SEC), 2009.[ PDF File | Talk ]
You can find the technical report version of the paper here.
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Automated Derivation of Application-aware Error and Attack Detectors

Karthik Pattabiraman, PhD thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), May 2009.

Part 1 (Pages 1 – 160)
Part 2 (Pages 161 – 318)

Abstract : As computer systems become more and more complex, it becomes harder to ensure that they are dependable i.e. reliable and secure. Existing dependability techniques do not take into account the characteristics of the application and hence detect errors that may not manifest in the application. This results in wasteful detections and high overheads. In contrast to these techniques, this dissertation proposes a novel paradigm called “Application-Aware Dependability”, which leverages application properties to provide low-overhead, targeted detection of errors and attacks that impact the application. The dissertation focuses on derivation, validation and implementation of application-aware error and attack detectors.

The key insight in this dissertation is that certain data in the program is more important than other data from a reliability or security point of view (we call this the critical data). Protecting only the critical data provides significant performance improvements while achieving high detection coverage. The technique derives error and attack detectors to detect corruptions of critical data at runtime using a combination of static and dynamic approaches. The derived detectors are validated using both experimental approaches and formal verification. The experimental approaches validate the detectors using random fault-injection and known security attacks. The formal approach considers the effect of all possible errors and attacks according to a given fault or threat model and finds the corner cases that escape detection. The detectors have also been implemented in reconfigurable hardware in the context of the Reliability and Security Engine (RSE).

Hardware Implementation of Information Flow Signatures Derived via Program Analysis

Paul Dabrowski, William Healey, Karthik Pattabiraman, Shelley Chen, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, and
Ravishankar K. Iyer, Workshop on Dependable and Secure Nanocomputing (WDSN), 2008.
[ PDF File | Talk Slides ]

Abstract: We present an architectural solution that provides trustworthy execution of C code that computes critical data, in spite of potential hardware and software vulnerabilities. The technique uses both static compiler-based analysis to generate a signature for an application, or operating system, and dynamic hardware/software signature checking. A prototype implementation of the hardware on a soft processor within an FPGA incurs no performance overhead and about 4% chip area overhead, while the software portion of the technique adds between 1% and 69% performance overhead in our test applications, depending on the selection of critical data.

Formal Reasoning of Various Categories of Widely Exploited Security Vulnerabilities using Pointer Taintedness Semantics

Shuo Chen, Karthik Pattabiraman, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and Ravishankar Iyer, Proceedings of the IFIP International Conference on Information Security (SEC), 2004.
[ PDF File | Talk ]

Abstract: This paper is motivated by a low level analysis of various categories of severe security vulnerabilities, which indicates that a common characteristic of many classes of vulnerabilities is pointer taintedness. A pointer is said to be tainted if a user input can directly or indirectly be used as a pointer value. In order to reason about pointer taintedness, a memory model is needed. The main contribution of this paper is the formal definition of a memory model using equational logic, which is used to reason about pointer taintedness. The reasoning is applied to several library functions to extract security preconditions, which must be satisfied to eliminate the possibility of pointer taintedness. The results show that pointer taintedness analysis can expose different classes of security vulnerabilities, such as format string, heap corruption and buffer overflow vulnerabilities, leading us to believe that pointer taintedness provides a unifying perspective for reasoning about security vulnerabilities.

Toward Application-aware Security and Reliability

Ravishankar Iyer, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, Karthik Pattabiraman, William Healey, Wen-Mei Hwu, Peter Klemperer and Reza Farivar, IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, January 2007 (Invited). [ PDF File ]

No abstract is available.

Here is a news article in the Chicago Tribune that describes this work.