Monthly Archives: October 2025

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When Words Breathe

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Under the Blanket

When I was a child, my favorite part of the day began when everyone else had fallen asleep. I would hide under my blanket with a flashlight in one hand and a book in the other, afraid my mother would open the door and find me awake past midnight. The world around me was quiet, but the one inside the pages was bright and alive. Reading was my secret act of resistance against routine—it was the only moment I felt entirely on my own. Unlike television, which offered ready-made images, books asked me to imagine. They demanded that I build the world myself, word by word, sound by sound.

The Cucumber Scene

The book that defined this ritual was Norwegian Wood by Haruki Murakami. I first read it in middle school, a time when every day felt packed and mechanical. The story was slow, melancholic, and strangely still, but within its silence I found comfort. I remember one scene vividly: someone eating a cucumber beside a sick patient.

“I could hear the crisp, wet sound as the person bit into it, the contrast between the freshness of that sound and the stillness of the sickroom struck me. I remember thinking that sound alone was enough to sustain life”

(Norwegian Wood 189). That line stunned me. For the first time, I felt that words could be as physical as sound, as tactile as touch. I could almost hear the bite, smell the coolness, and see the water glisten on the cucumber’s skin.

Hearing Through the Page

I never understood why that passage about the cucumber felt so alive until many years later, when I came across Marshall McLuhan’s description of the acoustic space. McLuhan writes that before writing was invented, “we lived in acoustic space, where the Eskimo now lives: boundless, directionless, horizonless, the dark of the mind, the world of emotion” (Understanding Media 41). Reading that, I realized what I had experienced as a child was a glimpse of that space. While reading Norwegian Wood, I was not only seeing words—I was hearing, smelling, and feeling them. The page was no longer flat or silent; it surrounded me, like sound. In the acoustic space, McLuhan explains, perception is simultaneous. The senses work together, not in isolation. Looking back, I understand that books once offered me that same immersive totality, a way of knowing that modern media rarely afford. Today, I scroll or listen, but seldom feel. When media speak only to the eyes or the ears, as McLuhan warns, perception becomes linear, reduced, and disembodied.

The Depth of Words

What draws me to language is the way it conceals its complexity beneath simplicity. Visual media reveals everything at once, leaving little room for the mind to wander; words ask us to linger. They depend on absence, on what they withhold. That tension—between precision and uncertainty—is what gives language its life. It moves in suggestion rather than display, always half-lit, always inviting us to imagine the rest.. When I open Norwegian Wood I feel as if I’ve stepped into a quiet bar where the air is thick with cigarette smoke and jazz. The words don’t describe the place; they become it. This is what Sherry Turkle means when she says that evocative objects are “things we think with” (Evocative Objects 5). My book is one such object. It doesn’t just tell me stories—it creates a space in which memory, imagination, and feeling mingle, like the indistinct murmur of voices in a room.

 Language as Mediation

Turkle argues that evocative objects “mediate between thought and feeling,” serving as psychological anchors that help us navigate transitions in life (6). It reminded me that media are not only about meaning, but about mood and texture—the spaces they open within us. To read was to enter that space, to feel the air of another world pressing gently against my own.

Reading as a Bodily Act

 As Bernadette  Wegenstein notes, media are “continuous with the human nervous system” (Critical Terms for Media Studies 29). Reading, in that sense, is a bodily act: the rhythm of the sentence, the quiet of the page, the slight movement of the eye all contribute to an embodied way of knowing.

Walter Benjamin might call this the aura of reading—the singular, unrepeatable encounter between reader and text (“The Work of Art” 220). My copy of Norwegian Wood, its softened spine and underlined phrases, still carries that aura. It is both material and emotional, both object and atmosphere. In contrast, the media that fill my days now—scrolling feeds, short videos, fleeting audio—rarely offer that sustained, resonant attention. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun observes, digital culture produces “enduring ephemeral” experiences that promise connection yet dissipate almost instantly (Updating to Remain the Same 59). Reading resists that speed. It slows perception, allowing thought to settle, memory to form, and the senses to reconnect.

Memory That Stays

Even now, when I open it, I can still hear that crisp, wet sound of the cucumber echoing faintly in the quiet. Since then, no image on a screen has stayed with me in the same way. Digital scenes fade as quickly as they appear, but that moment—the sound of the cucumber in the still air—remains exact, as if preserved in the rhythm of the page itself.

Works Cited

Benjamin, W. (2002). The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility. In H. Eiland & M. W. Jennings (Eds.), Selected writings, Volume 3: 1935–1938 (pp. 101–133). Harvard University Press.

Chun, W. H. K. (2016). Updating to remain the same: Habitual new media. MIT Press.

McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding media: The extensions of man. McGraw-Hill.

Murakami, H. (2000). Norwegian wood (J. Rubin, Trans.). Vintage International.

Turkle, S. (2007). What makes an object evocative? In S. Turkle (Ed.), Evocative objects: Things we think with (pp. 307–327). MIT Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhg8p.39

Wegenstein, B. (2010). Body. In W. J. T. Mitchell & M. B. N. Hansen (Eds.), Critical terms for media studies (pp. 19–34). University of Chicago Press.

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The Locket I Never Filled (Until Now): A Heart as Medium for Memory and Intimacy

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❦︎

Introduction


Growing up as an only child, I received a lot of speculation — usually in the form of little jokes — about my parents absolutely spoiling me. The logic being that, since my parents have only one child, all birthdays, Christmases, and even day-to-day gestures of giving were magnified, as they only had to make one child happy via gifts. Although my parents were generous with the gifts they gave me on the two major celebrations per year, they were, above all, thoughtful with their giving; every gift had to have deep emotional meaning and was usually small, in some form of metal. One of the first gifts that I can remember receiving from my parents was a small heart locket. It is silver, engraved with swirls and now slightly tarnished from years of wear. I have worn it since childhood, and initially, my parents gave it to me so I could place photos inside that represented the subjects that mattered to me deeply at the age of five. I always wanted to put my parents inside of it, but alas, I didn’t have a colour printer for the first nine years of my life, and after that point, I had simply just forgotten about it. For years, the locket sat empty around my neck, enduring the hot waters of many showers and the stinging cold of the winters it brought to the metal. Only recently have I filled it with photos of my partner and me. To me, my locket mediates both potential and presence-in-absence. Even when empty, it carried cultural meaning and expectation; when filled, it enacted intimacy, rendering it a rich example of media theory around hypomnesia, anamnesis, and image as paradox.

Description

Describing my evocative object is fairly simple: if one pictures a heart locket in their mind, there is a high chance that the conjured image will resemble my locket. I wear a thick, 15-inch chain, which has replaced the thin, 20-inch chains that came before and broke due to excessive wear. On the chain sits the pendant itself, which is round and heart-shaped, meant to carry images close to the heart, quite literally. Despite the locket being empty for fourteen years, the absence of the photos did not erase the meaning of the locket for me, as the shell of the pendant reminded me of what is missing, and what is yet to come. As I have recently filled my locket with two images of my partner and me, the locket now mediates and embodies intimacy, love, and continuity.

Mediation

When empty, my heart locket mediated potential and expectation, as it was quite literally an object “waiting” for memory, in the form of special images. In terms of cultural and historical significance, heart lockets have been “associated with love, affection, and emotional connection” (Locket Sisters). Lockets bloomed in popularity as early as the Victorian era, in which lovers would store photos, letters, and even locks of hair from their loved ones — even when a pendant is empty, it stages that possibility of being filled. When filled with sentimental items, most commonly images, the heart locket mediates presence-in-absence: in my case, the photos of my partner stand in for him when apart. The heart locket creates intimacy through selection and scarcity, as the two images that are selected to reside inside the pendant are special and limited in quantity. Furthermore, the ritual of opening and closing the pendant’s hinge is a tactile mediation of memory itself. Empty or filled, the locket is never neutral. Rather, the shift demonstrates that this object and its mediation are dynamic and flexible, never fixed.

Theory

Upon thinking of which object of mine I would like to write about as an evocative object, my heart locket came to mind because of its ties to the theories and discussions we have engaged with in class. In Critical Terms for Media Studies chapter 05 “Memory”, Bernard Stiegler writes about hypomnesis, as the technical and externalized forms of memory, such as photography serving as memory externalizations, and anamnesis, “the remembering of things from a supposed previous existence” (Oxford). The former correlates to the locket when it held no photos, as it was already a technical support of memory. Its very design, with the hinge, cavity, and chain, indicates its intended use, of holding images of ones near and dear to your heart. When I wore my necklace as a child, I was very much aware of what it should contain — this cultural script is a form of hypomnesis as the object outsources memory before it is even filled. Its design and cultural script reminded me of the relationships I may one day want to preserve and honour with my pendant. When I finally placed photos of my partner inside, the locket became a coupling of hypomnesis and anamnesis: the images function as external memory supports, but only matter because they call forth embodied recollections each time I open it. In Stiegler’s terms, the locket demonstrates how technical memory and lived memory are inseparable in mediation (Memory 77).
In chapter 03 “Image”, W. J. T. Mitchell argues that images are always paradoxical — they are both present and absent, here and not-here (Image 35-36). My heart locket demonstrates this paradox in both ways: when it was empty, the absence of images was still meaningful as it reminded me of what should be there, consequently staging the absence as potential presence. Once filled, the photos embody the paradox even more clearly. My partner’s face is materially here in the locket, but he is also not here — only represented. Each time I open it, I experience both recognition and loss, the double-moment Mitchell describes where an image appears as both a physical object and a ghostly apparition (Image 39).

Conclusion

As a mediator, a heart locket is certainly dynamic, as they do not necessarily have to be “used” in the intended manner to mediate meaning. Connecting my evocative object to Stiegler’s theories of memory’s exteriorization and Mitchell’s detailing of image’s paradoxical nature reminded me that mediation is not solely about digital technologies — even small analog objects shape memory, intimacy, and identity. This is something that was also revealed to me in Sherry Turkle’s Evocative Objects: Things We Think With. However, connecting these theories to an object that I consider mundane and wear every day, is even more revealing, as it suggests that mediation includes both what is present and what is possible.

Works Cited

“Locket Sisters.” Locket Sisters, 2020, thelocketsisters.com/locket-stories/the-meaning-behind-heart-lockets-a-symbol-of-love-connection-and-cherished-memories/. Accessed 4 Oct. 2025.

Stiegler, Bernard. “Memory.” Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W. J. T. Mitchell and Mark B. N. Hansen, University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 64–87.

Mitchell, W. J. T. “Image.” Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W. J. T. Mitchell and Mark B. N. Hansen, University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 35–38. Accessed 4 Oct. 2025.

Turkle, Sherry, ed. Evocative Objects: Things We Think With. MIT Press, 2007. Accessed 4 Oct. 2025

“Anamnesis.” Oxford Languages, Google, 2025, https://www.google.com/search?q=anamnesis+definition. Accessed 4 Oct. 2025.

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Memory, Media, and the Care Bear

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Care Bear and the Technology of Memory

When I was in the first grade, my mom bought me a Care Bear lunchbox and a piggy bank. They were bright pastel colors, smiling, and full of cute faces—little things that appeared to radiate heat. I remember to this day how happy I felt to carry the lunchbox to school, as if I had a chunk of home with me. They were not just sweet little trimmings; they were emotional extensions of my childhood and my relationship with my mother. Even now, when I glance at Care Bear products—especially those that have the aesthetic of the original American designs—I immediately feel nostalgic. Without even a second thought, I desire to buy them again, as if to spend money on a small piece of my past.

I guess the Care Bear as my evocative object throughout this blog post, according to Sherry Turkle’s Evocative Objects: Things We Think With (2007). I also draw on Bernard Stiegler’s theory of technological memory from his chapter “Memory” in Critical Terms for Media Studies (2010), in order to explore how this object mediates my relationship with time, feeling, and identity. In these paradigms, I would argue that the Care Bear is a vehicle of remembrance—a physical surface external to and reactivating memory, bringing the past to life in the present.

The Object and Its Emotional Charge

The Care Bears were originally developed in the early 1980s as greeting card characters, then expanded to toys, TV shows, and a global franchise. The original concepts were soft, rounded, and feeling-face—each bear representing an emotion like love, cheer, or friendship. My mother’s gift of the Care Bear piggy bank and lunchbox was of this early design generation. Their looks and texture were humble but comfortable: pale colors, small imperfections, and faces that seemed human and kind.

These items became a part of my early daily experience, mediating home and school, family and independence. They were comfort items, but also media items—transmitting a message about care and emotional display. Care Bears today, especially in malls or on the Internet, is not a pure experience. The photograph of the bear instantly causes a nostalgic flashback: I think of my mother’s kindness, my school lunch hours, the sense of security and being loved. It is this which Turkle (2007) describes as the evocative power of objects: they do not just represent memory—they make it come alive.

Objects as Emotional Media

Turkle (2007) suggests that objects can be “companions to our emotional lives,” mediating between thought and feeling (p. 5). My Care Bear objects do precisely this—they instantiate abstract feelings in physical form. They remind me of a period when love was enacted through physical care: a mother buying something small but thoughtful. The object is a medium—a vessel that carries affect and memory through time.

But this mediation is not stable. As the Care Bear brand evolved, so did the look. Modern versions—typically in fast fashion stores or in partnership with lifestyle brands—sport rounder eyes, more angular lines, and a slightly plastic digital glow. Their faces are discernible, almost too sleek. When I look at these newer versions, something is off. They don’t evoke the same sentiment, even though they share the same name and color scheme. This gap reveals how media transformation can reformulate emotional experience: the same image, remade in a different material or cultural context, mediates emotion differently.

This way, the Care Bear is a mirror of media’s impact on memory. Its nostalgic potential depends not only on personal experience but on material form, aesthetic texture, and historical continuity. The object’s “aura,” to borrow from Benjamin (1968), lies in its uniqueness—its attachment to a specific time, relationship, and feeling. When that form changes, so too does the emotional resonance.

Memory as Technological Mediation

While Turkle is interested in the psychological and emotional life of objects, Stiegler (2010) elaborates the concept of memory in its technical and exteriorized forms. Memory for Stiegler is never bound within the human mind; it is being exteriorized in material and technical forms all the time—a process he calls tertiary retention. Photographs, cinema, recordings, and even everyday objects are technologies of memory that allow individuals and societies to capture and transmit experience across time.

In doing so, my Care Bear is not merely nostalgic—it is a technical object of memory. It is a device that retains and reactivates what Stiegler (2010) calls “traces of temporal experience” (p. 66). Each time I see it or hold it, the bear instigates a process of remembering through mediation—a technologic reactivation of emotion. The material presence of the bear becomes a screen upon which emotion and memory are inscribed, stored, and replayed.

This text relocates nostalgia as psychological longing plus; it is a media process, one that depends upon externalized memory support. My Care Bear serves as a bridge between internal memory (what I recall) and external memory (what is stored in the object). The bear’s body—its color, its softness, the faint fading—serves as what Stiegler might call a mnemo-technical artifact, a prosthesis that extends human remembering into the sphere of things.

Recollection in the Age of Reproduction

Stiegler’s view also explains why my personal identification with the updated, digitally reengineered Care Bears is not exactly the same. These updated bears, optimized visually and mass-produced, are leaner on “temporal density” than the original. Mass reproduction itself and also the speed and seamlessness of digital culture dilute the aura Benjamin (1968) connected with singular pieces. The haptic connection that previously defined the bear—its bulk, its feel, its small imperfections—has been lost to an image that constantly circulates on the web.

To me, the old Care Bear is an analog medium of memory, the new one a digital simulacrum. The difference is not aesthetic but ontological: the older object holds time, the new one collapses time into design. That tension is representative of the greater cultural shift outlined by Stiegler—where memory is increasingly externalized by technology but in turn, paradoxically, increasingly fleeting.

Why It Matters

For my peers in this class—most of whom likewise grew up surrounded by media stars and digital photographs—the Care Bear is a familiar sight: the manner in which things are made into affective media that bridge the private and the public. The Care Bear franchise is never actually concerned with care, concern, and proximity, but only with those sentiments being intermediated by form, material, and appearance.

By Stiegler’s (2010) theory, I see that my Care Bear is a prosthesis of love: it allows my emotional memory to be externalized outside my head, in a material space. It shows how memory technologies are not limited to machines or screens but can take the shape of little, colorful toys that carry the traces of emotion from childhood.

Conclusion

The Care Bear, as my evocative object, is both emotional and technological memory. It is a case in point of Turkle’s (2007) suggestion that objects “carry meaning and emotion” (p. 6), but also of Stiegler’s argument that memory reduces to a process of externalization through techniques. The physicality of the bear is a mnemonic technology, brokering personal history and cultural continuity.

In this small pastel bear, I sense how memory isn’t something we simply have—it’s something we do with our objects, our technologies, and our media environments. The Care Bear itself might have had numerous countenances throughout the years, yet for me, its significance will forever be the same: a living medium whereby the past is resuscitated anew in the present, showing me that even the most ordinary childhood object can hold the complex machinery of memory itself.

References

Benjamin, W. (1968). The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction (H. Zohn, Trans.). In H. Arendt (Ed.), Illuminations (pp. 217–251). Schocken Books. (Original work published 1936)

Stiegler, B. (2010). Memory (M. B. N. Hansen, Intro.). In W. J. T. Mitchell & M. B. N. Hansen (Eds.), Critical terms for media studies (pp. 64–87). University of Chicago Press.

Turkle, S. (2007). Evocative objects: Things we think with. MIT Press.

Image Credits

The Care Bears Movie (1985) – promotional still. Image from IMDb.
Retrieved October 5, 2025, from https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0284713/

Official Care Bears Website. (n.d.). Care Bears character images.
Retrieved October 5, 2025, from https://www.carebears.com/

80s Fave. (n.d.). The Care Bears Movie gets U.K. collector’s edition release.
Retrieved from https://www.animationmagazine.net/2023/12/80s-fave-the-care-bears-movie-gets-u-k-collectors-edition-release/

Written by Mio Hashimoto

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Evoking control, memory and self while planning my studies

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Quick warning: this essay mentioned eating disorders. If this is something you’re not comfortable with, feel free to skip this post. Stay safe.

Ironically, my evocative object was heavily used to create this. And many other things, because I organize my whole academic life with my notion. Not to be that person, but I love it.

If a course isn’t on Canvas before the term begins, I can get frustrated: it means I can’t prepare for school in advance by adding all the deadlines into my notion, writing out grade components into each classes’ page, can’t break each assignment down and plan my workload before the first class. For MDIA 300, I wrote out not only the major and minor assignments and what each entails, but also what page of syllabus it is on, and I am very grateful to my past self for that. Notion helps me know what to do on any given day, if I’m lucky to find a good spot in either of the libraries.

That is not, however, to say that my notion has any power over me: I am free to ignore my own study plans if I feel so inclined. Notion simply evokes the feeling of control over my student life, gives me structure and simplifies the search for much needed information. 

Affordances 

In my personal case, the digital aspect of it has affordances that physical notebooks lack: mainly, accessibility, larger creative control and digital media opportunities (try putting in a hyper-link or a gif into a physical notebook). I also prefer typing out my notes and editing later over writing them down with a pen with no space for mistake. Being able to easily share my notes and copy and paste in-class assignments is also a huge boost for digital over physical copies. 

On the other hand, I’m aware that a large company holds control over my app for studying, and has the power to take it away. Which it did, actually: Notion is no longer available in Russia, so I was unable to see my notes or add my new subjects into my calendar when I was home. Which, obviously, is not that big of a problem.

Digital brain

Evocative objects are “things we think with”, according to Turkle, and that is exactly the function my Notion fills in. In her chapter about a long-lost datebook, Michelle Hlubinka describes her evocative object as “an external information organ—a piece of my brain made out of paper instead of cells”. Similarly, in her chapter on her own laptop, Annalee Newitz writes:

“It’s practically a brain prosthesis. Sometimes I find myself unable to complete a thought without cracking it open and accessing a file of old notes, or hopping online and Googling a fact or two”

And both of these are truly remarkable, mostly because I believe most of us relate to this sentiment. In the digital age with technology being so wide-spread, most of us delegate our knowledge and memories to a laptop, a phone, or a memory stick. So many of my friends (and me, too), when having trouble remembering the last week or our summer, pull out a phone and go through the gallery to see which moments come in which order.

This is what I am likely to do if you ask me about the syllabus: I’ll go to Notion, because I filtered out what I need to know from Canvas and put it in there. Wrote it down and, well, immediately forgot.

Mediation of memory

Bernard Stiegler wrote a rather gloomy and dystopian chapter on Memory, where he talks about the consequences of delegating knowledge and memories to an external source. While I agree with him about the dangers of information manipulation and the act of remembering for yourself as the “true form of knowing”, I am glad (or blind) to say my situation is not as dramatic when it comes to consequences and explications. The information isn’t being manipulated in my case: professors just change syllabus and move deadlines sometimes. 

But let’s go back to Hlubinka’s chapter on databooks. She describes losing her databook as a small-scale tragedy:

“I felt as though I had lost my life. My memory of all I did and planned to do from January to May 2003 vanished, along with the physical form that contained it.”

If I were to be locked out of my Notion and all the professors were to delete their syllabi at the same time, I would be very confused but also unable to retrieve all the important dates, all my notes, and all my study plans at once. Our understanding of what we wrote down will forever be tied to the object holding these memories: it’s a memory stick that, if lost, won’t be remade. While it is liberating to get some weights off our hard-working brains, we should keep one thing in mind: once we delegate the memory, it will be outside of our control.

Mediation of control 

I see myself a lot in how Hlubinka describes her friend Ginger and the way she manages her own databook. Ginger colourcodes her plans (check!), leaves herself extra time so as to not be late (check!) and says her need for control is rooted in her now recovered eating disorder (check!). 

For us, documenting, planning, colourcoding is a way to structure the way we see our lives, understand our weeks clearer and, therefore, control it. In the modern days more than ever, our lives are filled with chaos, days are filled with events, weeks filled with plans. How do you stay on top of things the way we’re expected to? We simplify it: this day is for writing comments on blog posts and reading two more chapters, tomorrow we will worry about source traceback, and the day after that Ingold’s Making will be due in the library, so I’ll need to re-check it. The world seems more approachable when it’s simplified and, therefore, controlled. And then we give ourselves a pet on the back for doing what we should: Ginger uses stickers, I get to see my calendar turn green from all the completed assignments. 

Lastly, both Ginger and I simply like our objects of structure. She says: “my audience is myself . . . a lot of these devices are to make me happy“. Me too, Ginger! I spend hours on end picking pretty covers for each subject, finding pretty gifs, assigning symbols. And while I don’t mind people looking over and noticing how cool my Notion is, it is for me only.

Mediation of self

Hlubinka describes her lost databook as a reflection of what kind of person she was: what caught her interest, what events she considered or attended, what conversations she had and what topics she found worthy of writing down. She says “I like to think that anyone could open up my lost paper datebook and see what kind of person I am”. 

While databooks and notion study calendars are purely personal, we as humans cannot stand to not mark things as our own, not shape them to be ours. There is so much personality in how we structure our books and notions just because it will so heavily depend on how we see this world. In a way, it is a two-way communication: we input our view of the world into the databook which reflects this view back at us, shaping it further. Ginger tracks her life by weeks, I break down a term into months, because this is how we live our lives. 

Control, calendars, due-dates

To sum it all up: the way we plan our lives is a powerful mediator of control, memory and self. It allows us to simplify our life and therefore understand it better, and while storing all the most important memories on one Google Drive is not recommended, digital planner allows us to take some weight off our brains when it comes to planning ahead and remembering dates.

Hlubinka, Michelle. “THE DATEBOOK.” In Evocative Objects: Things We Think With, edited by Sherry Turkle, 76–85. The MIT Press, 2007. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhg8p.13.

Newitz, Annalee. “MY LAPTOP.” In Evocative Objects: Things We Think With, edited by Sherry Turkle, 86–91. The MIT Press, 2007. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhg8p.14.

Stiegler, Bernard. “MEMORY.” In Critical terms for media studies, edited by W. J. T. Mitchell & M. B. N. Hansen, 64-87. University of Chicago, 2005.

Header and post by Bara Bogantseva

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Video Games as Evocative Objects

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Video games can evoke feelings of liberating escapism while shaping perceptions of real life. In her anthology, Evocative Objects: Things We Think With, Sherry Turkle demonstrates the ability of objects to facilitate transitional periods of life. Several chapters demonstrate how beloved objects can mediate coming-of-age experiences. When reflecting on my own belongings, I realized a Nintendo game titled, Harvest Moon: More Friends of Mineral Town, mediated my perceptions of adulthood. I perceive this cherished game as my own “evocative object”; as a young child, its virtual world evoked my excitement towards growing up. 

For my seventh birthday, my oldest sister gifted me a mysterious Macy’s box. Inside the box was my first video game console–a pink, hand-me-down GameBoy Advance. Inside the console was a game cartridge titled, Harvest Moon: More Friends of Mineral Town. As I flipped the console’s on-switch for the first time, a saturated, pixelated screen and a cheerful soundtrack greeted me. The game was a farming simulator, where the main character collects profits by selling dairy, poultry, crops, and foraged items across the quaint atmosphere of Mineral Town. While creating a profitable farm, the player can build relationships with NPC townspeople, get married, and start a family. The game never ends; however, one can presume that winning consists of bringing economic prosperity to the town and becoming a likeable figure among its citizens. At the young age of seven, I did not realize the game’s themes of coming-of-age, hard work, and social acceptance. Now, as a twenty-year-old reflecting on its narrative, I recognize its depiction of adulthood through the player’s journey of moving to a new town, meeting new people, and pursuing a risky career.

I played this game for hours on end, under the covers past bedtime, and during the morning before school; Harvest Moon: More Friends of Mineral Town not only catalyzed my love for video games, but mediated my expectations of adulthood. Through numerous hours of improving my farm and achieving a successful lifestyle for the in-game protagonist, the game subconsciously instilled the message that hard work results in joy and companionship. Additionally, the game introduced concepts of trade and capitalism to its child audience by framing a profitable lifestyle as the player’s ultimate goal. Within the game, the protagonist can earn the townspeople’s admiration by gifting them items and talking to them on a daily basis. This mechanic led my immature mind to think that in reality, showering individuals with their favoured items and repeatedly speaking to them would guarantee their loyalty. The addictive, interactive medium illustrated friendships as collectible prizes, rather than everchanging, complex relationships. Unknowingly, this piece of electronic media produced an unrealistic view of adult life as fun, easy, and exciting.

I believe this evocative object would belong in Turkle’s chapter, “Objects of Transition and Passage”. Turkle notes transitional objects “[mediate]” a child’s “growing recognition” of their independence (Winnicott qtd. in 314). Harvest Moon: More Friends of Mineral Town taught me such independence by forcing me to make responsible choices in a low-stakes environment. If I forgot to feed my livestock or water my crops, my profits could hinder. Then, I would have less money to purchase gifts for my in-game neighbours and I would lose their friendship; as a result, the game taught me accountability in a simulated setting. However, as I grew older, I lost interest in the game. I no longer needed it to simplify the concept of responsibility to me; instead, I practiced “real-life” responsibility through managing schoolwork, chores, and extracurricular pursuits. As I ventured into my teenage years, the game sat in my dusty drawer, supporting Turkle’s view that these objects of childhood development are “destined to be abandoned” (314). 

Harvest Moon: More Friends of Mineral Town as a Cyborg Object

Furthermore, this game acts as a “cyborg” object–an object which combines the “natural and the artificial” (Turkle 325).  An example of a “cyborg” object is Annalee Newitz’s beloved laptop in the chapter “My Laptop”. Newitz’s relationship with her laptop is deeply “intimate”; the inanimate device melds with her natural self causing her difficulty in distinguishing “where it leaves off and she begins” (Turkle 325). She exists as “one with her virtual persona” and views herself as the ‘“command line…of glowing green letters”’ on her screen (Turkle 325). Similarly to Newitz, I developed an emotional attachment to my virtual persona–the tiny, pixelated farmer on the screen of my GameBoy Advance. The more time I invested in my persona, the more she represented my hard work. As a result, my connection to her grew, similarly to the laptop’s “co-extensive” relationship with Newitz’s “self” (Turkle 325). Altogether, this avatar was not just an escape to a simplistic world where adulthood did not seem so frightening, but a representation of myself and the adult I aspired to be.


Harvest Moon: More Friends of Mineral Town’s Mediation of the Body

As Wegenstein states in Critical Terms for Media Studies, “‘the logic of the computer”’ has afforded humans the ability to exist as numerous “selves” (28). She notes that modern individuals experience satisfaction by constructing several virtual “personas” that contrast their real-life, “mundane” selves (Wegenstein 28). I experienced this phenomenon while developing my in-game persona; my avatar’s economic and social autonomy contrasted my supervised upbringing. Moreover, the amount of exciting tasks the game afforded my character differed greatly from my simple, repetitive childhood. Rather than being a supervised seven-year-old child, the game transformed myself into a farm-owner, creating a self-sufficient life.

Conclusion

Altogether, my virtual experiences afforded by Harvest Moon: More Friends of Mineral Town mediated my expectations of adult life. Through using this object as a form of escapism, I gained a deep emotional connection to this game that remains with me today. While glamourizing adulthood, this game played a role in my childhood development by introducing concepts of hard work and responsibility.   

Works Cited

Wegenstein, Bernadette. “Body.” Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T. Mitchell and Mark B.N. Hansen, U of Chicago P, 2010, pp. 19-34.

Turkle, Sherry. “WHAT MAKES AN OBJECT EVOCATIVE?” Evocative Objects: Things We Think With, edited by Sherry Turkle, The MIT Press, 2007, pp. 307–27. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhg8p.39 . Accessed 4 Oct. 2025.

Written by Emily Shin

Photos taken by Emily Shin

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Make It Make Scents: The Evocative Power of Perfume

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Illustration by James Taylor / Harvard Gazette

Have you ever been out in public and smelled a scent that brought you back to a certain time in your life? Or remembered a specific person?

When I put on perfume, that is the goal that I set out to have—to be associated with a fragrance so intimately that one can’t help but remember me in public if they encounter it. I remember an anecdote my friend once recounted to me of her sleeping at a library and being woken up by smelling my perfume somewhere. She looked up and I wasn’t there, but she knew at one point that I was. Thus, for me, my perfume mediates my expression of self in how it becomes part of my identity—so much so that if I leave the house without putting it on, I’ll go back to just ensure that I have so I can rid myself of the sense of something missing. On the other hand, for my friend, my perfume mediates her perception and memory of me.

Another friend once texted me that they put on an old hoodie that I borrowed in high school and the scent of my perfume had still been left behind on its collar. At that point, we hadn’t spoken to each other in over a year, and I had changed what perfume I wore daily by then. How much more had changed between us, between how they see me, between how I saw them? Their memory of me was confined to that one instance.

We forget that objects have a history. They shape us in particular ways. We forget why or how they came to be. – Sherry Turkle

Dawn Goldworm, the co-founder of an “olfactive branding company” explains that smell is the most developed sense in a child up until the age of around 10 when sight takes over; thus, “smell and emotion are stored as one memory” in your childhood. (Walsh, 2020). We can liken this back to Marcel Proust’s evocative object (which Turkle (2007) put as “perhaps the most famous evocative object in all literature”): the madeleine. When dipped in tea, the madeleine brings Proust back to his youth, opening him to “the vast structure of recollection.”

This phenomenon, aptly named the Proust effect, is when strong, vivid, and emotionally-charged autobiographical memories are involuntarily triggered by smell and taste (Green et al., 2023). Scientifically, this is because the part of the brain that handle smells and odours have a direct connection the regions of the brain related to emotion and memory.

One role of theory here is to defamiliarize them. Theory enables us, for example, to explore how everyday objects become part of our inner life: how we use them to extend the reach of our sympathies by bringing the world within. — Sherry Turkle

If we look at scent through the lens of Proust and relate it back to Charles Sander Peirce’s Model of the Sign, we begin to see how scent emerges within a system of signification. In my case, my perfume becomes a signifier that represents me, the signified, through memory and scent-association. The interpretant is then capable of interpreting this meaning only if they have both encountered me and my perfume before. Scent becomes a means of language and communication in a way that is profoundly human: we understand it only in relation to and in terms of other things—and memory is formed through a social system of constantly remembering.

If we go even further, then scent and perfumery become a powerful and evocative form of media, in the way that mediation is a form of negotiation between the mediator, our olfactory senses, and what is being mediated, our memory. Yet, this medium is often untapped. When we think perfume, we think of an aroma that is pleasant, fragrant, and palatable to be used for everyday—but this limits and confines the form completely.

The infamous Secretions Magnifiques from Etat Libre d’Orange seeks to subvert this by creating a nauseating, eerie odour reminiscent of melting plastic, sweat, blood, semen, rot, and perversion. Would anyone wear this perfume? The average person would say no for fear of smelling repulsive, yet reviews on Fragrantica, an online database for perfume enthusiasts like Letterboxd is for film and Goodreads is for books, describe it as “deliciously offensive”, an “excellent conversation starter”, and “a work of art.” This specific perfume becomes a medium for evoking a feeling that is vile and primal to the extent of disgust. It transforms the idea of perfume from being one for daily use into an object to be consumed as an art form that inspires memory in a guttural sense.

Hence, if scent and perfumery are a medium of communication, then it is important to emphasize that, along with every other medium, it is also political and tied to institutions of power. Dr. Ally Louks’ thesis on olfactory ethics presents this argument through the intersectional study of olfactory oppression by establishing the underlying logics of how smell creates and subverts power structures through film and literature (2024). A poignant example she uses is how in Bong Joon Ho’s Parasite, the rich associate the poor with the smell of sewage. Let’s place this idea in the context of our everyday life: how often do we associate femininity with flora, masculinity with musk, wealth with cleanliness, ethnicities with the smell of their food? These associations have relevance in understanding what we know of the world.

Indeed, my perfume can evoke the memory of me, but only if you know me. Recognizing that rose is feminine but Axe body spray is masculine and Aesop incense is upper-class but Bath & Body Works’ A Thousand Wishes is middle-class and so on is a learned behaviour. Our ability to associate a fragrance with a memory is limited by what we understand from our own experiences—how we can put this unknown scent in relation to what we already know. That last part, what we already know, is key. Certain scents become analogous to certain concepts and ideologies, which calls into question our preconceived notions and biases about gender, class, sex, and race.

So I ask: what can conversations about the evocative power of scent teach us about how we see—no, smell—and thus perceive, the world?

References

Green, J.D., Reid, C. A., Kneuer, M. A., & Hedgebeth, M. V. (2023). The Proust effect: Scents, food, and nostalgia [Abstract]. Curr Opin Psychol, 50(101562). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2023.101562.

Louks, A. (2024). Olfactory ethics: The politics of smell in modern and contemporary prose [Doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge]. Cambridge University. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.113239.

Secretions Magnifiques Etat Libre d’Orange. (n.d.). Fragrantica. Retrieved October 4, 2025, from https://www.fragrantica.com/perfume/Etat-Libre-d-Orange/Secretions-Magnifiques-4523.html.

Turkle, S. (2007). What makes an object evocative?. In S. Turkle (Ed.), Evocative objects: Things we think with (pp. 307-326). MIT Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhg8p.39.

Walsh, C. (2020, February 27). What the nose knows: Experts discuss the science of smell and how scent, emotion, and memory are intertwined – and exploited. The Harvard Gazette. Retrieved October 4, 2025, from https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/02/how-scent-emotion-and-memory-are-intertwined-and-exploited/.

Critical Concept Explication, Other

The Real in the Virtual and the Virtual in Reality:

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Since the 19th century, there have been numerous attempts at what we now know as “virtual reality”, including the concept of the stereoscope, to the more modern “Sensorama” invented by Cinematographer Morton Heilig in the latter half of the 20th century. However, the age of VR only came into existence later, in the 2010s, with the commercialisation of VR headsets from Oculus and Hive. The concept of “virtual reality” aims to replicate a multi-sensory experience of reality through the projection of a 3D environment, paired with surround sound and, often, controllers that allow players to control the movements of their characters by moving around themselves. 

Thus, arises the question, to what extent is VR real and to what extent is our reality nowadays considered virtual? In accordance with the critical concept of “senses”, we will aim to make this question clear through the lens of critical media theory. 

Throughout the world’s historical development, Ancient Greek thinkers regarded philosophical reasoning as the way to truly understand reality, most famously, Plato, with his Allegory of the Cave. Where he presented a prisoner shackled to the walls of a cave, where the prisoners perceive the projected shadows of objects as the objects themselves, for they can not turn around, and thus, they are unaware of the illusion being carried out.

In this sense, I propose a thought experiment to better explicate the implications of VR on our senses. Imagine a child, from the moment that it is born up to adulthood, has its head bound to a VR set and, as such, experiences reality through the mediation of the device. With its sense of hearing and sight greatly blinded to the truth of reality, as in the case of the prisoner in Plato’s cave. 

For this person, their perception of reality would be greatly shaped by their immediate experience via the headset, and thus, we must concede that the supposedly “virtual” would have to qualify as the “real” in this case, for this is the person’s only real experience of their world from a first-person perspective. Now, let us dive into a second experiment: what if we are in a simulation – as Descartes famously asked, how would we know on grounds of our senses that we are not in a dream? Then, would it not be logical to regard the world as we know it as something unreal and ultimately virtual? Through these thought experiments, it is thus reasonable to agree with Plato’s criticism of the dependency of the 5 senses to make sense of one’s reality, as we are easily deceived by them without the human faculty to reason. 

With technological advancements quickly growing, especially of VR headsets, the line between reality and virtuality is increasingly blurred day by day. Our sense of the world is greatly mediated and, in effect, somewhat virtual. According to Kittler’s technological determinism approach, which is also backed by Karl Marx’s argument. It is theorised that the media changes our senses. That is our personal interaction with the world, the ways our senses come into contact with the technology and political economies shape who we are.

In accordance with our main interest, VR can be seen to have greatly redefined and influenced our perception of the concept of reality and virtuality by blurring the line between them. Smartphones are also a more direct and immediate representation of this concept. In modern days, smartphone culture has literally rewired our brains biologically, as our eye pattern adapts to the constant scroll and scanning. The ways we perceive connections and communication have also changed. As we engage in social media culture, we are part of a virtual sphere of human interaction that is undeniably real, only that it is not physical. We are thus qualitatively changing into a species that now has technology – virtuality intertwined within its existence, and must also concede that our reality is also somewhat virtual.

In extending the many theories of senses into a media scape like virtual reality, the line between McLuhan and Kittler’s arguments is complicated. On one hand, VR creates a barrier within  Marshall McLuhan’s idea that the human body extends its senses through media. The notion that our senses can be extended through VR is a bit hard to support when considering that only our vision and often touch is supported into this medium. Additionally it’s hard to accept the surreality of it all, as mentioned earlier, it blurs our perception of reality, quite literally. 

Through our other theorist, Friedrich Kittler, we can consider VR a process of shaping our senses. For example, our vision, rather than VR extending it, the virtuality is changing what we understand as our senses, most effectively, our vision. As media shapes what we understand as sight, VR has dramatically warped this. Understanding through our experiences of combining the senses with sight to interact with our world, the communication of these functions has been fundamentally reshaped.

In conclusion, it is undeniable that the historical development of media has now led us to a present and future where virtuality finally dances with reality in a waltz; consider their performance our experience of life. Acknowledging the limitations of our senses and the endless possibilities that VR has to offer, the moment reality fails to catch up with its partner is when we, the audience, lose track of the dance. The waltz can be interpreted as a balance that must be maintained, as the audience may very well fail to properly appraise the solo performance that virtuality has to offer and thus, never be able to make sense of their lives. 

Nam Pham & Maxine Gray

Critical Concept Explication

Time & Space — A Critical Summary of the Concept in Media Realms

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The roles of time and space are present in almost all media, and the chapter asks the question: are space and time master, or meta media? Are they real and tangible? Or are they abstractions of reality? Through this blog article, we will be taking you into a dense critical summary of the idea’s development through important theorists in history and its importance in media studies.

Oh, and feel free to consult the original chapter if you’re more interested!

The Greeks considered time based art as more important, as seen in the daughters of the goddess of memory, which promoted music, history, dance, song, and more, all of which don’t have physical canvases or muses to exist, they only have the moment they are presented to exist. Lessing admits that there are elements of space in ‘time art’ and time in ‘space art’, however, Lessing is adamant that things like painting are mostly space and things like poetry are mostly time. He sees them as two friendly neighbours who respect each other and their spaces. Lessing also states that the superior art is ‘time art’ as it appeals more to the imagination. Kant believes ‘time art’ represents self expression and ‘space art’ is outward appearance, and Hagel believes the history of art shows the progression of material art to virtual art. Aristotle and Johnson argued that time elements of theatre, such as plot and emotion, were more important than spectacles, such as costumes and sets.

Frederick James argued that modernism was dominated by time because it used history and revolutionary change, while post modernism was dominated by focuses on loss of space, "the end of history", which jumped off of the ideas of Hegel and Francis Fukuyama. Fredrick Kittler argued the three most important media inventions were cinema, phonography, and the typewriter. He argued it helped us to analyze human perception in a new way, like how trying to match sound to footage in film is analyzing space and time in a new way. Kittler’s prognosis for the decoupling of man and machine/media and computers was using the objective and qualitative natures of space and time. Before, it was too hard to objectify space and time, but it is now way easier with the use of computers and more sophisticated tools that can be used to measure those aspects.

Blake saw time as the man and space as the woman, and Benjamin thought that all art strays further away from its true original aura when it is removed from the exact time and place it was made. There are some examples of this mindset today, particularly when it comes to content warnings or advisories that are placed in front of older media, typically due to off-colour depictions of slavery or other now-taboo subjects. Even when not thought of in relation to controversial subjects though, there are some effects that older audiences would’ve experienced that simply aren’t able to be replicated, like watching a movie about WWII after having been deployed.

Erwin Panofsky speaks of film as if it erased the borders that were believed to exist between space and time, as stated by Lessing. This does not mean that the existence of categories disappear, since they are still there to complement certain values associated with different artworks. Clement Greenberg dived deeper into the topics of Lessing, as Greenberg thought there was a purity that needed to be upheld with the forms of art. For example, painting and sculptures were deemed confusing during the dominance of literature in the 1700s since it was damaged by the "realistic in the service of literature". He thought that the fix for this was to banish illusion and imitation all together. Greenberg wanted to keep space and time in their metaphysical limits, he wanted visual arts like painting and sculpting to affect the viewer physically, bringing the art to immediate reception of senses and intellect.

Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel all perpetuated the idea that time was over space in many of their modern philosophical models. Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson viewed time as an experimental continuum and space as a discrete representation of an expanse of time. Bergson called the qualitative aspect of time as duration and the quantitative aspect of time two different distinct things, and suggested that between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of time there existed a "difference of kind" that is unviewable through the analysis of time as space. It can only be experienced and viewed by those with endowed consciousness which are human beings. It is like how despite the fact that we can measure how many seconds are passing during a pause in conversation, and we know how long a second is, we cannot measure when a silence becomes awkward. There are many moments in life when it comes to time that cannot be measured or ‘known’, but rather can only be experienced.

Husserl analyzed the givenness of the world to consciousness. His work focused on the goal of bringing things back to the conditions on which experiences are constituted. His work also focused on the reduction of the natural attitude to allow him to account for the constitution of the lived experience, and differentiated between the two modes of temporalization as retention and recollection.

The retention plus the immersion trail is what Gerard Granel considers the "large now". This is because the more moments that join the past, the more "nows” we are able to experience. To him, recollection is taking a now you experienced, going into the past, then bringing it back to the now to be experienced in a new light. This concept can be universally applied to everyone who has recollected something, as every time you remember something or tell someone a story, a detail gets left out or slightly altered, since the further away you get from the event the blurrier it becomes. The idea of re-experiencing a memory as a “new now” can also be compared to when individuals who have experienced a traumatic event are remembering it. To them, according to Granel, they are literally “re-living” through the experience.

Husserl didn’t speak much on space, except for the fact that for an object to exist in space, it needs to have an end date. Martin Heidegger continued the principle of time over space as he talked about the difference between the two modes of temporality for human beings, inauthentic and authentic time. Inauthentic is the time explained by clocks in specific units, and authentic time is the truth of the experience for a human being, similar to the concept of the “difference in kind” discussed by Bergsen.

Theodore Adorno and Max Horkhiemer worked on the critique of the culture industry and how it relates to the temporal dimension of media entertainment. They believed that the industry, such as cinema, needed a temporal factor inherently, which differs from the traditional workplace or other industries. This makes sense when you consider that movies have a set length, rely on editing to determine the pace of how a story is told, and so on. They also share the same priority of time over space.

Jacques Derrida’s work discussed the necessity of a non-origin for time and space and a purpose for our existence for us to find an inner sense of peace in a physical world. With that, we can have the power to stand against the power of space and time. Bernard Steigler brought this up in relation to media, suggesting that the giving of time and space is tied to the technologies that mediate the human experience. For example, Steigler suggests that the human experience and global views have become synchronized in a way, because of the cinema industry with things like broadcast real time television. There is a coalition between human time and media time, and with the rapid way that social media has taken over our lives and often dictates where we go, what we learn, and how we act, media time is often dominating control over human time.

This work is consulted on the chapter "Time & Space" from the book Critical Terms for Media Studies edited by W. J. T. Mitchell and Mark B. N. Hansen, published by The University of Chicago Press in 2010.

Blog post words by Oliver Cheung, Tyler Hannaford, Owen Menning, and Micah Sébastien Zhang. Cover image made by Micah Sébastien Zhang.

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Analyzing My Perspective

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Introduction

Everyday, when I wake up, the world is a little blurred. Beside my head, on my windowsill, are the frames of plastic that fix that. 

I have had glasses since I was nine years old and since then they have been the windows through which I have quite literally watched my entire life. Without my glasses, I would not have the same memories that I do today, namely because lots of the details would be missing. Nothing is more subjective than a person’s perspective, and in that, their perception of the world. By watching the world through my glasses, my perception has been permanently altered by them. It would otherwise be lacking image and depth as I literally would not be able to see the bigger picture. Unless I decide to wear contacts, or get surgery to fix my eyesight, my entire world will always be mediated through these pieces of plastic and because of that, they are the root from which all of my memories, perceptions, and opinions grow.

By clarifying the world around men, mechanically fixing the way that my eyes focus the light in the world they watch, my glasses have mediated my experience and memory since I got them.

Affordances

The main affordance of my glasses is pretty clear: they help me see. Without them, and assuming there was no alternative to fixing my vision, my everyday life would be significantly impaired. I would not be able to see properly beyond a foot from my nose, which would make things including–but not limited to–reading signs and whiteboards, driving, and recognizing faces pretty difficult. Though they are crucial to my easy access to the world around me, the function of my glasses reaches beyond what they do to the light as it enters my eye.

Each pair of glasses that I have means something different to me. I have a purple and green glow-in-the-dark pair from when I was a kid, pairs that were too small, pairs that gave me a headache and, most importantly, pairs that I love and feel myself in. In addition to helping me see, my glasses are a mode of self-expression. Just because they are functionally necessary to my everyday life, does not mean I can not use them to a further effect and have fun with them. I also deliberately avoid wearing contacts. Frankly, I hate them. Though I do not mind sticking a piece of plastic in my eye, they are far too finicky for my taste, and when I do wear them, they always really dry out my eyes. Additionally, because I have had my glasses for so long, I have gotten used to them, and feel more myself when I wear them than when I go without.

I rarely change my everyday glasses. All of these frames are distinctly associated to different periods of my life, and by that effect, are irrevocably linked to the memories I have within those periods. By mediating my world so thoroughly, my glasses can be studied within the context of many of the critical terms we discussed in class, most notably, Body and Senses.

Body

Growing up with glasses, they have become incorporated into my own sense of identity. This is interesting to consider in the context of McLuhan’s theory of media as “extensions of man” and it should be understood as “continuous with the human nervous system”(Wegenstein 29). My glasses are an extension of my eyes by necessity, altering the way my eyes receive light, and focusing the world around me. By affecting my vision so concretely, there is very little distinction between the “inside and outside” of the media and myself, greatly conflating my perspective with the perspective of the glasses. Theoretically, the glasses still mediate when they are not on my face, they still function off my face, there just is not anyone to perceive the perspective they create. 

McLuhan defines a dual function of media, one that is both an extension and amputation of the body (Wegenstein 29). They are an extension of my eyes and mediate my world through their lenses, yet they are also physically separate from my face, focusing the light in the world whether or not they are on my face. 

Senses

Obviously, my glasses pretty heavily impact my own sense of sight, however, what is more significant is how reliant I am on my glasses.

The concept of Plato’s cave is interesting to consider in relation to my reliance on my glasses. The basis for Plato’s cave is the division between “knowing and mere existence” in that the prisoners–bound to simply watching the world–only exist, while philosophers–who experience the full dimensions of the world and understand its mediation of reality–are in the know (Jones 89). This distinction between watching and knowing is applicable to my perception of the world with and without my glasses. Without them, my ability to see and move through the physical world is inherently altered, but I am still able to see. However, the lack of depth and detail that impedes my ability to see the bigger picture could be compared to the simple existence of the prisoners in the cave who simply watch without knowing.

By correcting my vision, my glasses afford me an effective sense of sight, allowing me the context and depth of details, and affording me the knowledge associated. The construct of the cave completely dictates the prisoners’ experiences of reality, forming “a system of representation and deception with which the blindered sense of sight colludes”(Jones 89). Similarly, my glasses completely mediate my perception of the world. Though the reliance between me and my glasses is far less absolute than that of the prisoners and the cave featured in Plato’s cave analogy, and most of the things I do in my everyday life are possible without sight, there is a similar reliance on media to fully experience the world and the full extent of knowledge it offers.

Exploring these parallels further, the concept of true vision–“turning away from spectacle… closing one’s eyes to the visible world—or its mediated image—to question what one sees”–is also interesting to consider. Associated with this notion, and Plato’s analogy, are two tropes of blindness:“the ignorant blindness of the prisoners and the volitional blindness of the philosopher”(Jones 89). These ideas of different blindness parallel the function of glasses. I can consciously take off my glasses, turning away from the spectacle and engaging in a form of volitional blindness, thus un-mediating the world and returning it to the state that my own eyes and brain have decided is right for me (as inconvenient as that may be). But it also renders me ignorant to the details of my physical surroundings.

Conclusion

It is intriguing to study my glasses as they have become such a routine and unremarkable part of my life. By looking at them through the lens of the theories discussed in these chapters, I found a new appreciation for my frames. By looking at the functional and everyday objects in our lives in these ways, we can appreciate how the more menial objects mediate us and how we perceive the world. 

(Note: Obviously there are ways to navigate the world without being able to see, I wrote this post in the context of the knowledge I have as someone whose vision is correctable with prescription lenses.)

Sources

Jones, Caroline. “Senses”, Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 88-100. 

Wegenstein, Bernadette. “Body”, Critical Terms for Media Studies, edited by W.J.T Mitchell and Mark, B.N. Hansen, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 19-34. 

Blog post written by Molly Kingsley

Image by Molly Kingsley

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Holding Memory

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Photo by me at the Laver Cup 2023 – making memories with friends

There’s a quiet intimacy in holding memory in your hands. My Fujifilm Instax camera has become a way for me to pause time, to transform fleeting moments with friends and family into fragile objects that I can touch, arrange, and carry. Unlike the endless scroll of images on a phone, each Instax print is deliberate. Film is limited (and a bit expensive), the picture develops slowly, and the print itself is singular. And by the time the image fully appears, the moment it records has already slipped into the past, leaving me with both proof and loss. This happened, and it’s gone.

I keep every print in a small photo album, a growing collection that has begun to feel like its own living archive. Flipping through its pages is different from scrolling through a phone gallery. Each print takes up space, carrying its own imperfections like a fingerprint smudge, a faded corner, a hint of overexposure. That’s why I think it’s an evocative object, one that teaches me how media hold onto time, how photos can mediate between presence and absence, and how the simplest object can become a way of thinking about what it means to remember.

To understand why these images feel so different from the thousands on my phone, I turn to media theory, which helps me see how the Instax mediates memory, materiality, and presence in ways that resist digital ephemerality.

Theory Part I – Objects & Materiality

Sherry Turkle writes that objects are “things we think with,” extensions of our inner lives that carry paradoxes into tangible form. My Instax camera has become exactly that. Every time I press the shutter, I’m reminded of what Turkle calls the way objects “extend the reach of our sympathies by bringing the world within.” This camera collapses an instant into a card I can hold, an object that forces slowness and attention in a world of infinite scroll. In the quiet ritual of waiting for an image to appear, I feel what Turkle describes in her account of Seymour Papert’s childhood gears, the way falling in love with an object can also mean falling in love with an idea. For Papert, gears opened the door to mathematics. For me, Instax prints open the door to thinking about time and how memory is always both preserved and already slipping away. Each print becomes, in Turkle’s phrase, a “partnership” that helps me live with presence and absence layered in the same frame. To hold one is to realize, as Turkle suggests, that theory itself can become an evocative object and that even in the smallest square of film, theory is brought down to earth.

Bill Brown helps me see why this matters so much especially now. He says, “materiality has come to matter with new urgency,” because we live in an era where images and information are constantly dissolving into pixels and numbers. With that context, my Instax photos feel like small rebellions. Unlike the phone gallery, where thousands of pictures blur into the endless scroll, each Instax print insists on its body. It can bend, fade, and hold the trace of a thumbprint. These so-called imperfections, in my opinion, are what make it feel alive and what Brown might call the “materiality-effect,” the way an object persuades us of its reality. Sliding a print into my album makes me realize that remembering is tactile and fragile, always mediated by surfaces, fibers, and light. Brown notes that new media often provoke a melodrama of threatened materiality as though the physical world is vanishing into code. But the Instax resists that narrative. It’s stubbornly here. A one-of-one artifact you can’t swipe away or back up to the cloud. In a time when digital photographs circulate endlessly yet somehow lose weight with every reproduction, my Instax reasserts the stubborn truth that memory is also matter.

Theory Part II – Images & Memory

W. J. T. Mitchell argues that images live in contradiction. They are, he writes, both “there and not there”material objects you can hold and spectral apparitions that summon what is absent. My Instax photos embody this paradox in the most literal way. When I watch a white square slowly darken into an image, I feel that double moment Mitchell describes: the excitement of recognition as my friend’s face or a fragment of sunlight appears, paired with the sudden awareness that the moment itself has already slipped away. Each print, I feel, is like a ghost, present enough to touch yet haunted by absence. Unlike the thousands of phone photos that blur together into a continuous stream, an Instax photo freezes the contradiction in miniature. Again, the feeling that this happened, and it’s gone.

Bernard Stiegler gives me another way of understanding what’s at stake here. He distinguishes between anamnesis (the living act of remembering) and hypomnesis (the technical supports) like writing or photography that externalize memory. The Instax makes me aware of both at once. Taking the photo is an act of attention, of choosing and framing a moment, an embodied practice of remembering. But the print that emerges becomes hypomnesis, a technical memory that lives outside me, tucked into an album. Unlike the automatic flood of digital images, though, this process feels deliberate. I decide what to keep, how to arrange the pages, what story the album tells. In Stiegler’s terms, my Instax resists the “industrial exteriorization of memory” that digital platforms often produce, where algorithms and infinite storage do the remembering for us. Instead, my album feels like a collaboration between lived memory and technical support. It’s not infinite, not perfect, definitely not optimized, and that’s what makes it special.

Thinking About Memory Now

We live in a time when most of our memories are outsourced to clouds and algorithms, where platforms decide what resurfaces for us through “memories” notifications and automated feeds. The Instax, by contrast, resists that industrial exteriorization of memory. It asks me to be deliberate, to decide what is worth holding onto and to give memory a material home. In that sense, it’s nostalgic but critical as it makes visible the stakes of how media mediate our lives.

In a way, this is a return to photography’s origins. Early cameras required patience and darkrooms producing images slowly and with effort. It feels like a strange return, a twenty-first century camera that reintroduces limits and imperfection. Maybe that’s what makes the Instax an evocative object. It reminds me that media are central forces in how we experience time, relationships, and even ourselves. And in thinking about memory now, in this moment of digital abundance and digital forgetting, we can see more clearly why theory matters as it helps us make sense of the fragile, human ways we hold on.

References

Brown, B. (2005). Materiality. In W. J. T. Mitchell & M. B. N. Hansen (Eds.), Critical terms for media studies (pp. 49–63). University of Chicago Press.

Mitchell, W. J. T. (2005). Image. In W. J. T. Mitchell & M. B. N. Hansen (Eds.), Critical terms for media studies (pp. 85–98). University of Chicago

Stiegler, B. (2005). Memory. In W. J. T. Mitchell & M. B. N. Hansen (Eds.), Critical terms for media studies (pp. 64–87). University of Chicago

Turkle, S. (2007). Evocative objects: Things we think with. MIT Press.

Blog post by Maryam Abusamak