Peru Election 2006

Maxwell A. Cameron
Comment is free The Guardian.
Reprinted as “Blind Justice” in The Guardian Weekly, Vol. 177, No. 5, July 20-26, 2007, p. 20.
The decision of Chilean judge Orlando Alvarez to dismiss Peru’s request to extradite former President Alberto Fujimori betrays remarkable ignorance about the nature of the civil-military regime that operated in Peru between 1990 and 2000. The ruling sparked outrage in Peru and around the world, leading to criticism by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Washington Office on Latin America, and Peruvian human rights umbrella group APRODEH. Disgust was also expressed by Peruvian bloggers, many of whom can be found here.
Alvarez found no evidence that Fujimori gave direct orders, or even had first-hand knowledge of human rights abuses that occurred during his tenure in office. In his ruling, the judge implied that the Colina paramilitary group, which carried out black operations against suspected Shining Path Maoists, predated Fujimori’s election. The human rights abuses it committed were not part of a systematic policy by the government–they were excesses for which the army, not the President, was responsible.
The judge accepted at face value Fujimori’s defence that he expressly instructed the military to respect human rights. Alvarez added that the crimes for which Fujimori is accused were covered by an amnesty in 1995–a law passed not by Fujimori, but by the Peruvian congress.
All of this flies in the face of reason and evidence. The very idea that the army carried out human rights abuses in defiance of Fujimori is utterly absurd. The Colina group was created by Fujimori’s closest ally, Vladimiro Montesinos, who was placed in charge of Peru’s intelligence operations shortly after the 1990 election. Montesinos worked assiduously to control the armed forces, and Fujimori provided political cover for his spymaster in return.
It is possible that some abuses by Colina operatives, such as the massacre at Barrios Altos, were ordered by Montesinos to enhance his blackmail power over Fujimori. But it takes two to tango. By closing congress, suspending the constitution, and purging the courts in April 1992, Fujimori removed himself and Montesinos from the reach of the law. He neutralized the judiciary, prevented investigations into higher levels of the military command or the executive, and created an obsequious congress that he could, in the words of Peruvian prosecutor Jose Ugaz, manage “with his beeper”. That the amnesty law was passed by congress was a mere formality; the law came from Fujimori, Montesinos and the high command of the armed forces.
It takes astonishing naïveté, or worse, to believe that Fujimori was not directly involved in human rights abuses. The ruling is a paean to impunity. One can only hope that the ignorance and biases in the thinking of this Pinochetista judge will carry little weight when the case is ultimately appealed to more competent authorities.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
Cif
Why is corruption endemic in parts of Latin America? A recent case from Peru suggests that a mixture of inequality and uneven enforcement of the law for those in power are often at the heart of the problem.
In late April, the television program Cuarto Poder (Fourth Power) revealed that Elsa Canchaya, Peruvian member of congress from the province of Junín, had placed her maid on the congressional payroll as a “political advisor.” “Out!” thundered Peru’s most important daily newspaper, El Comercio, in an April 25 editorial, “does this person have the moral authority to continue producing laws?”
The congressional ethics commission has called for a 120-day suspension without pay, and passed the file to the commission for constitutional accusations. The latter has the power to expel lawmakers. This should also be the first step toward a criminal investigation. But will it?
The salary of a congressional advisor is roughly $1,500 per month (US dollars), about ten times the miserable allowances generally given to maids in Peru. The press presumes (though this is rarely stated explicitly except by bloggers) that Canchaya was using her maid to line her own pockets. Jacqueline Simón Vicente, the maid in question, would have been placed on the payroll in exchange for agreeing to turn over most of her salary to the member of congress, though none of this is yet publicly confirmed. Such practices have, nevertheless, been revealed repeatedly in the past, and in one exceptional case a member of congress was expelled as a result.
Public indignation was stirred when Canchaya not only lied about her maid–claiming she was a notary-in-training when photos show her wearing a maid’s uniform–but also suggested the accusations against her were motivated by racism. If racism is the issue, it is only because discrimination is at the root of inequality in Peru. Gross inequality makes it possible for employers to engage in abusive practices such as stealing from employees. Maids are subject to extremely abusive and discriminatory working and living conditions in Peru (recently dramatized by their exclusion from beaches near Lima).
It would be easy to minimize the case against Elsa Canchaya as merely another episode of petty malfeasance. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) notes, however, “corruption in public office extends uninhibited when citizens either resign themselves to living with it or contribute to spreading it further”. Survey research repeatedly shows that Peruvians, and Latin Americans generally, have little confidence in their legislative institutions, and even less confidence in their judicial institutions. Less than one in three Peruvians has confidence in congress, and about one in five has confidence in the courts. Corruption in congress implicates the legislature and the judiciary, potentially compounding mistrust in both.
Given the stakes, why are the congress and the judiciary unable to respond in ways that would restore public trust? Why are they unable to uphold the rule of law, even with respect to their own members? The answer is that the members of Peru’s deliberative institutions are, in practice, above the law. Members of congress enjoy parliamentary immunity. Nobody would deny that members of congress should be able to pass legislation without fear of legal repercussions, but in practice parliamentary immunity has become a form of impunity. As a result, the toughest legal response to the Canchaya case is likely to come from the congress, not the courts. It would take the form of an expulsion and ban on holding public office for 10 years.
When members of the congress take it upon themselves to act as judges, as they are now doing in the case of Canchaya, they are engaged in what is called political justice. Members of congresses are bad judges because they often lack the requisite legal training, they are partisan, and the application or interpretation of laws in particular cases is not their area of competence. In recent memory, the Peruvian congress expelled a member only to be forced to readmit that person after she was cleared of all charges by the courts. And yet the courts, overwhelmed by a backlog of cases and lacking the energy to assert their prerogatives, are unlikely to push for justice.
Corruption unchecked metastasizes and grows more virulent. Canchaya should be expelled from congress not as a punishment but as a prelude to a trial. A criminal sentence, rather than a political ban on holding public office, would best stop the career of a politician who has done more harm than good. Unless congress can show that the rule of law applies to its own members, Peruvians are right to place little confidence in their political institutions.

Maxwell A. Cameron
Comment is free…
December 5, 2006 09:58 PM
The Latin American left must be allowed to find new solutions to the region’s political and social problems.

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En entrevista con el programa de televisión La Ventana Indiscreta (Frecuencia Latina), el periodista Augusto Álvarez Rodrich, director del diario Perú 21, habló sobre las derrotas de los candidatos del Partido Aprista y el Partido Nacionalista en las elecciones regionales y municipales del pasado 19 de noviembre.

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According to political scientist Fernando Tuesta, the municipal and regional election are a step backward for the development of a party system in Peru. Sociologist Sinecio Lopez concurs: this election has produced fragmentation rather than reinforcement of the party system, he says.
For a critical response read: Elecciones: vox populi, vox dei in the blog Gran Combo Club

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Analistas políticos de los diversos medios de prensa escrita emiten los primeros análisis de la contienda electoral del día de ayer a nivel nacional.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
The Guardian, Comment is free…
July 31, 2006
On July 28, 2006, Alan García Pérez, leader of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), assumed the presidency of Peru for the second time. The sight of the now middle-aged politician wearing the presidential sash fills many Peruvians with a weird sense of déjà vu. Having decided to give him a second chance, voters now wonder whether he has changed.
García is the kind of politician who, as one wag put it, needs to be the bride in every wedding, the corpse in every funeral. He must control the need to eclipse everyone around him if he wants to govern effectively.
García’s inauguration speech this July 28 suggests that he has learned some hard lessons from his previous term in office (1985-1990). (For a summary of the inauguration speech, in Spanish, see Adonde.com). He argued that the emphasis on macroeconomic stability and privatisation under the so-called Washington Consensus were insufficient to address social exclusion and unemployment, but he also appointed a conservative minister of finance who has the confidence of the international financial community. He will walk a fine line between striving to make Peru an investment grade economy while redressing the social causes that produced the massive protest vote in this election.
The speech also exposed García’s troubling urge to be the protagonist in too many policy areas. Many words were devoted to detailing a wide range of specific measures, rather than laying out the general principles that would guide his government (leaving the details to be fleshed out by cabinet, lawmakers, and senior bureaucrats). García has left little room for initiative to his prime minister, Jorge del Castillo. His stupendous ego does not allow him to delegate powers that he believes should be monopolized by the president.
In his first term, García turned Peru into what Argentine political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell called a delegative democracy. In a delegative democracy presidents do their best, and often succeed, to suppress constitutional checks and balances.
According to this conception of rule, says O’Donnell, “whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office.” The president is the “embodiment of the nation” and courts and legislatures are treated as mere nuisances.
In 1985, García came to power in the midst of a severe economic crisis, with the economy in recession and the public sector staggering under a massive external debt burden. The Shining Path revolutionary movement was on the rise, moving increasingly from Ayacucho into urban areas – especially Lima. The young leader responded with an ambitious policy agenda that involved placing a cap on debt service, controlling prices, and stimulating growth through public spending.
It worked for about 18 months. After an initial boom, however, the economy slumped. García attacked the business community, which he denounced as disloyal for refusing to invest to sustain the recovery he had stimulated. The 1987 decision to attempt to nationalize the banks led to a collapse of business confidence, capital flight, and a massive recession. The collapse was accompanied by hyperinflation as the government continued to print money to cover costs. Corruption ran rampant as APRA party members plundered the state in an end-of-term piñata.
Whatever the errors inherent in García’s management of the economy, one of the most important political errors in his administration was his own tendency to dominate policymaking initiatives while weakening mechanisms of accountability. The effort to nationalize the banks, for example, was a decision taken by García and a handful of advisers. Yet he abdicated democratic responsibility in the management of coordinated prison uprising in 1986, turning the matter over to the armed forces. The military bombarded the prisons and executed dozens of Shining Path prisoners who had surrendered. The matter was investigated by congress, but to this day Peru’s backlogged judiciary has refused to touch the case.
O’Donnell argues that delegative democracies tend to go through cycles. Presidents begin their term with the appearance of omnipotence but, unable to overcome opportunism based on skepticism about whether the delegative leader can deliver the goods, they fall prey to impotence and policy failure. García’s failures set the stage for the rise of the autocratic government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and the erosion of Peru’s democracy.
Today’s García is not the impetuous bête noire of 1985. A frequent theme in his recent speeches is the importance of the separation and independence of powers. He pledges to respect the jurisdictional independence of the judiciary. This is positive, as is his announcement that the anti-corruption tsar and comptroller general would not be members of the APRA party. Similarly, it is reassuring to hear his support for regional and municipal governments, and his desire to continue the process of decentralization.
At the same time, García was vague about what he calls the need to rebuild the political system. How will his government work with congress? Apart from calling for a reduction of salaries for the president and congress, he said little to indicate how he would work with congress to carry out his policy agenda. That agenda seems to come exclusively from the president and his inner circle; congress may have a subordinate role. This could set the stage for confrontations between the executive and legislature in the future, something that García hinted at during the election campaign. With regard to the bureaucracy, García emphasized austerity and an end to frivolous expenses, but reducing salaries and firing unnecessary employees does not necessarily alter the way the bureaucracy functions.
Another key issue will be García’s ability to work with and control his own party. APRA is the only well-organized party in Peru. García has a chance to govern with APRA, giving it real power while seeking to ensure that it does not become a source of corruption and scandal as it did in the 1980s.
García takes power today under conditions radically different from 1985, and far more auspicious for policy success. If his inaugural speech is an indicator, however, he will have to watch his tendency to rule by executive fiat. He more than anyone else should know how quickly the omnipotent powers of the presidency can evaporate.

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John Crabtree
28 July 2006
Alan Garcia returns to the presidency of Peru as a far less radical figure than in the 1980s, but the political and institutional challenges facing him are just as great, reports John Crabtree.
Alan García Perez – someone who most Peruvians never imagined would regain the sash of office, after his first period as head of state (1985-90) ended in hyperinflation and political crisis – was sworn in as president on 28 July 2006, among all the pomp and ceremony of his country’s independence day. However, he seems a very different Alan García to the figure sworn in twenty-one years ago, when he used his inaugural speech as a platform to announce Peru’s unilateral moratorium on debt-service payments. Today, he pledges to follow orthodox economic policies, and is keen to avoid the mistakes that led to his leaving office in 1990 in disgrace, amid a shambolic, unsustainable economy.
The new cabinet
García’s appointment of a sixteen-member cabinet, announced on 27 July, underscores this point in three ways. First, he selected the conservative banker Luis Carranza as minister of economy and finance. Carranza returns to Peru from Spain, where he held a senior position at the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). Before this, he was one of the key confidants of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, the prime minister (and former finance minister) of outgoing president, Alejandro Toledo. Kuzcynski’s imprimatur on Peru’s economic policy during 2001-06 has been seen by the international financial community as a guarantee of fiscal and monetary rectitude.
It is precisely García’s former heterodoxy (which included the ill-fated attempt to nationalise Peru’s private banks in 1987) that makes him determined to take every step to convince the outside world that he has learned the errors of his former ways. In practical terms, he and Carranza will follow economic policies that are close to those of the Toledo administration. As always in Peru, however, there will be tension between the economy ministry and those in government who would like to see more public spending. In the short term, at least, the new economy minister will seek to maintain a tight grip on the public purse.
Second, García is determined to show that he is not going to pack his government with party loyalists as he did in his first term, when these became widely viewed as the beneficiaries of institutionalised corruption. Card-carrying members of the centre-left Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Apra) are in a distinct minority in the new cabinet. García has gone out of his way to bring in independent technocrats. He has even reserved a seat round the cabinet table for the far-right Opus Dei militant, Rafael Rey, who becomes minister with responsibility for production. Apra militants privately feel rebuffed by García’s initial choice of ministers, though at least prime minister Jorge Del Castillo is one of their number.
A third criterion that has prevailed in the selection of the new cabinet is the number of women represented. García has strained to comply with a campaign promise – perhaps reflecting a concern not to be outdone in this respect by Chile’s new president Michelle Bachelet – to have a fifty-fifty split between men and women ministers. But to honour this commitment as far as possible (in the event only six women are included in the cabinet, including Mercedes Araoz as trade minister and Pilar Mazzetti as interior minister), there had to be last-minute changes which left one or two highly eligible males out in the cold.
The party landscape
The composition of García’s government also reflects new political realities arising from the results of the 2006 presidential contest. This saw the leftwing nationalist Ollanta Humala win more votes (just over 30% of ballots cast) in the first round on 9 April, with García only beating third-placed Lourdes Flores of the right-of-centre Unidad Nacional (UN) by the narrowest of margins. In order to win in the second round on 6 June, García had to appeal to conservative voters who had previously supported Flores. This meant that Apra found itself pushed to the right.
Humala’s party, Unión Por el Perú-Partido Nacionalista Peruano (UPP-PNP), is also the largest (with forty-five representatives) in the new 120-seat congress sworn in for a five-year term on 25 July; Apra (with thirty-six representatives) is the second-largest grouping. García could expect little support from Humala’s deputies who have no sympathy with neo-liberal economics and want a radical shift in Peru’s foreign and social policies. He therefore had little alternative but to seek collaboration where he could find it, on the right, and Unidad Nacional was the first port of call.
Although not prepared to enter any formal coalition with Apra, UN has made clear that it will support the government’s legislative agenda for the time being, so long as it roughly corresponds to policies that the right finds acceptable. Since Apra and the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), the senior partner in UN, are both reasonably disciplined parties, this should mean that the government can rely on majority support in the single-chamber congress. And even if it suffers defections, there are others from smaller parties that can probably be relied upon for help when needed. Moreover, Humala’s opposition UPP-PNP is proving extremely flaky, with early signs of internal schism.
The foreign-policy picture
If in its economic policies, Peru under García will seek to play by the established rules of the “Washington consensus”, in its foreign policy it is also likely to fall in closely with the United States in contraposition to countries like Venezuela and Bolivia that reject Washington’s tutelage in Latin America.
An early sign here is García’s apparent willingness to go along with the free-trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, negotiated by Toledo and signed in December 2005. During the presidential campaign, he argued the need for changes in the text agreed by Toledo, but these doubts seem to have dissipated in the face of Realpolitik. Although ratified by the outgoing Peruvian congress, it now seems unlikely that the FTA will be considered by the United States congress before the US’s mid-term elections in November 2006.
The pattern of García’s pre-inauguration travels – which have included trips to Brasilia, Santiago and Bogotá – suggest the flavour of likely alliances within Latin America. Peru will seek to align itself with governments that are moderate in their economic policies and prepared to do business with Washington. García has been particularly effusive towards Bachelet, promising détente in the prickly relationship between Peru and Chile in recent years. The Peruvian military regards the military balance as being stacked in Chile’s favour and regards rapprochement with suspicion; perhaps it is partly for this reason that García has chosen a retired general as his first vice-president.
The acrimonious war of words between Venezuela and Peru in recent months, heightened by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s open support for Humala in the Peruvian presidential race, is set to diminish. However, García is not inclined to cultivate friendship in Caracas if it means alienating Washington, and Chávez was conspicuously absent from the heads of state attending García’s inauguration.
In the case of Bolivia, the Peruvian position may be more accommodating. But, as in the past, the bottom line may prove to be Peruvian reluctance to go along with any territorial arrangement along its southern frontier that affords Bolivia some sort of access to the Pacific.
The social agenda
Peru has been among Latin America’s fastest growing economies in recent years, but a major challenge for the García government will be whether it has any more success than its predecessor in extending the benefits of this growth to the majority of the population officially classified as “poor”.
One of the main reasons for deep public disillusionment with the Toledo administration, which began with high hopes in 2001, was its abject failure to honour its campaign slogan of más trabajo (more work). More than half of the workforce continues to labour in the so-called “informal sector” where remuneration is low, employment unstable and where social benefits (such as pensions) are nil.
Alan García has promised to maintain Toledo’s flagship social programme, called Juntos. Like Bolsa Familiar in Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico, this is a scheme for making direct payments to poor households where families accept the conditions attached by sending their children to school and having the stipulated health injections. The main problem here is that the programme (if implemented throughout the country) is fiscally expensive and is dependent on the highly deficient educational and health provision offered by the relevant ministries. Many families complain, for example, that there is little point in sending their children to school when there are not adequate numbers of qualified teachers and when children can earn money for the family by going to work.
The problem of poverty in Peru is most acute in the Andean highlands, especially in rural areas. Here García has promised to introduce a scheme known as the sierra exportadora whereby peasant farmers are encouraged to produce for niche export markets. For instance, there has been some success in exporting broccoli from the highland valleys, echoing Peru’s previous success as an exporter of asparagus. However, it is most unlikely that this will benefit more than a tiny fraction of Peru’s highland farmers, while many producing for the domestic urban market face the prospect of disabling competition from subsidised United States producers due to the FTA.
The scale of discontent among low-income households, especially in rural areas, was made clear by a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report released in March 2006 which showed a clear rejection of the way in which democratic institutions work in Peru. The elections themselves showed voters dividing along clear lines of class and income, with lower-income Peruvians (especially those of indigenous origin) voting massively for Humala. If García wants to avoid growing social tension and possibly political conflict, he will need to show that he can do something concrete for the millions of poor Peruvians who expressed confidence not in him but in Humala.
The next elections
Even before Peru’s new president and congress were installed, politicians’ minds were turning to the next electoral hurdle: municipal and regional elections scheduled for November. This will be the first major pointer as to whether Alan García can hold on to his newfound popularity or whether Humala and his friends will take advantage of a mood of disillusion and discontent at the sub-national level.
The last time regional elections were held, Apra won in nearly half of Peru’s twenty-five departments. This time, especially in light of their relegation to second place in the congressional elections, the party will be on the defensive. A weak result in the November elections could prove a major psychological blow for the country’s new government and its ruling party. Alan García has work to do.

This article originally appeared on openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons licence. To view the original article, please click here.

John Crabtree is a research associate at Oxford University’s Centre for Latin American Studies. He is the author of Peru under Garcia: Opportunity Lost (Macmillan, 1992), Fujimori’s Peru (ILAS, 1998), and Patterns of Protest: Politics and Social Movements in Bolivia (Latin America Bureau, 2005). He is the editor of Making Institutions Work in Peru: Democracy, Development and Inequality since 1980 (Institute for the Study of the Americas, London University, April 2006).

Coverage of the inauguration of President Alan Garcia is being provided in English by Living in Peru.

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Toledo se despide de un Perú agradecido con economía, pero insatisfecho con pobreza
Marta Lillo Bustos
Diario Financiero
28/7/2006
Alejandro Toledo tendría dificultades hoy para ceder el sillón presidencial a Alan García en Palacio Pizarro. En sus cinco años de gobierno, recién en los últimos cuatro meses logró lo que en un principio parecía imposible: más de 20% de la aprobación popular. Impresionante, considerando que el nivel de rechazo ciudadano del mandatario llegó incluso a 90% debido a una seguidilla de errores políticos, frivolidades poco celebradas por más del 51% de la población bajo la línea de la pobreza, y escándalos familiares que terminaron por mellar su imagen, y que incluso en 2003 casi le cuestan la presidencia.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
July 20, 2006
Writing for The Guardian blog “Comment is free…” James Galbraith and Greg Palast have provided a great service by calling attention to the serious possibility of systematic fraud in the Mexican election. Neither offer definitive proof, but both provide information and analysis that, in conjunction with other deficiencies in the process, suggest this election may have been neither free nor fair. Yet I fear there is a danger that in searching for fraud of the sort that occurred in Mexico in 1988 we may miss the real story. The greatest obstacle to clean elections may arise not from systemic fraud but from the politicization of electoral processes.
The case of Peru is instructive. I recall a warning by a former Peruvian official at the outset of the election campaign. He said that systematic fraud by election authorities was unlikely, but incompetence among election officials, especially in the event of a close election, might create a context in which a loser might challenge an election result. Sure enough, one candidate (Lourdes Flores) raised doubts about the outcome, saying that she may have won in the ballot boxes but lost in the vote counting. To make matters worse, the ballots were destroyed after they were counted, making a recount impossible. Rather than a recount, judges ruled on the authenticity of voting returns.
The problem was not systematic fraud by the authorities. Elections are messy, especially when election authorities are badly trained and overworked. Parties must have scrutineers in every voting station to ensure mistakes or irregularities do not occur. Add weak party finance rules and media bias and you create conditions in which losers can’t accept defeat. Even if they believe they lost, both candidates and their strategists may impugn the electoral process in an effort to reinforce their image among supporters.
Something similar may be happening in Mexico. I doubt election authorities, in cahoots with the executive, engineered a massive conspiracy to defeat of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) and place Felipe Calderón in Los Pinos. There is, however, plenty of proof of incompetence which, coupled with documented irregularities (and here bloggers deserve credit), provided an opportunity to dispute the outcome. Vote stealing may have occurred in places where the PRD did not have scrutineers. The PREP was designed to offer the image of transparency, but it backfired when officials acknowledged that the PREP count was not the same as the official count.
Mexico is not a country with a high tolerance for computer problems during elections. The historical memory of the computer crash during the fraudulent election of 1988 makes the acceptance of cybernetic irregularities impossible. The fear campaign by Mexico’s entrepreneurial elite—which spent millions in a campaign to convince nervous voters that they would lose everything if AMLO was elected—made it even harder for the PRD to accept defeat.
I am not saying the election was not stolen. It may have been. But so far we have better evidence of incompetence than malfeasance by the authorities. The problem is not just the errors of election authorities, however, but something more systemic: the politicization of state institutions. Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute used to be one of the nation’s most respected public institutions—and a model for the region. Now it has a black eye. Good institutions cannot operate in isolation. The government of President Vicente Fox contributed to undermining its own electoral authorities. As a result, Mexican democracy has suffered a regrettable setback.
Counting votes is not rocket science, but legitimate results are hard to produce when election officials do not inspire confidence and the electoral process is politicized. An exhaustive vote-by-vote recount is necessary, not to appease AMLO or legitimate Calderón, but for the sake of Mexico’s democratic system. Those who chastise AMLO for building a social movement for a recount of the vote forget that such tactics are both legal and democratic. The worrisome reality, however, is that Mexico’s judicial institutions may not be strong enough to serve as neutral umpires.
There is also a lesson here for international election observers. It is not good enough for election observers to arrive a shortly before an election, deploy a small force of observers, accept the assurances of local authorities, and declare the election to be a legitimate exercise. Elections require, among other things, organized parties, a vigorous civil society, and strong public institutions. In the absence of any of these conditions, electoral observation should be widened to include reporting on the state of democracy analogous to the human rights reporting currently conducted under the aegis of the United Nations.
UPDATE: For sharp criticism of electoral observation, see the article from La Jornada below.

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Punto de Equilibrio
Año 14 – Número 91
Julio-Setiembre 2006
¿Cuál le parece que es el mensaje principal que nos deja la campaña electoral?
Son varios mensajes. Uno de ellos es un deseo de cambio, que se expresa tanto por el voto de cambio radical de Ollanta Humala como por el voto a favor de Alan García que, como él ha tratado de expresarlo, era un voto de cambio responsable. En todo caso, ambos candidatos están apostando hacia el cambio en el sistema y en el modelo económico. Humala ofreció un cambio de modelo más profundo; sin embargo, se pueden interpretar los resultados como un rechazo a la continuidad. En ese sentido, lo que ha puesto sobre el tapete la candidatura de Ollanta Humala es un deseo de una inclusión de esa población de la sierra que no se siente beneficiada por el modelo económico.
En esta campaña hubo una especie de paradoja: las propuestas están tendiendo a una cierta convergencia; la derecha habló más que nunca de programas sociales y aun la izquierda más radical de Humala hablaba de balance fiscal. Sin embargo, a pesar de esta convergencia de planes, la división que generaron en la sociedad fue mayor que las antes vistas.
En el nivel de planes de gobierno, los tres principales candidatos hicieron mayor énfasis en las políticas sociales, por ejemplo. Y los planes de gobierno de Humala y García han tenido aspectos tan similares, que se han criticado mutuamente de plagio. Sin embargo, creo que los electores han sido sabios: han entendido que la elección no es solamente entre planes de gobierno, sino entre candidaturas que tienen detrás de ellos intereses específicos. Ese ha sido el caso de Lourdes Flores que, por más que su discurso buscaba votos en los conos, en las provincias y en el Sur, fue percibida como una candidata que tenía lazos fuertes con el sector empresarial, grupos de clase media o profesionales de Lima, sobre todo; mientras que la diferencia entre Humala y García ha sido que este último planteaba cambios en el campo económico, político, social, pero dentro del sistema político existente, sin buscar cambios de las reglas de juego político. Humala era un outsider que se enfrentó al sistema político.

¿Cómo ha sido tomada la victoria de García en el ámbito internacional?
Creo que ha sido tomada con alivio. La comunidad internacional, en general, tiene una lectura bastante superficial de la realidad peruana y se manejan ideas como que Humala representaba un eje de izquierda que iba a conectar a Castro a través de Chávez y Evo. Los mercados financieros estaban preocupados por las propuestas de Humala de nacionalizar ciertos sectores de la economía. En ese sentido, Alan García ha sido visto como un candidato capaz de frenar eso, lo cual es un poco irónico, pues en su tiempo fue considerado un niño malo.
Se está hablando de la presencia de dos izquierdas en la región: una radical, representada por Humala, Chávez, Morales, y una “moderna”, representada por Lula o por Bachelet. En este sentido, ¿se puede decir que el APRA es ahora una izquierda moderna?
Yo creo que sí, hasta cierto punto. Evidentemente, ese es el discurso de Alan García. Hay cierta validez en esa hipótesis, pero el problema con ese argumento es que el Perú no es Chile y tampoco es Venezuela; es un país con sus propias condiciones, que ha generado opciones distintas. Ollanta Humala no es tan radical como Chávez, ni tan democrático como Evo. Evo tiene detrás un movimiento social fuerte, de indigenismo combativo, que viene de mucho antes.
No es un outsider…
Claro. Son veinte años de lucha muy consecuente con los intereses que representa: los cocaleros, la lucha por el agua, las tierras, los recursos naturales. Hasta sus adversarios reconocen que su elección representa un paso adelante en términos de democratización del país. Es importante que haya un líder que represente los intereses de los que se sienten excluidos. Esto aun no los ha conseguido Humala. Sin embargo, los primeros indicios son que será una oposición dura a García, lo cual no es necesariamente malo. Alan García, por su parte, puede aspirar a ser un líder democrático moderno de izquierda moderada, social demócrata, pero tendrá que demostrarlo, porque ha propuesto hasta disolver el Congreso. Aunque él tampoco es tan demócrata social, esa es su aspiración y, sobre todo, la oposición radical de Ollanta Humala lo obliga a ser un líder de centro izquierda.
Y en los próximos meses, ¿en qué se deben concretizar las tareas de gobierno?
Lo que probablemente va a tratar de hacer el Gobierno es mandar señales de confianza al sector privado, tratar de convencer, sobre todo al empresariado local, de que va a mantener la estabilidad macro y el modelo económico. El reto de Alan García es tener un plan económico de mediano y largo plazo, algo que no logró en su primer gobierno. En el primer gobierno, su plan de corto plazo consistió en gastar las reservas; promover el crecimiento a través de la intervención del Estado, controlando los precios para evitar la inflación; lo que puede funcionar por unos meses. Pero más allá de eso, buscaba una inversión del sector privado para continuar ese crecimiento, objetivo que no logró porque el sector privado sabía que ese modelo no era sostenible. Por ello, sacaron su dinero, lo cual socavó el proyecto. Era evidente que esas propuestas económicas no tenían credibilidad para el mediano y largo plazo. Por lo tanto, Alan García tendrá que mandar una señal clarísima. No va a ser tan difícil, porque el Perú no está en un momento de inflación, deuda externa, violencia.
¿Podría enviar señales contradictorias?
Si bien es un líder percibido como muy hábil para enviar mensajes distintos, en función de sus audiencias, deberá evitar mandar señales contradictorias que generen pérdida de confianza en su gobierno. Como líder, tiene que ser lo suficientemente inteligente, pensar en el largo plazo, para entender la necesidad de articular ese modelo exportador de la costa con la sierra a través de proyectos de infraestructura, de créditos, de capacitación, de manera que incluya el sur andino y la sierra central y norte en ese crecimiento. Un tema que va a provocar mucha discusión es el TLC. ¿Cómo vas a abrir el mercado interno a la globalización cuando tienes millones de personas que no están en condiciones de participar en el mercado? Eso va a requerir políticas del Estado fuertes, para evitar perjudicar más a los que no se sienten beneficiados por el crecimiento que se ha tenido hasta ahora; en particular, en los lugares que no votaron por Alan García.

En esos lugares, la victoria de Humala ha sido abrumadora.
Este es un anclaje en el país muy antiguo, entre Norte y Sur, entre sierra y costa, que se ha acentuado. El hecho de que Humala gane con más de 80% en Ayacucho, muestra que el país está dividido. Tendría quizá sentido empezar a pensar en formas de permitir más autonomía a las regiones, porque es clara la división en el país, lo cual es un reto para este gobierno.
Además de eso, las elecciones nos han mostrado la capacidad del Estado peruano de llevar a cabo un proceso electoral, que es importante para la consolidación de una democracia. Al mismo tiempo, se debe reconocer que hay más de un millón de peruanos que no tienen documentos. Si el elector no tiene identidad legal, no puede ser ciudadano. Hay muchas cosas que se pueden hacer para incluir a más personas en el proceso político, que no costarían mucho, pero fortalecerían la presencia del Estado y, al mismo tiempo, la sociedad civil.
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Here is an opinion piece on the election in Peru that a colleague recently brought to my attention. It is well worth reading.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
June 21, 2006 05:05 PM
Comment is free…
The Guardian
A backlash against free market orthodoxy is gaining momentum in Latin America. As voters in the region turn against the status quo, some are looking for radical change while others are seeking more modest reforms.
Alan García Pérez narrowly won the run-off election in Peru on June 4 by offering a programme of “responsible change.” His competitor, the nationalist Ollanta Humala Tasso, promised a more radical transformation. The candidate most closely associated with the existing economic orthodoxy, Lourdes Flores Nano, did not even make it into the run-off.
A similar race is heating up in Mexico, where voters will choose their next president on July 2. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, candidate of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) is neck and neck with the candidate of the incumbent National Action party (PAN), Felipe Calderón Hinojosa. Polls show the two candidates in a technical tie, with López Obrador gaining on his rival.
Calderón has tried to distance himself from incumbent president, Vicente Fox, by calling himself a “disobedient son” while portraying López Obrador as a dangerous radical and a protege of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. López Obrador denies any connection with Chávez, and has lashed back at Calderón with allegations of nepotism, corruption, and influence-peddling.
A broader scan of the region reveals a lot of diversity within the much-debated shift to the left. In countries including Chile and Uruguay, where democracy is strong, political parties are well organised and corruption is minimal, moderate socialists are advancing progressive social policy agendas.
After a rocky start in her first 100 days in office, Chile’s president, Michelle Bachelet, has made 36 specific promises in areas such as education, healthcare, public security, pensions and labour rights. She redoubled her commitment to reform after surprisingly militant student protests placed her government on the defensive. Another moderate socialist, Tabaré Vásquez, was elected in Uruguay last year on promises to address poverty and unemployment.
In the Andean region, where indigenous peoples have suffered centuries of exclusion and discrimination, where party systems are fragmented and corruption is rife, the backlash against economic orthodoxy has resulted in more radical nationalist and populist movements.
On May Day, Bolivia’s president, Evo Morales, fulfilled a major campaign promise by announcing the nationalisation of the gas and oil industry in Bolivia. He has also moved quickly to redistribute land belonging to the state. A national development strategy has been unveiled that seeks to dismantle the legacies of colonialism and the effects of neoliberal policies in recent decades. A major goal of the new government is to recognise Bolivia’s multicultural society in law and in the constitution, and to that end a constituent assembly has been convened.
A growing chorus of observers and policymakers, including the Miami Herald columnist Andres Oppenheimer, The Economist, Mexico’s former minister of foreign affairs, Jorge Castañeda, and the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, has argued or assumed that there are “two lefts” in Latin America, one social democratic and the other radical populist.
These labels are value-laden; in the words of Castañeda, there is a “right left” and a “wrong left.” This tendentious, simplistic, and misleading dichotomy is a hindrance to understanding both the backlash against economic orthodoxy and the various leftwing forces capitalising on it.
There are three good reasons for rejecting the right/wrong left shibboleth. First, the left typically reflects the society in which it emerges; one might as well argue there are right and wrong countries. Second, not all rights and wrongs come in coherent packages. Leftwing movements and parties often do some things wrong and some things right. Third, dichotomising the left leads to mistaken expectations about international alignments and conflicts. In general, radical postures disguise pragmatic intentions.
It is easier to be a moderate social democrat in stable and ethnically homogeneous countries such as Chile or Uruguay than in politically unstable and ethnically divided countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, or Peru. The constitutional separation of powers, the rule of law, and property rules evolve in diverse ways under different historical and structural conditions.
Evo Morales’ decision to nationalise Bolivia’s oil and gas industry may be a threat to private property and an economic error – it is probably unwise to nationalise an industry when the principal investor, in this case Brazil, is also the nation’s main customer – but the Bolivian leader is pursuing a vision of the national interest that is defensible on both constitutional and democratic grounds.
What is right on one policy dimension may be wrong on another. Chávez, with the unwitting assistance of a largely self-seeking and incompetent opposition, has created a political system with few real checks and balances. He has also attempted to provide basic health and educational services to people who were neglected under the corrupt power-sharing arrangement known as the pact of Punto Fijo (1961-1998).
Chávez should be neither deified nor demonized. He earns plaudits for his commitment to the poor, but, with the supreme court stacked, legislative elections uncontested by the opposition and the president rattling his sabre at the media, it remains unclear whether the Bolivarian revolution can secure for itself a viable political and constitutional framework in which fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed. Indeed, it is doubtful whether Venezuela will be able to hold competitive, transparent and fair elections at the end of this year.
Most of the leftwing movements and parties in the Latin American region fall far short of any ideal of social democracy or radical populism. Castañeda has difficulty deciding whether Alan García is part of the “right” or the “wrong” left. García’s APRA party, clearly “springs from the great Latin American populist tradition,” says Castañeda, but “Chavez’s unabashed meddling in the Peruvian elections may have so alienated Alan García that he actually becomes a European-style social democrat.”
As a causal argument, this is preposterous. Even if we leave aside the fact that García provoked and benefited from Chávez’s interference in the Peruvian election, the idea that the dispute will have a lasting effect on García’s political orientation is ludicrous. The main reason why García will not govern like a European social democrat is that Peru is not a European country. García’s main challenge is to overcome barriers to the inclusion of indigenous peoples in Peru’s apartheid-style society, not negotiate a European-style class compromise.
The absurdities inherent in the right/wrong left dichotomy are exposed when observers use such crude stereotypes to explain international alignments or conflicts. For those who imagine a “serpent” stretching from Havana through Caracas to La Paz, Evo Morales’s radicalism is a product of the dark machinations of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez.
Morales, however, is nobody’s puppet. In last week’s summit of presidents from the Andean Community of Nations, he proved to be a consummate pragmatist. Not only did he reject Chávez’s option of pulling out of the Andean Community, he used his leadership to support closer relations with the European Union and to push for an extension of trade preferences and drug cooperation with the US. Bolivia’s behaviour was neither strident nor nostalgic, but perfectly consistent with national interests.
The presumption that there will be a growing rift between Latin America’s radical populists and responsible social democrats is belied by Brazil’s measured response to the Bolivian nationalisation of oil and gas, as well as the courteous diplomatic relations between Morales and Bachelet.
Brazil may be pleased that Chávez’s meddling in the Peruvian election backfired and helped García. At the same time, Brazil is leaning toward backing Venezuela’s bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Tensions between South American countries may intensify, but they are likely to have more to do with national interests than ideological divisions between the so-called modern and archaic lefts.
There is a familiar ring to the distinction between the modern versus archaic lefts. Neoliberal reformers also saw themselves as imposing modernity on archaic societies. In their view, the “right policies” (the so-called Washington consensus, involving privatisation, deregulation, free trade, and the promotion of foreign investment) had to replace the “wrong policies” (protectionism, state ownership, subsidies, regulation of foreign investment). Those who resisted getting the policies right – peasants, unions, import-substituting industries, economists who had not read the “right” textbooks – belonged to the retrograde past. Arrogance and insensitivity got in the way of building sustainable and inclusive political coalitions.
How unfortunate, and how ironic, it would be for the left to make the same mistake.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ex presidente de Brasil

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Mario Vargas Llosa
El Comercio
18 de junio del 2006

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Rapporteur’s Report on a Round Table Discussion at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP), Lima, June 9, 2006.
Maxwell A. Cameron
June 16, 2006
Photos by J. Bazo
A round table discussion was held at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) to assess the process and outcome of the second round of the Peruvian presidential election which was held on June 4, 2006. Martin Tanaka, director of the IEP, and Maxwell A. Cameron, Professor of political science at the University of British Columbia, led off the discussion.

For a summary of Cameron’s comments, click here.
Martin Tanaka said the results of the second round of the election left a strong impression on many observers, yet some aspects of this impression deserve reconsideration in light of the first round. The most powerful image from the second round was a map of a country divided between north and south, and between the coast and the sierra; Ollanta Humala won a majority of Peru’s departments, especially in the south, while Alan Garcia captured the north; Lourdes Flores did best in Lima, and her votes were transferred to Garcia. The geography of the vote created the impression of a powerful fracture along class, region, and ethnic lines, divisions that can be traced to the 19th century and earlier.
Tanaka cautioned against failing to delineate how far this image of a fractured nation holds true, and he argued for examining the election results in both rounds in all their nuance and complexity. When the second round election is placed in context, it reveals both ancient fractures and new cleavages, changes and continuities. In some ways, the results of the second round in 2001 and 2006 are very similar. The vote for Alejandro Toledo and Peru Posible in 2001, and the support for Ollanta Humala and the Union Por el Peru in 2006, are virtual mirror images—though much has rightly been made of the larger standard deviation from the mean in the 2006 election. For example, the extraordinarily high vote for UPP in Ayacucho, 83 percent, is new.

Martin Tanaka
The biggest difference lies in an observation made by Alfredo Torres, head of the APOYO survey firm, prior to the second round. Torres suggested that the voters of Cusco have served as a bellwether for national election results; in Peru’s modern democratic history Cusco has never been on the losing side of an election. This, however, has changed with the 2006 election. Cusco voted for the loser. The election also casts the importance of Lima in a new light. Prior to the first round, some observers emphasized the electoral weight of Lima. While the candidate preferred by a plurality of Lima’s voters, Lourdes Flores, did not make it into the second round, Lima was, nevertheless, decisive in arbitrating between the two candidates who did.
Carmen Rosa Balbi agreed that there was a difference between the first and second rounds of the election, but she perceived the different in terms of how the rise of Ollanta Humala changed the political agenda of the campaign. Until the end of 2005, there was an ostensible consensus on the success of the existing economic model and on the need for continuity in macroeconomic management. Polls appeared to show that there was a center-right majority in the country; some opinion leaders suggested that to question the economic model was irrational. Little by little, during the course of the campaign between January and April, this center-right common sense began to change, producing a modification in the agenda. In part, this change reflected the fact that for part of 2005, Lourdes Flores was the most active and visible candidate on the campaign trail. She set the tone for the election because she was the first to start campaigning; the tone changed when other candidates entered the fray.

Carmen Rosa Balbi
As the campaign unfolded, and Ollanta Humala rose in the polls, the successes of the economic model began to be questioned with increasing insistence. Issues like royalties paid by foreign firms, and the need to audit and review contracts with foreign businesses, were placed on the agenda by Humala, and then picked up by other candidates. There was a notable radicalization of the message delivered by Alan Garcia, who echoed Humala’s insistence on the need to revise contracts with foreign companies. Humala did not win the election, but he did contribute to shifting Peru’s political agenda to the left. The fact that he won 47 percent of the vote suggests a turning point has been reached in Peru.
Alberto Adrianzen agreed with the view that Humala had achieved a lot against great odds. As he put it, “Humala received a very high vote in spite of all those who opposed him: his father, his mother, his brothers, Jaime Bayly and most of the media, APRA, UN, Fujimori, the United States, the Church. Never before has their been such a solid front against a candidate.” The opposition to Humala went so far as to paint him as a “fascist,” or as 21st century Sanchez Cerro. Carmen Rosa Balbi seconded Adrianzen’s criticisms of the media, saying that she could not recall such unfair coverage of a candidate in any previous Peruvian election.
Adrianzen also argued that Lima sank Humala. Remove Lima from Peru, Adrianzen argued, and Humala won the election by about 400,000 votes. Lima gave Garcia the advantage he needed to win. Humala won in the highlands and the jungle. What is more, according to Adrianzen, the people who supported Humala voted for him not as an act of protest or out of bad humour alone: he was the political option for those on the other side of Peru’s geographic, regional, social and economic fractures. In the “Indian stain” (the highland areas inhabited by the indigenous people of Peru), Humala received around 70 percent of the vote. His vote was highest in those areas, like in Ayacucho, where there was the most violence during the war with the Shining Path revolutionary movement. Peru may be witnessing the birth of a new political party, a process reminiscent of the 1930s when APRA emerged. Humala has changed the political map.

Alberto Adrianzen
APPA won with conservative votes, according to Adrianzen. Support for APRA was as high as 86 percent in affluent districts like San Isidro in Lima. APRA won with the votes of those who can be expected to benefit from the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Fabiola Bazo challenged this view, noting that APRA won in poor districts as well. In fact, APRA won in every singled district of Lima. On one point everyone is agreed: the election was a divisive one, and the level of tension as very high. As a result, there was a decline in blank votes between the first and second rounds, contrary to what many expected, as well as an increase in the number of spoiled votes.
Looking toward the future, Adrianzen predicted “serious opposition,” and not just in parliament. “Happily,” he said, “we’re finished with good manners.” According to Adrianzen, the “good manners” of the political class conceal conflicts and opposed interests. Humala can be expected to push his agenda through a strategy of confrontation that will be unlike in the past, when leaders challenged each other in public and colluded in private. Humala may be more like Evo Morales—with all due recognition for the important differences between Bolivia and Peru.
Marisa Remy noted that Humala had raised his vote between the first and second rounds from 30 to 47 percent; he came within a few points of winning. She noted the diverse projects within his movement.

Marisa Remy
Taylor Boas addressed the issues raised by Max Cameron concerning changes in institutional rules to widen participation in elections, especially for rural voters. He said that changes in rules generally benefits someone and hurt someone else. In a fluid polity like Peru, it may be harder to detect who will benefit from alterations in political rules, and this can facilitate change. In principle, however, it is not hard to see that a change like the elimination of the fine for not voting would probably affect most those for whom the fine matters the most—the poor.
Boas observed the relatively low salience of regionalism in campaign appeals in the election. He said that in election campaigns there are both elements of supply and demand; candidates can emphasize certain cleavages—class or ethnicity, for example—to the detriment of others. In the case of this election, the regional cleavage was not the focus of much of the campaigning. While he agreed with other participants about significant differences across regions in terms of voting results, and that this could be interpreted as a high rather than low salience in the election per se, his point was that differences between regions are also frequently differences between social class or ethnicity, and the latter were the cleavages that candidates actually emphasized during the campaign. Aside from the use of occasional epithets like “the candidate of Miraflores and San Isidro” (which really means candidate of the rich), no one really claimed that they represented the concerns of one region in particular, or that their opponent represented one region in particular.
Boas disagreed with the claim by Balbi concerning the rejection of neoliberalism. He said the economic model has always been part of the debate in Peru, and in the past it has been heavily questioned by the Marxist left. Humala has continued this, with, perhaps, the difference being that he has combined rejection of neoliberalism with anti-system opposition. That is, the “outsider” candidates who have in the past won the votes captured by Humala in this election, Alejandro Toledo and Alberto Fujimori, were advocates of neoliberal politics.

Taylor Boas
Rici Lake agreed with the assertion by Martin Tanaka concerning the similarities between the 2001 and the 2006 elections. In 2001 Peru Posible won about 60 percent of the votes of the south, while in 2006 Humala won closer to 70 percent. The biggest difference is the decline in the number of blank votes. Another major difference is that Toledo won in 2001 thanks to votes from the south, and Fujimori won in 1990 thanks to the same pattern of votes. In 2006, however, the candidate the south supported lost. The political map is not different, it is the same map as before, except that the left has changed. Toledo was elected by the south and failed to deliver his promises to help the south. After this election, the south does not have to oppose its own winner—it can oppose a winner it did not support in the first place.

Jim Rudolph and Rici Lake
Carmen Rosa Balbi agreed with Adrianzen regarding the media bias against Ollanta Humala. She said that the treatment of Humala was unlike anything seen in Peru before. Turning to the prospects for the future, Balbi raised the possibility of an alliance or coalition between APRA and the UPP. Such a coalition would guarantee nearly 90 votes. However, Humala and his inner circle appear inclined to reject the possibility of an alliance and instead seek to lead the opposition to the APRA government; this attitude has begun to produce divisions within UPP (between Carlos Tapia, for example, and Carlos Torres Caro). Balbi suggested that Humala’s refusal to congratulate Garcia on his victory suggests that he does not understand that there is more to this ritual than a “media show.” Peru is a country traumatized by violence. Offering congratulations to the winner is a desirable demonstration of conviviality.
Moreover, Garcia does not represent the right; the specious idea that he won with votes “lent” to him by the right was aptly dismissed by Garcia when he said that his second round votes were lent by the voters not by the right-wing candidate they supported in the first round. An intransigent opposition by Humala would lead to a continuation of polarization in a country in which protest has not been channeled by social movements, where conflict has been expressed politically but remains unorganized socially.

Martin Tanaka took issue with the idea that media bias against a candidate has never been worse than in this election, saying that in the role of the media in 1990 was worse. According to Boas, the worst case, by far, was 2000, when Fujimori’s security advisor Vladimiro Montesinos bought direct government control over the media. The comportment of the media might have been worse in 1990, though it was probably not as clear a case of net bias against one particular candidate.
Tanaka also insisted that the votes for Garcia were not just based on fear of Humala—thought this may have been true for sectors of the elite. Many voters in Lima supported Garcia because they were won over by promises such as the commitment to support microenterprises. Similarly, voters who did not share Humala’s opposition to the Free Trade Agreement with the United States would have been inclined to support Garcia. With respect to the sort of opposition that Humala will build, Tanaka suggested that the jury is still out. It is not yet clear whether his opposition will be loyal.
Alberto Adrianzen argued that the big issue to address for the future is not governability but representation. The task for Humala is to construct an opposition, based on a set of positions distinct from those of the government. The consensus that has to be built in Peru is not one that will be forged in dialogue round tables among technocrats, which have little to do with everyday life for many people. In politics, conflicting positions and interests need to be represented, yet for many Peruvians the systems fails to represent them at all.
Natalia Sobrevilla picked up the issue of the historical cleavages that have divided Peru, arguing that the north south cleavage can be traced to the importance Cusco has retained over time. She suggested, however, that the headway made by Humala in places like Cajamarca in the second round suggest a cleavage that cuts more along the coast versus highlands divide. The south as a region have never really been articulated. There are old rivalries between Cusco and Arequipa, between Tacna and Moquegua, for example. The efforts to create macro-regions stumbled on this reality. Sobrevilla suggested that the elections for regional and municipal governments in November will provide a measure of Humala’s staying power, and whether he has the organization and bases necessary to build a sustained movement.

Natalia Sobrevilla
Sobrevilla also reflected on the ways in which history is used in contemporary politics for various purposes. For example, the effort to “refound the republic” harkens back to most of Peru’s republican history and in this particular case appeals to memories of the confederation. Humala himself has been innocent of much of this, though his father has been more explicit in making historical references. She also stressed the impressive level of support won by Humala in this election, and argued that the 47 percent of the vote won by the UPP candidate was well in excess of the thirds in which the vote has been traditional divided and the quarter of the vote that the right commands.
Marisa Remy responded to Boas’ question regarding the critique of neoliberalism. She argued that neoliberalism has been uncritically accepted for most of the period between about 1990 and 2002. The media are linked to economically powerful groups that have not only muted criticism but have even demonized conflict within the democratic process on over fundamental questions like the viability of the economic model.
Fabiola Bazo wrapped up the discussion with two anecdotes showing how the APRA party is perceived by voters. The first was a conversation with a taxi driver who expressed his intention to vote for APRA because he did well in the first Garcia government as a money exchanger in the blackmarket on “Creole Wall Street.” She also gave an example of residents of San Isidro who were victims of the economic crisis of the late 1980s and, as a result, voted for Humala. These provide illustrations of the complexity of the processes leading to voting decisions.

Fabiola Bazo and Max Cameron
The main conclusions from this round table discussion were:
1. There are important contrasts between the first and second round results. Analysts should be careful about drawing inferences about how the political map has been redrawn based on the results of the first or second round in isolation. There are continuities between the results of both first and second rounds in 2001 and 2006. The biggest difference is that in the 2006 election the south voted for the losing side.
2. The nature of the opposition that will emerge from this election is still uncertain. Humala can be expected to be a tough opponent, provided he has the staying power and can build on the momentum of the election. Whether his opposition will be loyal or not is unclear. That said, conflict is part of democracy and there should be no presumption that only parliamentary opposition is legitimate.
3. There was some disagreement on whether to interpret the victory by Garcia as a victory for the right or the left. On the one hand, Garcia clearly captured right-wing support and his success in Lima tilted the balance in his favor. On the other hand, he won support from across a broad spectrum of voters in Lima and elsewhere. In general, opposition to neoliberalism appears to have intensified in this election largely as a result of the emergence of Humala.
4. Media bias was an issue in this election, though analysts had different views on whether bias was worse than in previous elections. In general, Humala was seen as having performed exceptionally well given his treatment by the media.
5. Analysts confront a major challenge to sort out the continuities and differences between this and previous elections. It is often said that Peru is a fractured nation, yet the specific fault lines, like tectonic plates, bear stress and shift in often unpredictable ways. This preliminary round table could only touch on some of the key questions. Further research, involving systematic and interdisciplinary efforts, will be necessary to decipher all the hidden lessons from this important electoral process.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
June 11, 2006

Photos: M.A. Cameron
In a meeting with the foreign press on Friday, June 9, Alan Garcia was asked about his admiration for François Mitterrand. The reporter mentioned that Ollanta Humala professes admiration for Napoleon Bonaparte and Charles De Gaulle, and he wondered whether Garcia would reflect on the tension between military men and social democrats.
Garcia said that military commanders tend to give commands and orders; they value order and “verticalize” society. Since the public rejects the tendency of democratic decision-making to be slow, the challenge is to demonstrate that democracy can operate within an authoritative and efficient state.

But Garcia said that it does not take a military man to govern with authority and energy, and this is why he admired Mitterrand. In addition to being an egalitarian republican and a socialist, Mitterrand also had superior tactical and strategic capacity. That Garcia identified closely with Mitterrand in this respect was made manifest in his statement that “a civilian can be a better tactician than a military man”—an obvious allusion to Humala.
Asked about the nature of power, Garcia said that power equals blame. Whoever has power is immediately blamed for everything. Therefore, who shares power also shares blame. Power never belongs to a single person or party. He cited political scientist Robert Dahl’s Who Governs? to make the case that in all democratic decisions power is distributed across a wide range of institutions. The politicians who have known how to share power, such as Mitterrand and Bill Clinton, have completed their terms as winners. “Whoever shares power, ends up winning” he said.

Concerning the challenges of governability facing the country, Garcia rejected the idea that he has to privilege the southern highlands where voters rejected him in favour of Humala. He insisted that he has won 7 million votes and is not going in “Humalize” himself (“no me voy a humalizar”). “Let us not forget the majoritarian message of the electorate. My first commitment is to my program and my electorate.”
Garcia also had harsh words for Humala for refusing to accept defeat gracefully. “He does not know how to lose. If one does not have greatness, one cannot lose with greatness. I regret that so many Peruvians have given their votes to people who don’t know how to lose.”
“The waters have returned to their normal level,” said Garcia with respect to the outcome of the election. That is, in spite of fears of an “irruption of something irrational” during the election, the result has been sealed without any disorder. If Humala persists in intransigent opposition Garcia said he would respond with the law. He called Humala someone who has recently left the barracks and needs to learn democratic habits.

Maxwell A. Cameron
June 9, 2006
It would be hard to understate the success of the second round presidential election on June 4, 2006. In the week prior to the election there was violence on the campaign trail and rumours of possible unrest in certain parts of the country if one of the political parties in contention lost. Yet election day came and the voters turned out in large numbers. They were orderly and peaceful. Yes, there was a confrontation in Arequipa after the polls closed, and there were isolated incidents elsewhere in the country, but by and large the election unfolded uneventfully. On 9:30 pm with over 77 percent of the vote counted, preliminary results were announced by the National Office of Electoral Processes; it was clear that Alan Garcia had emerged as the winner. There was no uproar, nor allegations of fraud. The reservists did not pour into the streets in protest. Everyone accepted the outcome as final.
The election is a big step in the consolidation of Peru’s democracy. Yet it also revealed huge divisions in Peruvian society, and it has exposed the limits of the Peruvian state. One of the biggest divisions is between town and countryside. In rural areas, voters sometimes have to walk for days to get to the polls. Others use public transport, but find that bus companies raise their fares to gouge customers on the weekend of the election. Rural voters often lack basic information about how to vote, or even where and when to vote.
Even more dramatically, many people in rural areas lack basic legal identification necessary to vote. The problem is most severe in the case of rural women. In some rural families, only the head of the household gets an identity card, leaving the rest of the family invisible to the state. A major reason for this is expense. Although it costs less than $10 (31 soles) to get an identity card, this is serious cash for those whose involvement in the cash economy is minimal. It is estimated that as over a million voters lack identity cards, and a quarter of a million people do not even have birth certificates.
Add to this the fact that many rural voters are illiterate and the problem is even more acute. Illiteracy is very high in rural areas. Statistics on this are unreliable, because there is no test of literacy when citizens take out their identity cards. People are merely asked whether they are literate. Rural schools are poor, and older rural inhabitants were schooled many years ago. They may have been taught to read and write at some point, but they are generally functionally illiterate today. Since members of voting stations are drawn by lottery, some of these people wind up becoming election officials on election day. The nice thing about lotteries is that they are democratic, but they also assume a basic level of civil competence. Without this competence, all sorts of problems may occur on election day and can give rise to material errors in the completion of voting returns. In some cases such errors can result returns from entire voting booths (which typically have around 200 voters) being annulled.
Add to this the complexity of the first round election, in which there were over 20 parties competing in three separate elections. Each member of the polling booth had to sign a form to install the poll, to carry out the scrutiny, and to close the poll. These forms were filled in at least 5 times (maybe more if there are lots of scrutineers who want copies), and had to be competed separately for each of the three elections. This meant signing at least 45 forms. In the first round, many members of polling booths were at work by 7 am and still signing forms by 11 pm in the evening—with only the most minimal sustenance provided during the day. The greater dispatch of the second round, and the speed with which results came in, demonstrates the difference that simplicity in the ballot can make.
The problem of the rural voter creates a huge opportunity for state building and the promotion of civil society. For example, peasant confederations could be used to distribute didactic material on voting procedures. Rural radio stations reach out to indigenous voters in their own native tongues, and they could be used to disseminate information about voting. In the process, resources could be channeled into rural areas and linkages built with rural communities. Peasant schools could be used for educating voters about the electoral process. A campaign to document voters would be a big step forward in promoting the presence of the state in rural areas, and the international community could be enlisted to provide resources. The state could also do a better job of getting voting stations into rural areas. More voting stations would help rural voters, especially if they were open for longer hours.
There is a notable contrast between the dramatic conditions that confront voters in rural areas and the hesitancy of officialdom to undertake steps that would make things easier for rural voters. For example, the Peruvian constitution is interpreted to mean that elections can only be held on one single day. This means there are no advance polls, nor can votes be submitted by mail. Advance polls are not logistically hard to organize, and they would take a lot of pressure off the entire system. The postal vote has been used by many countries around the world, and is not difficult to implement. Yet such simple reforms are met with indifference or resistance in Lima by officials and even by non-government organizations.
Electoral officials in Lima debate subtle distinctions such as whether election law permits a ballot to be “single” or “double,” or whether a general election is a single event or three separate elections (presidential, congressional, and Andean parliament). The various bodies responsible for the electoral process—the body that organizes the election, the body that resolves legal disputes, and the body that manages the voter list—wrangle at length over issues jurisdiction and competence. These disputes occupy much of the attention of officialdom, distracting them from focusing on more concrete issues like getting polling stations closer to voters or providing adequate training to the personnel in charge of polling stations. Last year a law was passed enabling the military and police to vote, yet the changes necessary to put this into practice were neglected. As a result, many soldiers were unable to vote because they were under orders to provide security for polling stations on election day. A postal vote would benefit the armed forces, as well as rural voters. It would also help people in jail who have not yet been found guilty. It would be one thing to dismiss the idea of a postal ballot if the state was capable of guaranteeing the vote to everyone legally entitled to vote, it is quite another when the state is denying the suffrage to those entitled to vote under the constitution.
Two aspects of the election process seem to cause serious distress and yet the willingness of electoral officials to address them is next to nil. One is the fact that voting is not only obligatory—the failure to vote results in a heavy fine. This punitive measure is especially harsh on poor people, and is bitterly resented. Why should voting—the ultimate act of popular sovereignty—be legally required? It would be one thing if the state were able to place polling stations near all voters and enumerate all those citizens eligible to vote. But if the Peruvian state is so deficient that it cannot provide legal identity to all its citizens, how can it insist that all should vote? Worse still, the fear of getting fined is a source of reluctance to acquire identity cards.
The second aspect of the electoral process that is unusual is the practice of destroying ballots once they are counted. As a result, recounts are impossible. Instead, when material errors appear in the voting returns, rather than recounting the votes, judicial decisions have to be made about whether voting returns are legally valid. If scrutineers of a political party challenge the results of a particular voting booth, it is not possible to go back and recount the votes. Rather, electoral official must decide whether to accept or reject the voting return. Advocates of this system suggest that the current system is better than retaining the ballots, since arguing over 83,000 voting returns (some 40 percent of which were challenged in the first round of this election) is more efficient than arguing over 16.5 million votes. The difference, however, is that all one can do with voting returns is decide whether they are legally valid. With original ballots the issue is not one of interpretation but one of simple recounting.
Another example of a regulation that was made by officials that simply cannot be enforced is the prohibition on the dissemination of polls one week before the election. In the age of the Internet, it is not surprising that the results of the polls conducted in the last week—and there are many such polls—circulate by a host of means and often wind up on the Internet reported by foreign services and returning to Peru. The law would be more enforceable if it prohibited the dissemination of polls for 24 hours or 48 hours before the election day, but one week is simply too long.
Political scientists Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz have argued that there can be no democracy where there is no state. The electoral process in Peru offers opportunities for state building that could, at the same time, reinforce democracy.

Jorge Castañeda
Daily Times (Pakistan)
June 8, 2006

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John Crabtree, Comment is free… The Guardian, June 5, 2006 03:55 PM
Second-time round Peru’s new president favours ‘liberal economics’. Washington is happy; less so are other Latin American leaders.

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Matthew Singer
June 3, 2006
As the election arrives, one question is how to interpret the large proportion of voters who have been reporting in polls that they intend to null their votes or vote blank instead of supporting one of the two candidates. For example, 19% of respondents in the Universidad Catolica poll conducted immediately prior to the debate and published last week said they would not vote for either candidate, three times the number of voters who were undecided (6%) and almost three times larger than the margin between the two candidates in the entire electorate (7%). The challenge for pollsters in interpreting these numbers in to determine (or guess) which of these blank votes will actually nullify their vote instead of supporting one of those candidates and which of these are “hidden votes” who simply prefer to not declare their support for one of the candidates.
In recent fieldwork, I was able to obtain a portion of the results of the before mentioned survey as part of an ongoing project on economic voting. I do not have measures of voters’ policy preferences at this time, only measures of voters’ demographic characteristics and employment status. However, this
data also allow us to perform a simple analysis of the choice between voting for Humala or Garcia or in blank. I should emphasize, however, that these statistical results are very preliminary and should be read with some caution but they do seem to be robust to model specification.
First, the model of support for Humala does not yield many surprising results that go against popular wisdom or commentary. All else equal, Humala supporters tend to be pessimistic with respect to their personal economic situation in the upcoming year, lower class, on the left of the ideological
scale, male, and (surprisingly to me at least) better educated than Garcia supporters. Evaluations of the national economy and employment status (whether or not the voter is unemployed or employed in the informal sector) do not have an independent effect on voter choices.
Interestingly, however, many of the factors that predict support for Humala also predict that voters will vote in blank. Specifically, the model predicts that voters who have negative evaluations of the nation economy or of their own economic prospects, who are leftist in ideological orientation, and who are
better educated are more likely to vote in blank than to support either candidate. More specifically, voters on the middle-left of the ideological spectrum are more likely to nullify their vote than to support either candidate. In addition, those with the most negative economic evaluations are substantially more likely to cast a blank vote. Finally, the most educated voters also tended to nullify their vote.
These three results suggest that a large number of voters who otherwise might have been part of Humala’s block, according to this preliminary analysis, have declared their intention to instead nullify their vote. The question is whether these results reflect 1) the failure of Humala to animate a substantial proportion of votes that were available to him, resulting perhaps even in blank votes costing him the presidency or 2) the existence of a large hidden vote for his candidacy who are identifying themselves as blank voters. The first possibility is especially interesting as Humala’s campaign between rounds has been to focus on mobilizing his base instead of reaching out to swing voters in the middle of the spectrum but his campaign appears (if the polling data is accurate) to still be losing ideological moderates that he has not targeted and also the economically pessimistic voters that his campaign claims to represent. This question of interpretation cannot be answered by statistics, however, but
will be resolved over the next few days as votes are counted.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
June 3, 2006
Much is at stake in the second round of the presidential election to be held in Peru on June 4. How will analysts interpret a victory by one or another of the two candidates?
A victory for Alan Garcia would mean:
1. The polling companies are doing their job
2. The median voter theorem works in Peru
3. Political parties matter
4. Responsible opposition is rewarded
5. The public has partially rejected the economic model, but wishes to retain some elements
6. The south will be governed by the north and Lima
7. The congress will be closed legally
8. Peru-Chile relations will be based on competition
9. Peru will be closer to Brazil, and this will favor Lula
10. The existing electoral democracy has a chance of consolidation
A victory for Ollanta Humala would mean:
1. The polling companies got it wrong
2. The median voter does not like the candidate who occupied the center
3. Voters prefer “outsiders”
4. Voters want change in the economic model
5. The public could not forgive Garcia
6. The north and Lima have lost their gravity
7. A constituent assembly will be convened
8. Peru-Chile relations will be based on rivalry
9. Peru will be closer to Venezuela, which will favor Chavez
10. The existing electoral democracy will undergo rapid transformation
The Polls: All publishable polls (Peruvian law prohibits the publication of polls one week before the election, and we respect this law) have pointed to an APRA victory, albeit by a narrow margin in some cases. A victory for Humala would mean that the polling companies failed to detect the hidden vote, and that the roughly 20 percent of the electorate that the polling companies rarely reach went overwhelmingly for Humala. Alternatively, a large shift in public opinion—probably driven by last-minute considerations by undecided voters or voters who had been planning to cast blank or spoiled ballots—altered the outcome at the very end of the campaign.
The Median Voter: Garcia occupied the center of the spectrum, while Humala failed to shift decisively toward the center in the second round. His message did not become significantly more radical, but he did not moderate his tone either. If the candidate closest to the average voter loses, this means that the average voter repudiated the candidate whose policy preferences are most similar to her own. The most obvious reason for this to happen would be a repudiation of the candidate for other reasons—in this case, negative views of Garcia would be the most obvious explanation.
Parties: A victory by Garcia would mean a victory for the party system. Alan Garcia campaigned as the leader of a political party with seven decades of history behind it. Moreover, the APRA party has acted like a responsible opposition for the past five years. It could have tried to overthrow Toledo, or otherwise obstructed his government as opposition parties have done in the past. Legislative opposition is a proving ground for leaders, and APRA has shown discipline in opposition. By contrast, Humala’s opposition has been anti-systemic. He adopted the Union for Peru after failing to register his own party. His most significant acts of opposition have been the uprisings in Locumba (and in Andahuaylas, though Humala has distanced himself from this rebellion). In the first round he hinted that a victory by Lourdes Flores would result in democratic instability, and suggested she would be removed from office before completing her term. If Humala loses, he will have to decide what kind of opponent he wants to be. His immediate reaction to defeat could be decisive in shaping his career in opposition, and a narrow margin of victory could set him on a course of confrontation.
Radical versus “responsible” change: It has been said that the winner of this election will be the candidate who is most able to voice discontent with the status quo. Lourdes Flores’ failure to hold onto her early lead in the first round campaign largely reflected her inability to tap into the angry mood among voters. The question is: how deep is the anger? Garcia casts himself as a harbinger of change, but he is still an insider. His campaign lemma was “responsible change.” A victory for Garcia will be read as a partial repudiation of the current economic model, and a move toward a more populist alternative. A victory for Humala would be a more forceful repudiation of the economic model.
Governing the South: A Garcia government will need to overcome its northern and Limeno roots and find ways of governing and including the south. This election has pitted north against south, with the central battle ground being Lima. Garcia has done a better job of appealing to Lima for votes, but it is not clear that he has made inroads into the south. Someone said that in the debate Garcia talked to Lima; Humala to the rest of the country. If Humala wins, this will confirm the old rule that whoever wins Cusco wins in the rest of the country. If he loses, the rules have changed.
Congress: Neither APRA nor UPP control the congress alone. Humala has announced plans to introduce a constituent assembly. There are no guarantees that he will do so according to established constitutional practices, which are precarious in Peru. Garcia has also announced plans to close congress should he fail to get a mandate to implement his program. When politicians talk about closing congress on the campaign trail, especially given the nation’s recent history, they should be taken seriously. APRA and UPP could always try to work together for constitutional change, but there are political logics of competition and fragmentation that may militate against this.
Chile: Whereas Garcia treats Chile as a competitor to be bested, Humala regards Chile as a threat to be deterred. Chileans will sleep more peacefully if Garcia is elected; they will be alarmed if Humala wins.
Chavez: The idea of “axes” of left-wing alternatives (one radical populist, the other social democratic) is not particularly helpful for understanding the current choices facing Peruvians. Humala is not as radical as Chavez; Garcia is not as social democratic as Lula. A victory for Humala would, however, contribute to an expansion of influence for Chavez, who has become increasingly assertive. If Garcia is elected, Peru will balance Venezuela and swing closer to Brazil. It is ironic that Garcia is now seen as a counter-weight to radical change, given that his first term in office was characterized by strongly anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic rhetoric and policy. Populism has its many “moments,” as Marxists are wont to say.
Democracy: In a democracy, there are winners and losers. In a consolidated democracy, the losers accept defeat, knowing they will have another chance to win in the future. Both APRA and UPP have to think about the possibility of defeat in terms of future elections. For APRA, a defeat would mean the extinction of the current generation of Aprista leaders. Alan Garcia would become APRA’s “historic” leader, and the next five years would need to be devoted to cultivating new blood. There are good reasons to expect APRA would do this well. Many observers believe that Humala entered the campaign without expecting to do as well has he has. His movement has been alluvial, not incremental, in growth. A presidential defeat would probably result in a splintering of the UPP, at least after the regional and municipal elections in the fall if not before. Not only will Humala need to struggle to hold his party together in congress, he will have to find a way of channeling the frustration of his supporters—voters in the south, reservists—into the democratic system. He may well look to Evo Morales for inspiration. Morales won the presidency after a prolonged struggle, not only in the electoral arena, but also on the terrain of social movement struggles for control over land, water, and natural resources.

Peru’s presidential election report (4:25)
The World, June 2, 2006
Correspondent Chip Mitchell reports on this weekend’s runoff round in Peru’s presidential election. Today international observers urged the two candidates — former president Alan Garcia and retired army officer Ollanta Humala — to moderate the tone of their campaigns.
Audio: Download file

Hugo Passarello Luna
Cusco, 1 de junio del 2006
Ayer por la noche el candidato Ollanta Humala cerró su campaña en Cusco. La decisión de terminar allí es acorde con el leitmotiv de su campaña: Cusco es la antigua capital del imperio inca, del tahuantinsuyo, del cual Humala flamea sus banderas redefiniendo el nacionalismo.
Además, Cusco fue tierra humalista en la primera vuelta obteniendo 57% de votos válidos (43 puntos por arriba del segundo ganador, el APRA).
A diferencia de lo sucedido en el anterior evento, antes de la primera vuelta, la Plaza de Armas de Cusco no estaba llena, alrededor de un 60% del lugar estuvo copado por los simpatizantes de Humala.
La fiesta nacionalista empezó temprano, a las cinco de la tarde, casi tres horas y media antes de que llegara Humala. Lentamente llegaban las delegaciones desde los distintos puntos del departamento.
Los maestros de ceremonias arengaban a la gente cambiando indistintamente entre el castellano y el quechua, ante la mirada confusa de los turistas que hacían un esfuerzo enorme por entender lo que ellos pensaban era ‘spanish.’
La música folklórica peruana mantuvo el entusiasmo de los asistentes mientras esperaban la llegada de su comandante.
Un curioso grupo que estuvo presente fueron los reservistas, que vestían polos que los identificaban como tales e incluían el nombre de Antauro (por Antauro Humala, hermano del candidato actualmente preso por su trágico levantamiento en Andahuaylas). De vez en cuando gritaban: ¡Se siente, se siente, Antauro esta presente!
Cuando finalmente llegó Humala, lo hizo con su tradicional corrida, que esta vez no sólo sirvió como show de virilidad sino para escapar de la marea humana que se le arrojó (logrando un record político no visto en el debate al hacer los últimos cien metros hacia el escenario en apenas unos segundos).
Nadine Heredia llegó unos minutos después y permaneció junto a su marido sobre el escenario pero se remitió sólo a entregar sonrisas y saludar a la gente.
Humala retornó a su discurso de la primera vuelta, siendo más incisivo, lleno de promesas y con ataques directos a Alan García. Volvió a mencionar sus caballos de batalla: la prometida rebaja de un 30% de todos los combustibles; la revisión de todos los contratos con las empresas transnacionales; la investigación y castigo de todos los funcionarios corruptos y la erradicación de las planillas doradas. Cada anuncio fue acompañado con fuertes aplausos y convenientes fuegos artificiales.
Al condenar la política económica de su rival, Ollanta atacó al posible candidato al ministerio de economía en una posible victoria aprista. Pero tropezó al decir: “¡Quien seguramente será el ministro de economía!” para luego corregirse “¡Quien posiblemente sea el ministro de economía!” si ganara Alan.
Humala hizo un tímido llamado a no caer en las provocaciones y actuar violentamente, quizás refiriéndose a como deben actuar los nacionalistas luego del 4 de junio. Humala dijo: “¡Estamos cansados de la violencia, queremos vivir en paz!” tratando de espantar los fantasmas que se arrojaron sobre ellos sobre una posible reacción violenta si es que pierden este domingo.
El discurso continuó con el mismo tono fuerte y punzante, gritándole al micrófono, durante la hora que duró.
Al final Humala se retiró sobre los hombres de sus simpatizantes que lo llevaron en una parcial vuelta olímpica por la plaza. La euforia, el entusiasmo y el sabor de una victoria se hicieron presentes.
Luego la gente se dispersó tranquilamente y la plaza fue invadida por policías y personal municipal que rápidamente se abocó a limpiar la plaza. Unas horas después no había rastros nacionalistas.
Más allá de la campaña política esta noche tuvo algo especial. Rompiendo con la rutina nocturna de turistas pululando por las calles, por una noche la plaza de armas fue nuevamente una fiesta de los cusqueños

Argumentos #4 incluye:
Martín Tanaka, Reflexiones antes del día D
Alberto Vergara, Alan y sus circunstancias
Víctor Caballero, ¿Y si pierde Humala?
Roxana Barrantes, Entre lo privado y lo público
Carolina Trivelli, La valla queda alta: una mirada a los cambios en la pobreza
Ramón Pajuelo, “La gente se ha pasado la voz”: un vistazo a la primera vuelta electoral desde las alturas de Huanta
Tania Vásquez, El comportamiento electoral de los peruanos en el exterior: ¿una emergente ciudadanía política transnacional?
Julio Vargas, Línea de tiempo
Números anteriores de Argumentos Electoral. Argumentos #4 Download file

Thanks again to Rici for his excelent analysis!

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Maxwell A. Cameron
June 1, 2006
Political scientists often debate whether campaigns matter. A lot of campaign activity seems to have little impact, but some political scientists insist that candidates can prime voters and frame issues in ways that influence how people vote.
The election in Peru this year offers an example of when campaigns matter, and when they do not. The first round showed how a front-running candidate, Lourdes Flores, could lose her lead and ultimately fail to place in a runoff as a result of her inability to respond to campaign dynamics such as the rise of an outsider candidate, Ollanta Humala, and the polarization that produced. Alan Garcia proved more able to exploit the rise of Humala, offering himself as a better opponent to challenge Humala in the second round.
The second round has demonstrated the limits of campaign activity. As soon as it became clear that Flores was out of contention, the bulk of her vote went to Garcia. In spatial terms, the reason is obvious: Garcia is located near the median voter, while Humala is closer to the left. Most of Flores’ voters are in the center of the right of the spectrum. In geographical terms, the reason is equally obvious: Garcia took the north while Humala took the south. This biggest block of voters up for grabs were in Lima, on the coast. In the north-south cleavage that divides Peru, Lima is closer to the north than the south.
As a consequence, the polls have shown no movement in the candidates’ support for most of May. According to APOYO, Garcia has hovered around 55 percent; Humala is around 45 percent. That said, a recent APOYO vote simulation poll placed the two candidates in a technical tie. It would seem that there are a lot of hidden supporters of Humala, voters who are not telling pollsters for whom they will vote.
The stability of voter preferences has not been altered by the main campaign events. The main events have been:
– Flores accepted defeat saying she had lost not in the ballot boxes but in the vote scrutinizing and counting process.
– The campaign has been internationalized by comments by Hugo Chavez who has criticized Alan Garcia and offered support for Humala.
– Polemical comments have been made by elected officials—including the president and former president Alberto Fujimori—as well as by Vladimiro Montesinos.
The campaign has been dirty rather than polarized, with constant “counter-campaign” activity, a bout of violence in Cusco and bitter personal attacks between the candidates. Humala seeks to dislodge Garcia by attacking his credibility while Garcia seeks to cast Humala as a dangerous and violent threat to Peru’s stability. It is hard to know whether these attacks will have an impact on the large number of voters who plan to cast blank or null ballots, or will win over undecided voters. There seems to be a growing mood of disenchantment with both candidates, and this will probably benefit Humala. While Garcia is still the most likely candidate to win, the growing sense seems to be that the race will be tighter than anticipated.

By Maxwell A Cameron
Comment is Free… The Guardian, May 30, 2006 – 04:45 PM
On June 4 2006, Peruvian voters will choose their next president in a run-off between the top two contenders from the first-round election, which was held on April 9.
The polls put Alan García Pérez, the former president (1985-1990) and leader of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), ahead of Ollanta Humala Tasso, the outsider candidate and leader of the Union for Peru (UPP) who has aligned himself with presidents Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia.
It would be tempting, but wrong, to frame the decision as a choice between social democracy and radical populism. The Peruvian election exposes the fallacy of splitting the Latin American left into two great subspecies.
In a recent commentary in Foreign Affairs magazine, the noted intellectual Jorge Castañeda and former Mexican minister of foreign affairs wrote of “two lefts” – a “right” left and a “wrong” left. The “right” left is “modern, open-minded, reformist and internationalist”, although it springs from the “hard-core left of the past”; the “wrong” left, born of the great tradition of Latin American populism, is “nationalist, strident, and close-minded”.
Castañeda extols the virtues of Chile’s new president, Michelle Bachelet, Uruguay’s president, Tabaré Vásquez, and, with qualifications, Brazil’s President Luis Ignácio “Lula” da Silva; he excoriates the “wrong” left, as personified by Chávez, Morales, and Argentina’s Peronist President Néstor Kirchner. He does not mention APRA’s García but he lumps Humala together with Chávez and Morales.
It is true that there is a big difference between leaders like Chávez and Bachelet, but we should not assume that all leftwing movements in the region can be classified into moderate social democrats and radical populists. Peru illustrates why.
Neither Humala nor García fits comfortably within Castañeda’s dichotomy. García has sought to portray himself as a social democrat and an advocate of “responsible change.” Foreign and local investors embrace him as the best candidate to retain Peru’s pro-market, export-oriented economic model while pursuing reformist social policies. Yet APRA is the very embodiment of populism: it is a multi-class party led by a paternalistic leader who offers redistributive reforms in return for votes.
Humala is nowhere near as radical as Chávez. Nor does he have Morales’s democratic credentials. His programme is unmistakably social democratic. It is called “the great transformation”, in deference to Karl Polanyi, not Karl Marx. It proposes the development of internal markets, greater access to credit, support for agriculture, a renegotiation of the free trade agreement, food self-sufficiency, and the renegotiation of tax holidays or special royalty exemptions for foreign investors.
The programmatic differences between APRA and the UPP are so minimal that each side accuses the other of plagiarism.
The two candidates differ most in the sphere of politics. In the words of journalist Gustavo Gorriti: “Alan García could not be a dictator even if he wanted; Ollanta Humala could not be a democrat even if he tried.” In this view, García is the leader of an organised party and he would, in all likelihood, govern according to the democratic rules of the game. Within these democratic rules, however, García proposes the adoption of faceless judges in Peru’s courts as well as the establishment of the death penalty. He picked a vice-presidential running mate associated with a prison massacre for which he was responsible in 1986, and he refuses to accept the central findings of Peru’s truth and reconciliation commission.
As an outsider, someone who challenges the party system, Humala would have difficulty governing in accordance with democratic rules. In this sense, there are notable similarities between Humala and Chávez. Both started their careers with unsuccessful acts of military rebellion before running for office. Like Chávez, Humala has proposes a constitutional assembly to rewrite the nation’s constitution. In the process, he would almost certainly attempt to centralise executive power.
Evo Morales has also called elections for a constituent assembly in Bolivia, but the similarities between Morales, Chávez, and Humala should not be overstated. Like the Jacques-Louis David paintings of Napoleon crossing the Alps, Chávez, and Humala resemble Bonaparte-like leaders mounted on relatively feeble movements and parties; Evo Morales has risen to power with the backing of combative and well-organised social movements.
For two decades these movements have struggled for water, land and control over resources; in the process, a militant indigenous consciousness has been awakened.
The constitutional underpinnings of democracy are always at risk when a powerful leader proposes radical changes in a country with deep inequalities, especially when political parties are in an advanced state of decay. Even Morales’s detractors agree, however, that his electoral victory represents, for now, a deepening of democracy.
In contrast with Morales, Humala’s leadership reflects popular disorganisation. Confronted by Morales’s bold nationalisation of the oil and gas industry in Bolivia, Humala failed to define what, concretely, nationalisation of natural resources would mean should he win office in Peru. He calls for reparations for victims of human rights crimes but refuses to address allegations that he committed human rights abuses while serving as commander of a military base during the counter-insurgency war in the early 1990s. His electoral strategy oscillates between appeals to a disenfranchised rural supporters and assurances of moderation for urban professionals. A leader of a real movement–or an organised party–would be compelled to define a position on these issues more clearly.
A victory for APRA would signal a return to populism. APRA’s populism is not the strident subspecies that Castañeda deplores; nor is it anything like the Chilean-style social democracy he admires. García presided over one of the most corrupt and inept governments in Peruvian history, but he has won over many of the voters who cast their ballots behind more conservative candidates in the first round of the election. The business community and urban professionals back García as a bulwark against Humala – and the influence of Chávez.
Peru, like the rest of the region, no longer shows the enthusiasm it once did for the market-friendly economic recipes of the so-called Washington consensus. It is hard to generalise beyond that observation, except to say that a multiplicity of movements and parties is emerging in search of alternatives to the existing order. The idea of a “right” left and a “wrong” left, so redolent of the rhetoric of axes of good and evil, obscures more than it illuminates.

Hugo Passarello Luna
Lima 25 de mayo del 2006
Fotos: H. Passarello Luna
Después de los ataques que Ollanta Humala recibió en algunas de sus caravanas por Lima (le arrojaron rocas, tomates, frutas, etc.) los miembros de su seguridad decidieron hacer escudos para protegerlo en las futuras marchas (tienen la formar de la olla con la cruz del voto sobre ella).

Esto es un reflejo del miedo que su seguidores tienen de un posible atentado contra Humala. Siempre que el candidato sale esta rodeado de por lo menos 7 (a veces más) hombres y mujeres con chaquetas rojas que los identifica como seguridad.

Los escudos son el ultimo objeto creado para proteger al candidato que, al acompañarlo en varias campañas pude comprobar, es blanco de algún que otro piedrazo acompañado con acusaciones de ‘asesino.’
En Rimac sus simpatizantes fueron recibidos con algunas naranjas y piedras. Lo mismo se repitió el pasado 24 de mayo en San Juan de Lurigancho. Hay que notar que estos casos son aislados y poco frecuentes, pero pasan en casi todas las marchas.
Lo único que han logrado estos ataques es de aumentar entre los nacionalistas las sospechas y el miedo por el bienestar de su líder. La paranoia latente en el partido crea continuos rumores internos, ideas de infiltrados y una constante orden de estar en guardia. Un ejemplo, el pasado lunes 22 de mayo, corrió un rumor que un grupo alrededor 100 personas iban en camino al Comando Nacional de Campaña para tomarlo. La ansiedad creada dentro del Comando en San Borja hizo que muchos de sus integrantes estuvieran afuera esperando cualquier eventualidad. Finalmente, el grupo de potenciales agresivos (no más de 30) llegaron y entregaron un documento para Ollanta Humala. Luego se fueron y todo volvió a la normalidad. Si bien sus intenciones no eran para apoyar la candidatura de Humala, el miedo creado alrededor de su llegada era parte de esa burbuja paranoica.
La democracia en Perú, por suerte, no es tan sensible a ataques violentos contra candidatos. Pero quizás el pasado militar de muchos de los integrantes del Partido Nacionalista los condiciona a una visión maniquea de amigos y enemigos donde la violencia esta latente.
Hay que notar que la seguridad Humalista no se comporta de manera violenta en sus marchas y sólo se limita a dar espacio al candidato y tratar de parar los objetos arrojados contra Humala. Hay casos en que algunos miembros del partido actúan de manera independiente y agreden o insultan a las personas que gritan asesino y otras acusaciones contra Humala. El sentimiento es que los apristas (así los consideran ellos) están siempre listo para infiltrarse, provocar y arruinar las campañas de Ollanta y por lo tanto tienen que ser confrontados con la misma moneda.
¿Quien empezó? No se sabe, pero las acusaciones vuelan de un lado al otro y se potencian a si mismas.
Las campañas en Perú todavía tienen un sabor de agresión y conspiraciones, en general falsas, pero siempre presentes.

Hugo Passarello Luna
Lima, 25 de mayo del 2006

Photos: H. Passarello Luna
Hoy es el cumpleaños de Nadine Heredia, esposa del candidato nacionalista Ollanta Humala, y creí conveniente dedicar unas pequeñas palabras a esta reciente participe de la política peruana.
El pasado martes Nadine asistió a un breve evento para ella en una base del Callao, a escasas cuadras del puerto.
La asistencia fue grande. Alrededor de 250 personas colmaron la base en un evento organizado por el grupo de ‘mujeres nacionalistas’ de esa base.
Este pequeño acto demostró la dimensión femenina que los Humalistas quieren lograr. Desde que Argentina presenció el fenómeno Evita en los años 40 muchos políticos de Latinoamérica han tratado de emularlo.
Después de vencer en la primera vuelta, los nacionalistas crearon un ‘Comando de Mujeres’ que ayuda a organizar la enorme y activa presencia femenina en el partido bajo la imagen de Nadine como ‘ejemplo de mujer y madre nacionalista.’ Ya es común observar polos (T-shirts) que leen ‘LAS MUJERES CON OLLANTA’ y otro tipo de parafernalia feminista especialmente confeccionados para este nuevo comando y para el pasado día de la madre.
En el Callao, la gran mayoría de los presentes eran mujeres que venían a ver a su líder. En el momento que se formó un nudo de gente en la angosta puerta de entrada, algunas personas demandaban paso con la excusa de ‘Soy mujer.’ Era una tarde de mujeres, para mujeres y con mujeres.

Hubo muchos (muchísimos) oradores durante el evento, pero lo que mas sobresalió fueron las constantes interrupciones de los presentes con cánticos y gritos de apoyo para Nadine y Ollanta. Uno de los que mas llamó la atención fue el comentario de un organizador que dijo: ‘Finalmente, por primera vez en años, tendremos una primera dama nacional’ en clara alusión a los orígenes no-peruanos de Eliane Karp Fernenburg. Y esto fue seguido de todos gritando ‘Nadine es peruana, Nadine es peruana.’
Nadine trata de ser un pilar esencial de la ideología nacionalista, que presenta no solo planes de gobierno sino también modelos de vida a seguir (similar a otros regímenes del pasado reciente).
La movilización de grupos femeninos bajo el liderazgo de Nadine ha sido efectiva. Pero todavía no queda claro cuales son los objetivos propuestos para que una mujer sea verdaderamente nacionalista. ¿Significa ser una madre? ¿Significa ser una fiel acompañante? ¿O los nacionalistas tienen nuevos roles para una nueva mujer?

Cynthia Sanborn was on RPP commenting on the debate last night. She read my description of the debate, and wrote the following response:

Gustavo Yamada, Fernando Villarán and I ended up staying in RPP with Raul Vargas throughout the debate and making comments after each block, at the commercial breaks. We watched the debate on the TV monitors in order to be able to transmit to listeners what they were not seeing. Because I think I watched pretty closely, I beg to disagree with a few of your points in the blog summary — about Humala winning on style, and on his closing statement being the strongest.
Frankly, I think Humala showed an incredible lack of style, clarity or timing, all of which he needed to make effective jabs at Garcia – he came out swinging and took the anticipated aggressive stance, but in my view he didn’t pull it off well. He read a lot from notes, apparently unfamiliar or uncomfortable with some of the issues at hand, and missed a number of excellent opportunities to take the initiative or get back at Garcia’s weak spots. From the very start, when Garcia criticized him for arriving late, he could have made a retort about Garcia making all of us wait in long lines during his past government, but instead he opted for an obvious lie. Everybody who watched TV saw what actually happened, that it wasn’t Apristas who held him up but his stopping for an agua mineral, so what was the point of saying that? Under pressure, what else would he lie about?
(Aside — miiltary professionals are noted for their punctuality, even in Peru, so I don’t think anyone believes he arrived late by accident).
During various other times he could have reminded the audience in general, understandable terms of the errors of Garcias first government — indeed, he HAD to do that to counter Garcia’s image of newfound maturity and redemption– but instead he made oblique references to Rodrigo Franco and Mantilla, which younger voters might not even understand or care much about (unfortunately). Garcia went after Toledo, not Humala, and I think that is what many voters have fresh in mind — replacing an often tardy, often frivolous, often incomprehensible president with somebody serious and authoritative. Like García?
Formerly known as “Caballo Loco”, Garcia now looked extremely tranquilo y sereno. Humala was not able to provoke him, try as he might, and instead let himself be provoked on the Andahuaylas issue — “pisó el palito” as they say, about his brother, instead of changing the topic or getting back at APRA. Really, I thought he was a mediocre sparring partner, at some points even repeating the promises and programs Garcia had just enunciated (“analfabetismo cero”). Even if he did make some good points (the Montesinos issue was a good point, for example, which Garcia evaded), and even if he did put forth some programmatic ideas that differentiate him from Garcia and can resonate with voters (seguridad ciudadana con participacion, fortalecer alcaldes, defensa de RRNN, etc).
In the closing statements, Garcia looked straight at the camera and thanked the Peruvian people (and Dios). Humala read a canned statement, did not look at the audience, and did not thank anyone but himself. The bit about not taking the presidential salary — now who believes THAT? Really, I did not see that as a strong closing statement.
In any case, it was useful to see both of them in action and I think Humala will certainly retain his committed followers after this, but I don’t think that kind of performance in the debates or on the road — is going to capture significant numbers of indecisos. Garcia, for his part, was so full of catchy programs and sound bites that it soon began to sound like too much. But he didn’t really have to worry about this — just had to avoid losing points to Humala and, except for the Montesinos issue, I don’t think he did.
We will see that the polls say, and what actually happens on election day of course.
Cynthia Sanborn is a political scientist who teaches in the Centro de Investigaciones de la Universidad del Pacifico (CIUP). She did her PhD at Harvard University, and works on public policy, democracy, development, and civil society in Latin America.

Maxwell A. Cameron
May 21, 2006
Overall Assessment
The presidential debate between Alan Garcia and Ollanta Humala will probably do little to help Peru’s undecided voters. Garcia won on substance, while Humala won on style. The overall effect is unlikely to be decisive.
The 31 percent of the electorate who voted for Humala in the first round will probably be pleased with their candidate’s performance. In the face of a formidable rhetorician, Humala not only held his own ground, he conveyed a sense of sincerity and passion. His words often came out in a harsh, staccato manner, but he spoke directly to the audience, making solid eye contact with the camera. His hand gestures and body language were consistent with his words. Although he sometimes looked a little spooked about being face-to-face with Garcia, his overall attitude was pugnacious and confident. Humala’s informality was reinforced by his dress. He wore a white shirt, open at the collar, under a brown sports jacket.
The 24 percent of the electorate who voted for Garcia in the first round may be confident that Garcia struck the right balance between appealing to his core supporters and offering reassurances to the new voters he must attract. He wore a blue suit and tie and struck poses that seemed designed to convey authority. He came across as knowledgeable on matters of policy, and his statements were full of concrete policies and proposals aimed at specific audiences. At the same time, Garcia seemed tired and distant. He often looks more shifty than earnest, more calculating than thoughtful, and this reinforces the tendency of voters to see him as untrustworthy.
Given that there were no knock-out blows, and no egregious errors, Garcia may have won a victory by default. Polls conducted prior to the debate showed Garcia ahead by a substantial margin. APOYO gave Garcia the lead by 56 to 44 percent, while the University of Lima gave Garcia an advantage over Humala of 62 to 38 percent. The same polls suggest that about 1 in 5 voters are either undecided, or inclined to cast blank or spoiled ballots. In other words, Humala has an uphill battle to catch up with Garcia. His performance in the debate was strong, but probably insufficient to revert the advantage held by Garcia.
A Strange Beginning
The drama began even before the debate with a delay caused by Humala. Just a few minutes before 8 pm, I was standing in a crowd of journalists in the patio in front of the National Museum of Archeology, Anthropology, and History of Peru in Pueblo Libre where the debate was held. A silver SUV pulled up in front of a nearby canteen called “El Libertador.” Within seconds, the assembled reporters recognized Humala and surrounded him.

Chaos outside El Libertador
Inexplicably, rather than heading for the Museum, Humala entered the bodega and ordered a bottle of mineral water. He then left and rather than getting back in his vehicle, he walked three blocks to the rear entrance of the museum. The walk took over 10 minutes because Humala was mobbed by unruly press. A block away in the background one could hear the chants of APRA supporters who had assembled outside the police perimeter.

Press mobs Humala as he walks to Museum
The debate began almost 20 minutes late, and Garcia, who arrived 20 minutes early, complained that Humala’s behavior showed a lack of respect for the country. Humala denied responsibility for the delay, and blamed it on a “reception” that he had been given by APRA supporters. In fact, the APRA crowd was never anywhere near Humala, and the delay was entirely due to his inexplicable behavior. Garcia responded that stopping for 15 minutes for a “sandwich in the Queirolo” was not a good reason for delaying the debate.
Human Rights and Governability
The most notable aspect of the first part of the debate, which dealt with the topic of human rights and governability, was what was not said. Humala did not mention the massacre at El Fronton, which occurred under Alan Garcia’s government in 1986, nor did Garcia raise allegations about human rights abuses that Humala is accused of having committed when he commanded a military base in Madre Mia.

The press room in the Museum
Garcia opened by calling for a social democracy based on liberty, tolerance, and the respect for the separation of powers as an impediment to the abuse of power. He dismissed the need for a constituent assembly. Humala said Peru’s democracy does not represent the Peruvian people or serve national interests, but rather economically powerful groups and transnationalized interests. He said that governability must be based on social peace, and this requires attending to the needs of the poor.
In his reply, Garcia attempted to cast Humala as a representative of Peru’s long tradition of military involvement in politics. He also alluded to Chavez, saying Peru’s sovereignty would not be threatened by a petroleum power in the Caribbean. Humala insisted that his vision of governability requires recovering control over natural resources. He compared the current regime of control over resources, in which the resource belongs to the nation until it is extracted, as being like saying a child belongs to its mother until it is born, and then it is taken away.
Garcia responded by saying he favors renegotiating with foreign capital, but not by taking a leap into the void, along the lines of the Bolivian government of Evo Morales, which would result in capital flight, and unemployment. Garcia acknowledged that Humala has won votes in the south of Peru, but said that the inter-oceanic highway that he wants to see built would not be possible under such conditions.
The Economy
Humala rejected the economic model based on the export of natural resources, which has led to the growth of inequalities, and he used the contrast between the beaches of Asia and Ventanilla to make the point. He argued for development based on internal markets, within a framework of macroeconomic stability. Humala asked why Peru, a country that exports oil and gas, has the most expensive petroleum in the region. He made a specific, and quite dramatic promise: to reduce the price of petrol and gas by 30 and 25 percent respectively.
Garcia rejected this promise, saying that a sharp cut in the cost of petrol and gas would deprive the state of income needed to support a range of programs such as pensions. At the same time, he also made a series of specific proposals like building more ports and roads; promoting agriculture and microenterprises; providing water for 50,000 low-income inhabitants of Lima; and reducing fees for services.
Humala asked Garcia whether he was in favor or opposed to the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Garcia did not answer, but limited himself to saying that he would provide compensation for groups affected by foreign competition.
Education, Health, Decentralization…and Corruption
On education and health, the candidates largely repeated themes they have been hammering away at throughout much of the campaign. It was during this exchange, however, that the toughest words were exchanged on the issue of corruption. Garcia criticized Humala for receiving $300,000 in salary as a military attaché in South Korea and France. Humala responded by saying that he would reopen a hard-labor camp in the jungle for former presidents who had committed acts of corruption, including those who ended their terms with numerous properties.
Garcia complained that the level of the debate was being lowered, but did not defend himself. Humala persisted, mentioning the recent statements by Vladimiro Montesinos and asking “if he could, for whom would Montesinos vote?” He also asked Garcia if he would release Montesinos. Garcia replied saying Humala was imprudent in asking this question, since he had already released Montesinos. This was an allusion to Humala’s “semi-uprising” in Locumba. Humala responded by pointing to links between APRA and Montesinos, beginning with Agustin Mantilla, who was caught on a Vladivideo taking money from Montesinos. He reiterated that Montesinos’s statement was a “missile” aimed at destroying his candidacy, he restated the question “for whom would Montesinos vote?” and he insisted he would not release Montesinos.
Garcia reproached Humala for asking whether he would pardon Montesinos. The matter is in the hands of the judiciary, and it is not up to the president to make such decisions said Garcia. He said the notion that the president could decide whether or not to pardon a prisoner reflects the sort of non-democratic style of government epitomized by Hugo Chavez. Humala insisted that presidents can offer pardons.
Security for Citizens
The final segment of the debate dealt with security for citizens. Garcia attacked Humala for wanting to place the police under the control of municipalities, saying this would destroy the police force by breaking it up into 1,800 micro units. Humala rejected this claim, saying that the police should be under the control of democratically elected authorities, and that this in no way would involved breaking up the force.
Garcia insisted that mayors are not police chiefs, and said Humala’s plan was dangerous. He then thrust the knife in deeper: “we defend the police, we do not kill them.” This was an allusion to the uprising in Andahuaylas led by Ollanta Humala’s brother, Antauro. Humala seemed shaken by Garcia’s statement about killing police; momentarily, he seemed to lose focus. He responded saying that he had fought for the honor of his country, but he did not address the charge directly. Garcia joked that Humala reminded him of the popular phrase (attributed to the brother of a Peruvian gangster) “I am his brother but I don’t know anything.”
Closing Thoughts
Humala had by far the stronger closing statement. He swore he would renounce his presidential salary and only collect his military pension; he would get rid of the 1993 constitution and convene a constituent assembly; he would fight corruption and uphold the rule of law; he would implement the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and that he would recover control over natural resources and protect national interests. Garcia had a weaker closing statement in which he rejected hatred and confrontation, called for unity and peace, and emphasized the world of opportunities open to Peru. He asked for God’s blessing on all homes and illuminate Peru’s path.

Torres Caro repeats claim that Humala was late because of Apristas
On the way home I asked my taxi driver what he thought of the debate. He confessed that he was a Fujimori supporter who had voted for Martha Chavez for president, APRA for congress, and Rafael Rey Rey for the Andean parliament. He said he was still undecided for whom to vote in the second round, but he seemed very impressed with how well Humala had stood up the Garcia. He also liked the promise of cheaper gas. His assessment of the debate: it was “a tie.”

El Libertador

Hugo Passarello Luna
21 de mayo del 2006
La noche fue de un clima de fiesta. En la calle frente al Comando de Campaña de Lima del UPP se colocó un gran escenario, una pantalla gigante y un ensordecedor sistema de sonido. Todo estaba preparado para hacer llegar el debate a todos los nacionalistas que estaban en el lugar (alrededor de 700).
En las horas previas al debate se arengó a la multitud con música folklórica, música de campaña y cánticos proselitistas.
La cúpula del UPP que no estaba en el Museo Nacional de Arqueología y Antropología se acurrucaba frente un viejo televisor en la base limeña. El virtual congresista, Daniel Abugatas, que no pudo entrar al debate y tuvo incidentes con la prensa, estaba junto con los demás nacionalistas.
Cuando finalmente comenzó el debate, el silencio invadió el lugar. Pero brevemente. Una oleada de silbidos recibió las primeras palabras de Alan García.
Todo cambió cuando Ollanta Humala habló. Con bombos, cornetas y cánticos, eran bienvenidas sus promesas, como la comentada rebaja del 30% al precio de la gasolina. Fue muy aplaudido su comentario sobre Vladimiro Montesinos: “¿A quién, si pudiera, votaría Montesinos?” en referencia a los recientes comentarios del ex –asesor fujimorista sobre el levantamiento de Lucumba.
La seguidilla de dardos que siguieron a este comentario fueron escuchados con
mucha atención, negando con ruido los dichos de Alan y con silencio y aplausos los
de Humala.
Cuando el debate finalizó todos parecían acordar que Humala había hecho un gran trabajo y que Alan había sido tomado por sorpresa. El clima de fiesta retornó como maremoto a todos los presentes. La cúpula nacionalista se unió a la multitud abajo en la calle: Humala estaba en camino para agradecer el apoyo de sus simpatizantes. La ansiedad aumentó y con ella la música y la alegría.
Cuando finalmente llegó el candidato se revivió ese caos de corridas, saludos y gritos. Todos compartían un sentimiento de victoria.
Humala estaba eufórico y arengó a su gente a participar como personeros en la segunda vuelta. Advirtió sobre un posible fraude en las mesas, como ya había denunciado Lourdes Flores. “¡Cuidado con que pase eso!” sentenció (¿amenazó?) el nacionalista.
Atacó también a lo que dicen las encuestas y aseguró que ellos están primeros en todas las provincias.
La gente respondía con gritos de apoyo.
Ollanta Humala, a pesar de lo que se esperaba, hizo un debate interesante. Más allá de los seguidos titubeos que ofreció durante todo el debate, habló como sus militantes querían: con fuerza, decisión y sentenciando para todos lados.
¿Habrá conseguido convencer a algunos indecisos o habrá reafirmado su digno 30%?
Las repercusiones de este debate, si las habrá, se verán en las próximas encuestas. Y de no confiar en ellas, habrá que esperar hasta el 4 de junio.

Maxwell A. Cameron
May 20, 2006
El Comercio has provided a transcript of the audio tape that was released to the press containing explosive comments by former president Alberto Fujimori’s intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, regarding Ollanta Humala and his uprising in Locumba on October 29, 2000. The tape was apparently made in secret, perhaps in the Callao Naval Base, and then leaked to the media by Montesinos’ lawyer.
The transcript is worth reading carefully for a number of reasons, but first a caveat: Montesinos is a pathological liar whose words should not be taken at face value. As one of his associates put it, Montesinos is “amoral, and has no principles. He functions according to his interests and objectives. It does not matter to him whether he steals a little or a lot; whether he blackmails a few people or lots of people. He can be enchanting when he wants to and [when he] has something to gain. When angered, he is a moral enemy; when he cries or laughs it is calculated” (quoted in Cameron 2006: 282-283).
There are two parts to Montesinos’ statement.
The first part of the statement by Montesinos reveals the extent of Peruvian military involvement in Fujimori’s re-election effort in 2000. According to Montesinos, the re-election campaign involved the distribution of stoves to popular kitchens, the circulation of propaganda, the organization of meetings, and the deployment of 80,000 scrutinizers throughout Peru. It also involved close coordination with the electronic and print media.
The mobilization and deployment of scrutinizers was undertaken by the intelligence service of the Peruvian army, under the leadership of Ruben Wong Venegas. Ollanta Humala, according to Montesinos, was responsible for organizing scrutinizers in the south of Peru, using Locumba as a base. In particular, he was charged with the task of recruiting reservists and other retired military personnel to serve as election officers, both in the first and the second rounds of the election.
In a press conference called late last night, Ollanta Humala dismissed the claim that was sent to Locumba to organize reservists as scrutinizers. Why, asked Humala would he be sent to Locumba to do this? He had been previously posted in Huancayo, the capital of Junin, which would have been a more logical place for such activity given its electoral weight.
The second half of Montesinos’ statement inadvertently reveals the limits of his own knowledge. Specifically, he appears to lack a clear understanding of why Humala led the uprising in Locumba. Montesinos implicitly offers three quite distinct interpretations of this event. Each interpretation coexists uneasily with the others.
The first interpretation is that Humala’s uprising was a “farce” and a ruse aimed at providing cover for Montesinos’ flight from Peru. Montesinos goes on to support this by saying that a serious military rebellion would have counted on support among military brass and the public, and would have threatened Fujimori’s power. Humala’s rebellion, if that is what it was, “never put at risk the continuity of the government.”
Curiously, Montesinos never offers any material evidence that he orchestrated Humala’s rebellion, something he ought in principle to be able to do. He merely reiterates the assertion–which has been a subject of speculation from the moment that the rebellion occurred–that the “farce” was a smoke screen.
The second interpretation offered by Montesinos is that Humala sought notoriety. In this view, the rebellion was aimed at creating a “personal image,” presumably with an eye toward a future political career. At least prima facie, this interpretation seems at odds with the first view. At the very least, it suggests a different motive for the Locumba rebellion.
A final interpretation is that Humala “lacked contact with the reality of the country.” Montesinos says there was a “possible dose of madness” in Humala’s actions, since the “strategic objective” were never defined. This seems to run contrary to the view that there was a clear strategic objective: to provide cover for Montesinos’ flight.
The inconsistencies between the various motives that are attributed to Humala give the reader the strong impression that Montesinos himself lacks any clear sense of what motivated Humala to lead his rebellion in 2000. That alone would seem to discredit, at least to some extent, Montesinos’ central claim: that Humala was helping to facilitate his departure from Peru on the Karisma yacht.
Note
Cameron, Maxwell A. “Endogenous Regime Breakdown: The Vladivideo and the Fall of Peru’s Fujimori,” in Julio F. Carrion, ed. The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Penn State University Press, 2006.

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Vladimir Torres
Embassy
May 17, 2006

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Hugo Passarello Luna
Lima, 17 de mayo del 2006

Photo: H. Passarello Luna
Son muy conocidas las declaraciones hechas por la madre de Humala sobre la necesidad de fusilar a los homosexuales.
Desde ese día, Ollanta Humala ha tratado de convencer a los medios y al electorado peruano que esa no es su ideología. Fueron las palabras de su madre, con la cual, en estos tiempos, no tiene las mejores relaciones.
Sin embargo, a pesar de reiterar una y otra vez que él (Humala) no tiene intención alguna de atacar a los homosexuales, ha tenido una gran dificultad de que la gente le crea. En Perú y en el exterior.
Una y otra vez se ha mencionado que es un candidato anti homosexual (como se pudo ver en el editorial del New York Times el pasado 3 de mayo).
Al tener la oportunidad de pasar prácticamente todos los días con la gente de Humala, en su centro principal en San Borja (Lima) puedo asumir que Ollanta esta verdadera y totalmente lejos de las palabras de sus familiares.
Es probable que, de ser Humala el nuevo presidente, no veamos grandes avances en las políticas dirigidas a la tolerancia de los homosexuales. Pero, me cuesta creer que su posible gobierno tomaría acciones discriminatorias y agresivas contra la población homosexual.
En todo caso noto una gran indiferencia por el tema. Y eso, en una sociedad conservadora como la peruana, ya es un avance.

According to journalist Gustavo Gorriti, “Alan García could not be a dictator even if he wanted; Ollanta Humala could not be a democrat even if he tried.”

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Andrés Oppenheimer comments on the apparent trend to the left in Latin America. In contrast to what has been said by some analysts, Oppenheimer believes that, more than a leftist tsunami, Latin America is being divided by a struggle among the left itself.
Bolivia’s nationalization of the natural gas industry has added some tension to its relations to Brazil and Argentina (both with center left governments). Argentina’s has taken Uruguay’s social democratic government to The Hague in a row about the paper mills being constructed in the banks of the river Uruguay. Chile’s socialist government has consistently increased Chile’s arsenal, possibly straining future relations with whoever wins Peru’s elections.
For Oppenheimer this is just the beginning. He concludes that next time we hear about a leftist wave in Latin America, we should take the comment “with tweezers.”

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Hugo Passarello Luna
5 de Mayo del 2006- Santa Anita, Lima
Fotos: H. Passarello Luna

Es el segundo día de campaña con vistas a la segunda vuelta. Los partidarios de Ollanta Humala empiezan temprano sus preparativos desde el Comando Nacional de Campaña en San Borja. El ambiente es primero de desconfianza y secreto hasta que me permiten pasar a una sala de espera para, justamente, esperar por dos horas que todos están listos para partir hacia Santa Anita. Mientras tanto, se me indica que no se esta permitido tomar fotos en el comité (o mi cámara será decomisada) y las tres puertas que acceden a la sala de espera sólo son accesibles para personal autorizado. Solamente puedo entrar o salir. En la sala hay una pequeña televisión donde esta hablando Toledo, pero a nadie le interesa. El día esta comenzando y hay muchas cosas que hacer.
A medida que pasan las horas, más y más gente llega y mi presencia es lentamente aceptada como la de un partidario más.
Finalmente llega mi contacto en el comité, alguien al que todos llaman el Coronel y con una simple orden le indica a un militante que sea mi guía durante el día. Yo deberé estar siempre junto a él (no tanto por desconfianza hacia mí sino por la rápida dinámica, que pronto descubriré, tiene este grupo de militantes).
Son las 11am (dos horas después de mi cita) y ya estamos listos para hacer una caminata por todo el distrito de Santa Anita, un área humilde de Lima.
En menos de media hora llegamos hasta nuestro primer ‘punto’ (así llaman a cada estación que visitaremos). Ya hay gente, banderas, afiches, altavoces y oradores (todos hablando al mismo tiempo). ‘Ya llega, ya llega’ se le dice a la expectante centena de curiosos y simpatizantes.
Lo que sigue se va a repetir por las próximas 4 horas cada vez que Humala visita un lugar. Todo es simplemente un flash.
De la nada y con considerable velocidad, aparecen muchos vehículos. Llegan Humala, su director de campaña y varios medios (hasta ahora no presentes en el lugar). La gente se dispara hacia el candidato, pétalos de rosas caen de todos lados, empujones, cameras, gritos, algarabía, dos bailarines haciendo el baile de las tijeras, besos y un desconcierto general. ¿Para donde ir?

Finalmente Humala se sube a un improvisado escenario (en verdad un banco de madera donde sólo él cabe) y comienza a hablar. No empiezo ni a escuchar que esta diciendo cuando alguien me toca el hombro. Es uno de los militantes que me está acompañando: “Nos vamos” “¿Ya?” pienso yo. Corremos hacia el automóvil y cuando me doy vuelta para ver a Humala, me doy cuenta que ni él esta ahí. Lo veo corriendo hacia la cima del cerro seguido por toda la gente del lugar. Es hora de ir hacia el otro punto y preparar el terreno.
Visitamos alrededor de seis bases (o centros políticos) y la misma escena se repita una y otra vez. Todo muy rápido, todo pura euforia.

En los cortos discursos que Humala hizo apuntó sus comentarios hacia el ‘maquillaje’ que algunos (por Alan García) esta usando. ‘La gente no se olvida’ declaró aludiendo al anterior y no muy exitoso gobierno de García. Mas tarde intentó enfatizar su plan de gobierno dejando en claro que el evitara que unos pocos tengo mucho y que no se olvidara del sufrimiento de los pobladores de los asentamientos humanos. Incluso hizo referencia a la importancia del deporte en el desarrollo de los jóvenes. Luego tomó una pelota, la pateó y convenientemente, hizo un gol.
Si bien los números no son lo que los organizadores estaban esperando, la gente que apareció lo hizo con alegría, pasión y una enorme curiosidad. Santa Anita parece prometer muchos votos para Ollanta y el UPP. Lo sabremos luego del 4 de junio.
Hugo Passarello Luna is a research assistant and student in the University of British Columbia.
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Maxwell A. Cameron
May 5, 2006
The success of Ollanta Humala in rural Peru can be attributed in part to his ability to activate a sector of the population that has been ignored by mainstream political parties—reservists, or conscripts who have served in the military and can be called up for active duty. They constitute a dynamic–and respected–element within many rural communities. Another reason for the success of Humala’s campaign is that he has not only made promises that resonate with some sectors of the rural population but also that he has made his candidacy a felt presence in rural areas in ways that the other parties have not. These are a couple of the main conclusions of a workshop organized by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP).
The discussion was led off by Victor Caballero, who noted that reservists have always been present in Peruvian society but they have recently acquired an unprecedented degree of militancy and assertiveness. Reservists tend to be of peasant stock, young males who come from campesino communities and have formed part of the armed forces for a period of time. Their identity has been deeply shaped by military service and the imprint is a lasting one; it is an identity shaped by the barracks, the promotion, and arms. As Julio Cotler noted, rural Peru is no longer a static society, but a very mobile and dynamic one. Reservists are good examples of “cholos,” those who come from a provincial or rural background but who have traveled, studied (in military schools), and who have broader horizons and social ambitions.
Reservists may be veterans of internal or external conflicts—or both. Many served in peasant self-defense squads, or fought in the war with Ecuador. They tend to see themselves as successful, though they may also be frustrated by social exclusion. The sense of success comes from having expelled the Shining Path from rural communities or winning on the battlefield with Ecuador. The notion of having fought with honor plays a big role in this sense of efficacy and identity.
Although reservists have been around forever, they have only become a political force in this election, which is also the first election in which members of the military have been given the vote. Humala has said that the other political parties in Peru neglected the reservists and that has allowed his group to capture their allegiance, but there is more to his appeal among the servicemen. For one thing, Humala’s message resonates with reservists who see themselves as patriots and heroes. For another, Humala is one of them. And, as Cecilia Blondet noted, Ollanta Humala and his brother Antauro have spent 4 or 5 years mobilizing this population and circulating the news bulletin “Ollanta.” (The recent schism between Ollanta and Antauro appears not to be an issue for the rural voter). Humala likes to talk about having created a political party and taking it to victory in 10 months. But the organizational effort is deeper than this might suggest.
What has made Humala so popular among rural voters more broadly? The support of reservists is natural, but what accounts for the massive support he received in Ayacucho and the decline of support for the mainstream parties relative to 2001? Part of the answer is that Humala has made promises that resonate. Javier Torres mentioned that Humala’s congressional candidates symbolize important sectors of the rural society—the coca producers, the church and clubs of mothers, and non-governmental organizations which are thick on the ground in Ayacucho. The coca producing peasants have joined Humala’s ranks en masse in response to his promise to legalize coca production and end forcible eradication.
Another reason for support for Humala is the desire to punish traditional politicians. The sectors that support Humala were strongly supportive of Alberto Fujimori in the past. They benefited from the commitment of the Fujimori government to bring public works and social programs into their communities, and they have been frustrated by the bureaucratic red tape and inertia in the current administration, and by the abandonment of these works. There is a mood of ire that expresses itself in the hope that Humala “will punish” those in Lima and the government, as well as traditional parties (read APRA and Unidad Nacional). A intimation of this mood came with the rejection of the process of formation of new regions as part of the decentralization effort in November of 2005. In part, this rejection reflected the perception that larger governing units were being created that would be more remote and unresponsive.
Another source of identification with Humala is the fact that he is seen as “like us,” an ordinary guy. In addition, according to one participant in the round table, many rural voters supported Humala for two simple reasons. First, the candidate or someone from his movement took the time to explain the nationalist movement’s goals in face-to-face interaction. Second, many voters follow the advice of peasant communities and the advice was invariable to vote for Humala. Humala’s efforts to make direct contact with the voters contrasted with the lack of connection that rural voters felt with Lourdes Flores. Nobody from her group spent much time in Ayacucho.
The other point that Javier Torres made had to do with the media. The rural population watches the television mainly for entertainment. The radio has more weight for news because its broadcasts are typically from the perspective of the locality. Above all, however, it is the word of mouth communication that matters the most.

Durand, Francisco. Elecciones y dinero: la lógica de la atracción mutua, Revista Coyuntura: Analisis economico y social de actualidad, CISEPA-PUCP, mayo 2006 Download file

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Observatorio Electoral tiene una interesante discusion entre Martin Tanaka y Santiago Pedraglio analizando escenarios para la segunda vuelta. La mesa redonda tuvo lugar el 17 de abril del 2006.

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In this essay, Ecuadorian political scientist Simón Pachano asks whether Ollanta Humala can be considered of the political left.

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Maxwell A. Cameron
May 1, 2006
According to the BBC, Venezuela is spending billions of dollars of its massive oil revenues on projects designed to enhance Chavez’s influence in the region as a counter-balance to the hegemony of the United States. An opaque $4 billion fund has been put at the discretion of the President. It is estimated that Venezuela has already spent as much as $25 billion on various projects to enhance its influence in the region since 1999.
Chavez recently said that if Alan Garcia is elected in Peru he would have to recall his ambassador “because Venezuela will not have relations with that thief.” He then called for Ollanta Humala to win the election: “Ollanta, save Peru, compañero, and you will have all our support!”
These statements appear to be part of a strategy of “carrots and sticks.” If Peruvians voters support Ollanta Humala, Chavez will use his oil revenue to help Peru; if they do not, he will break diplomatic relations. The not-subtle delivery of this message in the middle of an election campaign is seen by Peruvian diplomats as worse than inappropriate–it is contrary to Venezuela’s commitments as a member of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.
In response, Peru recalled its ambassador to Venezuela, Carlos Urrutia. This prompted William Lara, Venezuela’s Minister of Information, to call Alejandro Toledo the “office boy” and “puppet” of George Bush. Lara said Venezuela would not withdraw its ambassador nor fall into provocations. He also said Garcia, who had asked for a debate with Chavez on CNN, lacked the stature to debate with the Venezuelan leader.
Ollanta Humala lamented the recall of the Peruvian ambassador and tried to distance himself from the dispute by taking issue with both the statements by Chavez and by Garcia. However, he said that he cannot ask Hugo Chavez to cease making statements about Peru. “I cannot ask that of the president. I am a candidate to the presidency.” He said the dispute involved three individuals: Chavez, Garcia and Toledo: “This should not affect bilateral relations. External relations are turning into verbal problems, and this should not be a theme in the election. This is not a problem for Peru, but one between three actors which, leaving aside who started it, everyone laments has reached these levels.”
Humala also said that Garcia does not represent Peru’s sovereignty, and he rejected the claim that Chavez is his political godfather (an accusation made by Garcia). “We nationalists are a sovereign project” he said, “the president of the United States, George Bush is godfather of Toledo and Garcia.” Daniel Abugattas, who will be a member of the next congress for Humala’s Union for Peru (UPP)–mixing his metaphors a little–accused Garcia of mounting a circus and using it as a smokescreen to avoid debating real issues.
Nadine Heredia, Humala’s wife, also disagreed with Peru’s demarche. She deplored the insults and name-calling between Chavez and Garcia, and called for a higher level of dialogue. “We are not in agreement with what has happened” she said. At the same time, she did not believe the dispute reached the point of justifying the recall of an ambassador. According to Heredia, Garcia–who she called the candidate of the right, of the oligarchy–provoked the dispute, and Chavez overreacted. She suggested that Garcia was trying to create a smokescreen to avoid a debate with Humala, and recommended that he have a manzanilla tea.
Garcia said that “Nationalism has become a boomerang against Humala and his protector and godfather. Now, nationalist Peru is against the diplomatic and political invasion of Venezuela in Peru.” According to Peru.21, Garcia appears to enjoy the role of defender of Peru’s sovereignty. He reserved his harshest words for Chavez, who he accused of being a drunk and a thug. “Who does he think he is? Sadam Hussein, and because he has petroleum he can takeover other countries, like Kuwait?”
President Toledo also warmed to the role of defender of Peru. “I will not allow Mr. Chavez or Mr. Morales to express themselves the way they have” intoned Toledo. “Mr. Chavez, learn to govern democratically. Learn to work with us” he said.
The decision to recall the ambassador must have been taken by Toledo personally, since it appeared to catch by surprise an official as powerful as Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, the president of the council of ministers. Kuczynski had advised against escalating the conflict. The Chancellor (or minister responsible for external relations), Óscar Maúrtua, undoubtedly had a hand to play in the decision. He was on record earlier saying “the supreme good of the country is to ensure the election develops normally in Peru.”
Diego Garcia Sayan supports the measure. He is the former minister of external relations who manages the Comision Andina de Juristas (Andean Jurists Commission) a non-governmental organization which is not much liked by Chavez. Before the ambassador was recalled, Garcia Sayan had said that “the statement made on Friday by the Chancellery is quite correct” but he noted that it was missing a logical implication: the recall of the ambassador. “The threats by Chavez are unacceptable. The recall could have practical effects, but it is a symbolic move.” According to Garcia Sayan, the goal of recalling the ambassador is not to break all diplomatic relations with Venezuela but to downgrade diplomatic representation as a gesture of protest.
The decision to recall of the ambassador was supported by Valentin Paniagua, the former interim president of Peru and unsuccessful candidate in the presidential election. The decision was also supported by Lourdes Flores, another unsuccessful presidential candidate who was the target of earlier jabs by Chavez.
All the fuss between Lima and Caracas has gotten the attention of policymakers in Washington. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), José Miguel Insulza, issued a press release today in which he said: “restoring peace and democracy required an enormous effort on the part of our countries in decades past, and therefore we should do everything necessary to preserve peace and democracy, and avoid situations that could undermine them.” He placed himself at the disposal of the parties to find a cooperative solution.

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A thoughtful piece on the current electoral landscape.

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