How to promote rule of law in China:

Comments on the Regulations on the Principal Officials in Charge of the Party and the Government to Fulfill the Responsibility to Promote Rule of Law

Written by: Jiang Wan, translated by Yan Wang

Posted On: July 21, 2020

(The following is a translation of a shorten version of Professor Wan’s longer blog entry in Chinese.)

In December 2016, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued the Regulations on the Principal Officials in Charge of the Party and the Government to Fulfill the Responsibility to Promote Rule of Law (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations). The Regulations set out the main responsibilities of the principal officials in charge of the party committee and the government in promoting rule of law, and require that the principal officials should include their performance in promoting rule of law in their year-end reports. The higher-level party committee should consider lower officials’ performance during evaluation. If a principal official fails to fulfill their duties, they shall be held accountable in accordance with the relevant Party regulations such as the CCP Accountability Regulations, as well as national laws and regulations.

Performance evaluation and administration by law are generally considered distinctive governance methods. Rule of law is a profound revolution in China’s national governance. Why did the central leadership promote rule of law through performance evaluation?

I. Inherent discrepancy between performance evaluation and rule of law

For a long time, the central leadership has mainly used promotion as an incentive for local party and government leaders. It has also imposed constraints on local leaders through position adjustments. These personnel approaches served as a strong incentive and supervision mechanism for local party and government leaders. In order to get the promotion that they want, local leaders have no choice but to actively implement the policies issued the central leadership. Although performance evaluation can solve some problems in the principal-agent relationship between central and local leaderships, it may still fail to function as intended or to reflect the real situation. This is because local leaderships have the full control over their governance capabilities, governance behaviors and feedbacks on its performances. It is possible that local leaderships may conceal, exaggerate, or distort information. Moreover, overusing the mechanism of performance evaluation would lead to an emphasis on results rather than procedures, as well as a governance logic centered around evaluation.

When the central leadership cannot effectively control local leaderships through its personnel approaches, it is increasingly important to administer the local governments and control the behaviors of local leaderships by law. Contrary to performance evaluation, which focuses on results but neglects procedures, the primary function of regulating local leaderships by law is to ensure that the governance procedures themselves are regulated and legal, and to make sure that local governments are under an institutionalized supervision mechanism. The goal is to ensure smooth pass down of government orders and to maintain the authority of the central leadership. Moreover, administration by law can also provide fundamental insurance that the administrative bodies and their officials would truly serve the people’s interests, which will consequently consolidate the Party’s ruling position and realize long-term stability in the country.

Promoting administration by law can ensure that administrative procedures are regulated and in accordance to the law, but regulated procedures alone may not guarantee effectiveness. Not violating the law is only a minimum requirement. It does not reflect the ability or level of governance of local leaderships. In addition, China is still in the process of economic, social and political transformation, and policies rather than laws actually play a more important role within the government. For areas such as energy conservation, emission reduction, prevention of overcapacity, and real estate regulations, the legal basis for the implementation of policies is still extremely abstract, or even absent, and it is simply not feasible to control local leaderships by holding the local leaders legally accountable. In addition, China’s current political system has its distinctive characteristics. For example, each level of leadership is accountable only to the next level above, and the party committees of various levels have the leading power over the government bodies of the same levels. Although local party committees play a decisive role in local development, they usually do not replace local governments and do not directly perform administrative tasks. It is not feasible to control local party committees by holding them legally accountable.

II. Promoting rule of law through performance evaluation

The substance of promoting rule of law in governance is to regulate local administrative actions and to check arbitrary exercise of power. It will inevitably receive passive resistance from the local governments. In order to promote administration by law, the State Council issued the Outline for Comprehensively Promoting Administration by Law in 2004. The outline proposed that the executive heads of various local governments and departments are the primary responsible persons for the promotion of administration by law. In 2005, the State Council began to propose evaluations on the administration of local governments by law. In 2008, the Decision by the State Council on Strengthening Rule of Law in the Administration of the City and County Governments clearly put forward the requirement to establish a system for evaluating administration by law. The system listed several evaluation items: whether decisions are made in accordance with the law, whether regulatory documents are issued in accordance with the law, whether administrative management are implemented in accordance with the law, whether administrative review cases are accepted and dealt with in accordance with the law, and whether administrative responsibilities are performed in accordance with the law. These evaluation items are included in the performance evaluation of city and county governments and their officials. The evaluation results will affect rewards and penalties, as well as appointments, removals and promotions of officials. The decision also proposed that the principal persons in charge of the city and county governments should effectively assume the responsibilities of the primary person responsible for administration of governments by law. In 2010, the State Council’s Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of the Government under Rule of Law further proposed the establishment of a law-based administrative leadership coordination mechanism led by the principal leaders of various administrative agencies, where the evaluation results will serve as an important part of the comprehensive assessment of the government leaderships.

The Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central Committee further stated that it is necessary to “take the implementation of rule of law as an important item in evaluating the actual performance of the leaderships at all levels, and incorporate it into the performance evaluation system.” It also proposed that the principal official in charge of the party and government should perform the duties of the primary person responsible for promoting rule of law. In December 2015, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued the Outline for Promoting Rule of Law in the Administration of Governments (2015-2020), which expressly required that the principal officials of the party and the government shall perform the duties of the primary responsible person for promoting rule of law.

So far, the document provides the most comprehensive requirements in this regard. Article 8 of the outline incorporated the principal party and government officials’ responsibilities for promoting rule of law in the administration of governments into the performance evaluation system, which adjusted the behavioral incentives of the local party and government officials. The strong political motivations as a result of the incentives would transform the promotion of rule of law in administration of governments into real actions, rather than merely political slogans.

III. Operation of the dual governance model

The current governance mechanism for local governments in China consists of both traditional evaluation-based method and law-based method. The latter has been strengthened during the recent years. The two methods have gradually formed a dual governance model for local governments in China.

  1. Several types of relations between performance evaluation and rule of law

(a) A complementary relationship

Both performance evaluation and rule of law can regulate local government activities. Performance evaluation can make up for the incentives, which administration by law lacks, while administration by law can strengthen the procedural legitimacy of performance evaluation.

First, performance evaluation can be incorporated into existing laws. Performance evaluation is considered a political approach, and excessive use of the approach is considered to affect the legitimacy of governments’ administrative actions. Incorporating performance evaluation into the modern rule of law system not only provides performance evaluation with legal basis, but it also strengthens the binding force of performance evaluation on local governments and ministries. As early as in 1982, Articles 89 and 107 of the Constitution have expressly set out that the State Council and the people’s governments at and above the county level have the right to appoint, remove, evaluate, reward and penalize administrative officials in accordance with the law. More than ten laws, including the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, the Sand Prevention and Control Law, the Employment Promotion Law, the Food Safety Law, and the Environmental Protection Law, have stipulated that the local governments must be evaluated on their performance in completing the relevant matters. Performance evaluation is by no means a purely political governance approach outside the current laws, but it has become a legalized governance method.

Second, performance evaluation can promote rule of law. When there is a conflict between rule of law and evaluation items such as political performance and financial indicators, local governments lack incentives to implement rule of law in their administrative actions. For key legal matters closely related to the legitimacy of governance, the central leadership has adopted an approach to advance these matters through performance evaluation. This is due to the high-incentive nature of evaluation performance. When illegal acts give rise to social problems within a particular region, the central leadership will turn to performance evaluation, where it would apply a one-vote veto for those issues that are likely to cause antagonism in the public, and put more weight on those issues that are likely to receive public approval. This is to prevent local governments from failing to comply with the law or failing to enforce the law completely. Some of the exemplary provisions can be found in the Food Safety Law and the Environmental Protection Law. When the central government finally decides to vigorously promote administration by law and set qualifiable evaluation indicators, the local governments have no choice but to obey the decision.

(b) Rule of law weakened by performance evaluation

Promoting rule of law in the administration of government is a low-incentive governance method, while performance evaluation is high-incentive. Once the central leadership adopts the two methods simultaneously, local governments would lean towards performance evaluation rather than administration by law, which will eventually lead to the result where the latter is shelved, alienated, or weakened.

First, it is difficult to quantitively evaluate administration by law. In the lack of full participation of members in the society, change of the central leadership’s governance concept alone will result in local administrative actions being merely an evaluation-driven response. The issued documents, the legal system development goals, and the activities to promote administration by law would all become formalistic.

Second, performance evaluation puts more weight on the excellence of results rather than regulated procedures. Government actions that are useful for evaluation purposes but contrary to the rule of law principles may be treated with lax standards. Particularly, during the time where the economic situation deteriorates and the employment problem is serious, the central leadership would have no choice but to tolerate violations by local governments and adopt an “one eye open and one eye closed” attitude to let go of some activities that are contrary to the law. Those activities will be exempted from penalties, as long as it complies to the governance philosophy of the central leadership.

(c) Performance evaluation replaced by rule of law

Because of the high-incentive nature of performance evaluation, it is easy to cause substitution effects. Therefore, the central leadership would sometimes adjust its governance strategy according to the current situation. For example, when law enforcement is too strong and unregulated, the central leadership will abolish performance evaluation and focus on administration by law. As early as in the last century, the Ministry of Public Security issued a document prohibiting evaluations based on administrative fines, so as not to induce government agencies to conduct phishing law enforcement and use fines to generate income.

  1. Empirical analysis of the dual governance model

Figure 1: Frequencies of two approaches in official documents

Note: upper pair of panels portray State Council documents, lower pair portrays ministry documents; blue line indicates use of rule of law measure, red line indicates use of performance metrics.

Between 1979 and the end of 2015, 244 documents issued by the State Council and 3,753 regulations and documents issued by the ministries required the implementation of policies through administration by law. On the other hand, the State Council promoted policy implementation through performance evaluation in 567 documents, while the ministries promoted policy implementation through performance evaluation in 5,090 regulations and documents (see Figure 1).

In terms of historical trends, both administration by law and performance evaluation have played an increasingly important role in the implementation of documents issued by the central leadership, and the two have demonstrated a complementary rather than a substitute relationship.

Figure 2 compares different ministries by showing the difference between the proportion of documents using the rule of law approach with a similar proportion using performance metrics. Various ministries have used the dual governance model differently. The industry and commerce ministries have always put more weight on administration by law. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the environmental ministries have paid more attention to performance evaluation. In general, those that focus more on administration by law include the ministries in charge of food and drugs, human resources, commerce and justice. Those that focus more on performance evaluation include the ministries in charge of finance, taxation, temporary working groups and work safety supervision.

Figure 2 Differential use of rule of law and performance metrics across ministries

IV. Controversy and assessment of the dual governance model

The reasons why the central leadership kept the previously adopted performance evaluation method in promoting rule of law are two-fold. Besides inertial thinking, the more important reason is that law is a strong and stable mechanism to check and balance administrative power. Effective rule of law means a new and independent authority system, as well as relatively more stable and impersonalized implementation of legal provisions. This, however, will weaken the authority of the central leadership and limit its mobilization capacity. In modern China, any modifications of governance methods must be implemented on the basis of ensuring central authority. Therefore, the Regulations emphasize that the principal officials in charge of the party and government must adhere to the leadership of the party. The Regulations require that local party committees serve the core leading role in promoting rule of law in the regions. The Regulations stipulate that the upper level party committees should conduct regular inspections on and provide special supervision to the principal officials of their subordinate party committees with regard to this issue. In 2019, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued the Regulations on the Inspecting Responsibilities in Promoting Rule of Law in the Administration of Government, which discussed the inspections in more details.

Of course, there is a logical conflict in the operation of the dual governance model. It is possible that the authority of the law may be weakened by means of promoting rule of law through performance evaluation. Under the premise of democratic centralism, however, it is not realistic for the CCP to abandon the dual governance model and fully rely on rule of law. It is an arbitrary idea to simply separate and contrast performance evaluation and rule of law. Such an idea does not help to understand China’s governance logic. It also obscures the possibility of building the foundational system for China’s economic and social development. It would fail to provide a possible path to further improve the country’s governance model.




Litigating the Party’s Internal Rules

Written By: Yan Wang

Posted On: July 10, 2020

A 2016 document jointly issued by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and China’s central government put principal government and party officials in the drivers’ seat for the promotion of rule of law (法治) in the country. The document set out these officials’ obligations to ensure the country’s rule of law system and possible consequences if the officials fail to fulfill their duties. A few attempts to invoke the document in lawsuits that challenge administrative decisions in China, however, have been unsuccessful.

The Regulations

In December 2016, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued the Regulations on the Principal Officials in Charge of the Party and the Government to Fulfill the Responsibility to Promote Rule of Law (The Regulations).[1] The two-page document comprises 12 articles and applies to “principal party and government officials above the county level” (article 2). The document, however, does not define “principal officials.”

According to the Regulations, the principal officials shall “personally make plans for important work in promoting rule of law, personally look into important issues, personally coordinate important links, and personally supervise important tasks” (article 4). If a principal official fails to fulfill their duties, they “shall be held accountable in accordance with the relevant Party regulations such as the CCP Accountability Regulations, as well as national laws and regulations” (article 9).

The cases

Our research yielded 17 cases where the plaintiffs either referred to the Regulations in their submissions or cited the Regulations as evidence. The earliest case was in April 2017 and the most recent in November 2019. All of these cases were heard by local courts at the district, city or provincial levels.

The majority of these cases concern government information disclosure. For example, in a 2019 case heard by the Guangdong High People’s Court,[2] the plaintiffs sued their local governments at the district and city levels for failing to fulfill information disclosure obligations. In March 2018, the plaintiffs filed an information disclosure application regarding land acquisition with their local district government. In April 2018, the district government provided a response that directed the plaintiffs to several published government documents. Unsatisfied with the boilerplate response, the plaintiffs applied to the upper-level government, i.e. the city, for a review of the district government’s response. The city government was of the opinion that the district government’s response “was based on clear facts, followed proper legal procedures, and correctly applied the law.” In August 2018, the plaintiffs filed their case at the local Intermediate People’s Court, seeking a court order to revoke the district government’s response and the city government’s review decision. The intermediate court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for “lack of factual and legal basis.” The plaintiffs then appealed to the provincial higher court. In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the governments have violated the Regulations, as the district government failed to fulfill its legal obligation, and the city government’s decision was biased.

In a 2017 commercial dispute,[3] the appellant submitted that a lower court judge’s decision on their case “disrespected legal ethics and disregarded judicial responsibilities.” The appellant urged the Hangzhou Intermediate Court to penalize the lower court judge per the Regulations.

Court responses

In both the aforementioned two cases, the courts ruled against the plaintiffs. In the 2019 case, the Guangdong High Court upheld the intermediate court’s decision and did not mention the Regulations in its decision. In the 2017 case, the Hangzhou court dismissed the appeal on the issue and, similarly, did not mention the Regulations in its decision.

In fact, only 1 out of 17 decisions we found accepted the Regulations as supporting evidence. The remaining cases that cited the Regulations found them either “unable to support the claims” or “irrelevant.”

The one case where the Regulations were accepted as supporting evidence was an information disclosure case heard by the Beijing First Intermediate Court in April 2017.[4] But the court did not talk about them again in its decision, and eventually, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for “lack of factual and legal basis.” The Beijing case was the earliest to receive a court decision among all 17 cases. In all of the ensuing decisions, courts shunned accepting the Regulations as supporting evidence.

None of the decisions provided reasons for the courts’ refusal to apply the Regulations, except for one decision made by a court in Jiangsu. In March 2019, the Jiangsu High People’s Court dismissed an appellant’s case against the local government for failing to respond to their application for administrative inspections (行政督察) on two particular local officials. The appellant cited the Regulations as the legal basis for their application. The court held that the claim should be dismissed for falling out of the scope of administrative litigation. According to the decision, the substance of the appellant’s application was the inspection and supervision of particular individuals, as well as the management and training of principal Party leaders. Therefore, the subject matter of the claim was about management issues within the Party, rather than administrative behaviors.

In two information disclosure cases in August 2018, the plaintiffs received favorable decisions from the same court in Beijing.[5] In both cases, however, the court found the Regulations irrelevant and unsuited as supporting evidence.


In general, local courts in China at both intermediate and higher levels have refused to engage with the Regulations in their decisions on administrative issues. This is not surprising, because the Regulations are unlikely to be intended to be rules open to private enforcement, and they are not formally binding on courts either. What is more striking is that Chinese citizens have taken note of the Regulations. This seems sufficient reason in itself for scholars to give the implementation of the Regulations some attention.


[1] 《党政主要负责人履行推进法治建设第一责任人职责规定》

[2] 何志鹏、李小英二审行政判决书,(2019)粤行终92号

[3] 唐元秀、杭州百欧进出口有限公司产品责任纠纷二审民事判决书,(2017)浙01民终8886号

[4] 陈爱时等与中华人民共和国国家发改委其他案,(2017)京01行初152号

[5] 胡来满与北京市怀柔区北房镇人民政府信息公开一审行政判决书,(2018)京0116行初130号;马明春与北京市怀柔区北房镇人民政府信息公开一审行政判决书,(2018)京0116行初7号

Rule of Law and Performance Metrics (I)

Written By: Wan Jiang

Professor, School of Economic Law,

Southwest University of Political Science and Law

CALS visiting scholar, 2015-6

(An abbreviated English translation of Professor Wan’s blog post is forthcoming.)

Posted On: July 2, 2020

万江: 在中国如何推动法治建设:


2016 年12月底,中共中央办公厅和国务院办公厅联合印发了《党政主要负责人履行推进法治建设第一责任人职责规定》(以下简称《规定》)。《规定》第五条、第六条分别明确了党委主要负责人、政府主要负责人在推进法治建设中应当履行的主要职责,包括将法治建设纳入地区发展总体规划和年度工作计划、严格依法依规决策、推进行政执法责任制落实、督促领导班子其他成员和政府部门主要负责人依法行政、推动落实“谁执法谁普法”责任等。《规定》第七条至第九条进一步指出,党政主要负责人应当将履行推进法治建设第一责任人职责情况列入年终述职内容,上级党委应当将下级党政主要负责人履行推进法治建设第一责任人职责情况纳入政绩考核指标体系,党政主要负责人不履行或者不正确履行推进法治建设第一责任人职责的应当依照《中国共产党问责条例》等有关党内法规和国家法律法规予以问责。







法治政府建设是要规范地方行政行为、控制权力的恣意行使,因此必然会受到地方的消极对待。为调动地方党政领导对法治建设的重视,中共中央在2004年提出要贯彻依法治国基本方略、完善干部实绩考核评价标准。早在 2004 年,国务院在《全面推进依法行政实施纲要》中指出依法行政还存在的不少问题,比如:一些行政机关工作人员依法行政的观念还比较淡薄,依法行政的能力和水平有待进一步提高。中央依法治国办负责人2019在就《法治政府建设与责任落实督察工作规定》答记者问时同样强调:当前,一些地区和部门对法治政府建设的重视程度、领导力度、推进速度还有待进一步加强。


2010 年,《国务院关于加强法治政府建设的意见》进一步提出要建立由行政机关主要负责人牵头的依法行政领导协调机制,加强依法行政工作考核,将考核结果作为对政府领导班子和领导干部综合考核评价的重要内容。要强化行政首长作为推进依法行政第一责任人的责任, 行政首长要对本地区、本部门依法行政工作负总责,切实承担起领导责任,将依法行政任务与改革发展稳定任务一起部署、一起落实、一起考核。党的十八届四中全会进一步明确提出,要“把法治建设成效作为衡量各级领导班子和领导干部工作实绩重要内容,纳入政绩考核指标体系。”并提出党政主要负责人要履行推进法治建设第一责任人职责。

2015 年12 月,中共中央、国务院印发的《法治政府建设实施纲要(2015-2020年)》确立了法治政府建设的总蓝图、路线图、施工图和时间表,明确提出,要落实第一责任人责任。党政主要负责人要履行推进法治建设第一责任人职责,将建设法治政府摆在工作全局的重要位置。要强化考核评价和督促检查。各级党委要把法治建设成效作为衡量各级领导班子和领导干部工作实绩的重要内容,纳入政绩考核指标体系,充分发挥考核评价对法治政府建设的重要推动作用。《规定》第四条为此提出,“党政主要负责人作为推进法治建设第一责任人,应当切实履行依法治国重要组织者、推动者和实践者的职责,贯彻落实党中央关于法治建设的重大决策部署,统筹推进科学立法、严格执法、公正司法、全民守法,自觉运用法治思维和法治方式深化改革、推动发展、化解矛盾、维护稳定,对法治建设重要工作亲自部署、重大问题亲自过问、重点环节亲自协调、重要任务亲自督办,把本地区各项工作纳入法治化轨道。”



Rule of Law and Performance Metrics (II)

Written By: Wan Jiang

Posted on: July 2, 2020

万江: 在中国如何推动法治建设:


















图1 依法行政与指标考核年度



图2 不同部委依法行政与指标考核差占比







  1. 万江:《依法行政与指标考核:双重治理模式的实证研究》,《法学家»2017年第1期。



The “Netflix Tax” Debate in Canada 加拿大关于“奈飞税”的政策争议

Written By: Yi Zhao 赵祎

Posted on: July 2, 2020

2018 年 3月 29 日,魁北克省在2018年的预算中提出了新的销售税法案改革。这一新的改革要求在魁北克省内没有实体分支的企业同样作为魁北克销售税的代收代缴主体进行注册,从而加强了魁北克销售税(QST)的征收。对于在加拿大境内没有实体分支的企业,这一举措将于2019年1月1日生效;对于在魁北克没有实体分支,而在加拿大境内有实体分支的企业,这一举措将于2019年9月1日生效。

魁北克的这一新税务改革是为了应对新的数字经济形势下销售税的征收。在魁北克省2017年的税务问题调查报告中,2017 年未能征收的销售税已经达到 2 亿7千万加元之多,这是由于像 Netflix 这样在魁北克省内乃至在加拿大境内都没有实体分支的企业并不需要代收代缴 QST 之故。在新的规定下,凡是对魁北克的特定消费者(即不具 QST 注册资格的魁北克居民)销售达到三万加元的企业,都必须在魁北克税务局注册,并代收代缴QST;同样,作为提供非实体产品(如电影、书籍、音乐的下载或流媒体服务)和服务的电子平台也同样需要注册成为QST的代收代缴者。

在这一改革下,像 Netflix 这样提供流媒体订阅服务的的外国企业将开始代收QST;提供非实体商品的其他电子平台,如 Google,Apple,Amazon 等,也同样要开始代收 QST。

然而,这并不意味着魁北克征收了一种新的Netflix税。在销售税制度下,销售税是根据货物和商品流动的终点征收的。也就是说,QST 的征收对象是在魁北克省内购买的所有产品和服务,无论它们是来自于魁北克还是其他任何地区。只是在原来的销售税规定中,一旦商品的供应商或销售者在魁北克没有经营实体,那么它们就不用在魁北克税务局登记,也不需要代收并代缴QST。相对的,消费者在向这些供应商或销售者购买产品的时候,便产生了自我评估并向税务机关缴纳 QST 的义务。但这在实际中很难实行,像Netflix这样的影视订阅服务,对于消费者而言应缴纳的销售税并不多,假若公司不代收,也很难从每一个消费者手中强制征收。



因此,在 2017 年,魁北克就提出了从三方面加强销售税征收的计划:

  1. 从加拿大境外直接购买的服务和非实体商品的销售税;
  2. 从加拿大境外直接购买的实体商品的销售税;
  3. 从魁北克省外、加拿大其他地区购买的商品和服务的销售税。

并在2019年开始要求 Netflix 这样的网络电信服务供应商代收代缴 QST 税款。

到了 2019 年年中,魁北克已经从Netflix收到了 2800 万的 QST 税款。让这些境外电子巨头同样缴纳销售税,一方面有利于省财政的收入,另一方面也使加拿大境内的内容供应商和他们处于同一竞争的起点线上。但是加拿大联邦政府并没有在 GST 征收上作出同样的改革,这和 Netflix 在 2017 年作出的向加拿大电影产业投资五亿加元的承诺相关。

不过,在数字经济逐渐兴起的此时,魁北克的改革是和国际上 OECD 的改革相呼应的。在应对数字经济所产生的税收挑战时,OECD 呼吁加强外国企业在增值税和销售税税种上的登记,也推荐国家通过简化登记系统,使外国企业能够易于履行缴纳这些税款的职责。

在魁北克之外,BC 省 2020 年的预算同样将登记的措施转向数字经济下的企业。新的登记措施要求凡是在 BC 针对普通消费者的销售超过一万加元、提供软件和电信服务的经营者都需要在 BC 省注册,这意味着像 Netflix 这样的跨国企业将开始代收代缴 PST。BC 省将是继魁北克和萨斯喀彻温省之后第三个向外国网络公司要求收取销售税的省份。

以身传道的柯恩教授二三事 Jerry Cohen and Preaching by Example

Written By: 程洁 Jie Cheng

Posted on: June 30, 2020






I have known Professor Jerome Cohen for more than 20 years. When I was in graduate school, Professor Chen Xiaoping told me the story of Jerry helping the June 4th dissidents. Shortly after joining Tsinghua University, I got to meet Jerry in person. When he recounted his experience of meeting with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s and the early social and legal conditions in China, it was like reading a living history book. Later our paths crossed because of our common interest in legal aid and government information disclosure.

When Jerry visited Beijing around 2002, I was the supervisor of the Civil Rights Assistance Legal Clinic at Tsinghua. At that time, many construction projects were promoted by local governments. Illegal land acquisition and demolition triggered social unrest. The Legal Clinic was approached by many landless farmers, urban demolished households, and other affected homeowners, including Liu Zhengyou and Hua Xinmin, who later became well-known rights defenders. However, the registration and trial of such cases often encounter interferences and pressure from the government. Friends and colleagues of mine also believed that clinical education was a distraction from conventional legal pedagogy, and that constitutional scholars should focus on theoretical research. But Jerry always confirmed the importance of the work of the clinic, which gave me great encouragement.

Another common interest we share is government information disclosure. After the SARS epidemic in 2003 ended, I participated in the State Information Office’s research project on information freedom and security. In 2003-4, I was fortunate enough to visit the United States as a Fulbright scholar. Jerry invited me to give a public lecture at the Foreign Relations Committee. After 2007, the “Government Information Disclosure Regulations” began to take effect, causing lots of controversy and litigation. These new phenomena have also become areas of common concern to us. From 2009 to 2014, I participated in the Sino-US Judicial and Human Rights Dialogue almost every year and discussed this topic with Jerry and other experts from both countries.

Jerry has recently reflected on his own journey of Chinese law as a “missionary.” He is of course being modest: many think of him as not a “priest”, but a “godfather” figure who pioneered the study of contemporary Chinese law in North America. I personally think that Jerry’s contribution to the deontology of Chinese law will be more lasting than that of scholars of legal doctrines. To some extent, the “missionary” thinking reflects the traditional paradigm of transplanting American law and exporting legal cultures. In the context of social pluralism and the increasing multi-polarization of international relations, it is inevitable that they will be resisted and questioned. But unlike Frank Goodnow and Roscoe Pound in the first half of the 20th century, Jerry has always maintained solidarity with the dissidents and various minorities. This makes Jerry a moral icon and a true legal preacher. As other studies have demonstrated, the realization of legal ethics is more difficult than statutory enactment.

Jerry’s rich life experience is beyond any simple narrative. My understanding of him is almost like “blind men touching the elephant”, which can only be one-sided. I hope he will forgive me for the inadequacies. I also hope that all of us can restore a more multifaceted Jerry. But one thing I’m pretty sure is that even though Jerry is 90 years old, he has been the same intellectual with full passion for justice. I want to learn from him, and I wish him follow his own heart and stay young forever.




The Ascendance of the Resolution Power in China’s Parliamentary Bodies

 Written By: Julie Qiu  and Wei Cui

Posted on: June 26, 2020

Peng Zhen speaking at a conference of the NPC Legal Affairs Commission

Since the COVID-19 epidemic broke out in Wuhan in January 2020, sub-national People’s Congresses (PCs) in many Chinese provinces and cities have announced policies regarding the control and prevention of the disease and economic recovery. Many of the policy documents promulgated have the same function and effect as local statutes (difang fagui), and have been pronounced as having the effect of law. But they often came with the title of “decisions” or “resolutions” (jueding).  Both in name and in the procedure of adoption, this particular parliamentary instrument is to some extent distinguishable from the adoption of local statutes under the Law on Legislation. In previous decades, it was seldom used independently in providing for individual’s legal rights and obligations.

To invoke potential comparisons with non-statutory parliamentary actions in Canada and other jurisdictions, we provisionally refer to these instruments as “resolutions”. The subnational parliamentary “resolutions” on COVID-19 that were adopted in February and March 2020 are related to the increasingly frequent exercise by Chinese PCs of their resolution power regarding “major issues” (zhongda shixiang jueding quan) in the last few years. This potentially important development has not been previously noted in Western media or scholarship. We offer a brief background on the history and legal basis of the resolution power.

Article 104 of China’s Constitution grants PCs above the county level the power to “discuss and decide” major issues in all fields of work in its jurisdiction. Article 44 (4) of Organization Law for Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments at All Levels (Local Organizational Law) further provides that PCs above the county level have the powers to discuss and decide major issues in “politics, economy, education, science, culture, public health, protection of the environment and natural resources, and civil and ethnic affairs in their jurisdictions”. While these may be regarded as the Constitutional and fundamental legal basis for PCs’ resolution power, they clearly say little about the extent of the power, nor how it would be exercised. Instead PCs are granted discretion to make rules themselves regarding this aspect of their competence.

The powers of PCs in China are sometimes said to be divided into four types: legislative, supervisory, appointment and removal, and decision-making on major issues (the so-called
“Four Powers”). This conceptual division is attributed to Peng Zhen (in an important speech given in 1980) and has been kept in use by scholars in China. The evolving relationship of the resolution power to the other three parliamentary powers has gone through two periods.

1982-2013: the Resolution Power depended on the exercise of the other powers

PCs’ Resolution Power was written into the Chinese Constitution in 1982. However, from 1982 to 2013, the central roles of PCs were seen as performing their legislative and supervisory functions. Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, resolutions were only used to render decisions related to legislative and supervisory procedures. Moreover, Jiang and Hu gave consistent emphasis to the legislative and supervisory powers of parliamentary bodies, relegating the resolution power to far lower prominence. For instance:

  • On March 18, 1990, at the Third Session of the 7th National People’s Congress (NPC), Jiang Zemin stated that those important decisions of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee that should be decided by the NPC must be submitted to the latter to go through the legal process so as to become the will of the state. The same principle should apply to subnational PCs. He then emphasized improving the functions of PCs, especially strengthening their legislative and supervisory
  • On September 12, 1997, in the report to the 15th Party Congress, Jiang Zemin stated that it was necessary to integrate legislation with policy decisions on major issues in reform and development.
  • On November 8, 2012, in the report to the 8th NPC, Hu Jintao reaffirmed that, in order to turn the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) proposals into the will of the state, PCs’ functions as the organ of state power need to be fully utilized, which involves the exercise of the powers of legislation, supervision, appointment and removal, and decision-making. He then emphasized legislative and supervisory work in particular, again leaving the resolution power to lower status.

Indeed, prior to 2013, Hu was the only CCP General Secretary who mentioned the four powers of PCs as a whole. Emphasis instead was reserved for legislative and supervisory powers. After the 7th NPC, NPC Chairmen also seldom talked about the Resolution Power in public speeches, especially compared to the other parliamentary powers. PCs used the resolution instrument in relation to legislative activities mainly when they amended or repealed previous statutes. Newly enacted statutes generally assumed the names of ordinances (tiaoli) and measures (banfa).

2013-present: the Resolution Power was promoted to an unprecedent height

On November 12, 2013, the Third Plenum of the 18th NPC published the Decision on Major Issues to Comprehensively Deepening Reform. While this lengthy announcement was extensively parsed at the time for understanding Xi Jinping’s approach to law, one sentence buried in it eluded little attention. The Decision proposed to “improve the system of discussion and decision-making on major issues in People’s Congresses; governments at all levels shall report to the PC at the same level prior to making decisions on important issues.” As it turned out, this sentence heralded the entry of the parliamentary resolution power into political light, after decades of near invisibility.

In January 2017, the CCP General Office circulated a document titled “Implementation Opinions on Improving the System of Discussing and Decision-Making on Major Issues by People’s Congresses, and Reporting to People’s Congresses at Their Levels before Issuing Major Government Decisions” (《关于健全人大讨论决定重大事项制度,各级政府重大决策出台前向本级人大报告的实施意见》). This document was not made public, but as can be inferred from the lengthy title, there were two separate ideas: first, developing an institution for discussing and deciding on important policy issues within parliamentary bodies; and second, strengthening the practice of requiring the executive branch to report to PCs at same level before making major decisions.

  1. Instituting parliamentary discussions and decisions over important issues (apart from legislation)

Since the 2017 CCP Implementation Opinions, among the 28 provincial PCs that already had procedural statutes regarding “discussing and decision-making on major issues” (DDMI), 17 amended such statutes, where they elaborated the scope of “major issues” in conformity to the Implementation Opinions and introduced further procedural details. Beijing, which had no DDMI statute before, also enacted one in 2017.

Notably, Article 16 of Zhejiang’s DDMI statute and Article 4 in Hubei’s DDMI statute both provide that Resolutions adopted according to DDMI procedures have the effect of law. That is, these provisions assert that PC resolutions possess the same effect as local statutes recognized under the Law on Legislation. Since 2017, the Zhejiang Provincial PC has passed three Resolutions regulating individual obligations directly. By contrast, there were no such Resolutions before 2017.

  1. Requiring the executive branch to report to local PCs at before major policy decisions

In the past three years, five provincial PCs in China (Zhejiang, Anhui, Sichuan, Hubei and Guangxi) have introduced rules in their DDMI statutes that the executive branch should report to PCs at the same level before making decisions on major issues. In October 2018, the Beijing People’s Government released an informal document prescribing the policies that it would itself follow for reporting to the Standing Committee of the Beijing PC regarding major policy decisions.

On February 25, 2019, Xi Jinping presided over the second meeting of the Comprehensively Governing the Country by Law Committee. The meeting approved the Interim Regulation on Major Administrative Decision-Making Procedures (Draft), which was issued later by the State Council on April 20, 2019. Article 8 of this Regulation stipulates that when major administrative decisions fall within the scope of matters required by law to be deliberated and decided by the PC at the same level, or when there is a specific legal requirement for reporting to the PC, the “relevant procedures shall be followed.”

It is likely that the “relevant procedures” referred to here are to come from local DDMI statutes. Currently, with the exception of Xinjiang and Ningxia, all provincial PCs have issued DDMI statutes and listed the scope of major issues, based on the Local Organizational Law and the 2017 CCP Implementation Opinions. If a matter fits into the category of “major issues”, PCs can adopt Resolutions independently, while the executive branch can also make policy decisions. In the latter case, the executive branch should report to the PC at the same level and obtain approval before issuance of the policy.

As a result of these developments, the Resolution Power of Chinese parliamentary bodies has been promoted to an unprecedented height, in some ways even above the legislative and supervisory powers. PCs in prefectural cities may issue Resolutions with legal effects directly under DDMI statutes. If they opt for this procedure, cities can avoid submitting draft legislation to the provincial PC for approval before it comes into force (as provided in the Law on Legislation). Just as remarkably, there seems to be acceptance that PCs at the county level, while possessing no legislative power based on LL, can pass Resolutions on major issues with the effect of law in their jurisdiction. In short, insofar as major policy issues are concerned, there appears to be an emerging view that DDMI statutes preclude the application of the Law on Legislation, relax the procedural strictness on parliamentary lawmaking in lower-level PCs, and thereby grant extensive flexibility and discretion to these bodies.


Institute of Theory on China’s People’s Congress System  Decision-making Power of People’s Congress under Different Concepts, 中国人民代表大会制度理论研究会,《不同概念下的人大决定权》,专题探讨。

Sun Ying (2019), On the Dual Attributes of Decision-Making power of People’s Congress on Major Issues, Politics and Law, no. 2, p. 33, 孙莹,《论人大重大事项决定权的双重属性》,《政治与法律》2019年第2期, 第33页,





Lawmaking in the Time of the Pandemic

Written By: Wei Cui

Posted on June 25, 2020

On February 5, 2020, two weeks into the national lockdown to stop the spread of the novel coronavirus epidemic that had broken out in Wuhan, President Xi Jinping convened a meeting in Beijing of the Comprehensively Governing the Country by Law Committee (CGCLC) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The publicized agenda of the meeting contained disparate items, ranging from reforming judicial accountability, further entrenching the rule of law in China’s countryside, to using rule of law to enhance the business environment in Shanghai. The first item on the meeting agenda, however, was the approval of a CGCLC Opinion with the lengthy title, “CGCLC Opinion regarding Preventing and Controlling COVID-19 by Law, and Tangibly Protecting the Lives, Health and Safety of the People” (《中央全面依法治国委员会关于依法防控新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情、切实保障人民群众生命健康安全的意见》). This Opinion was not made public and presumably, like many other CCP documents, was intended to be read only by the relevant members of the high Party ranks. At least according to the official summary of the meeting offered by the Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping only argued that the government response to COVID-19 should make good use of law: he gave particular emphasis to strictly enforcing existing law to preserve social order, without explaining why the law was particularly relevant at this moment in an evolving crisis.

Yet this obscure February 5 meeting triggered an extraordinary response from sub-national legislatures across China. Just within the next week, People’s Congresses in 17 provincial-level jurisdictions enacted local legislations that laid out detailed government and societal measures for responding to the COVID-19 public health crisis, while stipulating the related rights and obligations of citizens and private parties. By the end of the months, 23 provinces have enacted such legislation. Even more impressively, 62 prefectural jurisdictions across China took similar legislative steps, largely independent of legislation in their respective provinces and often before provincial legislation. All of these legislative actions rapidly advanced without any move on the part of the National People’s Congress (NPC), traditionally the most prominent lawmaking body in China. Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the geographical distribution of these provincial and city legislative responses across China.

Figure 1 Provincial COVID19 legislation

(color scheme reflects concentration of diagnosed COVID19 cases)

Figure 2 Prefectural COVID19 legislation

A reading of these subnational legislations reveals that there was clearly no blueprint or template for them. While the content of legislations adopted in difference provinces and cities displayed extensive overlaps—as one might expect for contemporaneous legislation that shared the same subject matter—the detailed drafting of the statutes substantially varied across jurisdictions, and there was a noticeable quantity of unique local policy elaborations. This, combined with the apparent absence of any national-level instruction (and especially in the absence of any NPC action), strongly suggests that the legislative outburst was not orchestrated or merely mechanically implementing some superior directive. Supporting this conclusion is also the fact that 8 out of 31 Chinese provinces, as well as 70 % of prefectural cities, did not enact local legislation. The decisions to adopt legislation appeared to be made independently by each jurisdiction.

This outburst of subnational legislation in February and March 2020 is remarkable not just in comparison to subnational PC’s regular level of activity, but also, and primarily, because there are three important reasons to think that subnational legislation was an especially appropriate instrument with which to implement COVID-19 response in China at this time.

First, like many other countries such as the U.S., Canada and Germany, the Chinese government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was decentralized. Other than a nationally organized effort to aid the province of Hubei (and the city of Wuhan in particular), the national government had a relatively small role to play in each province’s policy choices, whether regarding how to stop the spread of the coronavirus, or regarding how to pursue economic recovery. Post-pandemic policymaking in both the social and economic realms, therefore, is likely to be concentrated at the sub-national, and especially sub-provincial, level.

Second, because the response to COVID-19 is largely about mobilizing society—from social distancing and wearing masks to implementing safety measures in the workplace and sites of economic exchange—government policy especially needs to be public-facing. Enforcement by government agents is insufficient; the whole society needs to be mobilized to follow a set of changing rules and norms. The government needed to reach out to the public at this time more than any other, and legislatures can play a unique role in setting norms for the public for voluntary compliance in this way.

Third, for a number of institutional reasons, People’s Congresses give actors within the CCP a unique channel to speak to the public. This channel is unique both in the symbol of legitimacy it carries and in its ability to allow the Party to speak in an anonymous fashion: no particular political leader needed to associate him or herself with the legislatures’ announcements, while at the same time, arguably, legislative action can signal and declare political loyalty.

In a series of forthcoming blog entries, we will comment on some of the institutional backgrounds—many of which are unfamiliar to not only the public but even to legal communities—for understanding this wave of Chinese subnational COVID-19 legislation. We will also summarize some findings from our analysis of these legislative actions. Our investigation has two goals. The first is to identify features in the timing and format of local congressional actions, as well as potential interactions among them, that may be relevant to understanding their political motives. The second is to highlight those aspects of the provisions of COVID-19 local legislation that are likely to have substantial impacts in the short or medium term. Because the paths to vaccines and cures for COVID-19 and to economic recovery will take time to explore, and because lasting changes to economic and social institutions may occur as a result of the pandemic, our working assumption is that the legal framework set up by Chinese subnational governments in February-March 2020 will not soon be forgotten. We aim to identify new legal mechanisms of policymaking and implementation that is likely to be effective (or at least have an effect), and that is far less top-down than students of Chinese law are accustomed to.





China’s in the race to build a COVID-19 vaccine Written by Michael Wong

Written by  Michael Wong

Posted on May 26, 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic has thus far spread to all six inhabited continents, infected at least 5.4 million people and caused at least 340,000 deaths. Governments the world over have, to various degrees, closed their borders and shut down their economies. Countries that have successfully controlled the spread of the virus, such as China and South Korea, are weary of a second or third wave of new infections. The 1918 Influenza Pandemic has given a glimpse of the potential devastation that can occur with a virulent transmissive disease and an unvaccinated populace. The race to create an effective vaccine has become one of the most important priorities for the world’s advanced economies—and for China.

The stakes for China are high. COVID-19 disrupted every facet of Chinese life during the first three months of 2020. Hospitals were overwhelmed, and offices and factories were shuttered. The country’s gross domestic product contracted by 6.8% in the first quarter of 2020, the first decrease on official record since 1992. A successful vaccine therefore has immense value by preventing further waves of disease transmission and lockdowns, as well as ensuring the stability of the economy.

Before a vaccine can be distributed, it must first be approved and deemed safe and effective by a country’s health regulatory agency, such as the United States’ Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or China’s National Medical Products Administration. For approval to be granted, at least three phases of clinical trials are performed in humans. Phase I trials involve determining a safe dose for the vaccine and involves healthy volunteers, while phase II trials aim to find the right vaccine dose for an effective treatment. If the right balance is struck between safety and efficacy, the vaccine would move into phase III trials, where the vaccine would be compared against standard treatment. COVID-19 phase III trials would likely compare a vaccine candidate against an unrelated marketed vaccine. The use of an existing vaccine as a comparator may help mask the study participants from differentiating between the COVID-19 vaccine from the comparator.  After approval by a regulatory agency, further clinical trials may be completed to ensure that the product actually works.

China has multiple vaccine candidates in the pipeline—of the ten worldwide vaccine candidates currently enrolled in clinical trials, six are developed or invested in by the Chinese as of May 22, 2020. A further few dozen Chinese institutions and companies have candidates at the pre-clinical trial stage. Two Chinese vaccine candidates in particular have made headlines in Western media during the past few weeks.

The first is a collaboration between CanSino Biological, a private Chinese company, and the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology, affiliated with China’s People’s Liberation Army. The vaccine candidate, named Ad5-nCoV, has completed phase I testing, with the results published in The Lancet on May 22, 2020. Ad5-nCoV showed promising results in safety—the most common side effects were mild or moderate in severity—and efficacy, by eliciting a positive immune response in the test subjects. Ad5-nCoV has since moved to phase II trials in China, amongst the first of all vaccine candidates. CanSino made headlines last week when it was announced that the company intends to work with Canada’s National Research Council (NRC). The NRC had contributed to the development of the vaccine by licensing technology to CanSino for creating a cell line needed in vaccine production. The collaboration allows CanSino to test its vaccine in Canada, expanding its sample size in determining whether the vaccine is safe and efficacious. In return, Canada secures a potential vaccine for mass production and distribution, should the candidate remain viable throughout all clinical trials.

The second vaccine candidate is created by Sinovac Biotech, a private Chinese company. The company is conducting phase I and II trials concurrently; phase I trials began in April 2020, while phase II trials commenced the following month. Sinovac also published results on its vaccine candidate in Science; the company had previously tested on mice, rats, and non-human primates. In macaques, the higher dose of the vaccine candidate tested elicited complete protection against SARS-CoV-2, the causative virus of COVID-19. The vaccine did not lead to enhancement of infection in the macaques, which was a potential concern for certain types of vaccines. Venture capitalists have taken notice as well: on May 22, Advantech Capital, a Beijing-based private equity fund, and Vivo Capital, a Palo Alto-headquartered healthcare investment firm, have each invested US$7.5 million towards development of the vaccine.

The other four vaccine candidates pursued by Chinese parties and currently undergoing clinical trials are not far behind, with all four in combination Phase I/II trials. Sinopharm, a state-owned enterprise, is working with the Wuhan and Beijing Institutes of Biological Products on two separate vaccines, with funding from China’s Ministry of Science and Technology. The Shenzhen Geno-Immune Medical Institute, owned by the Shenzhen local government, is currently recruiting participants for its own vaccine study. Rather than creating its own vaccine, Fosun Pharma, a private Chinese company, invested in German biotechnology company BioNTech, whose vaccines are currently undergoing clinical testing in both the EU and the US. In exchange, Fosun Pharma has marketing rights of the vaccine in China upon approval by regulatory authorities.

Should any or all of these vaccine candidates emerge successfully, a future problem lies ahead for these pharmaceutical companies: regaining the Chinese people’s trusts in vaccines. The New York Times reported in early May of the wariness that the Chinese public has on Chinese-made vaccines, owing to the 2018 vaccine scandal in China. Two Chinese companies and institutions, including the Wuhan Institute of Biological Products, were involved in the production in several hundred thousand substandard vaccines, which were ultimately administered into children across the country. In order for vaccines to have a meaningful impact, widespread acceptance and uptake is required. Thus, Chinese companies have to not only find a successful vaccine, but also convince the public that it is safe for use.

Although China currently has COVID-19 disease spread under control, this is likely only temporary. Health experts warn of a subsequent wave, perhaps as early as September. A safe and effective vaccine remains the most coveted prize by countries worldwide, with China investing heavily in vaccine development. That investment is returning dividends—China currently has the most candidates in clinical development. Can China overcome its public perception on vaccine safety? China has to; their nation’s health and economic stability depends on it.




A Legal and Empirical Study on Collective Labour Relations in China: Analysis on Collective Wage Consultation

Written by Lili Wang

Posted on April 24, 2020

Collective wage consultation, similar to but different from collective bargaining, is a strategy in China for preventing and resolving collective labour disputes relevant to remuneration. Under this process, employers and a labour union, or representatives of employees, consult about labour compensation, working hours, rest days and leaves, labour safety and hygiene, vocational training, insurance, welfare benefits, and conclude a collective contract draft, which must then be approved by the workers’ congress or a general meeting of workers of the enterprise, signed by the two of the consultation representatives, and confirmed by local government.

Legislation governing collective wage consultation sets out a model based on co-determination, that is, one which endows rights of wage determination to employees and employers. But in practice, Corporatism-Coordination, a system in which governments regulate collective labor relations, and employees, employers, and district trade unions work together to make it true, better reflects the actual functioning for collective labor relations in China. That is “one party governs, and three parties coordinate”. This article discusses how collective labour relations in China is moving from a model of Corporatism-Coordination towards the envisioned model of Co-determination.

The legislation governing collective wage consultation formally conforms to a model of Co-determination. First, both employers and employees have equal rights to negotiate and determine the wage and essential issues according to article 13 and 15 of Trial Measures for collective wage consultation and article 26 of Collective Contract Provisions. Employers have no right to shutdown business enterprises, and employees have no right of strike, although employees do have rights of final deliberation on the consultation result. Second, governments supervise the consultation process and mediate related disputes, but cannot interfere in the communication of the two parties. Third, related regulations help to keep the balance of the two parties. Article 3 of Provisions on the Democratic Management of Enterprises affirms the rights of workers to know, participate, express and supervise business management activities.

Collective labour relations in China is moving from Corporatism to Co-determination. Under a model of Corporatism, wages were managed by the government, and employees and employers had little opportunity to discuss or influence wage determination. Under a model of Co-determination, as discussed above, wages are determined mainly by employees and employers.

Currently, collective labour relations in China exists under a model of Corporatism-Coordination, in which government is reducing its intervention in the labour market, but continues to provide guidance to employees and employers in the consultation process. The graph below illustrates this change. The thick arrow illustrates strong bargaining relationships, where strength reflects the significance and influence of the relevant parties, and dotted arrow illustrates weak bargaining relationships.

Under a model of Corporatism, there is a strong relationship between the government and employees and employers, but a weak relationship between employees and employers. In Corporatism-Coordination, there is a strong relationship amongst all three parties. In Co-determination, there is a strong relationship between employees and employers, but a weak relationship to government.

The shift from Corporatism and towards Co-determination can be seen in existing collective wage consultation cases in China in the past decade. Based on the analysis of 61 collective wage consultation cases from relevant news in the website of All – China Federation of Trade Unions from January 1, 2008 to April 10, 2017, relevant articles in the magazine of China Worker from July 2009 to December 2016, relevant articles in the graphic database of the newspaper of People’s Daily from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2016, and cases in the internal material of C district trade union, the practice of collective wage consultation presents four models: co-determination; co-determination with assistance; synergism; and, integration.

One case fell under the model of co-determination, in which parties of employers and employees completed the process with a little guidance from local government. 18 cases fell under the model of co-determination with assistance, in which the process could not be completed without help from local government, district trade unions, lawyers, scholars and other social resources, due to disputes arising during consultation or a lack of familiarity with the consultation process. 40 cases fell under the model of synergism, in which the process was completed by the three parties, two consultative parties and local government. This model is characterized by top-down direction and influence from local government, which persuaded the employers and employees to start collective consultation, gave pressure to the employers to finish it, helped the two parties to summarize their ideas, held informal conferences for them to communicate effectively and even provided the model collective contract and detailed consultation result suggestions. Finally, 2 cases fell under the integration model by enterprises, in which the employers controlled the consultation and the collective contracts did not reflect the needs and interests of employees.

In practice, each of these models fall within the ambit of Corporatism-Coordination. First, government participation is an essential condition in the process of establishing collective labor relations under each model. All cases included encouragement, persuasion, guidance, supervision, or mediation from government. Second, the cooperation between employers and employees is a dominant trend under most models and cases. Although in most cases employers and employees lacked the capacities to consult effectively, they did have motivation to communicate and conclude a collective contract.

Corporatism-Coordination is providing a pathway towards Co-determination for labour relations in China. Between the periods from 2008-2013 and 2014-2017, the cases falling under the model of co-determination by assistance increased from 19% to 55% and the cases falling under the model of synergism is decreased from 76% to 40%. The only co-determination model case appeared in the period of 2014-2017. Therefore, it is shows that the effective communication and cooperation between employees and employers is increasing, suggesting that the model of Co-determination, as envisioned under the legislation, may be emerging in China. Today, the Chinese government is encouraging harmonious labour relations and establishing a social governance model based on collaboration, participation, and common interests. That will also encourage employers and employees to develop a collective labour relationship, and advance Co-determination as the dominant model for collective wage consultation in practice.