The political climate in Ulaanbaatar is now in favour of the pro-professional cabinet. President, Chairman, members of parliament, and even well-known columnist Baabar advised Mr. New Prime Minister to recruit professionals outside from the parliament and to tame the parochial interests. This is not new. The majority of past governments, either the coalition or the ruling party, had tried. But, I would doubt – this ad hoc solution would address the deep problem of governance – because the current structure of the public service continues to create incentives for anyone to follow their parochial interests, but not the fine laws of the Public Service and professional merits.
First, professionals are frustrated – they don’t want to see another around of the politicization. Now we can categorize the public servants into three major categories: (1) old cadre and senior specialists, (2) newly recruited professionals through merits, and (3) political party-affilliated specialists. The first group are people who are familiar with the bureaucratic routines – who were either part of or worked with experienced cadre of the pre-1990 administrations. Now most accept – they [senior specialists – ‘ахлах мэргэжилтнүүд’] are shouldering the heavy workload. The second group has been recruited through a standard public service entry process [following the professional merits]. They are hardworkers, but poorly paid. The last group could be divided into two sub-categories: (1) the true party fanatics – who come and go depending on the election results and (2) assimiliators – who find ways to become public servants through the political party line. In comparison with previous two groups, the third group has less incentives and expertise to work, but more accessible to benefits (e.g., travel, schools, awards, bidding, contracts). For sure, the new professional minister and vice minister will bring his/her own team (e.g., advisors, assistants) and will attempt to provide another opportunities for political party-affilliated specialists.
Second, it will deepen the unequal distribution of the workload and benefits. After each election, at the national and provincial/local governments, we would see strong (most of the time, quite explicit) competitions for posts of ministers, vice-ministers, chiefs, and deputy chiefs of agency, chiefs of departments, senior positions of the state-owned enterprises. Why, because these posts are highly paid and accessible to all sorts of public funds and assets. And, even these senior officials create new positions and units for ‘their’ persons, but not for the workload. This parochial interest-driven process creates unequal distribution of workload and benefits for public servants. The majority of public servants could not complain because they could be easily marginalized or victimized by temporary political appointees.
Third, the appointment of the professional minister and the ignorance of professional bureaucrats weaken the bureaucracy – which is the core of any government. Obviously, we would see three types of professional ministers in this new cabinet: (1) A true professional minister – an skillful manager, who can uphold his professional expertise and ethnics over other interests. (2) A ‘hijacked’ minister – a good manager, but caught up in his/her personal, factional, and tribal (i.e., provincial) interests. (3) A ‘balanced’ minister – who tries to balance his professional and parochial interests. But, all these ministers will work under same structural constraints. For one, they are all uncertain about the fate of the coalition government – since they could not see the lifespan of the new government within and beyond one and half year. Second, they and their team would spend 3-6 months to figure out, 3-6 months to implement, and 3-6 months to choose their options before the 2016 election. Third, political parties, political and economic factions, their provincial homeland associations (нутгийн зөвлөл), and others will often pressure them either to support their candidates, polices, and tenders or not to endanger these interests. Some professional ministers would fight against these structural constraints, but most wouldn’t because of the audience costs.
So, what should be done.
Yes, Mr. New Prime Minister has no options other than to appoint professional ministers, but, it would be a temporary fix – and exacerbate the underlying problems.
This is up to the parliament. The parliament is the only institution – that could establish a non-partisan commission to examine the public service, to brainstorm with the past and current experts, and to implement a long-term public service reform plan.
The commission could be headed by influential politicians – former presidents and prime ministers – along with non-partisan experts. They could examine past experiences (even including the communist periods and along with transitional periods of 1990s), asks hard questions on why our fine public service law, regulations, and standards are not solving the problems, and, produces the long-term public service reform strategy.
The public service is the core, the main processor (i.e., computer PC), of the state. Our processor needs an overhaul, if we delay this reform process, the state will implode; the bureaucracy could not respond to any external and internal crisis. With a short-term fix, parties will continue to see the public service as a school for their cadre, an asset for their election, and a source of income whereas the political-economic factions will consider the bureaucracy a tool to increase and protect their profits. Only the parliament could dismantle this current public service structure that forces public servants to side with politicians, parties, and factions to survive, but not pursue their professional merits.