Table of Candidates, Parliamentary Elections 2024

By Marissa J. Smith

I’ve put together an Airtable of candidates, available at this link:
https://airtable.com/app4qRxMRvaDmDLsg/shrJ1RxjGJL3QeSWz

(Click here to see detailed changelog)

6/12/23 – 6/13/24: The table has been updated based on the elections coverage platform at ikon.mn. Changes here:

Democratic Party
#24 – N. Javzanpagma -> N. Baigalmaa
#28 – I. Narantuya -> E. Badamgarav
#29 – D. Amartuvshin -> Ts. Tserentogtokh
#38 – L. Otgontsetseg -> T. Tsatsral
#39 D. Altangerel -> B. Munkhgerel
#43 S. Yumenkhuu to #48
Toirog #5 – Darkhan, Selenge, Tuv
S. Bayartsogt replaced by L. Odbayar
Toirog #9 – Bayangol
B. Battulga replaced by Ts. Tavanchuluu

KhUN
#29 U. Unenkhuu removed [not replaced, party list now has only 47 candidates]
Toirog #2 – Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, Uvs
S. Byambaasuren replaced by M. Byambadorj

Civic Unity Party
Toirog #1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor
D. Bas-Orgil Removed

National Coalition
#1 Nomtoibayar removed
#6 N. Khulan removed
#13 D. Enkhbat -> D. Bekhbat
Toirog #1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor
D. Odontuya -> D. Odontungalag
Toirog #10 – Sukhbaatar, Chingeltei
L. Bayarkhuu removed
D. Ganbold removed

Mongolian Conservative Party
Toirog #4 – Bulgan, Khuvsgul, Orkhon
T. Erdenetsetseg added

5/31/24: We’ve added candidates for Oyungerel’s Civic Unity Party and the National Coalition and will continue to add other candidate listings as they are announced by parties and as we have time to input them.
5/22/24: For now, this is based on information from three parties (MPP, DP, and KhUN) and the media; these candidates have NOT obtained their final candidate cards, i.e. their candidacy is still being reviewed by the General Election Commission.

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Election Results: How Did Incumbents Fare?

By Marissa J. Smith

The 2024 Parliamentary Election has resulted in prominent MPP MPs from specific constituencies losing their seats. Especially of note here is Zandanshatarthe Speaker of Parliament, in the Khangai district (1), and Ganibal from the eastern steppe constituency (6), and Ch. Khurelbaatar (Minister of Finance and longtime MP) from the western aimags (exclusive of Bayan-Ulgii) (2). However, overall, incumbents fared well outside of those constituencies and number 7 (the Gobi). Notably, the DP also took the majority of directly-elected seats in the Khangai and Gobi constituencies, a trend that we intend to analyze further in a coming post.

Despite a huge gain in the percentage of women candidates elected (see Bulgan’s post), women incumbents also lost a significant number of seats, with only three of nine women incumbents retaining their seats. This is also an issue we expect to take up soon.

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Quick Overview of Election Results

By Julian Dierkes

After this morning’s very hot takes, I want to offer a slightly expanded summary of the results of the parliamentary election. For those of you wanting to look at various aspects directly, the Ikon.mn website is my go-to for presentation and accuracy.

Bulgan has already taken a look at women in the new parliament, we will have posts focusing on turnout and incumbency later this morning.

Bottom Line(s)

I am basing this on numbers around 9h on June 29 with 99.95% of polling stations reporting.

  1. Democracy lives. Turnout is roughly stable at 69.3%, voters have voted against the myriad incumbency advantages of the new election system to weaken MPP dominance. The proportional representation system has diversified party voices in parliament.
  2. MPP’s supermajority reduced to mere majority. To some extent this may have been part of the point of the changes to the election system, but PM Oyun-Erdene might have wished for a slightly larger majority than just 68 of 126 seats.
  3. Policy substance still does not matter much. There was no single issue that seemed to capture the imagination of the public. On a trip through the countryside during the campaign, the recurring theme from all opposition parties was “replace them with new people”, not policy on topic X needs to change. Choice of individual candidates and teams continues to trump policy directions.
  4. The DP is back. Despite being in organizational shambles for years now, a somewhat  disappointing party list set of candidates and a weak campaign, the DP has come roaring back to claim a third of the seats in the new parliament.
  5. KhUN did not triumph. Even though voters seem to have indicated a desire for change (though not enough to lead to a change in government), KhUN seemingly was not able to capitalize on that to really establish itself as the opposition choice. Just over 150,000 votes out of just over 1,450m is a strong showing, but note that the KhUN presidential candidate received just under 250,000 votes in 2021, so the party has not grown its voter base. It will be represented in parliament with eight seats.
  6. Proportional representation diversifies parliament. The Civil Will Green Party comes back to life after being last represented in the 2012-16 parliament. It had seemed moribund when charismatic leader S Oyun left politics, but will be represented by four MPs. The National Coalition led by N Nomtoibayar will also be represented by four MPs.

Outlook

As expected, this result implies government and policy continuity. Even with rumours of coalitions, the MPP will be leading the government for the next four years. Cabinet will be reconstituted and as has been in the case, ministers will bring personal agendas and projects to their portfolio, but the overall direction of government in central areas of policy-making is unlikely to shift.

If anything, the election has (re)solidified the dominance of MPP and DP in a two-party system, though proportional representation has led to a diversity of parties in parliament.

Questions

Lots of questions remain:

  • How much of an advantage has incumbency been in the larger constituencies/short campaign period?
  • What about prominence/name recognition?
  • Are there individuals who did well?
  • What about rural vs urban voter behaviour?
  • Can we deduce anything about vote splitting strategies and what this implies for future campaigns?
Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, National Coalition, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Women MPs in 2024 election result

By Bulgan Batdorj 

The results are in, and Mongolia has made history—a record-breaking 32 women have secured seats in the country’s 126-member parliament, representing 25.4% of the total. Of the 32 women elected, 8 were chosen directly through constituency votes, while the remaining 24 gained seats through the party list system. All represent five political parties: MPP 15, DP 10, KhUN 3, Civil Will Green Party 2, and National Coalition 2.

Table 1: Women Parliamentarians 2024-28, Mongolia.

Name Elected from Party
B. Battsetseg 1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor Mongolian People’s Party
Kh. Bolormaa 10 – Sukhbaatar, Chingeltei Democratic Party
Ch. Nomin 11 – Songinokhairkhan Mongolian People’s Party
E. Bolormaa 2 – Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, Uvs Mongolian People’s Party
D. Uuriintuya 4 – Bulgan, Khuvsgul, Orkhon Mongolian People’s Party
Ch. Undram 5 – Darkhan-Uul, Selenge, Tuv Mongolian People’s Party
L. Munkhbayasgalan 7 – Govisumber, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Umnugovi Democratic Party
Kh. Bulgantuya 8 – Bayanzurkh Mongolian People’s Party
B. Narantuya – Nara Party List Civil Will Green Party
S. Zamira Party List Civil Will Green Party
S. Odontuya Party List Democratic Party
S. Tsenguun Party List Democratic Party
J. Bayarmaa Party List Democratic Party
D. Enkhtuya Party List Democratic Party
B. Punsalmaa Party List Democratic Party
P. Batchimeg Party List Democratic Party
B. Jargalan Party List Democratic Party
Ts. Munkhtuya Party List Democratic Party
L. Enkhsaikhan Party List KhUN
G. Uyangakhishig Party List KhUN
B. Munkhsoyol Party List KhUN
M. Enkhtsetseg Party List Mongolian People’s Party
O. Saranchuluun Party List Mongolian People’s Party
D. Ganmaa Party List Mongolian People’s Party
M. Mandkhai Party List Mongolian People’s Party
B. Uyanga Party List Mongolian People’s Party
A. Ariunzaya Party List Mongolian People’s Party
B. Kherlen Party List Mongolian People’s Party
O. Nominchimeg Party List Mongolian People’s Party
Kh. Baasanjargal Party List Mongolian People’s Party
A. Undraa Party List National Coalition
M. Sarnai Party List National Coalition

According to our previously written article, this number falls under the “modest setback” scenario—as the number of women elected directly is 8 out of 316 women candidates in the 13 constituencies, representing a success of only 2.5%. However, the party list mechanism allowed for the maximum potential of 24 women to be elected, demonstrating the importance of the zipper system. While the direct constituency results represented a setback, the overall outcome of 32 women securing seats in Mongolia’s 126-member parliament is still a historic achievement. This 25.4% representation shatters the previous record of 15%, significantly increasing the number of women parliamentarians from 13 to 32.

These women parliamentarians now have the opportunity to leverage their positions to champion the concerns of Mongolian women and promote gender equality, in addition to the expertise they bring to their respective areas. I also hope they can come together as a group to leverage their collective influence for meaningful reforms and solidify this success to pave the way for continued success in future elections.

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Election Hot Take: Change but not Quite

By Julian Dierkes

Everything points to a reduced MPP majority with a surprisingly strong showing by the DP and no major surprises on individual candidates.

Mongolian voters have thus opted for personnel change, but even that not quite. There were no issues in the campaign that suggested a programmatic change, even with a stronger opposition showing, but really the change that was embraced was change for change’s sake and particularly change in the people governing, even if the DP’s offering of potential MPs was not exactly reformist or exciting.

The relatively strong turnout also suggests that desire for some change.

More detailed analyses will have to wait tomorrow, particularly in terms of more solidified results, the showing of DP and KhUN in Ulaanbaatar vs the countryside, the number of women MPs elected, and any strong showing by individuals in more solidified results.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, National Coalition, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Guest post: Election Platforms on Extractive Sector Governance

By Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan 

While political party platforms play arguably a limited role in the final outcome of elections in Mongolia, they are nonetheless important since the aspirations of the ultimate winning party stated in them end up forming the basis of the government policies for the coming four years and beyond. In this article, I comment on policies voiced by political parties in their platforms in the run-up to the parliamentary elections to be held on 28 June 2024.

Overall, 21 political parties and coalitions presented their platforms to the General Election Commission. In this blog, I focus on the extractive sector governance of five that are seen as having greater chances to grab some of the 126 seats available in the new parliament. These are the incumbent ruling party, the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP); the main opposition, the Democratic Party (DP); the third party in the current parliament, KHUN; the National Coalition (NC); and the New United Coalition (NUC).

I use the framework promoted by the Natural Resource Charter, which looks at four key parts in the chain of decisions that determine the quality of governance of mineral resources in any country. These include the discovery of resources, getting a good deal for the country, managing volatile revenues, and investing in sustainable development, as well as two cross-cutting pillars, that of domestic governance foundations and international stakeholders. I simplify this framework by focusing on three aspects of mining governance, namely policies related to (1) discovery, exploration, and extraction of minerals, (2) maximization and management of extractive sector revenues, and (3) good governance and institutions.

The comments provided below are not exhaustive and reflect the personal view and positions of the author and are not related to the institution the author is affiliated with.

Discovery, exploration, and extraction of minerals

In recent years, the country has suffered from dwindling interest from foreign and domestic investors to invest in the exploration and development of new projects in Mongolia’s extractive sector. Licensing is stalled, and investors fear potential expropriation amid a lack of clarity on ownership of projects in light of potential state intervention in the mining business through various channels. In terms of mining, Mongolia has actually increased production and exports of coal and copper, the main mineral commodities for the country. Mongolia has largely failed to engage in downstream processing and producing a final product, as most of the exports to China are in the form of raw commodities and concentrate. The sector suffers from poor infrastructure related to access to efficient power, water, transportation, and border services. Negative environmental impacts and perceived lack of local benefits create resistance to mining at the local level.

Let me look at what plans political parties and coalitions participating in the parliament have on these issues.

The incumbent ruling party, MPP, focuses on large-scale or strategic projects in its exploration and mining policy. It pledges to expand the geology and exploration work aimed at attracting investments for large-scale deposit development. In doing so, the party would focus on ensuring transparency in the licensing process. In terms of the mining sector, the strategy is to focus on high-technology and strategic projects. The platform calls for better control of environmental rehabilitation work and sanctions against violators.

At the same time, the policy promotes large national companies and channels investments from the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to strategic projects, which are likely to be in the mining sector as well. Investments would also be promoted through the expansion of infrastructure facilities and streamlining of government services. For instance, the stated goals include increasing border capacity, streamlining government services to businesses through digitization and automation, and transferring the responsibility of delivering some public services to professional associations. Value addition in the extractive sector is given a high priority, including coal-based projects, copper smelter, iron and steel processing, and fluorspar processing.

DP also included important pledges in their platform. One pillar for DP to bolster the economy is through “the energizing of exploration in the extractive sector”, including improving capacity to carry out geology and related survey and research work, and improving guidance and methodologies for such work. In addition, like the MPP platform, DP plans to focus on large-scale projects in mining and the use of progressive technology for exploiting mineral deposits in full, with the separation of as many mineral elements as possible. In terms of the processing of minerals, the focus is on those with export potential; specific minerals that are to be processed include copper, gold, iron ore, and rare earths. Support for processing is explicitly aligned with the infrastructure support, such as energy and water.

The pledge also includes improvements in the control of mining operations and focus on rehabilitation and the closure of mine sites. For instance, the responsibility for mine rehabilitation and closure will be placed squarely on license holders.

KHUN party, the current minority in the parliament with its single member of the parliament, stressed “the energizing of exploration work.” In doing so, it stressed two policies, namely, to delink the exploration work from the business cycle and price fluctuations in the mining sector and to expand the exploration in line with the global green transition. In addition, the promise is to limit irregular license trading. Other support for business would be through the renovation of mining royalty regime, stabilization of the legal environment including ‘reducing non-tax burden to business operations’, and promotion of processing.  Channeling mining revenue back to the implementation of mega projects in the sector is also envisioned, and so is the sharing of mining revenue with local communities. A pledge to diversify export destinations for mineral commodities is also included.  On the environmental side, clarity over responsible mining and environmental criteria would be required. The Gobi desert region would be singled out to address environmental and social impacts.

NC does not have specific pledges for the exploration of minerals on its platform. As for mining, the sector would be promoted through clarity on taxes. At the same time, revisions to the royalty regime are foreseen, apparently with the aim to maximize royalty collections. The coalition also stresses strategic investments and mega projects as well as processing of coal, and development and processing of hydrogen, rare earths, copper, iron ore and other minerals.

NUC’s platform also seeks to energize the geological surveying and focus on strategic and mega projects including processing of coal, copper, iron ore, fluorspar and gold processing.

Maximization and management of extractive sector revenues

The current ruling party, MPP, starts its platform with the pledge of using mining revenue to address the issue of housing of citizens. The platform pledges to operationalize the Sovereign Wealth Fund and improve the governance of SOEs, which are critical to fiscal spending and revenue generation. Plans include earmarking some mining revenue towards investments in science, innovation, and expansion of exports. For SOEs, the plan is to raise funding by floating their shares in international markets.

DP proposes to engage citizens in decisions over mining revenue and spending and limit politically motivated cash transfers. It also proposes to reduce the debt burden of the government and SOEs using surplus mining revenues and privatization of SOEs, respectively. The platform pays significant attention to the SWF governance, including a dedicated section on the subject. Issues such as limiting political interference and politically motivated spending, focusing on economic diversification, and using the funds for future generations are part of the policy proposed.

KHUN platform stresses megaprojects aimed at both mining and mining linkages and revenue sharing with local communities and limiting off-budget spending through SOEs. Interestingly, KHUN does not specify any explicit policy on the SWF.

NC proposes government guarantees for the implementation of large-scale projects, alluding to the use of mineral revenue for that purpose. The platform includes objectives to operationalize the SWF with the focus on mobilizing funds to it from the privatization of SOEs.

NUC plans to improve the legal environment around the SWF and presumably use the fund for the support of non-mining businesses.

Good governance and institutions

All parties and coalitions stress the importance of governance and anti-corruption efforts. MPP pledges to ensure the mining sector’s transparency, especially in licensing and the use of mineral exchanges for commodity trading. SOE reforms through floating their shares on stock exchanges and allowing public and civil society scrutiny are envisioned. Pledges on fighting corruption include establishing a special corruption court, introducing the whistleblowing mechanism, and the continuation of policies aimed at retrieving assets lost due to corruption. Automation and digitization of government services will also be a priority.

DP pledges to improve public participation in decisions related to the mineral revenue collection and spending, and focusing on improving governance of SOEs and special government funds. The anticorruption efforts would focus on whistleblowing, scrutiny of tax payments and spending alignment of high level officials, and stricter sanctions for corrupt officials.

KHUN pledges to eliminate corruption, and improve governance, and reform SOEs by reducing their number, mostly through turning them into public companies, and the state participation in business.

NC would privatize SOEs and use technology and public-private partnerships to eliminate opportunities for corruption.

NUC pledges to improve the current Glass Accounts system to improve the transparency of state entities, including SOEs.

Comments on platforms

Almost none of the pledges by the MPP, or for that matter by other political parties or coalitions, are new, as they have been included in various policy documents or discussed at various policy platforms over the years.

MPP focuses on Mongolia’s aspirations to move large-scale projects ahead, be they in mining or mineral processing. Similar aspirations have often failed over the years due to a lack of funding, especially from foreign investors. A few successful projects, like coal hauling railway and road, coal processing, or Oyu Tolgoi underground mining, have been the result of many years of wrangling, cost overruns, and delays. Reliance on SWF to fund such projects may be overoptimistic, as the current high revenues from coal may not last long, and the use of SWF is somewhat scattered, as it consists of three different spending channels and only a small portion may go back to domestic industry investments. In terms of downstream processing, coal or other fossil fuel-based investments will likely fail to attract foreign investments and result in the country’s over-dependence on the mining sector while limiting investments in alternative priorities like education or health sector.

In addition, many of the platform pledges are not specific enough, risking that there will be no accountability over the pledges should the MPP win the elections and the platform pledges become the new government policy.

DP’s platform pledges are more specific than the MP’s on some aspects, like geology and exploration policy, making it easier to track should the platform become the government policy. DP policy to prioritize debt repayments using mineral revenue may be a testament to high borrowing rates and lack of profitable projects that these borrowed funds could currently be used for. One can see DP’s accent on preventing mining revenue from flowing into and influencing politics, but the platform is not detailed enough to see how this could be implemented. This can be seen by the DP’s interest in reopening the mandate and purpose of the SWF. DP’s platform stresses public participation as an important mechanism for how mining revenues should be spent.

KHUN goes into greater detail in terms of how exploration and mining can be revitalized. The platform does not go into that level of detail when it comes to managing mining revenues, for instance through the newly legalized SWF. The accent on promoting mega or large-scale projects in mining and mining linkages, i.e. downstream processing and infrastructure is the backbone of the policy on mining for the party.

NC, headed by the owners of one of the largest private mining companies in Mongolia, focuses largely on tax incentives for mining and downstream processing while restructuring the sector by significantly limiting SOEs’ role and streamlining the government’s oversight burden.  

NUC’s plans for the mining sector are limited, but stresses economic diversification and use of Glass Accounts for transparency in its few pledges.

The parties’ platforms all stress the importance of downstream processing. This has been an aspiration or policy pledge for many years now, but the actual results have been limited. It should be noted that all parties still stress investments in fossil fuel mining and processing, although investments in cleaner minerals are also included. Especially with fossil fuels, the risk of investing public funds into potentially stranded projects is high, and the government needs to provide details every time such projects are funded by public resources. While platforms also include extensive pledges on anti-corruption efforts, they still do not provide enough details on the level of transparency that needs to be achieved to ensure public scrutiny over government policies and actions by all parties.  

About Dorjdari

Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan is an economist and the country manager for the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. In this role, he works with the Mongolian government, civil society, and industry to address challenges faced by the country’s mining sector through policy research, analysis, capacity building, and dialogue.

Dorjdari’s experiences span over two decades, during which he has witnessed the mismanagement of natural resources during mining booms and busts. His interest in public policy was sparked by the monumental changes he observed during Mongolia’s transition from one political and economic system to another.

Dorjdari recently completed his SPPGA Practitioner Fellowship at UBC, where he engaged with the academic community, deepened his knowledge about energy transition challenges, and shared his experiences with others.

 

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan, Governance, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mining, Mining, Mining Governance, Oyu Tolgoi, Party Politics, Populism, Reflection, Tavan Tolgoi | Leave a comment

Gendered Trends in Candidacy for Mongolia’s 2024 Parliamentary Election

By Bulgan Batdorj 

There are total of 1,340 candidates across 13 constituency regions and the party list. Of these candidates, 498 (37%) are women and 842 (64.3%) are men.  It looks that the women quota and the zipper system in the party list have helped increase the number of women candidates. Women comprise 32% (316/969) of the candidates at the constituency level. On the party list, women account for 49% (182/371) of the candidates. The 2020 Ikh Hural election had a 20% of women quota, and there were 151 or 24.5% of women out of 606 candidates. The quota increase to 30%  have helped to bring out the number of women candidates by 12.5% (see here for the new election system here)

Women candidates at the party level:
The party with the highest number of women candidates is the KhUN party, with 57 women (46%) out of 92 candidates. The Civil Movement Party is second, with 54 women (43%) out of 125 candidates.

The Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party and Motherlanders United Party have one woman candidate, thus making them 100% women’s parties. The CUP party has the highest percentage of women candidates, at 60%, with 34 women out of 57 candidates. The Good Democratic Citizen’s United Party and KhUN party have 47% of women candidates.

Party Women Men Total Women Percentage
Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party 1 0 1 100%
Motherlanders United Party 1 0 1 100%
CUP 34 23 57 60%
Good Democratic Citizen’s United Party 26 29 55 47%
KhUN 57 65 122 47%
Civil Movement Party 54 70 124 44%
Civil Will Green Party 30 42 72 42%
Mongolian Conservative Party 9 13 22 41%
National Coalition 28 41 69 41%
True and Righteous Party 32 48 80 40%
Republic Party 21 33 54 39%
People’s Power Party 23 37 60 38%
People’s Majoritarian Governance Party 26 45 71 37%
Motherland Party 15 28 43 35%
For the Mongolian People’s Party 14 28 42 33%
Mongolian Social Democratic Party 2 4 6 33%
New United Coalition 28 62 90 31%
Freedom Implementer Party 9 21 30 30%
Freedom Coalition Party 14 33 47 30%
Democratic Party 37 89 126 29%
Mongolian People’s Party 37 89 126 29%
Independent candidate 0 42 42 0%

The ruling MPP and opposition DP party have 37 women candidates, representing 29.4% of their total candidates. All the other 19 parties have reached the quota of 30% women representation.

Women candidates at the constituency level:
The constituencies with the highest number of women candidates are Constituency 5 (Darkhan-Uul, Selenge, and Tuv), with 41 women out of 119 candidates, and Bayanzurkh, with 36 women out of 83 candidates. The constituency with the highest percentage of women candidates is Constituency 12 (Baganuur, Bagakhangai, Nalaikh), where 14 out of 32 total candidates (44%) are women who are competing for two seats only.

Constituency Female Male Grand Total Number of seats per Constituency
3 – Bayan-Ulgii 4 19 23 3
13 – Baganuur, Bagakhangai, Nalaikh 14 18 32 2
9 – Bayangol 16 34 50 3
12 – Khan-Uul 19 30 49 3
6 – Dornod, Sukhbaatar, Khentii 22 54 76 7
2 – Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, Uvs 25 90 115 10
4 – Bulgan, Khuvsgul, Orkhon 25 61 86 8
1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor 26 54 80 9
11 – Songinokhairkhan 27 58 85 5
10 – Sukhbaatar, Chingeltei 30 63 93 6
7 – Govisumber, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Umnugovi 31 47 78 7
8 – Bayanzurkh 36 47 83 5
5 – Darkhan-Uul, Selenge, Tuv 41 78 119 10

Constituency 3 (Bayan-Ulgii) has the fewest women candidates, with four out of 23 candidates running for 3 seats. Constituency 2 (Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, and Uvs) has the second-lowest female representation, with 25 out of 115 candidates running for ten seats.

Women candidates in general:

It is disappointing that the ruling party, MPP, and the main opposition DP have not only a broken zipper in the party list, nominating 23 women and 25 men instead of 24 each but also have not met the quota of 30% overall. They have nominated 37 women, representing 29.4% of women. The reasons behind this are not the lack of qualified women candidates but rather an entrenched/paternal party culture and old-boys networks in these parties and the lack of these parties’ institutional commitments to gender equity.

Among the remaining 19 parties, two met the 30% quota, and 16 exceeded this quota with an average representation of 47%. Even if the two parties have only one woman representation removed, the average women representation is 40%.

Another interesting thing with the candidates is that all 42 independent candidates are male, and two women candidates are running from two minor parties, the Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party and Motherlanders United Party.

Note: I used the Сонгууль 2024 (ikon.mn) and supplemented the information with candidate.mn – Бие Даагч in identifying the genders.

 

Posted in Bulgan Batdorj, Democracy, Democratic Party, Gender, Ikh Khural 2024, Inequality, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Analyzing the Environmental Strategies of Five Parties

Jangar Ts. and Bolormaa P. 

Overview of Natural Resources and Ecosystems

Mongolia, renowned for its vast steppe grasslands, abundant water resources, forests,
wetlands, and rich mineral deposits, faces significant environmental challenges. Key threats include environmental degradation, desertification, unsustainable water extraction, air and water pollution, and soil and habitat loss. Seventy percent of pastures are degraded, threatening livestock and resilience to climate change. These threats are primarily driven by overgrazing, urbanization, mining, and climate change.
Despite having high per capita water availability, Mongolia’s water resources are under stress:
Freshwater Withdrawal: Accounts for only 1.5% of total renewable water resources, with
uneven demand and extraction, stressing rivers and groundwater in urban areas.
Pollution: Freshwater sources are increasingly polluted by industrial effluents,
inadequate sanitation, solid waste, and livestock access.
Climate change exacerbates drought and water scarcity. Efforts to expand Mongolia’s protected areas network are ongoing, supported by Local Protected Areas established by provincial and district governments.

Environmental Issues in the Mining Sector

Mining activities have caused significant environmental damages:

  • Land Damage: 8,147.58 hectares affected by gold-placer mining, with excavations and quarries occupying 21.1% of these lands.
  • Surface Water Damage: Accounts for nearly 90% of environmental damage in the Zaamar zone.
  • Soil and Plant Cover: Significant damage in Eastern regions and Selenge province, varying by local environmental features.

Selenge province has suffered substantial damage in, with MNT 28.2 billion lost, representing 40% of total damage. Mining activities are prohibited in 35,900 hectares of river and stream sources, with significant damage in Zaamar zone and Khangai region. 17,400 hectares of protected forest funds have been affected, predominantly in Selenge province.

Mongolia’s rich natural resources and ecosystems face severe threats from environmental degradation, water scarcity, pollution, and climate change. Efforts to improve water governance, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable tourism are critical. Addressing mining-related environmental damage is essential for preserving Mongolia’s natural heritage and ensuring sustainable development.

Here, we provide a brief analysis of the proposed environmental strategies by the following parties: Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), the Democratic Party (DP), KhUN Party (HP), Civic Courage & Green Party (CC&GP), and the National Coalition (NC).

MPP. New Revival Policy Regional Development Reform (Шинэ сэргэлтийн бодлого бүсчилсэн хөгжлийн реформ)

Chapter 6: Human and Environment

6.1.4. Renew environmental monitoring, introduce high technology, AI in natural disaster projection and prevention.

6.2.1. Pass “Pasture management” law to protect water, soil and pasture and prevention from land degradation and desertification.

6.2.5. Pasture irrigation, continue well work.

 6.3. Water – precious resource

6.3.1. Create environment to ensure water security

6.3.2. Collect water from snow, ice, build 140 ponds, water reservoir to improve water access for local community, wild animals, livestock, and industry.

6.3.4. Limit use of groundwater in mining and promote use of surface water

6.3.5. Promote responsible mining: technologies for water re-use, re-cycle, use of grey water.

6.3.6. Promote wastewater use through recycling.

6.3.7. Expand water exploration to supply drinking water for local population.

6.5. Green Economic Transformation

6.5.3. Promote Green product, sustainable consumption, green lifestyle through introduction of environmentally friendly technologies in waste reduction, resource use.

6.5.4. Increase investments in green jobs and businesses.

Key Strategies:

• Environmental Monitoring and Disaster Prevention: Renew environmental monitoring systems and introduce high technology, including AI, for natural disaster prediction and prevention.
• Pasture Management: Pass the “Pasture Law” to protect water, soil, and pasture from degradation and desertification, and continue well irrigation projects.
• Water Security: Enhance water security by collecting water from snow and ice, building 140 ponds and reservoirs, and promoting responsible mining practices that include water reuse and recycling.
• Green Products and Jobs: Promote sustainable consumption through environmentally friendly technologies and increase investment in green jobs and businesses.

Analysis:

Integrating technology and AI into environmental monitoring systems offers an effective approach to predicting and preventing natural disasters. However, recent years have shown inefficiencies in environmental monitoring systems, with significant gaps in data collection and analysis. Limiting groundwater use in mining operations may face opposition from  stakeholders in regions like the Gobi, where groundwater is crucial resource for both mining and local communities.

The proposed “Pasture Management” law to be effective, it must be part of a broader, integrated strategy that includes sustainable agricultural practices, pasture water management, and soil conservation efforts. Without this integration, the law alone may not achieve its intended outcomes.

The construction of dams and canals for flood management and the collection and storage of rain and snow water are crucial for water resource management. These efforts are effective with good governance and adequate funding.

MPP’s tenure has been marked by economic and social challenges.

Democratic Party. Full Mongolian, Complete Democracy: Steadfast Development Plan  (Бүтэн Монгол, Бүрэн Ардчилал)

Chapter 5.7.1 Water

5.7.1.1. Build Engineering infrastructure for clean water supply and water sewage.

5.7.1.2 Implement “Kherlen – Gobi”, “Orkhon – Gobi” and “Tuul – Gobi” projects

5.7.1.3. Build water reservoirs and implement projects to increase water resources.

5.7.1.4. Support the project of building an additional hydroelectric power plant.

5.7.1.5. Built Dams in large rivers.

5.7.1.6. Increase the use of grey water.

5.7.1.7. Implement projects to reduce/stop groundwater use

5.7.1.8. As part of the “Billion Trees” national movement and the fight against desertification, create 50-100 hectares of green spaces/facilities in every soum.

5.7.6. Hydropower station, nuclear power station

5.7.6.1. Increase domestic production of energy

5.7.6.2. Build a large reservoir, artificial lakes, floating ponds, and accumulate water to supply water to desert and grassland areas

5.7.6.5. Intensify research on hydroelectric power plants and build hydroelectric power plants within PPP.

5.7.8.15. Improving the supply of economical and environmentally friendly technologies to water supply to increase crop harvest

5.7.8.17. Implement solar and wind renewable sources for greenhouse farming and drip irrigation.

Chapter 6.1.1 Local Development

6.1.1.7. Promote Intensive animal husbandry and irrigated agriculture.

6.1.2.5  Renew and put in operation irrigation system near  Gahanch River in Biger, Sharga, Taishir and Bugat Sums.

6.1.2.6. Build a 50 m3 capacity water treatment plant in Jargalan, Chandman, Togrog, Darvi sums, Guulin, Bayantooroo soums

6.1.2.7. Build a new flood dam on the west of Yesenbulag Sum.

6.1.2.10. Create a waste processing system based on PPP, implement an eco-environment program.

6.1.2.12. Build Erdeneburen hydroelectric power plant

6.1.4.1.Build Egiin  hydropower station

6.1.6.5. Build dams and canals in province centres to manage and mitigate floods.

6.1.7.2. Implement “Water for Gobi region” program

6.1.7.6.Collect and store rain and snow water for agriculture irrigation.

6.1.7.8.  Resolve drinking water purification

6.1.7.10. Implement water projects to protect wildlife, and prevent desertification.

6.3.29. Introduce automated system for monitoring and measuring of water, electricity and heat use.

Key Strategies:

  • Water Infrastructure: Build engineering infrastructure for clean water supply and sewage, and implement significant projects such as “Kherlen – Gobi”, “Orkhon – Gobi” and “Tuul-Gobi for water resource enhancement.
  • Hydropower and Renewable Energy: Support for hydroelectric power plants and renewable energy sources like solar and wind for greenhouse farming and irrigation.
  • Desertification and Afforestation: As part of the “Billion Trees” national movement, create green spaces in every district to combat desertification and improve environmental quality.
  • Waste Management: Develop a comprehensive waste processing system through public-private partnerships, including building new water treatment plants and flood control infrastructure.

Analysis:

The Democrats focus on large-scale infrastructure projects and renewable energy to provide sustainable solutions to environmental challenges while promoting economic growth. However, the strategy lacks a unified framework that integrates these initiatives into a cohesive plan.

KhUN Party “It’s Time to Change” (Өөрчилнө цаг нь болсон)

Chapter 4: Close to nature development

Key initiatives include expanding protected areas, integrating environmental data into digitized system, and collaborating with the private sector to boost financing and community participation. A  public environmental management and reporting system for mining operations will be established, along with a legal framework for a mineral deposit system to fund rehabilitation.

Sustainable land management practices, such as afforestation, reforestation, and advanced agriculture techniques, will restore degraded lands and enhance ecosystem resilience. Create opportunities to generate revenue from the ‘Billion Tree’ program, aiming to attract private and foreign financing for tree planting.

Urban-rural ecosystem services will be updated to reflect the value of land use. A stable and financing model will reduce reliance on the state budget, ensuring foreign investment and private sector participation. An Environmental Trust Fund will be established with and international investments. The government will also work on implementing international agreements such as the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species, the Human and Biodiversity Program, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Natural resources management will prioritize installing bio-sanitary facilities and identifying locations for renewable energy. The “Ezentei Garbage” program overhaul waste management, improving recycling standards. Land along the Selbe and Tuul rivers will be protected  and developed for recreation with private investment.

Climate change policies will expand water, climate, and environmental monitoring, integrating technical innovations. A smart monitoring network will protect natural resources, supported by technology and transparency. Professional resources will be developed for environmental restoration in urban areas.

A natural disaster prevention system and comprehensive risks assessment will be established. Emissions from harmful vehicles will be banned, and a monitoring system will be implemented. Water policy reforms will manage cross-border and domestic water, including urban water management policies.

Public awareness campaigns will promote natural resources conservation and green development initiatives. Efforts to reduce waste, save resources, and promote recycling will be supported. Environmentally friendly technologies and a Circular Economy policy will be introduced. Households will be encouraged to plant trees, supported by a legal frameworks. Incentives for green consumption and green government will be introduced.

Key Strategies:

  • Protected Areas and Ecosystem Services: Increase protected areas and integrate environmental, social, and economic data for better management. Promote sustainable land management practices such as afforestation and sustainable agriculture.
  • Environmental Finance: Establish an Environmental Trust Fund with private and international investments, reducing dependency on state budgets.
  • Waste Management and Renewable Energy: Update the waste management system to improve recycling standards and identify appropriate locations for renewable energy generation.
  • Public Participation: Increase public awareness and participation in environmental conservation through educational campaigns and community-led projects.

Analysis:

KhUN Party focuses on innovative financing and community engagement, involving private and international stakeholders for sustainable funding. Public participation and awareness could enhance policy effectiveness, with comprehensive initiatives aimed at creating a sustainable environment. Integrating modern technologies, fostering private and community participation, and promoting international cooperation are key to managing natural resources.

Civil Will and Green Party. “Have the Courage to Make a Change” (Шинэчлэлд Зоригтой бай)

3.1. Sustainable development

3.1.1. To balance environmental protection and economic growth

3.3. Nature and Environment (forestry)

Launch afforestation campaign to increase forest cover, carbon sequestration, soil stabilization, water basin protection, increasing efficiency, reducing sand migration in the Gobi

3.1.6. Implement circular business/economic practices, reduce waste, Increase recycling.

3.3.1 To protect wildlife biodiversity, and their habitat, redefine protected areas and natural reserves

Key Strategies:

  • Sustainable Development: Balance environmental protection with economic growth, focusing on circular economic practices and waste reduction.
  • Afforestation: Launch campaigns to increase forest cover, stabilize soil, and protect water basins, particularly in the Gobi region.
  • Biodiversity Protection: Protect wildlife biodiversity by redefining protected areas and natural reserves.
  • Green Economy: Implement policies to promote a green economy through sustainable consumption and increased recycling.

Analysis:

CC&G’s platform emphasizes ecological sustainability and biodiversity protection, balancing environmental and economic goals through circular economy practices.

National Coalition. “Let’s Support National Industry, Let’s Make Nation Rich”

Chapter: Regional Green Development, Rural Revival

Reforming the government’s water policy, develop master plan, collect water, use water resources for energy generation, build hydropower station.

Key Strategies:

  • Water Policy Reform: Reform the government’s water policy, develop a master plan for water resources, and build hydropower stations to generate energy and improve water management.
  • Green Development: Emphasize regional green development and rural revival through sustainable resource use and environmental protection measures.
  • Economic Integration: Integrate environmental concerns with industrial development, ensuring that economic growth supports environmental sustainability.

Analysis:

The National Coalition aims to integrate environmental sustainability with industrial growth, focusing on water policy reform and green development to address environmental issues while promoting economic growth.

Conclusion

Each party addresses key environmental issues such as water management, desertification, forest cover, waste management, and sustainable development. They offer varied approaches with infrastructure projects, innovative financing, community engagement, and green development. Some difference, however, can be seen on methods of implementation; by creating a legal framework to promote e.g. public with private partnership, or just old school way when government takes control on steering.

While the MPP has focused on water security, environmental monitoring and disaster prevention, green product and jobs, their current governance raises concerns about economic and social impacts. One strategy recommends limiting the use of groundwater in mining operations and encourages the use of surface water for mining activities. However, this strategy may raise concerns and potentially lead to opposition from different stakeholders involved in ongoing mining operations in regions like the Gobi, where groundwater is a crucial resource for both mining and local communities.

The Democratic Party continues previous water supply projects to Gobi region, supporting mining and hydropower. These projects were proposed over eight years ago and seems finding a broad political support these days; when pre-feasibility study on Herlen-Gobi project was concluded in 2007, then MP from Khentii Aimak B. Bat-Erdene was strongly opposing this project, seizing any further initiatives.

The Civic Will Green Party’s program is well-articulated and integrated, promising impactful results upon implementation.

KhUN party proposes a unified framework for sustainable and resilient environmental management through modern technologies, private and community participation, and international cooperation. These initiatives promise positive results by ensuring participation and long-term financing opportunities.

About Bolormaa Purevjav

Dr. Bolormaa Purevjav is a researcher at the Mining Engineering Department of UBC. Her PhD research focused on integrated water resources management, stakeholder engagement in sustainable water management, and water governance in the context of mining.

About Jangar Tsembel

Jangar Tsembel is a Ph.D. candidate at University of British Columbia (UBC) in Vancouver, Canada. His master degree was focused on effect of land use change on generation of floods in B.C. interior, Canada. His doctoral research is also focused on hydrology where he investigates how environmental controls of watershed can play synergistic or antagonize the generation of peak flows in small catchments and floods in a bigger watershed.

Posted in Air Pollution, Author, Bolormaa Purevjav, Civil Will Green Party, Climate Change, Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Environment, Garbage, Ikh Khural 2024, Jangar Tsembel, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Policy, Policy | Leave a comment

Speculation about Post-Election Scenarios

By Julian Dierkes

Of course, there is lots of speculation about what election results next week might mean for the next four years.

Coalitions?

Long-time Mongolia watchers have heard this story before: rampant speculation around Ulaanbaatar that regardless of a probable-seeming MPP victory, the MPP might reach out to the DP or KhUN to form a “unity government” of some kind.

Why would the MPP govern in a coalition if it ends up with an absolute majority? That question obviously becomes a very different question if the MPP does not win a majority, but here I will focus on a scenario where it does hold a majority.

To some extent, this may link to the challenges that the MPP has experienced in governing with a supermajority. These are primarily two-fold: maintenance of party discipline in parliament, and the lack of an opposition to foist some blame off on for policy gone awry.

A coalition would address the party discipline issue only partly, but some of that will depend in the new Ikh Khural on the role that MPs who have been elected via the party list will play. But the shared responsibility and thus shared accountability may make a coalition government attractive to the MPP. The public presentation would focus on some kind of argument that big changes need to be made (whatever those may be) and that a coalition of political forces and the implied near-consensus around those changes, are needed. As a German, this sounds familiar to the arguments that had been made for the Grand Coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, though the number of “big projects” that coalition took on was actually quite limited. But, this coalition argument is likely to resonate with many Mongolians who expect pragmatic and single-best solutions to political challenges rather than a competition of values approaches.

The precedent for all of this is the coalition government following the 2008 parliamentary election where the then-MPRP secured a majority of seats, but formed a coalition with the DP. That coalition was primarily aimed at concluding the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement which was signed in 2009. Note that while Mongolia is facing a number of policy challenges, there currently is no single issue that is demanding a decision the way that the OT IA was 15 years ago, though perhaps one might wish that aspects of a climate change response, particularly the reliance on coal might be recognized as such an issue.

MPP-DP

Why would the DP want to enter into a coalition with the DP? First of all, there are few real ideological/policy differences between the two parties. Occasionally, the MPP veers slightly more toward state involvement in the economy and the DP has a slightly more liberal economic bent. Similarly, there are more Russophiles in the MPP than the DP, but these differences are not large, so there is no ideological gulf between the two parties.

Secondly, Mongolian politics is very much focused on winning executive power of some sort (on balance, more than bringing about change). A coalition would allow the DP to negotiate some appointments for its leadership, something they have been locked out of since the 2016 election.

Finally, the DP continues to be in disarray. It does appear that frm president Kh Battulga has reasserted some of his hold over the party, note his own candidacy in the Bulgan-Erdenet-Khuvsgul constituency. He does not have a discernible political agenda other than the quests for power and immunity and has previously been rumoured to be in various conversations and alliances with MPP leaders, making this scenario somewhat plausible.

MPP-KhUN

Among the many conspiracy theories and rumours that always circulate, the insinuation that KhUN leader Dorjkhand has somehow been collaborating with the MPP has been persistent recently. KhUN’s claim of having initiated a fairer and more inclusive election system with proportional representation obviously depended on the MPP championing this change as well, given its supermajority.

After the election, KhUN may well be open to offers of a coalition to fulfill their aspiration to participate in government. The trajectory that KhUN has taken since its “arrival” as a possible third party would point toward such a decision as well. Whereas I had initially hoped that a new party might champion a change of political culture, including a more substantive, perhaps even more ideological debate and competition between parties, KhUN has seemed focused more on winning seats than on changing politics, other than emphasizing their own outsider status would bring an obvious change. For a number of its leaders, the offer of ministerial appointments, should that come with coalition discussions, may be too tempting and they might argue that this would give them access to some levers to implement their change agenda.

Cabinet

There is little sense in speculating about the make-up of any cabinet post-election cabinet as cabinet appointments have always been somewhat mysterious and linked more closely to party factions than any particular interests in portfolios from potential ministers or a balance of regional and gender representation (a principle that is important in Canadian cabinets, for example).

Some portfolios may change and that would seem especially likely if any coalition came about.

Cabinet appointments may also represent linkages between individuals and the MPP leaders who seem most powerful at the moment, Pres Khurelsukh, PM Oyun-Erdene, General Secretary Amarbayasglant, and MP Uchral.

The only appointment that seems likely even if only temporarily after the election is FM Batstsetseg, regardless of the outcome of her election campaign, as she would be hosting the World Women’s Forum some time in August 2024.

President

There is also a lot of talk about Pres Khurelsukh trying to engineer a constitutional change in the next three years that would make the President elected by parliament and would effectively allow him to run for a second term. I am not sure what to make of this especially as I am obviously not privy to any agreements that may be being made between Mongolian politicians. I do not find the talk of such a plan surprising. Somewhat like former pres Battulga, Khurelsukh does not appear to be driven by political ideas. Yes, the 1 Billion Trees campaign is a big project, but it is not a political project of change/reform or a (new) direction for Mongolia. Pres Khurelsukh thus does seem interested in staying in office for the sake of being in office. However, we have heard many similar rumours of engineered continuity (“doing a Putin”) in the past regarding other politicians which makes me skeptical on the likelihood of this scenario coming about. Yes, Khurelsukh might see himself as a “strong man” and might appeal to voters and the public in that way with some resonance, but power remains highly fragmented among political and business leaders, so it seems somewhat unlikely that enough power centres would agree to such a continuation of a Khurelsukh presidency or the constitutional change that would be required.

Foreign Agents Law

Unfortunately, there does seem a widespread expectation that the MPP will introduce some kind of “foreign agents” law after the election. This may be called something else to make it less obvious that it might be a close copy of the Russian law that has been enacted across Central Asia and has led to such civil society mobilization in Georgia, for example. It remains entirely unclear to me why anyone in democratic Mongolia would want such a law, the allegation of foreign interference would primarily apply to the origins of his law, i.e. Russia, and perhaps China, but there does seem to be a sense in Ulaanbaatar that the conflict around the introduction of such a law is likely to reappear in the first year after the election.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, JD Democratization, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Election Platforms on Health

By Tsogtbaatar B

Health stands among the most essential and common social goods in Mongolia. Yet, there is often displeasure among the Mongolian public for how health services are delivered and doubts where the overall sector’s policies are headed. The public health concept as the most promising gateway to better development of health sector and population health is still understudied and underutilized. Quickly analyzing the health platforms of several parties with seemingly comprehensive proposals on health that were submitted to the National auditing office  I offer the following categorization of priorities and loopholes.

Progressive

  • SMART (specific-measurable-attainable-realistic-timebound) approach seen to be considered within some objectives: “Enact policies specific to improving access of mobile clinic, telemedicine and public health centers’ services to remote and marginalized communities.” (KhUN)
  • Logical continuation of a strategy or an intervention that has previously been successfully or adequately implemented such as the next phase of risk-based health screening and early detection that was proposed by the MPP, “National programs – Healthy liver, Healthy teeth” (MPP), “Improving the implementation of performance-based financing” (DP)
  • Innovation and recognition of healthy environment for population health took place in “mitigating the environmental health impacts through the advancement of technology and PPP” (NC), use of AI in disease prevention , “Introduction of national program-Cervical cancer free Mongolia” (both MPP)
  • Specific interventions proposed such as further developing the emergency care to the international level through PPP on air-emergency care (MPP and NC), “establishment of Health promotion centers to mitigate post-COVID impacts” (DP)
  • DP has declared mental health problems as an underlying challenge and proposed to strengthen national capacity to diagnose, treat, monitor and prevent. AI is proposed to be used in doing so.
  • DP has identified a need to revise and implement the State Policy on Health, necessary treatment guidelines and regulations in line with international standards. 80+ Ageing strategy and very important health professionals’ liability insurance law proposed to be developed.
  • Highlighted the need to develop and implement comprehensive human resources program including capacity building, social aspect and job security (DP)
  • NC segregated its activities based on demographic groups which makes their target and resources more efficient and realistic. Such public health interventions by the same coalition such as “Monging Milk” and “Nutritious Lunch” are specifically targeted at lowering the child obesity and poor dental health among children.

Stagnant

  • Generic such as “Modernization and standardization of health facilities and infrastructure” (KhUN) “establishment of New diagnostic centers at the regional level to save people’s time and hassle” or “Provide policy support to the establishment of traditional medical hospitals by the private sector” (NC) which all have been works-in-progress for few decades in the health sector with varied success rates.
  • Inaccurate word selections, crude literal translations, disengagement, typos such as “Improving diagnostic capacity, treatment choice and patient’s result through improving quality assurance for health equipment, technology and pharmaceutical products” (Khun), “To reform health sector’s administration system and improve regulatory environment-..Эрүүл мэндийн салбарын удирдлагын тогтолцоонд рефорт хийж..” (MPP). This is very confusing and begs for better wording and conceptualization in the latter sentence which could be “To reform/refine develop health system governance” as it is the overarching concept that refers to processes, structures and institutions that are in place to oversee and manage overall healthcare system including administration and leadership aspects within.
  • Too vague, general, obvious or unclear such as decreasing the burden of preventable disease through the promotion of prevention initiatives including health education and detection (Khun), Building capacity of health professionals and improving coverage of care through investment of specialized and continuous training” (Khun),“Reforming the health insurance system to alleviate financial hardship for citizens” (MPP), “Strengthening the public health system to prevent from diseases and to promote healthy lifestyles such as exercising regularly and eating healthy” (MPP). Wish these were not too symbolic and vague, Instead, were direct, targeted and segregated.
  • Too symbolic, impractical or misleading: “Promotion of universal health care so that all citizens can receive necessary health services without any financial barrier” (KhUN). Over the few decades, Mongolia has gradually been attempting to move away from the Universal health system free-of-charge by systematically introducing a balanced mix of social health insurance system and out-of-pocket system. “To decrease morbidity and mortality of preventable diseases by 35%” (DP)
  • Flat-out ineffective, not-cost-efficient or overpromising: “To increase financial support of those who are required to be treated overseas due to certain illnesses that are not treatable in Mongolia. And to sign collaboration agreement with hospitals overseas to send Mongolians to” (MPP). This non-cost-efficient overpromise, triggered by politicians in the past, would simply go against the very objective of State Policy on Health to invest into and build national capacity in decreasing the number of medical procedures that are not diagnosed and treated within Mongolia. Unmet need in this regard can be unbearable under the current morbidity burden and scarce economic capability, nationally, as well as the general public’s very critical approach on the selection of a few who ends up getting the monetary support.
    “To implement policies to train 3000 doctors, 10000 nurses and 500 care takers internationally and locally” (MPP). Apart from nurse practitioners, Mongolia is regarded to have more than enough health professionals per capita. Instead, the main flaw rests upon equal distribution and improving the quality of existing undergraduate, graduate and residential level training at the national academic and teaching medical institutions as well as improving their fair compensation in line with the workload and labor security.
    “Building the reference level hospitals in every regional center” (MPP). This can be better conceptualized as Strengthening the current capacity of health professionals, equipment and financial mechanisms of Regional Diagnostic and Treatment Centers (RDTC) and improving the patient-referral system between the provincial health facilities and RDTCs, since RDTCs have been built in all 5 regions, years back.
  • Lack of current scenario, data, and clarity: “bring the state portion of social health insurance premium to a medium level” (KhUN, DP)

Overall, these portfolios can be applauded for their mention of leading causes of mortality and some morbidity and their relevant interventions among the general population. A largely vague but very common mention of how crucial public health and prevention of disease are. MDP provocatively believes that some hospital buildings need to be auctioned off and modernized. Health is rightfully prioritized and positioned in the opening sections as a standalone chapter.

However, they generally and chronically lack the following: 1) Accurate diagnosis of Mongolian health system, its current state and challenges, and threat to population health 2) Accumulated and emerging flaws in governance, financing and service delivery 3) Prioritized, clear strategies and actions to fix existing flaws at the national policy level as well as service delivery levels 4) Failure to link and address inadequate social determinants of health and adverse environmental health problems as triggering factors of particular diseases and their preexisting health risks. There are no clear division nor linkage between the layers of proposed policy/challenges/ intervention/ activities /objectives/expected result.

These flaws were further weakened by the absence of sound data, clear implementation strategy, achievable goals/targets as well as both adequate financial resources and motivated human resources, within the next 4-year timeframe.

Grades

KhUN: C (innovative, jumped throughout, vague, lacks backbone)

Green party: F (seemingly complete cloning of the Khun’s proposal which is a big red flag)

MPP: B (innovative, continued implementation proposed, vaguely written,  left pores, over promising)

DP: B+ (better summarized and systematized, emphasized on policy level, redundancy of vaguely “improving” concept, vague in areas, overpromising)

NC: C+ (progressive, didn’t cover broad policy areas, but specific in those touched upon, overpromising)

About Tsogtbaatar

Dr. Tsogtbaatar is an experienced PhD with a demonstrated history of working for the Academic, State, Non-profit and International institutions in the areas of Public health, Health policy and Health Administration. He was involved in the development of the State policy on health as well as Election flatforms back in 2016 and 2020. Dr. Tsogtbaatar has received 3 degrees in health from prestigious institutions in 3 countries and is currently residing in Colorado.

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Health, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics, Public Policy, Public Service, Tsogtbaatar Byambaa | Leave a comment

More Election Talk Around Town

By Julian Dierkes

I was about to head to the countryside until election day with likely fewer opportunities to post but now, inclement weather has led to delay of that plan, so a quick set of notes before I leave the city.

General Calm

Compared to what I recall from previous election, downtown Ulaanbaatar seems not to be involved in the election very much.

The new central posterboards for election posters have led to a lack of visibility of the election in the street. I noted in a previous post that there seemed to be many more campaign offices in more residential areas, but they remain absent from the city centre.

 

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It is difficult to tell whether this calm is a sign of apathy among political parties or just the impact of changes to the electoral law. If it is the latter – i.e. the mandated focus on the official poster boards where parties have to equally show all district candidates – then this would seem to be another hurdle for smaller parties to climb. When campaigning is restricted in this way, how can you get a message to voters. The answer given is, of course, social media which Marissa has taken a closer look at. But surely, this cannot be the entire answer as there are some voters who will not be reached by a social media campaign and some who might not be persuaded by such a campaign.

But, this calm may also be restricted to the city centre.

 

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Where’s Waldo, the Candidate

A “where’s Waldo”-style image is called a Wimmelbild in German, wimmeln is to crowd, probably an onomatopoeia, Bild is image. I always liked that word.

Anyway, candidates and their campaign events are hard to find. I and others have tried to reach out to candidates we know individually, as well as to campaign organizations to try to get schedules of appearances and rallies, but are not getting answers. It is unclear why that might be. Schedules are only being released day-of, and various contacts seem to be hesitant to give out information. It is unclear whether they are nervous about foreigners attending election events (it is not like I am looking to be on stage, I quietly stand in the back, take in atmosphere and speeches), or generally nervous about candidates’ schedules. What that also means, however, is that it seems unlike that voters are very aware of candidates’ plans.

DP

According to most views around town, the DP continues to be in disarray. One event that was advertised online and which I was therefore able to attend, seemed to indicate this as well. It also pointed to the struggle to let voters know about events, or to rely on social media entirely for such announcements, as this event was very poorly attended and did not seem to capture casual pedestrians’ attention.

 

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In principle, this was an event I was especially interested in as it involved candidates from the party list. One of the strategic challenges I had been thinking about is how a party list candidate might campaign and how party organizations might allocate resources to party list candidates. Obviously, as a party list candidate, one would want to build the general appeal of the party and could therefore be a candidate anywhere. Given variable places on the list and thus likelihood of being elected, that may mean that candidates are campaign not only for others, but also may be campaigning for others who have a much higher likelihood of being elected.

In the case of this event, it was three younger candidates from the DP party list who were campaigning. The DP lists is generally being criticized for offering very little to voters to capture an “out with the old” sentiment among voters, in contrast to the MPP list that seems designed to do just that. But these three younger candidates were probably meant to exude a freshness or innocence given their ages and lack of previous political experience.

This kind of voter segmentation might make a lot of sense from the campaign’s perspective as well, i.e. if you are trying to promote the party generically to increase the vote share in the proportional representation, perhaps useful to segment voters and offer particular focus areas. In this case, this was youth, under the slogan of “Democracy Calling”. Given the lack of a crowd that came, the puns on that slogan are obvious.

All in all, only about fifty people turned up,  many of them wearing DP-insignia t-shirts and carrying DP tote bags, suggesting that they were working for the campaign not unrelated voters. Perhaps the purpose of this event, right in front of the Beatles statue with the State Department Store as a further background, was to film it for social media or other use. Surely different camera angles might mask the absence of an audience. But even more shocking – to me – than the lack of an audience and the apparent lack of surprise or frustration with the lack of an audience, the candidates delivered a very “traditional” campaign event, i.e. they stood on a stage and lectured voters. This is Gen Z campaigning? It did not elicit a single moment of applause, until E Bat-Uul showed up.

I have seen this in previous campaigns as well, i.e. an event where each of the three candidates could have easily sat down on a park bench and had a conversation with <10 voters, maybe even solicited their views or challenges and offered some discussion of how the DP program responded to those. Instead, the three candidates lectured.

MPP

Many of the discussions that I have joined have centred on interpretations of the MPP party list. The consensus remains that the composition was strategically very astute in that it has countered the impression of the MPP as the staid incumbent, instead signalling some kind of departure. Conversations then focus on identifying individuals on the list who are closely associated with Pres Khurelsukh, while others are more closely affiliated with PM Oyun-Erdene or MPP General Secretary Amarbayasgalant, perhaps even MP Uchral who is happy to tell all listeners that he was the second highest vote-getter in the last parliamentary election.

Vote Splitting

One of the unfortunate things about the absence of exit polling is that as researchers we will not be able to tell how voters behaved. Given the changes in the electoral system and especially the enlargement to 13 electoral districts, that would be particularly interesting.

For example, one might imagine some kind of typology of voters: straight party slate, split vote of major party + additional parties, split vote between major parties, split vote across additional parties (perhaps while voting a major party on the party vote). All of these seem plausible, but we can only speculate about voter behaviour. Where this will be relevant to the current election is to understand what frustrated voters might do if they go to vote. On the one hand, one might expect voter frustration to hurt the MPP, but perhaps also the DP. On the other hand, there may be some district races where frustrated voters are looking for alternatives and either converging on some such alternatives, or splitting their votes across multiple alternatives. The former scenario would lead to some candidates who are not MPP, DP, or even KhUN to be elected to parliament, while the latter would reinforce big party, perhaps MPP-dominance.

Party Finance

One of the changes that the recent party law introduced is more public funding for parties. That funding will be based on how well parties do in the party vote. This might explain why so many parties have chosen to nominate candidates for the party list even when their chances at gaining a seat will be slight. I’m hoping that we will have a post on this topic in the near future.

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Election Campaigning and Discussions on Social Media

By Marissa J. Smith

A brief summary of trends I am observing on Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit:

Candidate Assets

Besides its usual excellent infographics presenting candidates and parties, ikon.mn has also released data visualizations on candidate’s assets (“Candidates of MPP, DP, HUN and National Alliance are leading in terms of the number of shares in the largest number of companies”). These have been being shared and discussed in the last day or two.

Short Form Video

While pictures of some of the campaign poster boards that Julian wrote about are circulating online, some parties have invested in the production of short form videos featuring candidates. CUP and PPP, lead respectively by former DP MPs Ts. Oyungerel and L. Gundalai, have also released one-on-one “podcast” like clips with some of their candidates. Those that I have viewed are autobiographical in nature, as printed campaign materials in past elections have been.

This example for an MPP candidate running for a seat in a non-Ulaanbaatar constituency establishes the candidate as a highly educated urbanite with an established lineage based in a rural locality (nutag). As is not uncommon with MPP promotional materials, the 20th and 21st Centuries are presented as following a continuous path of historical development:

This example, from DP breakaway CUP, in a diametrical contrast to MPP tropes, invokes the post-socialist period of transition navigated by entrepreneurial youth:

(This candidate’s meme-styled printed poster also elicited much comment on social media: https://www.reddit.com/r/mongolia/comments/1dfnwfz/election_in_mongolia_goes_crazy/)

Public assemblies

Social media-based parallels to assemblies on the central square of Ulaanbaatar have also crossed my feed, though none of these has as of yet taken off, become associated with a hashtag and gone viral.

On the evening of June 15, the DP held a memorial gathering,  photos of which are circulating on Facebook and Twitter. As reported by Xinhua and Agence France Press, in addition to Mongolian media, a DP party member and local leader was beaten and killed by a campaigner for an MPP candidate in Uvurkhangai aimag (part of the highly contested #1 constituency) on June 15. The candidate’s status has been revoked. As included in the DP’s facebook post, DP leader L. Gantumur called for an official apology from the MPP and that all MPP candidates for constituency #1 remove themselves from the election (this would include incumbent Speaker of Parliament Zandanshatar and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Battsetseg).

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A Walk Down Campaign Street

By Julian Dierkes

I’ve noted before that campaign activities so far seem oddly subdued. That was based on my impression mostly of the urban core of Ulaanbaatar. So, for the weekend, I was able to venture a bit further afield and found more of the campaign activities that I saw in previous elections in Mongolia (2012 | 2013 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2021).

I want to emphasize that my photos here are based on a relatively arbitrary walk down some busy roads in districts of Ulaanbaatar further outside the central area. I did not look for specific candidates and am not endorsing any of the parties by showing photos of their flags/materials, obviously.

Since I have foresworn Twitter, you might want to follow me on various other platforms as embedded below for updates on the election.

Voter Education

 

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Poster Boards

As I’ve also noted before, these seem to still be fairly empty even six days into the campaign…

New #Mongolia campaign style: public poster boards with assigned fields for candidates.
#Сонгууль #Сонгууль2024 #MGLpoli

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) Jun 13, 2024 at 10:03 PM

 

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Campaign Offices

Not surprisingly, MPP, DP and KhUN seem to be the most visible in terms of stores, kiosks and other buildings that have turned into campaign offices.

#Mongolia-ns sometimes think of MPP and DP together as Манан, the Fog Party. Funny when their campaign offices are so close together, here in Chingeltei.
#Сонгууль

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) Jun 15, 2024 at 10:23 PM

 

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More campaign impressions, this one in Songinokhairkhan.
#Mongolia #Сонгууль

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) Jun 16, 2024 at 1:00 PM

Rallies

I’ve only caught one real campaign rally with candidates giving speeches and all by randomly making my way around town. Perhaps I’ll be able to get some information about planned appearances in coming days as well.

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Campaign Materials

I’m hearing from others that they’re receiving lots of campaign materials in their apartments. I have not been blessed with those.

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Election Talk around Town

By Julian Dierkes

I’ve only been in Ulaanbaatar for a couple of days, but I am having lots of conversations with contacts about the election. As Mendee keeps emphasizing, I may be the person in Ulaanbaatar who is most excited about the election.

Here are some snippets of some of these conversations then.

Voting Process

There are some obvious concerns about voters’ understanding of how they will actually cast their ballot. This is not surprising given the significant shift from purely first-past the post voting, albeit in multi-member districts, to a mix of direct election and a proportional vote where the direct election is happening in enlarged districts with a greater number of seats. I do not hear this worry from Mongolian contacts so much and they may share my confidence in the General Election Commission on voter education. Every parliamentary election since 2008 has seen a different electoral system, yet when I have had the chance as an election observers to ask voters whether they are confident that they know how to vote, the answers have been almost universally positive.

 

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I have already seen several elements in the GEC voter education campaign around town as in the above. The GEC also set up a polling station simulation on Sukhbaatar Sq last week which struck me as a very innovative idea, though I do not know whether this was replicated around the country.

The greater concern may be around the time that voting will take. Given the size of the ballot (some voters will be voting for 10 seats in multi-member districts) there is some work to be done in the voting booth. Ballots will not be valid unless the voter casts the number of votes that correspond to the number of seats contested in that constituency. If the voter lives in a seven-seat constituency, they have to cast seven direct election votes for the ballot to be valid. Apparently, voters get one re-do if they have not filled out the ballot accordingly and that will slow the process down even more. While it would be possible to add additional voting booths, the number of election machines that the ballot is deposited in is limited, so that lines may well form to insert the ballot which could create a bit of a traffic jam in actually casting the ballot. Note that the forced choice for all the available seats may lead to a greater number of spoiled ballots as voters might resent this. All of this may then lead to significant delays at polling stations which might turn some voters off from voting all-together.

I can only speculate that this might lead some to vote straight party slates to facilitate the voting, while others might deliberately mix their choices (3 candidates from one party 4 from another, etc.). I do not think that observers or party strategists have much of a chance to model voting strategies around this question so that we will not know from the results what voters might have chosen to do.

DP

There is a sense that the DP has botched its candidate nomination process. Not only was the process itself bumpy, but there is little excitement about the candidates nominated to the party lists. There are just too few new or young faces to generate excitement, or so goes the widely-held perception. If that perception remains and is indeed widely held, the DP might not benefit as much from the desire for a chance in government that some voters might hold.

MPP

By contrast, many people seem quite impressed by how the MPP has handled the party list. This might be partly just their attempt to sell the party list, but many contacts of mine agree that they knew hardly anyone at the top of the party list, thus giving off a strong sense of new and fresh candidates.

Campaigning: TV

A number of contacts mentioned how much they were enjoying the candidate debates on TenGer TV. A sense that candidates actually had a chance to talk about substance and to show themselves to voters. Note, however, that the views on YouTube are in the low thousands, so perhaps the impact remains limited.

Campaigning: Poster Boards

Here is something that definitely is new: centralized poster boards with assigned spots for candidates. This has been common in Japan for a long time where I have seen it during many elections, perhaps this exists elsewhere. I was a bit surprised today that the poster board I saw was tucked away on the inside of a residential block, not an area that is likely to see much foot traffic and it appears that there are only limited numbers of these boards.

New #Mongolia campaign style: public poster boards with assigned fields for candidates.
#Сонгууль #Сонгууль2024 #MGLpoli

[image or embed]

— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) Jun 13, 2024 at 10:03 PM

Other than the scant poster boards, campaigning in the urban core of Ulaanbaatar has been quiet, maybe even subdued.

Speculation

Among those who are interested in this election, there seems to be a popular game of trying to predict likely results. Given the absence of public polls, this really is a guessing game more than a prediction. But for the 48 seats that will be distributed by proportional representation, this guessing can be broken down into the number of votes a party might need relative to the number it may have gotten in the past. Divide the roughly 1.5m voters that are an easy-to-calculate guess at voter participation by 48 (seats), and you have a sense of how many votes may be needed to win a seat for a party, presuming that the minimum threshold will be met. The number of votes for parties that will not have met that minimum will change that number of votes for those parties winning seats, but this is still a rough guideline. Based on all of that, I’ve got some guesses in my mind, do you?

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Guest Post: Political Parties’ Election Platforms on Higher Education

By Orkhon Gantogtokh

This review focuses on how 19 political parties and 2 coalitions that submitted their election platforms reflect higher education (university level education) in their platforms, based on comparisons available at iKON and iToim. The analysis includes how many objectives each party has on higher education extracted from their platforms in iToim, the areas of higher education they cover, and the specificity of their objectives. Here, I summarize the main actions of the five parties with the most objectives in higher education, followed by an overall summary of the remaining parties’ objectives.

Democratic Party

The Democratic Party (DP) stands out with its specific section on higher education, having the highest number of objectives (21 objectives) related to higher education. For comparison, the Mongolian People’s Party, Citizen Will Party, and United Party of Patriots each have 6 objectives, the National Labour Party has 5 objectives, and other parties have fewer than 4 objectives in higher education.

The Democratic Party places significant emphasis on research capacity building in alignment with the country’s socio-economic development to strengthen the knowledge society. Specific objectives include increasing research funding to 1% of GDP from the current rate of 0.1%, recognizing research as a public good, establishing a matching fund to strengthen university-industry research partnerships, increasing funding for interdisciplinary research addressing socio-economic problems, investing in research faculty, and improving research management. They also focus on faculty development, attracting diaspora academics to work in Mongolian universities, providing scholarships to faculty members to study for PhDs abroad, and improving their English skills to retain talented scholars in public universities. They prioritize the autonomy of public universities through specific changes in higher education law, increasing the number of external members on university governing boards, and making professional associations like the Quality Assurance Agency more autonomous. They aim to establish a campus for regional higher education and increase the number of scholarship recipients studying abroad. The Democratic Party’s objectives are specific and cover the widest range of higher education areas, including university governance, autonomy, academic freedom, research management and funding, university and industry partnerships, student fees, scholarships, faculty development, life-long learning through micro-credentials, quality assurance, campus development, and alignment of academic programs with practicum opportunities.

Mongolian People’s Party

The Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) has 6 objectives directly related to higher education. Their objectives include general statements about improving the link between university and industry through research, increasing research funding, and establishing an ecosystem of research. They have a specific objective of supporting two universities in reaching the global top 1000 in university rankings. They also support regional higher education to meet labor market needs, attract diaspora academics, support teacher education colleges, and aim to increase student scholarships through a transparent system. While their objectives are fewer and more general compared to the opposition party, they include ambitious goals, such as improving Mongolian university’s rankings in the global standing, but do not specify how.

Civil Will-Green Party and United Party of Patriots

These two parties have relatively numerous objectives (6 each) in higher education among the parties not represented in the current parliament. The United Party of Patriots aims to elevate higher education to a global level, improve university human resources through merit-based recruitment, allow global and Asian top universities to open branches in Mongolia, elevate the status of science and research through better funding and recognition, support university-industry partnerships through state recognition, and provide scholarships for talented first and second-year students to study abroad. The Civil Will-Green Party emphasizes research, labor market alignment of academic programs, and education funding systems, and stands out with its focus on increasing part-time work opportunities for students.

KhUN

The KhUN (National Labour) Party has surprisingly few objectives, considering many of its members are from academia. However, some of their objectives are different and specific. They aim to develop universities as innovation-based institutions, foster university-industry partnerships, improve university governance through greater autonomy, align academic policies with labor market needs, and instill market principles in higher education by decreasing the number of poor-quality universities through stricter criteria, including higher university entrance scores. They also emphasize flexible pathways to higher education, a shorter period of studies through accepting high school credits and supporting the link between secondary schools and universities through career development programs.

Other Parties

The parties that have 3 objectives related to higher education include the New United Coalition, Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party, Motherland Party, Social Democratic Party, and United Party of Good Democrats. The National Coalition and Power of the Masses Party have 2 objectives. The Republican Party, the Party For Mongolian Humanity, the Truth and Justice Party, Masses’ Majority Governance Party, and Civic Unity Party each have one objective. The majority of these parties have similar general objectives, emphasizing research universities, alignment of academic programs with labor market needs, quality assurance of higher education, and research funding systems. The Freedom Implementation Party, Civil Movement Party, and Freedom Alliance Party do not have specific objectives directly related to higher education.

To summarize, it is commendable to see that the majority of parties’ election platforms emphasize improving university governance through granting autonomy, supporting research at universities through better funding, fostering university-industry partnerships, enhancing faculty development through better human resource management, and aligning academic programs with labor market needs. Many of them emphasize increasing scholarships to study abroad through a more transparent funding system, which may be related to the recent scandal associated with foreign study scholarships. Several parties also aim to improve regional higher education, quality assurance mechanisms, flexible pathways, and funding and fees for students. In their overall education-related objectives, most parties seem to focus more on basic and secondary education, whereas the Democratic Party provides a more balanced approach across all levels of education with a comprehensive and specific focus on higher education in its platform.

About Orkhon

Orkhon Gantogtokh is a PhD candidate in Education Studies at the University of British Columbia. She has been actively engaged with the higher education reform processes of Mongolia with her civic engagement, research activities, and involvement in national-level projects. She has led the higher education sub-committee of the Education Reform Movement, an NGO established in 2019 to address the low quality of education in Mongolia. She completed an MSc in Higher Education at the University of Oxford in 2016. Her professional experience includes positions at the University of British Columbia as a Researcher and Academic Policy Assistant, Higher Education Reform Project as a HE Specialist, the London School of Economics Enterprise as a Researcher, Mongolian National Council for Education Accreditation as a Research and Partnership Manager, and NUM and MUST as a Higher Education Consultant and Mongolian Academy for Higher Education Development as Executive Director.

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Constituency Competitiveness

By Julian Dierkes

With the men’s European Championship in football about to start, one might ask if any of the constituencies in the election are a “group of death” like Group D in the Euro where Austria, France, the Netherlands and Poland will be facing off.

For the direct election seats, constituencies will vary as to how fiercely competitive they may appear with some constituencies having more prominent and intuitively viable candidates nominated for the total number of available seats than other ridings.

Assuming that all constituencies will reach the prescribed minimum threshold of 50% voter turnout, election in these constituencies will be by simple ranking of the number of votes received. In a riding with three seats, for example, the top three vote-getters will be elected.

Two factors that might make candidates more or less competitive may be the prominence of candidates running in the riding, and the number of incumbents running.

Prominent Candidates

Prominence is obviously a subjective criterion in that it involves our judgement of a candidate’s visibility and name-recognition. As direct election implies a focus on the individual candidate, party affiliations may be less important in determining a candidate’s chances, especially since the party list vote offers voters the opportunity to express a more general preference for one party over another.

If prominence also implies that candidates have some sway with party organizations in terms of where they have been nominated, we assume that they’ve made some calculation of their electoral chances in a particular constituency. This is particularly interesting in cases like N Altankhuyag who had previously been elected in Erdenet but is now running in Songinokhairkhan or Kh Battulga who had been elected in Bayankhongor when he was an MP, but is now running in constituency 4.

We have listed some notable candidates in a previous post.

Incumbency

While we did not quantify the (incrementally greater) likelihood of election for incumbents in past elections, we are assuming that incumbents have some advantage in upcoming elections. That advantage is based on previous campaign experience and the opportunity of “shadow campaigning” ahead of the official campaign period as MPs. In a previous post we have offered some observation of incumbency in the current set of candidates.

If we take incumbency to be an advantage, we can look at different constituencies in terms of the proportion of incumbents running to available seats.

 

Constituency # of Incumbents/
# of Seats
Standardized
# of Incumbents/
# of Seats
# of Candidates/
#of Seats
Standardized
# of Candidates/
# of Seats
1 5/9 56/100 9/80 11/100
2 7/10 70/100 10/115 9/100
3 2/3 67/100 3/23 13/100
4 6/8 75/100 8/86 9/100
5 6/10 60/100 10/119 8/100
6 4/7 57/100 7/76 9/100
7 5/7 71/100 7/78 9/100
8 1/5 20/100 5/83 6/100
9 2/3 67/100 3/50 6/100
10 2/6 33/100 6/90 7/100
11 2/5 40/100 5/85 6/100
12 0/3 0/100 3/49 6/100
13 1/2 50/100 2/32 6/100

The most incumbents relative to available seats are thus running in constituency 4, 7, 2, while constituencies 12, 8, 10 are the leasts competitive. Note that these three most competitive constituencies are outside of Ulaanbaatar while the least competitive are all Ulaanbaatar constituencies.

Update (June 13, 2024):
Thanks to Bulgan‘s efforts, I added the last two columns to the above table. Note that by looking at the measure of candidates/seats, the city constituencies are more competitive than the countryside, i.e. there are more candidates running for the number of seats contested. By this measure, Bayan-Ulgii (constituency #3) is the least competitive, while Songinokhairkhan (constituency #11) is the most competitive.

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