Mongolia Focus | Strategic Analysis: Contemporary Mongolian Politics, Resources, Society

Guest Post: Mutton and Mahogany: Mongolia’s 62-year Friendship with Laos Continues

Posted on July 25, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Benjamin Nuland

On June 11th 2024, Mongolia welcomed the Laotian president to Sukhbaatar Square for the first time since 2007. Thongloun Sisoulith’s arrival celebrated a 62-year long friendship between Laos and Mongolia and decades of goodwill. In the 1980s and in 2018, a total of 1,200 sheep and a 60-bed hospital were donated by Mongolia, and in 2003, Laos donated 76 beautiful red mahogany desks for Mongolia’s Great State Khural’s Government Palace, pledging 50 more in 2024 for Mongolia’s expanded parliament. In hopes to create 60 years of ‘better friendship,’ the two nations signed a series of 10 agreements over two presidential visits. Despite the benefits to trade, the greater success for Mongolia lies not in economic and cultural cooperation, but rather in forming a protective pact against China and fulfilling its strategic goal in amplifying its voice in Southeast Asian regional dialogues.

2022-2024: 60 Year Anniversary and A New Vision of Cooperation

The 60th anniversary of bilateral relations in 2022 served as a momentous occasion for both Laos and Mongolia, as intercultural exchange programs and celebrations were hosted by both nations. However, the happy occasion also marked a reckoning that beyond gestures of goodwill, the relationship had never evolved into a full-fledged partnership. Therefore, a commitment to enhancing the friendship for ‘60 better years’ became a motive for action.

In a new vision for cooperation, the Laotian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saleumxay Kommasith, met with Mongolia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Battsetseg Batmunkh, in September 2022 to begin drafting new agreements on air travel and environmental cooperation, also signing the Agreement on Student Exchange 2022-2027. While Mongolia committed to increase its aid to Laos’s agricultural industry, Laos committed to combat climate change and desertification in Mongolia through the ‘One Billion Trees’ Program, targeting the reforestation of 16.6 million hectares of the Mongolian plateau by 2025.

After pre meetings in September of 2023 finalized the legal framework for inter-parliamentary cooperation, President Khurelsukh paid a visit to Vientiane in November to sign seven cooperation agreements. Focusing on a dual mandate of agricultural cooperation and interpersonal exchange, Laos and Mongolia’s agreements aimed to align animal and plant quarantine measures, investment in plant protection and veterinary medicine, and seal aviation agreement for direct flights. Of greater note was joint proclamations by the presidents on tourism, establishing the ‘Year to Visit Mongolia 2023’ and ‘Visit Laos Year 2024.’

President Sisoulith’s June 2024 visit to Ulaanbaatar cemented the agreements and marked the beginning of a new era in Laos-Mongolian relations. Sharing a joint vision on environmental protection President Sisoulith committed to creating a dedicated area within Ulaanbaatar’s “International Eco Park ”to support the “One Billion Trees” National Project. Following the new mandate to increase bilateral agricultural trade, an agreement was signed to formalize veterinary certification for meat exports and hygiene requirements for animal products. To serve the second mandate, two agreements were signed to encourage technical exchange within health and medical sectors, as well as cultural exchanges, research, and joint trainings.

Potential Concerns with the New Agreements

Despite the two countries’ efforts to strengthen economic ties, Mongolia has found it difficult to create business interests in Laos. Except for the Mongolian doctors who traveled to Laos in the 80s, Mongolians have little to no knowledge of Laos. More critically, Mongolia’s key exports have limited market potential in Laos. Though both Mongolia and Laos have relatively free economies, neither country has established trade in the other. In 2021-2022 the volume of trade between the two nations totaled just $45,700, with Laotian exports to Mongolia accounting for almost all of that amount.

While Laos and Mongolia are trying to address this issue by creating the Mongolian-Laotian business roundtable, it seems unlikely that this agreement will materialize into anything valuable for either nation. Prior to 2018 Mutton and Mahogany underpinned a friendship built on goodwill, but trading Mutton for Mahogany will never develop into a vibrant economic relationship.

The question then arises: Why push for this agreement at all?

A Third Neighbor Strategy?

Laos and Mongolia share very similar concerns about their constraints. Geographically, Laos and Mongolia are both landlocked countries surrounded by regional powers — Mongolia is enveloped between China and Russia, and Laos is surrounded by China, Thailand, and Vietnam. Economically, both are heavily dependent on single industries – mining in Mongolia, agriculture in Laos. Both countries are concerned about their indebtedness to China and the increasing risks that result. China has funded 815 projects in Laos since 1989 worth $16 billion, and invested $5.4 billion in Mongolia since 1990. Mongolia still owes $2 billion from its Currency Swap Agreement with China, while Laos’ debt exposure from railway projects alone is $12.2 billion, 64.8% of its GDP. Meanwhile both currencies are devaluing versus the dollar (LAK -45%, MNT -30%), further complicating debt repayment.

Because of their similar struggles against China’s economic influence, Mongolia and Laos would both benefit from an unspoken alliance to protect both nations from the harms China could inflict. Institutionalizing legal frameworks for cooperation creates a more convenient system for direct dialogue and bilateral measures in response to China. The elaborate network built on a history of trust and mutual support also serves as a potential lever for debt forgiveness; both countries together can have a louder voice in appealing to the international community for debt forgiveness, term extension, or reduction in interest rates from China.

Because Laos is in a larger debt crisis, it may seem that this pact is more beneficial to Laos. In fact, Mongolia’s benefits far outweigh those afforded to Laos. By assuring a cooperative relationship with Laos over the past two years, Mongolia has been able to secure an opportunity to amplify their voice in ASEAN. During its 2024 tenure as ASEAN president, Laos invited Mongolia to host a regional forum, the ‘Steppe Lotus Workshop,’ on countering biological warfare. While this could enhance Mongolia’s reputation as an advocate for peace, it also elevates Mongolia’s position as an arbiter of its neighbors’ interests in the face of China’s rise. Over time that position could evolve into an intermediary role as conflict arises between regional powers.

Conclusion

‘Mutton and Mahogany’ is not about trade, but it does reflect Mongolia’s policy playbook — creating a framework for mutual protection based on history, goodwill and common concerns about dominant neighbors. Through partnership with Laos, Mongolia can expand its friendly networking to Southeast Asian nations.

The playbook directly addresses Mongolia‘s greatest fear: of being ‘forgotten’ by powers who could defend and protect them in case Russia and/or China violates their sovereignty. The more Mongolia engages with its neighbors as it has with Laos, the better it can attain an ‘insurance policy’ of international awareness and support. Therefore, ‘Mutton and Mahogany’ is not for economic benefit but for Mongolia’s security, through means of friendship, kinship, and goodwill.

By aspiring to take on an intermediary role in regional and international dialogue, Mongolia hopes to make itself uniquely valuable to the international community. With its non-adversarial positioning and commitment to universal neutrality, Mongolia believes it has the potential to become the global ‘golden retriever’ (i.e., trusted companion). Using its non-threatening economic and military stature to its benefit, Mongolia can create a comfortable space for discussion, free of concerns over leverage, unlike other intermediaries like the UAE, Qatar or China. Mongolia’s evolution as a ‘trusted’ moderator for international discussion would create vested interest in all nations to assure Mongolia’s sovereignty. Therefore, a step towards friendship is a step towards security. So while obtaining Laos’ support may seem like low-hanging fruit, Mongolia’s ‘Mutton and Mahogany’ project could serve as a stepping stone to a grander mission: To protect Mongolia against the risks of domination by their stronger neighbors.

About Benjamin Nuland

Benjamin Nuland is a Jack Hachigian Scholar at Yale University currently studying history and international relations. Recently completing the Directed Studies Program, he’s received the Topol Silliman Grant and the Summer Experience Award to study in Mongolia the summer under the guidance of Professor Arne Westad and Professor Julian Dierkes.

Posted in ASEAN, Benjamin Nuland, Diversification, Foreign Investment, Foreign Policy, Laos, Mongolia and ..., Policy | Leave a comment

Observing Election Day: Erdenet City

Posted on July 24, 2024 by Marissa Smith

By Benjamin Nuland and Marissa J. Smith

In the week leading up to election day on June 28, Julian and Benjamin observed 10 polling stations in constituency 4 (Khuvsgul, Bulgan, and Orkhon aimags), traveling from Murun to Bulgan to interview the election staff on their confidence toward the smoothness of the electoral process (our findings can be found on the preparations post here).

On June 28th election day, Benjamin and Marissa stationed themselves in Erdenet City, Orkhon aimag, a major voting center for both constituency and nationwide elections. Throughout election day, we observed eight polling stations which administered voting for a total of around 8000 voters, also interviewing local voters and election staff in Mongolian and English. Almost all of the the polling stations in Erdenet were at local schools, including ones attended by former Mongolian President Ts. Elbegdorj and the current president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Here was how the election went down on election day:

Opening:

When we arrived at 7 AM, the election staff were already fully set up to begin the election process. Party observers from the MPP, DP, KhUN, and National Coalition also arrived early to take their seats in the first polling station we were at. Around 3 to 4 voters were lined up to cast their ballot, mostly elderly voters, party officials, or those super motivated to vote. There was also a local journalist at this polling station, though unfortunately he had left when we moved outside to go to our next stop and we were unable to learn more about his planned activities for the day. Here we also observed a local VIP (poll workers exclaiming about a “darga”) cast his vote between 7 and 8 AM (he announced loudly to the entire room that he didn’t know which side to have facing up when submitting the ballot to the machine; more on this issue below).

Voting Process:

At the beginning of voting at 7 AM, heads of polling stations conducted a 10-minute demonstration for both voters in line and party observers on the polling station processes, from voter registration to ballot submission.

Here was the demonstrated procedure: voters would arrive at the polling station with their IDs, and a finger scanning machine then validated the identity of a person and confirmed that they were at the right registered polling station. (A loud error sound would be heard if any voters were checking into the wrong station. We heard this a few times at larger school complexes that had three different polling stations at the same site, more on this below.) Voters would go to one of three or four desks depending on their registration number to exchange a receipt from the fingerprint-scanning station for a packet of two ballots (one for the constituency vote , the other for the party vote). After waiting in line, a voter would use a voting station to fill in the ballot. If a voter was struggling to fill it in, they could use the provided accessibility aids to help them (provided devices varied between polling stations). When done, voters would put their ballot in a prepared folder and line up at the voting machine to cast their vote. To insert the ballot, the voter would put the constituency vote in first, then the party vote in second, both facing down (a point of confusion in the voting flow, as we note below). When a light on the machine turned green, the voter moved on to the finger marking station, confirming one had voted. Julian provided a photo example in our post about election preparations.

We’ve inserted a map of an example polling station below:

The time it took voters to go through the whole process was relatively short, ranging from 5-10 minutes, out of which only 1-3 minutes was typically dedicated to filling out the ballot itself. Lines mainly formed at registration or between obtaining the ballots and sitting at one of the voting stations. The lines leading up to the ballot machines often moved pretty quickly because the machines were relatively efficient, accepting ballots in 40 seconds or less. However, at approximately 1:30 in the afternoon, when lines were long, we observed one voter wait almost 10 minutes between getting their ballot and sitting down in a voting station to mark their ballot.

One of the concerns we began to notice was the orientation of the voting machines; since the machines often faced the voters, we thought that a voter’s choices could potentially be seen by those in line to the voting stations.

Midday Mechanics 1: Long Lines

The lines really began to form at about 9 AM, as middle aged voters, some with young children, began showing up to form lines of 10 people. We noticed that after the voters collected their ballots, many were rigorously scanning the candidate names on the constituency vote, suggesting that perhaps many voters did not come in having made their decisions. When we spoke to her outside the polling station exit after she had voted, a young voter mentioned how she had three specific candidates they wanted to vote for, but picked the five others randomly based on her favorite party. She and other voters also talked about how they had done research on most of their candidates, making judgements based on candidate education, qualifications, and party affiliation. A young voter even showed us Songolt, an app that showed mock ballots of all the candidates and parties from all constituencies, making lists of all candidates more accessible to voters. But nevertheless, a large number of 87 candidates campaigning in total meant that it was hard for voters to have extensive knowledge of them beyond their qualifications and party affiliations. In the middle of the day when lines were long in Erdenet and voters were being admitted into the room one by one, a polling station head expressed to us that the size of the mandate was a concern in terms of keeping voters moving through the polling station, with voters having to take the time to select eight candidates.

Longer lines were observed during the middle of the day, late afternoon, and early evening. The lines reached a maximum capacity of 30-40 people at around 12:30 pm, prolonging voting processes from ten minutes to an hour. Yet despite this, the long lines did not seem to bother voters much, as all voters we observed stayed in line to cast their ballots. We began to notice that there was a presence of police and in a few cases soldiers on site, with every polling station employing about one to three police or military officers. These had various approaches and degrees of involvement in the electoral process; some were more laissez faire in only being a backup in case of an immediate security issue, others played a more active role in voter crowd control, letting in one voter into the polling station at a time to prevent overcrowding. One of the latter also checked our observer badges himself when we entered. A great concern that we had and observed among others was that there were at times 2-3 polling stations at the same school complex, making it challenging to locate the correct path to a particular polling station, meaning that at times people waited 30-40 minutes in line just for the finger scanning machine to tell them they were not in the right polling station and they would have to go to another line and start the process again (i.e. they were at the right school but not at the right part of the school). Even though this would create some frustration with voters, it evidently wasn’t channeled into a reason not to vote. We did not observe a single voter leave a line. By the end of the day, we noticed that poll workers had put up signage to help direct voters to the correct polling stations, and earlier in the day, voters were helping one another (and us!) to find particular polling stations.

Midday Mechanics 2: Party Observers

Overall, party observers were obviously very dedicated to their duties, and were generally open and welcoming to foreign observers. While some parties had alternating observers based on shifts, other party observers stayed for the whole day (7am to 4am). In Erdenet, observers represented a range of parties; in addition to MPP, DP, and KhUN, the National Coalition and Shine also had observers at poll stations. At one station in Erdenet, it was noted that the MPP had four observers; for the most part however there was only one observer per party.

Throughout election day, we noticed that party observers were taking timestamps of voter data, specifically the percentage of those registered who voted. That data was most likely collected to watch out for suspicious voting patterns, as a concern was that many voters, called or pressured by party members, would turn up in the masses at the last minute to vote. In some stations, party observers took on a more proactive role to gather data, taking photos of both voter identification and voter data on GEC-provided monitors. While this seemed like a standard practice, keeping record of voter information could suggest that some party observers had an expectation that certain people would show up to vote for their party, and if not, they could directly make a call requesting people to vote.

While Julian noted that the countryside in Bulgan and Orkhon aimags had party observers from the DP and MPP, there was more party observer representation in Erdenet, including KhUN and National coalition. But beyond noticing the diversity of party observers in Erdenet, we also noticed some people claiming to be “independent” observers, not seeming to be members of the press. One of the “independent” observers we saw was rather close with the observer for the MPP, taking selfies with the MPP representative and engaging in heavy conversation. While we could speculate about the impact of nonpartisan independent observers, it would be the case that with “extra” observers, parties would have more extensive data on voters who casted their ballot, and would have more resources to make phone calls to voters who had yet to come to the polling stations, pushing more people to potentially vote for their party.

Midday Mechanics 3: Election Management

All of those in charge of the polling stations were extremely professional throughout election day, but they had various reactions to our presence. Some heads actively approached us to give a general presentation about their polling station, update us on the proportion of registered voters that had cast their vote, and answer a few specific questions we had, while others seemed drained with the long day and left us on our own. Despite incoming thunderstorms in the midday and early afternoon, election management did not seem too concerned with voter turnout. One head of a polling station in Erdenet told us when asked about clouds and thunder that had just rolled in that voters would be “safe inside polling stations [from the thunder and lightning].” When we asked them about projected traffic at the polling stations after important shift-change times during the day (the Erdenet mine and mineral processing complex operates twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, including on election day), heads of polling stations said little; one indicated that it might be an issue (“magadgui”).

Despite the smoothness of the election process overall, election management for some polling stations were not observed to enforce the GEC’s “no-phone policy.” Phone baskets were observed at some voting stations and “no-phone” posters were posted around election rooms, but voters did not put their phones in the basket nor always put their phones away when in line. The policy was intended to prevent bribed voters from giving proof of their vote to a briber, but it is hard to say whether that was the case in the polling stations we saw.

A significant speed bump in the voting process observed throughout the day in Erdenet was that voters were unsure which side of their ballot should face up when being fed into the voting machine. We observed that poll workers were alert to this issue, however, and poll workers were quick to instruct voters who were getting stuck. At at least one polling station a worker was even observed to be focusing complete attention on watching this step and coming to the immediate aid of any voter getting tripped up.

Closing

Closing at 10 PM was fairly smooth, taking around an hour and a half to shut down machines and properly put away voter registration paperwork. The staff allowed party observers to collect election data in three ways: 1. by allowing observers to take photos of the flatscreen monitor showcasing all voter demographic data before shutting the screen off, 2. by distributing to party observers a voter data receipt printed from the registration station, and finally 3. by collecting party observers’’’ small USB flash drives and uploading voter demographic data into them. At the close of polling observed in Erdenet, the number of party observers was greater than the number observed earlier in the day, and by the time of the manual count, only one had left.

To stop the ballot machine from accepting more ballots, the staff took out the machine from the white box holding the physical ballots, ripped off the plastic seals in the front of the machine, and then proceeded to print multiple copies of receipts that contained preliminary election results. The receipts included the tally of votes each candidate won as well as the number of votes accumulated per party. One receipt was given per represented organization (party observer, independent observer, or foreign observer entity), and election staff required all observers to give a signature to confirm receipt of these election results. Election staff took photos of our signatures and sent them to the aimag election commissions. Upon receiving election results, party observers immediately contacted aimag election commissions, notifying them of the results.

Manual Vote Count

Before the manual count began, the head of the polling stations conducted another demonstration in front of the election observers on how the manual count would work. Two locations in the room were designated for four tables each, one for the constituency vote, and the other for the party vote; all the ballots within the “white box” were poured onto the table and divided by ballot type. For the table holding the party votes, piles were sorted by party selected. Two election staff, both women, hand-counted every ballot in each pile three times, before using a pen to label every ballot with a number to confirm their count. The constituency votes on the other hand were separated into three piles: the “party line” vote (those voted for all the candidates within a party), the “clumps” vote (those voted for groups of candidates from selected parties), and the “all over the place” vote (those who voted for candidates across various parties). Three women were situated at the table, the ballot sorter, the reader of ballot results, and the recorder. The recorder was given a grid with all the candidates, and, by listening to the reader recite the votes, tallied them up one by one.

Conclusions

Overall, the election process went very smoothly. Voters didn’t share concerns over long lines or bad weather, party observers showed up and were dedicated to their duties, and the election staff was professional and perseverant. All these concerns were relaxed because of a strong democratic framework put in place, with extensive protocols and an experienced staff guiding the electoral process. But nevertheless there were still a few concerns that arose: 1. Difficult voter choice with large mandates, 2. confusion over correct polling station locations within polling station complexes, 3. unenforced “no phone policy,”” and 4. the presence of “independent” party observers.

Posted in Benjamin Nuland, Elections, Erdenet, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged Marissa Smith | Leave a comment

New to Ulaanbaatar June-July 2024

Posted on July 22, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Bulgan added her observations in Spring 2022.

I’ve copied previous lists here and am adding to them. New items since previous posts appear in italics. Since this list has been growing, I’m also beginning to delete some items that I’ve had on the list for some time. ~~Strikethrough~~ means that these items will be off the next list.

This list was cruelly interrupted by something that was new to the world in 2020, a global pandemic and thus restrictions on travel. After not being able to visit for 32 months, I finally made it back in August 2022.

What has arrived?

drive-home service for drivers who have been drinking. You call the service, they drop off a driver who drives you home in your car and is then picked up again. Given – fortunately – much stricter enforcement of drunk driving laws, a great service!
~~fixies~~
airport road is getting ever fancier, now there’s a giant overpass just before crossing the Tuul on the way into town. Lots of fancy on/off-ramps popping up everywhere on roads.
fully electric cars, charging stations, green license plates for electric cars, Tesla
street art (several years now, but I hadn’t noted this before) and newly commissioned public art Seeing more tags though. On buildings and in pedestrian tunnels. One particularly common one in one part of town: ‘to be or not to be’. Deep!
Prius-based delivery services around downtown for online orders, food, etc. Just like informal taxis, lots of Priuses (?) roaming central Ulaanbaatar to pick up/deliver orders, fleet of Prius clustered around restaurants in the evening to take diners (and drinkers?) home
several new parks: North of Winter Palace, Southeast corner of Sukhbaatar Sq, also astroturf on Sukhbaatar Square (summer 2022) seemingly quite popular as picnic spot, park in Yarmag. The park behind Government House is open to the public again.

As a specific park: the redesign of the Children’s Park seems to represent commitment to preservation of that open space and greater incorporation into urban centre. The new park opened on July 4.

Not just parks but also nearby urban recreation, such as municipal nature reserves and hiking.

~~When I first started visiting Ulaanbaatar in mid-2000s, streets were tree/shrub-lined. Trees disappeared, perhaps for lack of watering, but are definitely back now in the urban centre~~
Oat milk and lactose-free milk. Of course, good health reasons for both, but still a little odd in the land of meat and dairy.
Eye makeup with small glittering tears in the corner of an eye. Note that I am not much of a fashion correspondent, but I remember seeing this first in Japan in the early 1990s when it was called ピカピカ, I think. Cat eyes have also arrived.
Coffee choices. Not just Korean chains, but more local choices appearing.
Taste for spicy foods. Surely this has arrived via Korean food, but quite the contrast to years ago when spices seemed entirely absent.
~~Movember~~
Solar panels on commercial buildings, also on balconies, in downtown core
The development of Mongolian brand consumer products, especially food products has been happening for years and I can’t pinpoint the moment they started appearing on grocery shelves in big numbers. While I still find New Zealand butter in Mongolia strange, most of the dairy shelf is now made in Mongolia, for example.

So many renovated sidewalks with paving stones, benches, and planters.

Yoshinoya – 吉野家. How obvious are beef bowls for the Mongolian market, but their appearance is sudden to me.
Shisha bars. I had seen these before, but neglected to note that down.
Convenience stores have become a very common sight in downtown Ulaanbaatar but also beyond. Currently, this is a duopoly of CU and GS25. Note that small grocery stores have disappeared from town with the rise of these convenience stores.
байхгүй (“we don’t have that”) has become a frequent response of waiters in restaurants referring to items listed on the menu, but not actually offered.
Some new buildings appear to be considering the public space that they’re providing, for example through setbacks from the street and parks in those setbacks. One example would be large office building/mall on the way into town from Zaisan on the right before Peace Bridge with its broad sidewalk, plantings.
In addition to the Northwest of town and the area around the power plants which have been somewhat industrial, Yarmag seems to be turning into an industrial zone in parts as well, with the surroundings of the old airport seeing some warehouse developments.
In terms of city planning, many of the very large developments in Yarmag and elsewhere seem to be stand-along neighbourhoods, rather than forming a part of a larger district. Note that they all seem to have a large supermarket as an anchor.
Visible Korean influences continuing to grow.
Imagery of Mongolian People’s Republic appearing as pop cultural reference point. Not sure whether that signals nostalgia for state-socialist days (Ostalgie).
Blue license plates for government cars. [More on license plates]
Men carrying umbrellas as protection from the sun.
Big bus procurement scandal in 2023-24, but some very modern buses around town and major busstop construction projects.

Google Maps now offers transit connections as well as traffic updates. The former easier for me to use than local alternatives, as I’m familiar with Google Maps interface. Makes public transit that much more usable for visitors even before the Metro is “completed”.
There seem to be many more people using electric rental scooters in town. With them, the ringing of bells to warn pedestrians has arrived on bike paths.

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

for-pay scales (actually, they seem to be hanging on)
~~supposedly haunted house South of Choijin Lama Temple~~
Victims of Political Persecution Memorial Museum. Promised floor dedicated to museum in newly-constructed large building on site does not appear to exist!
private fences encroaching on public land/sidewalks
It seems like (Korean) convenience store chains are replacing the small grocery stores that were ubiquitous in the downtown core. Not gone yet, but waning.
Urban heritage core. One building at a time, heritage buildings in the centre of town are being torn down, largely replaced by generic glass-and-steel towers.

What will appear in the future

navigation systems. Google now offers in-town traffic updates. Countryside systems still limited.
mental maps shifting to street names/addresses instead of landmarks
subway (really, I wish they had selected light rail instead, but who knows whether either will come)
urban renewal and historical restorations embracing district north of government house (National University of Mongolia, German embassy, etc.), but perhaps it will be too late for that

~~parking (meters), electric charging in parking spots/lots~~
Combined Heat and Power Plant #5 (yeah, right!)
hipsters discovering УАЗ (minivan and jeep), but also Porters, perhaps as platform for mobile raves?
giant hole blown into Bogd Khaan mountain to “drain” polluted air out of the valley (that actually is a proposal, but it will not appear! There also seems to be a proposal to blast away mountains on either end of the valley to let bad air escape!)
some kind of traffic routing system with overhead displays
~~Mongolia-themed coffee travel mugs~~
Mongolia-themed bicycle stands, for example roof structure of a ger as a steel structure
vending machines
Chinese cars
Misters at outdoor restaurants. Very attractive feature in cities like Almaty and Bishkek when it gets hot.
In the very long term, current young people (starting from 2000s birth cohorts) will think of themselves as the Prius generation, analogous to German Generation Golf.

What will disappear in the medium-term future

I’m going out on a predictive limb here… 2-3 years is what I mean by “near future”.

Actually, since I have been predicting this as “near future” change for some years now, I guess I was wrong with all these predictions, and have changed the listing to medium-term future.

stretched-out hand to signal for a car ride
that awkward extra half-step on most stairs
whitening make-up.

What will disappear in the long-term future

I mean beyond 7 years or so. None of these seems to be coming true quite yet, so I’ve changed the name of this category from medium-term to long-term.

new (to Mongolia) cars that are right-hand drive
the neo-classical Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, with its Stalinist (if that’s an architectural style) spire [Tough call to make as the MFA building is now dwarfed by its own annex]

deels in the city [actually, they seem to be making a bit of a fashion comeback among young people]
some of the downtown university campuses
buildings of 4 floors or less in the urban core
Russian minivans (УАЗ452)
the Winter Palace. It won’t disappear entirely, but it is more-and-more surrounded by a very urban and very tall landscape making it look somewhat forlorn, a fate it shares with many other buildings
heritage buildings
street vendors with their little cardboard boxes of tissues, lighters, soda, perhaps rounded out by pine nuts or other offerings
that colour in staircases and hallways of apartment and public buildings.

Posted in Change, Curios, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

Double Deel Direct

Posted on July 18, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

As Bulgan B recently pointed out to me, very member of PM Oyun-Erdene’s new cabinet is an MP!

Maybe not surprising for many parliamentary democracies, but this has been a lingering topic of discussion for many years. Ministers who are also Members of Parliament are generally referred to as wearing a “double deel“, wearing two hats perhaps being the right English analogy.

On our blog, a search for “double deel” will point you at 18 posts many of which refer to proposed or envisioned constitutional amendments. This has been that big an issue for Mongolian political discussions.

Note that the first mention of “double deel” that the search generates is a 2014 post speculating about Ch Saikhanbileg’s cabinet, a very grand coalition. Other parallels from that post:

Also, note

Two of those individuals, Kh Battulga and Kh Temuujin are back in parliament 10 years later, but not included in the cabinet.

People who ended up being appointed to Saikhanbileg’s grand coalition cabinet back in 2014 include: U Khurelsukh (then Deputy PM, now president) and L Gantumuur (then Minister of Education, Culture and Science, now DP chief and Deputy PM).

One of the elements of discussions of the double deel has been the size of parliament, or more importantly the relative size of cabinet vs parliament if there are many members of cabinet wearing the double deel. This is something that Julian Dierkes commented on in a 2015 post already. Given that that has been a long-standing topic in Mongolian discussions, one might say that fears about this relation in size have been alleviated by the enlargement of parliament. 22 ministers are only 1/5 of the membership of the new Ikh Khural when there are 126 members, not the nearly 30% that would have implied in a 76-member parliament.

Reflection of Power Balance

Direct Election vs Party List MPs

In the run-up to the election, we had already considered implications of the expansion of parliament for the status and power of individual MPs. To some political actors, it seems that a directly-elected seat counts for more than being elected off the party list. The cabinet appointment would seem to reinforce that view in that all MPP members of the cabinet were directly elected. For the DP and KhUN this may be less relevant, in part because party list-elected MPs make up a bigger portion of their MPs. Also, in the case of the opposition parties, some parts of the party leadership chose to run via the party list rather than in a constituency. For example, L Gantumuur for the DP and T Dorjkhand for KhUN were both named to the top spot on the party list for their respective parties as party leaders. Within the opposition, there might thus be less of a perception of a power differential between these two types of MPs.

Party Power within the DP

Following the surge of DP seats in the election and the apparent success of some candidates aligned with frm pres Kh Battulga, it was unclear who might even be conducting coalition discussions to speak for the DP. It may be noteworthy that neither Battulga, nor frm PM N Altankhuyag were included in cabinet. It is obviously impossible to know from the outside of these discussions whether the DP had proposed either and had been refused by the PM, or whether their names were not floated. This does seem to suggest that a renewed takeover of the party by Battulga and his associates may not have happened.

Posted in Governance, Government, Ikh Khural 2024, JD Democratization, Politics | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

PM Oyun-Erdene’s Multi-Party Cabinet

Posted on July 10, 2024 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

After each winning shares of seats in the election, the MPP, DP, and KhUN signed a cooperation agreement to form a “grand coalition.” (The Civil Will Green Party and National Coalition also won four seats each).

The following Cabinet configuration including MPs from each party (every minister is also an MP) has just been finalized.

Heads of Parliamentary standing committees have also been announced, and include both MPP and DP members.

Key takeaways:

There are now three deputy PMs (shadar said), one each being held by DP (L. Gantumur) and KhUN (T. Dorjkhand). Both of these are designated for Economy and Development (DP), and Trade and Investment (KhUN)
A few major seats are now held by DP members. I would particularly highlight Justice and Internal Affairs and Mining Industry. This is interesting given that a major focus of former Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs Nyambaatar had been the resolution of the 2022 Coal Theft scandal. The DP is now also in charge of Housing and Urban Construction and the Twenty Minute City initiative, major areas of concern for residents of Ulaanbaatar, where the DP in fact did not perform well in the election. In contrast, besides the Deputy PM spot, a KhUN member holds only one other seat (Education, P. Naranbayar).
While Battsetseg and Nomin retain their seats, only one other woman has been included in the cabinet, S. Odontuya for Environment and Climate Change.

(new members in bold, reshuffled and returning members underlined)

Prime Minister – L. Oyun-Erdene
Cabinet Secretary – N. Uchral (Formerly D. Amarbayasgalan)

First Deputy Prime Minister and Economy and Development – L. Gantumur [DP] (Ch. Khurelbaatar was formerly minister of Economy and Development)
Deputy PM – S. Amarsaikhan (formerly Ch. Khurelbaatar, who was not reelected, previously Deputy PM in 2022)
Deputy PM for Trade and Investment – T. Dorjkhand [KhUN]

Finance – B. Javkhlan
Defense – S. Byambatsogt (formerly G. Saikhanbayar, previously Minister of Roads and Transport)
Justice and Internal Affairs – O. Altangerel [DP] (formerly Kh. Nyambaatar)
Education – P. Naranbayar [KhUN] (formerly L. Enkh-Amgalan)
Roads and Transport – B. Delgersaikhan (formerly S. Byambatsogt, now Minister of Defense)
Tourism, Culture and Sport – Ch. Nomin (previously Ministry of Tourism and Environment was separate from Culture, and lead by B. Bat-Erdene)
Environment and Climate Change – S. Odontuya [DP]
Foreign Relations – B. Battsetseg
Mining Industry – Ts. Tuvaan [DP] (formerly J. Ganbaatar)
Family and Social Protection – L. Enkh-Amgalan (formerly Labor and Social Protection led by T Ayursaikhan, previously Minister of Education)
Urban Development and Housing – J. Batsuuri [DP] (formerly Construction and Housing, led by Ts. Davaasuren)
Health – T. Munkhsaikhan (formerly S. Chinzorig; Munkhsaikhan was previously Minister of Health in Khurelsukh’s Cabinet)
Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry – J. Enkhbayar (formerly Kh. Bolorchuluun)
Energy – B. Choijilsuren
Digital Development and Communications – Ts. Baatarkhuu [DP] (formerly N. Uchral, now head of Government Secretariat)
Twenty-Minute City – R. Erdeneburen [DP] (formerly there was a Minister of Traffic Congestion, J. Sukhbaatar)
National Monitoring and Evaluation Commitee – E. Odbayar [DP]

Previous Oyun-Erdene Cabinet Posts on Mongolia Focus:

Oyun-Erdene Cabinet, Version 01/2023
Oyun-Erdene Cabinet, Post-Constitutional Change
Oyun-Erdene Cabinet

Posted in Elections, Government, Ikh Khural 2024, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged Marissa Smith | Leave a comment

Guest Post: The Thunder Dragon Arrives on Dragon Year: Mongolia and Bhutan Are Just Getting Started

Posted on July 10, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Benjamin Nuland

If I could give an award for Mongolia’s ‘most underestimated relationship’, it must be that with Bhutan. Mongolia’s relationship with Democratic Bhutan began on January 18, 2012, when UN representatives of both nations mutually signed letters of communique in Mongolia’s permanent UN Mission office in New York. In March of 2016, Mongolia sent its first ambassador to Bhutan, hoping to convince Bhutan to join the International Think Tank for Landlocked Developing Countries (ITTLLDC). On June 17th, Mongolia welcomed Bhutan’s first ever ambassador to the nation, Amb. Vetsop Namgyel, to submit a letter of credence from President Khurelsukh. As a non-resident ambassador, Amb. Vetsop Namgyel serves as the ambassador to Japan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Mongolia from the Bhutanese embassy in New Delhi. And most importantly, on July 8th, Mongolia welcomed the King of Bhutan for the first time in its history as an honored guest to Naadam.

In its short history as a democracy, Bhutan has established diplomatic relations with relatively few countries – approximately 50 countries plus the members of the UN Security Council. By and large, Bhutan has not been involved in multilateral organizations either other than a few UN activities.

Bhutan’s long-standing dependence on India hit the skids during the recent COVID 19 pandemic as the interruption of imports from India resulted in 15% inflation in food prices. 63,900 school children went without school meals.

With a contested history with China, especially concerning China’s involvement in Tibet, Bhutan has no intension to engage in friendly relations with China. Yet concerned about China’s territorial claims on the border and China’s ambitions to assert control over Buddhism, Bhutan also doesn’t want to provoke China in any way.

Like Mongolia then, Bhutan must look beyond its two big neighbours to find partners. Yet, to prevent to prevent antagonizing any global power, Bhutan also cannot expand relations to the extent that it becomes over involved in international political webs. Since 2006 Bhutan has carefully committed to creating diplomatic relations that avoid big power states, opening relations with 32 countries like Colombia, Armenia, Oman, and now Mongolia.

Although Mongolia hopes to build trade and investment with Bhutan, their economic relations are currently non-existent. In 2022, exports from Bhutan to Mongolia were estimated to be $589In 2018 Mongolian exports to Bhutan were just $625, mostly cheese products. It seems rather interesting that Mongolia and Bhutan maintain such close relations despite their lack of trade. In fact, their relationship is primarily based on shared history, culture, geographical circumstance, and most importantly, religion. Beyond that, geopolitical similarities, such as their common dependence on hydropower, tourism, and mining, and their reliance on neighbors to export their products, also account for their common interest in diversifying their economies.

Membership in Multilateral Organizations

The greatest gain for Bhutan is growing their participation with regional and religious multilateral organizations.

Using Mongolia as a springboard for further involvement in the ITTLLDC would fit perfectly into Bhutan’s foreign policy objectives. Similar to Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbor Policy’, doing so would align Bhutan with nations less likely to threaten its economic or geo-political sovereignty. Furthermore, aligning with landlocked developing countries, Bhutan could leverage their focus on Gross National Happiness to create incentives for other countries to establish bilateral relations with them. Given Bhutan’s concerns over Chinese encroachment, especially on a disputed border, an established network of friendly nations could create a watchdog effect and preserve their sovereignty.

On addressing the security concerns of Bhutan’s undisclosed border with China, Mongolia would also offer the opportunity for the Royal Bhutan Army to re-join Khaan Quest, a multilateral defense training program led by global powers like the US, China, Canada, India, Germany, and more. Although only possessing a national defense force of about 8000 personnel, Bhutan can be sure their army receives the best military education from the program. Renewing their participation in Khaan Quest would be important not just for their military, but also to provide Bhutan a better ‘insurance policy’ in the case of military altercations on the Sino-Bhutanese border.

Mongolia could also facilitate Bhutan’s membership in Buddhist multilateral organizations. Having founded the Asian Buddhists Conference For Peace (ABCP) in 1970, Mongolia has been able to attract a coalition of Buddhists from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamshala, India, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, both North and South Korea, Laos, Russia (Buryatia), Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam, notably without China. It was only recently that Bhutan began to show interest in joining the organization, applying to be a member in January 2024. Condemning China for its involvement in Tibet, Bhutan’s tense relationship with China can be reflected in a will to protect its own Buddhist sovereignty. Collaborating with other Buddhist nations under similar pressures by China, Bhutan can be sure that their voice for regional peace and resistance to China’s assertion of control over Buddhism will be supported by a collective of nations.

Address Food Insecurity & Support Digital Policy

Like its policies with other southeast Asian nations, Mongolia would be open for educational exchanges, specifically for Bhutanese scholars to attend Mongolian Universities. Bhutan hopes to capitalize on this, sending students to Mongolia’s University of Life Sciences and National University of Medical Science. In perfecting their skills in crop management, Bhutanese scholars from Mongolian universities can better address Bhutan’s food insecurity issues, which at one point in 2017 affected one out of three people throughout the nation.

From the Digital Drukyul in 2010 to the establishment of Thimphu Techpark in 2012 to creating an Identity System in 2023, Bhutan has been very ambitious with their digitization policies. Thimphu Techpark specifically was met with huge success, especially with employing the youth as well as attracting foreign investors. Mongolia seems to be on a similar trajectory, passing eMongolia and D-Parliament for online services and government transparency initiatives. While exchanging expertise on the techpark project could help Mongolia address their issues regarding youth unemployment and slugging western FDI, Mongolia can help Bhutan on strengthening government digitization initiatives, improving Bhutan’s transparency and governmental efficiency. Nevertheless there does leave space for more collaboration in the future; bilateral exchanges on technology innovation launched in 2022 have considerable space for expansion.

What Could Mongolia Gain in a Relationship with Bhutan?

Being heavily dependent on fossil fuels, Mongolia could learn from Bhutan’s commitment to renewable energy. Bhutan boasts a high percentage of energy consumption derived from renewables –82.5% in 2022.The greatest force behind this is hydroelectricity, being both Bhutan’s main source of energy and Bhutan’s largest export. Furthermore, Bhutan seeks to grow on this sector, with a $275 million Dagacchu hydropower plant project projected to increase electric output by 126 megawatts. Mongolia, having just established projects with Japan to construct dams in Govi-Altai and Khuvsgul, would benefit from exchanging with the Bhutanese on government mechanisms to increase hydroelectric output. In fact, bilateral collaborations began in June of 2019 when a delegation from The Bhutan Power Corporation visited Mongolia to cover topics on energy sector legal frameworks.

On a more symbolic level, its relationship with Bhutan has provided Mongolia a new spiritual ally in the Asian region. Mongolia has always received pressure from China to disavow the Dalai Lama as its spiritual figure, whether through sanctions imposed on Mongolia after the Dalai Lama’s visit in 2016, or China’s request to bring the newly instated 8 -year-old US-born Mongolian Khalkha Jetsun Dhampa back to Mongolia under Chinese observation. By welcoming Bhutan as a new member of the ABCP, Mongolia is one step closer to strengthening its international support base to resist Chinese Buddhist influence. Furthermore, participating in bilateral agreements with Bhutan, Mongolia is also indirectly supporting another spiritual neighbor and Bhutan’s biggest economic partner, India. Improving already warm relations with India through Bhutan, Mongolia could count on more support from India, a growing global power, to voice concerns on the international stage about growing Chinese influence.

Mongolia as ‘Big Brother’

Being a minnow under most bilateral relations, specifically under those with China and Russia, reaching a relationship with Bhutan would be one of Mongolia’s first opportunities to symbolically become an ‘older brother.’ Although both nations share similar concerns regarding geographical difficulties, national security, and Buddhist sovereignty, Mongolia believes that its democracy, more developed compared to that of Bhutan, can take the front step promoting physical and digital development. With Mongolia founding both the ITTLLDC and the ABCP on an international level, Bhutan’s support and membership within these organizations would make them a trusted companion to the Mongolians, specifically in their geopolitical prominence in hosting multilateral dialogues. And although Bhutan doesn’t have much to ‘give’ to Mongolia, their assertion of Mongolia’s role as a facilitator of regional dialogue gives Mongolia an international status that Mongolia’s Third Neighbor Policy aspired to become in the first place. In short, what Bhutan could gain from this relationship is material, while Mongolia’s benefits are more geo-political.

About Benjamin Nuland

Posted in ASEAN, Benjamin Nuland, Food, Foreign Policy, Mongolia and ..., Trade | Leave a comment

DP Results

Posted on July 8, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

To me, the success of the DP was one of the surprises of the June 28 election.

Below, I want to speculate about what might explain some of this success. I would note that in the absence of polling, especially exit polling, this remains speculation for now. Some obvious questions about this result, for example the concentration of non-MPP votes in Ulaanbaatar, perhaps, will remain unanswered unless the Central Election Commission releases further and more detailed results at some point. These results could be available to the parties themselves, as their party observers will have received scans of all ballots on a polling-station-by-polling station basis, but even that won’t link choices for the direct election in constituencies to choices made on the party vote. So, subsequent speculation must be rooted in conversations I’ve had in the countryside and Ulaanbaatar during election observation as well as afterwards.

The DP

The success? Exactly a third of seats in the new parliament! Of these, 26 were won in majoritarian district elections and 16 were won via the nearly 440,000 votes the DP received in the party election. In the constituencies, the DP did particularly well in constituency 1 (Arkhangai, Ovorkhangai, Bayankhongor) winning 7 of 9 available seats. Among these is S Ganbaatar returning to parliament, this time for the DP. Another DP stronghold is constituency 7 (Govi-Sumber, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Umnugovi) where the party won 5 of 7 seats. While the party capitalized on significant support in the city in the past, it only picked up 4 of 24 seats in the six Ulaanbaatar constituencies.

Of the people we had identified in our “notable candidates” listing prior to the election, the following won majoritarian seats:

N Altankhuyag (constituency 11)
Kh Battulga (4)
S Ganbaatar (1)
Ch Lodoisambuu (12)
L Munkhbayasgalan (7)

The most prominent candidate who was not elected from a district is perhaps frm party leader S Erdene (constituency 9).

Out of our notable candidates, the following were elected via the party list:

L Gantumur
E Odbayar
Kh Temuujin

Two women were elected directly: Munkhbayasgalan and Kh Bolormaa (40), while the 16 party list seats obviously lead to eight women so that ten of the 42 DP MPs are women a slightly lower percentage than parliament overall.

Run-Up to the Election

The DP has struggled with in-fighting for many years now. While it had been rife with factionalism even before the 2016 election, the resounding MPP victory in that election and the no-quite-widely-supported-nomination of Kh Battulga as a presidential candidate in 2017 only increased internal division that the party has been battling since then. Substantively adrift under the leadership of Pres Battulga, the party neither managed to continue a process of integration, nor was there even the beginning of a generational renewal under the leadership of such people as S Erdene.

There was a bit of turmoil around the announcement of the party candidate list and there were few people who expressed any kind of excitement about the list. This lack of excitement was also evident in the campaign event ostensibly focused on younger voters that I described.

A week into the campaign there was a death of a DP soum governor in Ovorkhangai. As far as could be ascertained this was a political event in the sense that the brawl that caused the death very unfortunately seemed to have erupted around the lack of attendance at a campaign event. The other party in the brawl was associated with the campaign of then-speaker of parliament G Zandanshatar. But both big parties were relatively restrained in reacting to this news and the DP did not explicitly try to frame this as a political attack. Marissa Smith had included this reaction in her impressions of on-line campaigning.

When we were driving across the countryside and visited campaign offices along our route, it was evident that the single pitch to potential voters was “It’s us vs them”, i.e. if you are frustrated with the MPP, vote for the DP. There was not a whole lot of nuance in that and substantive issues did not seem to be tied to that in any particular way.

By chance, we were in Murun to attend the final campaign rally for the DP with all eight candidates on the last day of campaigning. While a good number of party faithful turned up, this rally seemed neither particularly boisterous nor optimistic to me.

There was a bit of visual excitement toward the end of the event.

From these campaign impressions and the various looks at campaign platforms that colleagues had prepared, I was not expecting a particularly strong showing of the DP despite the long pattern of Mongolian voters to prefer some kind of balance between the two major parties.

Results

Clearly, I was wrong in my assessment that the DP had little to offer.

Instead, it appears that the DP continues to have a strong political “brand” of being the party opposed to the MPP that is most electable.

From my countryside impressions this was plausible in the sense that the other parties were simply not that visible in the country, including KhUN which obviously try to push into the most-electable-opposition slot. Visibility is partly effort, but it is also degree of organization. Since we did not travel through the Gobi aimags, I have to imagine that the degree of organization is what is behind the strong showing in the Khangai and Bayankhongor aimags. This strong showing may have also been helped by the incident I described above, but it is hard to imagine that that played a major role.

Outlook

Coalition talks appear to be on-going in Ulaanbaatar. This is puzzling. I cannot see any strategic argument for the party to enter into a coalition other than the personal ambitions of some of the leadership, call it political greed, i.e. the desire to secure a post in cabinet. If a coalition does materialize I would expect the cabinet posts that go to the DP to closely reflect the new power structure in the party.

Presumably the weight of power in the party has shifted (back) to frm president Battulga and his faction, though post-election jockeying for positions in or outside of a coalition will tell us more about that. Battulga has not focused much attention on specific political issues in the past, even less on any kind of theme, so I would not expect a clear policy focus from the DP in the coming four years. Also, as president he frequently seemed to shoot from the populist hip on particular issues (mining, but also capital punishment stand out in my memory). In a coalition, I would expect no more than power politics from the DP, and in opposition, the party would likely be ineffectual in terms of initiating a long-needed generational renewal, but also a more specific policy focus. Despite the electoral success, my perspective on personnel and policy orientation of the DP thus remains somewhat negative.

As will be the case with the MPP, there is some chance, however, that some of the MPs who were elected off the party list may emerge as leaders, or at least as dedicated legislators.

Posted in Democratic Party, Ikh Khural 2024, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

New City Park

Posted on July 4, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I have mentioned the increase of green space several times in my notes about how Ulaanbaatar is changing. One big new development is the opening of the large park that is South of the Shangri-la Hotel and West of the amusement park.

There had been a lingering threat for some time that this might be developed, losing yet another large parcel of open space in the downtown core, but the creation of the park seems to have averted that.

In a way this park also preserves the layout of Urga with an opening to the South and the Bogd Khaan Mountain, replicating the open door of a ger to the South.

The park opened on July 4 2024, with the likely raising of a large flag at its flagpole perhaps to come on Flag Day, July 10.

The Park

Given the size of the parcel of land, the park offers a lot of recreational opportunities.

From an initial first visit, I did notice the relative absence of benches or other places to sit down, but there are bathrooms. What also seems to be missing is some spaces for skateboards, bicycles, etc. activities that have become much more visible in downtown Ulaanbaatar and that might be particularly important to younger Ulaanbaatarites.

I was really very happy to see that apparently Tumen Ekh, the cultural ensemble whose building had been demolished, will have a new home in the park as well.

In its newly opened state, the park offers a lot of open space. There are many paths to go for a stroll, a large lawn area that looks to offer space for families to come together, and lots of other features

The Impact

As I have noted, the amount of green space in Ulaanbaatar has been increasing steadily over the past several years. There are several examples of public spaces that are either open for recreation or gatherings, or that offer some vegetation to urban residents. The largest of these are the National Park and some of the park areas along the Tuul river. From casual visits past these parks, it seems like Ulaanbaatarites are delighted by these recreational opportunities. Even the National Park which is somewhat outside of the very core of the city seems to be getting lots of traffic with joggers, strollers, and families.

I thus suspect that the new city park will be received with some enthusiasm. Its proximity to Sukhbaatar Square suggests that many people will wander over to the park in the summer and some of the energy from the Children’s Park immediately adjacent, will spill over into the city park.

All of that in turn suggests a possible migration of the centre of activity of the city core towards the park. The opening of the Shangri-la had a similar impact some years ago where activities along with retail and food offerings sprung up that were now two blocks of Sukhbaatar Sq. The restoration of the open space around the Chojin Lama Temple has further reinforced this shift.

If the focus of (summertime) activity will be drawn toward the new city park, what might this mean for further developments?

The southern border of the park is the large Narni Road that stretches along the railroad track.

The narrow strip between the road and the railroad tracks is currently filled with garages and other drive-by businesses. It would seem likely that despite the obstacle of a busy road, that strip might develop into food/retail options to serve park visitors, at least during the summer months.

If such a shift and development occurred, it might also bridge the significant divide that currently exists between the downtown core and anything that lies beyond the Peace Bridge, stretching toward Zaisan. To me, this would be a very welcome change with some recreational options, but also a further development of the city centre.

Posted in Architecture, Change, City Planning, Heritage, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

Preparing an Election

Posted on July 2, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Benjamin Nuland and Julian Dierkes

Leading up to the election on June 28th, 2024, we traveled as international election observers through Arkhangai, Khuvsgul, Bulgan and Orkhon aimags to observe the preparations for the election and the election campaign. We were impressed that despite the procedural complexities of this year’s election, public servants throughout the country were well prepared with proper machinery and training to ensure that the electoral process went smoothly. They were also genuine in their dedication and diligence in these preparations.

Testing

There was a nationwide test of election procedure on June 24th, testing various forms of machinery, including fingerprint scanning and 3,300 ballot-receiving machines. The staff who ran these tests were mainly women who are public servants like teachers or local administration officials, with extensive election-monitoring experience. If 10 staff in each of the 2,198 polling stations participated in the testing (as seemed about typical, including an IT officer and the 9-person election commission) that suggest that approximately 220,000 people were participating, about 1% of Mongolia’s total eligible voter population (2.2 million). Yes, five days before the election 1% of the voting population ran a test of voting procedures!

The testing included a powering up of all devices (registration laptop, fingerprint and biometric ID scanner, as well as receipt printer; election machine with all accompanying electronics and communications equipment, back-up generator, GEC camera) and sample submission of ballots and communication of results.

It seems that different Aimags ran their testing somewhat differently, possibly due to different delivery schedules of equipment, ballots, etc.; while Arkhangai ran tests in polling stations with all equipment and supplies delivered, testing in Khuvsgul seems to have been done centrally in soums before the equipment was distributed to polling stations. While testing centrally might cause concern over the machine’s functional ability on local internet connection, it didn’t seem to be too big of a problem during the election, as all electronic results were still successfully sent to the soum centres.

Technology

Mongolians often express doubts about election results, yet prosecutions for fraud are rare. The response to these allegations has been the deployment of technology designed to safeguard electoral processes and that has continued in this election. Julian has speculated about the likelihood of electoral fraud during the 2017 presidential election.

Machinery like fingerprint scanning machines, CCTV cameras, and a movable TV to display data and voter ID all continued from previous elections, though the display of voting statistics and an image of the inside of the polling station in the area outside of the station has been abandoned. Although there was some talk about the government sending over new generation voting machines for this election, it seems that the newer ballot machines resemble the same ballot machines from previous elections. In fact, even some of the old ballot machines were distributed with the new. Although we were initially told that the new generation of voting machines included cameras to record an image of the voter, this seemed to be a misunderstanding.

The innovation in this election was the deployment of Starlink connections, set up in over 400 bag locations. This enabled polling stations with no cell service to electronically transmit results quickly after the closing of polling stations. The greatest difficulty in bringing Starlink to these rural stations was in entering necessary precise coordinates for stations. Once the coordinates were set up, however, this mechanism seemed to work well, as there were no report delays when it came to submitting election electronic results.

Beyond the administration of elections, Starlink also seems to have been a tool for (well-funded) candidates. Installed on the roof of candidate’s cars, Starlink allowed big parties such as the DPP or MPP — who had the resources to afford it — to reach targeted rural voters on social media as they traveled in between rural areas, notifying any rural voter of any last minute rally coming up.

For every polling station, there was a backup plan in case any technical issue arose. Most stations had a backup generator or large batteries for voting machines in case of power outages, and an IT member of staff on standby to fix any technical issues. And although this might seem unnecessary at first glance, it must be said that they were extremely useful during the election, as in two rural voting stations we visited, power did go out, but the electoral process did not stall.

Staffing

The staff had gone through extensive training and knew their 2024 election manual well. In many polling stations, the 9-member election Stab was either predominantly or entirely female. Each staff member was assigned a task to their subsequent stations: A person sent by the statistical office was in charge of the registration and ID station, 3-4 women were in charge of issuing ballots, and a person was in charge of marking fingernails with an ink pen at the exit to ensure no double voting could occur. Knowing that the equipment can be difficult to operate, a person was specifically delegated to aid voters in inserting ballots into the counting machine. Lastly two people were staff on standby in case of technical issues or elderly voters or voters with disabilities needed assistance.

What was most impressive was the professionalism of the election commissions. When we asked whether they would support a youth or new candidate, the staff was strongly impartial, and believed any position they shared would jeopardize the election process.

The safeguarding of locations and equipment also requires a major staffing effort. Polling stations are under 24h police guard from when materials are delivered. In one polling station that meant that the just-out-of-the-police-academy officer and had stayed at the polling station for the three days prior.

Accessories

Similar to the last election, the government had provided accessories to various disabled and elderly voters, including lights, magnifying glasses, wheelie chairs, plastic mats to hold down ballots. It must be said that although voting stations did have accessibility aids, not all of them were uniformly provided for every polling station. For example, some voting stations had lights and magnifying glasses, while others had magnifying glasses and wheelchairs. Furthermore, on election day it seemed that few users made use of the magnifying glasses, those with difficulties seeing/reading being perhaps more accustomed to reading glasses. What was constant however was the presence of back-up staff to aid those in need to vote.

The GEC also promoted accessories to support the ‘no-phone policy’ at the polling station. This has always been intended as a mechanisms by which bribed voters could give proof of a vote cast to a briber. Polling stations set up phone baskets by voting booths for voters to deposit their phones. But while these phone baskets were at every voting station, they were not used consistently.

The greatest dedication to creating voter accessibility was the election staff’s commitment to attain the ballots of every immobile (hospitalized, infirm) voter. Policies were set in place for the first time in a couple of elections that allowed Mongolian expatriates to vote from their respective embassies or consulates from June 20th to the 23rd. For attaining mobile votes by elderly or infirm voters teams of mobile ballot collectors, consisting of electoral staff and party observers, travel to these voters. We were told in one bag voting station that they travelled 160 km to collect 6 votes, bringing with them all the necessary accessibility equipment and party observers to do so. Apparently, this was also a practice during state socialist times.

It must also be said that bad weather, including rain and thunderstorms, posed a great difficulty in traversing these lands to reach those voters in this election. But nevertheless, by Election Day the staff was able to collect all the mobile ballots of those who registered to do so. Even though missing out on such ballots due to logistical difficulty wouldn’t significantly change the results of the election, the electoral staff still commits itself to cover great distances to secure every vote.

Dedication to Democracy

The dedication of election personnel to ensuring a smooth election was impressive and, in some areas, inspiring given the infrastructural, procedural and geographic challenges that this effort faces. If Mongolian voters have little confidence in political parties and the parliament, or if there are concerns about democratic backsliding, this is likely not due to the on-the-ground process of voting.

About Benjamin Nuland

Posted in Benjamin Nuland, Democracy, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

How Much Power and Legitimacy Do New Women MPs Hold?

Posted on July 1, 2024 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

As already noted in Bulgan’s post, the new Parliament has the highest proportion and number of MPs ever, with over a quarter of the new Parliament being comprised of women.

While this is certainly a result worth celebrating and it holds great potential, I write here to make some important caveats.

Unfortunately, a closer look at which women were (re)-elected and how suggests that their legitimacy and power is such that these almost all new women MPs are starting from a tough place.

Majority of Women MPs Were Not Directly Elected

In this year’s election, voters both selected individual candidates on one ballot, and selected a party on a second ballot. Seats were distributed to parties from an ordered list of candidates based on their results from the second ballot. The lists were mandated to have a “zipper” format, with female and male candidates alternated in the list.

Of the 32 female candidates elected, only 8 (1 in 4) were directly elected, i.e. voters specifically chose those individuals on their ballots. As Bulgan noted, 316 women candidates ran for direct election.

None of the parties winning seats started their “zipper” with a woman candidate.

Majority of Women Incumbents Lost Their Seats

As I noted in my initial reaction to the election results, only 3 of 9 female incumbents retained their seats. Only 2 were directly elected (Ch. Undra and Kh. Bulgantuya; S. Odontuya was elected from the party list). This speaks to difficulties women face in their ability to gain and maintain political legitimacy.

Take-aways and Caveats

The fact that so few women were directly elected and that such a large proportion of incumbents lost their seats points to the fact that individual women candidates struggle to successfully campaign in Mongolia. As pointed out in recent books by former MP and minister Ts. Oyungerel and anthropologist Mandukhai Buyandelger, in the contest to garner party and popular support for their campaigns, women lack resources and access to spaces of networking and negotiation. (I am working on a post to show this leveraging public financial statements candidates were required to submit to register for candidacy.) This is of course a reflection of broader trends in Mongolian society what roles women are expected to play and in what manner.

Of course, such a large number of women MPs, especially if working cross-party, might be able to shift some dynamics. However, it remains to be seen how much latitude women MPs will have to operate independently of parties or factions within parties. One of the first conversations I observed on social media when candidates were first announced focused on whether or not party list candidates, particularly from the MPP, would be able to act independently. Many participants in this conversation argued that they would not, and perhaps the most stringent version of this view called the MPP party list “make-up,” with young, new faces hiding an old guard running for direct election. See Julian’s prior post thinking about directly-elected vs. list-elected candidates here.

As Julian has noted, in 2012-2016 a cross-party women’s caucus was formed, and this is something we will be watching for. We are also eagerly watching to see which seats in the new Cabinet will go to women and will provide updates here on Mongolia Focus.

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged Marissa Smith | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Voter Participation

Posted on June 29, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Benjamin Nuland

Working as an official foreign observer team with Marissa Smith, I visited nine different polling stations across all six of the urban bags of Erdenet on election day (including polling stations at schools attended by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and former Mongolian President Ts. Elbegdorj).

Voter turnout had a relatively slow start but gradually increased throughout the day. By 10 o’clock on election day, only about 15% of registered voters had voted, with voters 55 and above dominating voter representation. Around half way into the election at 3pm, 30-35% of voters had already cast their ballot. Long lines of up to 40 people and 60-minutes of total polling time didn’t discourage voters to leave, as many middle-aged voters between the ages of 30 and 40 showed up to the polls to overtake the elder vote. At 6 o’clock, around 60% of registered voters had voted. By then the polling stations were mainly empty, with some staffers submitting their votes to make up for lost time. By closing, around 70% of voters had cast their ballot, with middle aged voters making up the majority of those votes, and the elderly vote in second.

The gender split seemed even across the day. The gap tilted male in the morning making up about 55% of voters and women 45%. Around half way into the election, the gender gap began leaning towards the female vote, as small families, including mothers with their children, came in to vote; 55% of voters were women by then and 45% were male. By 6pm, more single women began showing up to the polls, growing the ratio to a 60-40 split. By 10 pm closing, the male vote seemed to close the gap a bit.

Results

Age

Voter turnout for this parliamentary election has fallen from 73.6% in 2020 to 69.3% in this election. The most notable contribution to this is decreasing voter participation from the youth, with voters ages 18 to 25 falling in participation from 62.5% to 56.23%. All this while the elder vote of those ages 56 and above saw a voter participation increase, rising from 78% in the 2020 election to 82.35% in this election. But while some might assume that a lack of youth participation was the defining reason for the overall rate drop, this isn’t fully the case. Voter participation has also surprisingly decreased for the middle-aged voters, with voter ages 26 to 40 years and voter ages 41 to 55 years falling from 69% to 64.45% and from 83% to 75.3% respectively. Both cases saw a decrease of about 4 to 6%, similar to the amount decrease of the youth voters.

As expected from our observation, more votes came from women than men, with about 796,000 female votes compared to 652,000 male votes, a percentage ratio 54.95% to 45.05%. Looking at gender distributions, more women eligible to vote chose to vote (74.1%) compared to that for men (65.9%). Seen as a significant difference for voters between the ages of 25 and 55, the difference in percentages consistently reach around a 10% gap. For voters above 65 years old more eligible male voters vote compared to that of women.

Region

There was a mixture of predictions and surprises when looking at voter turnouts for aimags and constituencies. Similar to previous elections, Bayan Ulgii, the Kazakh constituency, had the highest voter participation out of all constituencies, coming in with 73.6%. yet this number seems lower than normal, especially compared to their 80% turnout in the 2020 local elections. Aimags like Zarkhan and Uvs also had some of the highest voter participation, both with 73.8%, a constant compared the rates of 2020 elections. The greatest surprise was the high turnout for Ulaanbaatar, with over 70% voter participation on average across all districts, with its constituencies making up 5 out of the top 7. Keeping on with the trend of previous elections, northern regions had suffered the lowest voter participation, with various northern aimags, like Khovsgol and Selenge, sharing a participation of about 67% and below. Despite these changes and differences across aimags, it seems there is no great deviancy between the most participating participating regions and the least; the gap between the highest and the lowest is 9% when gaps for local elections can be as high as 20%.

Sources for this post include:
ikon.mn/elections/2020
ikon.mn/elections/2024/turnout

About Benjamin Nuland

Benjamin Nuland is a Jack Hachigian Undergraduate Scholar at Yale University currently studying history and international relations. Recently completing the Directed Studies Program, he’s received the Harold Silliman Topol Grant and The Summer Experience Award to study in Mongolia for the summer under the guidance of Professor Arne Westad and Professor Julian Dierkes.

Posted in Benjamin Nuland, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Leave a comment

Election Results: How Did Incumbents Fare?

Posted on June 28, 2024 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

The 2024 Parliamentary Election has resulted in prominent MPP MPs from specific constituencies losing their seats. Especially of note here is Zandanshatar, the Speaker of Parliament, in the Khangai district (1), and Ganibal from the eastern steppe constituency (6), and Ch. Khurelbaatar (Minister of Finance and longtime MP) from the western aimags (exclusive of Bayan-Ulgii) (2). However, overall, incumbents fared well outside of those constituencies and number 7 (the Gobi). Notably, the DP also took the majority of directly-elected seats in the Khangai and Gobi constituencies, a trend that we intend to analyze further in a coming post.

Despite a huge gain in the percentage of women candidates elected (see Bulgan’s post), women incumbents also lost a significant number of seats, with only three of nine women incumbents retaining their seats. This is also an issue we expect to take up soon.

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged Marissa Smith | Leave a comment

Quick Overview of Election Results

Posted on June 28, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

After this morning’s very hot takes, I want to offer a slightly expanded summary of the results of the parliamentary election. For those of you wanting to look at various aspects directly, the Ikon.mn website is my go-to for presentation and accuracy.

Bulgan has already taken a look at women in the new parliament, we will have posts focusing on turnout and incumbency later this morning.

Bottom Line(s)

I am basing this on numbers around 9h on June 29 with 99.95% of polling stations reporting.

Democracy lives. Turnout is roughly stable at 69.3%, voters have voted against the myriad incumbency advantages of the new election system to weaken MPP dominance. The proportional representation system has diversified party voices in parliament.
MPP’s supermajority reduced to mere majority. To some extent this may have been part of the point of the changes to the election system, but PM Oyun-Erdene might have wished for a slightly larger majority than just 68 of 126 seats.
Policy substance still does not matter much. There was no single issue that seemed to capture the imagination of the public. On a trip through the countryside during the campaign, the recurring theme from all opposition parties was “replace them with new people”, not policy on topic X needs to change. Choice of individual candidates and teams continues to trump policy directions.
The DP is back. Despite being in organizational shambles for years now, a somewhat disappointing party list set of candidates and a weak campaign, the DP has come roaring back to claim a third of the seats in the new parliament.
KhUN did not triumph. Even though voters seem to have indicated a desire for change (though not enough to lead to a change in government), KhUN seemingly was not able to capitalize on that to really establish itself as the opposition choice. Just over 150,000 votes out of just over 1,450m is a strong showing, but note that the KhUN presidential candidate received just under 250,000 votes in 2021, so the party has not grown its voter base. It will be represented in parliament with eight seats.
Proportional representation diversifies parliament. The Civil Will Green Party comes back to life after being last represented in the 2012-16 parliament. It had seemed moribund when charismatic leader S Oyun left politics, but will be represented by four MPs. The National Coalition led by N Nomtoibayar will also be represented by four MPs.

Outlook

As expected, this result implies government and policy continuity. Even with rumours of coalitions, the MPP will be leading the government for the next four years. Cabinet will be reconstituted and as has been in the case, ministers will bring personal agendas and projects to their portfolio, but the overall direction of government in central areas of policy-making is unlikely to shift.

If anything, the election has (re)solidified the dominance of MPP and DP in a two-party system, though proportional representation has led to a diversity of parties in parliament.

Questions

Lots of questions remain:

How much of an advantage has incumbency been in the larger constituencies/short campaign period?
What about prominence/name recognition?
Are there individuals who did well?
What about rural vs urban voter behaviour?
Can we deduce anything about vote splitting strategies and what this implies for future campaigns?
…

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, National Coalition, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

Women MPs in 2024 election result

Posted on June 28, 2024 by bulgan batdorj

By Bulgan Batdorj

The results are in, and Mongolia has made history—a record-breaking 32 women have secured seats in the country’s 126-member parliament, representing 25.4% of the total. Of the 32 women elected, 8 were chosen directly through constituency votes, while the remaining 24 gained seats through the party list system. All represent five political parties: MPP 15, DP 10, KhUN 3, Civil Will Green Party 2, and National Coalition 2.

Table 1: Women Parliamentarians 2024-28, Mongolia.

Name	Elected from	Party
B. Battsetseg	1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor	Mongolian People’s Party
Kh. Bolormaa	10 – Sukhbaatar, Chingeltei	Democratic Party
Ch. Nomin	11 – Songinokhairkhan	Mongolian People’s Party
E. Bolormaa	2 – Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, Uvs	Mongolian People’s Party
D. Uuriintuya	4 – Bulgan, Khuvsgul, Orkhon	Mongolian People’s Party
Ch. Undram	5 – Darkhan-Uul, Selenge, Tuv	Mongolian People’s Party
L. Munkhbayasgalan	7 – Govisumber, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Umnugovi	Democratic Party
Kh. Bulgantuya	8 – Bayanzurkh	Mongolian People’s Party
B. Narantuya – Nara	Party List	Civil Will Green Party
S. Zamira	Party List	Civil Will Green Party
S. Odontuya	Party List	Democratic Party
S. Tsenguun	Party List	Democratic Party
J. Bayarmaa	Party List	Democratic Party
D. Enkhtuya	Party List	Democratic Party
B. Punsalmaa	Party List	Democratic Party
P. Batchimeg	Party List	Democratic Party
B. Jargalan	Party List	Democratic Party
Ts. Munkhtuya	Party List	Democratic Party
L. Enkhsaikhan	Party List	KhUN
G. Uyangakhishig	Party List	KhUN
B. Munkhsoyol	Party List	KhUN
M. Enkhtsetseg	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
O. Saranchuluun	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
D. Ganmaa	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
M. Mandkhai	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
B. Uyanga	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
A. Ariunzaya	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
B. Kherlen	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
O. Nominchimeg	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
Kh. Baasanjargal	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
A. Undraa	Party List	National Coalition
M. Sarnai	Party List	National Coalition

According to our previously written article, this number falls under the “modest setback” scenario—as the number of women elected directly is 8 out of 316 women candidates in the 13 constituencies, representing a success of only 2.5%. However, the party list mechanism allowed for the maximum potential of 24 women to be elected, demonstrating the importance of the zipper system. While the direct constituency results represented a setback, the overall outcome of 32 women securing seats in Mongolia’s 126-member parliament is still a historic achievement. This 25.4% representation shatters the previous record of 15%, significantly increasing the number of women parliamentarians from 13 to 32.

These women parliamentarians now have the opportunity to leverage their positions to champion the concerns of Mongolian women and promote gender equality, in addition to the expertise they bring to their respective areas. I also hope they can come together as a group to leverage their collective influence for meaningful reforms and solidify this success to pave the way for continued success in future elections.

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Election Hot Take: Change but not Quite

Posted on June 28, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Everything points to a reduced MPP majority with a surprisingly strong showing by the DP and no major surprises on individual candidates.

Mongolian voters have thus opted for personnel change, but even that not quite. There were no issues in the campaign that suggested a programmatic change, even with a stronger opposition showing, but really the change that was embraced was change for change’s sake and particularly change in the people governing, even if the DP’s offering of potential MPs was not exactly reformist or exciting.

The relatively strong turnout also suggests that desire for some change.

More detailed analyses will have to wait tomorrow, particularly in terms of more solidified results, the showing of DP and KhUN in Ulaanbaatar vs the countryside, the number of women MPs elected, and any strong showing by individuals in more solidified results.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, National Coalition, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

2022-2024: 60 Year Anniversary and A New Vision of Cooperation

Potential Concerns with the New Agreements

A Third Neighbor Strategy?

Conclusion

About Benjamin Nuland

Opening:

Voting Process:

Midday Mechanics 1: Long Lines

Midday Mechanics 2: Party Observers

Midday Mechanics 3: Election Management

Closing

Manual Vote Count

Conclusions

What has arrived?

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

What will appear in the future

What will disappear in the medium-term future

What will disappear in the long-term future

Reflection of Power Balance

Direct Election vs Party List MPs

Party Power within the DP

Membership in Multilateral Organizations

Address Food Insecurity & Support Digital Policy

What Could Mongolia Gain in a Relationship with Bhutan?

Mongolia as ‘Big Brother’

About Benjamin Nuland

The DP

Run-Up to the Election

Results

Outlook

The Park

The Impact

Testing

Technology

Staffing

Accessories

Dedication to Democracy

About Benjamin Nuland

Majority of Women MPs Were Not Directly Elected

Majority of Women Incumbents Lost Their Seats

Take-aways and Caveats

Results

Age

Region

About Benjamin Nuland

Bottom Line(s)

Outlook

Questions

Recent Posts

Topics for Mongolia Focus

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