Quick Observations On the Eve of Local Elections 2024

By Marissa J. Smith

While I was in Mongolia this summer for the 2024 Parliamentary Elections and was discussing the results for third parties, some interlocutors expressed enthusiasm for the 2024 local (Citizen’s Representatives’ Khural) elections, which will take place tomorrow Mongolia-time (October 11), as an opportunity for third parties to acquire seats.

Comparing the number of candidates by party for the Parliamentary elections (https://ikon.mn/elections/2024/parties) with that for the local elections (https://dnn.mn/news/308908) reveals a sharp contrast:

 

I have discovered that Ikon.mn has a wealth of information on this election, here it is possible to see how many candidates each party is running for each electoral district. For example, KhUN and the DP’s candidates for Ulaanbaatar and for each of UB’s districts.

Posted in Elections, Local Elections, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Mongolian Hoops Dreams — Creation of Soft Power Through Basketball

By Benjamin Nuland

Basketball was introduced to Mongolia in the 1960s by the Russians and Chinese.  More recently, basketball has become Mongolia’s most popular sport, but Mongolians’ associations are primarily American. This fascination lives under the halo of the NBA and its associations with American pop culture – NBA jerseys and streetwear define “cool” and passion around NBA games resembles levels in the US.  The cultural impact pays huge dividends to America’s soft power among Mongolia’s young population.  How then can all three stakeholders – Mongolia, the US and the NBA benefit from this undeniable cultural trend

Mongolia does not have much of a history with team sports, but it seems that basketball could be a sport that breaks this pattern; since 2017 Mongolia’s men’s teams have medaled five times at the FIBA 3×3 Asian Cup. Furthermore, the Mongolian women’s 3×3 basketball team qualified for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics for the first time. With three Mongolian players playing in the American NCAA, including Mike Sharavjamts, who hopes to be the first Mongolian drafted by the NBA when he graduates from the University of Utah in  2026, it seems that basketball in Mongolia will only gain further momentum over the next few years. (For more insights, check out this piece by Zorigtkhuu Bat-Erdene: Mongolia’s Success in Team Sports.)

In 2024 Mongolia hosted the 3×3 basketball world tour, but it has never been able to attract an NBA team or secure a visit from an NBA star. Nevertheless the demand is there. This leaves an interesting gap that the United States could fill with an unconventional foreign policy initiative.


Why Basketball Works

 On a macro-level, basketball appeals to what expert Tuvshinzaya Gantulga calls the real strength of American-Mongolian relations, “the philosophical underpinning of democracy.” Basketball initiatives would not be perceived as a support for American corporate advantage, but rather, a celebration of ideals that Mongolia also celebrates – perseverance, hard work, teamwork, and opportunity. China and Russia would likely perceive this type of influence as benign, borne from the same cultural forces that popularize basketball in their own countries rather than a seeping US influence. Even if China does see Mongolian basketball in competitive terms, it would focus on “upping its game” on the court, to the benefit of both countries.

The successes of Basketball Diplomacy can be portrayed as a local Mongolian success story. A rise in the quality of local basketball leagues would increase domestic revenue, and represent a new form of economic diversification into sports. By cultivating local talent, Mongolia would also have the opportunity to send students overseas for education in American universities. From the US perspective, an initiative which can hook an entire generation to embrace American culture would be a major victory

By cultivating its talent to showcase internationally, Mongolian basketball would bolster national pride through sport patriotism. Success in international competitions can also amplify Mongolia’s status on the world stage. In this sense, the US would not only be bolstering Mongolia’s basketball success, but also its confidence as a sovereign nation in a neighborhood dominated by China and Russia.

For US corporations like the NBA and Nike, the benefit from participating in basketball diplomacy might be small in the short term, but they would be seeding an opportunity for a larger, long-term win at relatively low cost. The NBA already participates in TV programming in Mongolia, selling live broadcast rights and supporting fan-focused Mongolian language programming.  Merchandise sales, though small, penetrate the leading edge of Mongolian youth.  Opportunities to monetize that fanbase will only grow with the popularity of the sport. There may also be a bit of a halo effect of Mongolian success in other “small” nations around Asia who might be embracing basketball.

By boosting local leagues, the US can draw NCAA or NBA scouts to the exceptional talent already developing in Mongolia.  One could only imagine the frenzy, and business opportunity, created if a Mongolian ever achieved stardom in the NCAA or NBA. Shortly after Mike Sharavjamts joined, the University of Dayton Fliers created a Mongolian Facebook account that quickly attracted nearly 30,000 followers.

How the US Could Build Basketball Diplomacy in Mongolia

The US government has long-standing programs across several agencies that could build soft power through basketball in Mongolia. They can also coordinate the work of their partner NGOs. There are many case studies worth referencing

USAID has launched programs in Somalia and Tunisia, where US government funding is used to build basketball courts and training facilities and provide equipment for youth programs. This could provide the initial funding that kickstarts local basketball programs.

The State Department’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs offers a few initiatives:

The Sports Visitor Program invites young athletes, coaches, and administrators from around the world to the United States for sports-based exchanges. Young Mongolians would participate in both basketball training and joint workshops on leadership, team building, conflict resolution, as well as inclusion and equity in sports. The US Embassy runs this program under its umbrella of English language teaching initiatives; this year it provided scholarships for 5 kids to travel to the US to learn English through playing basketball.

The Global Sports Mentoring Program (GSMP) [from its website] is a professional development exchange that pairs international leaders with American executives in the sports sector for a mentorship that promotes inclusion and gender equality. GSMP delegates develop in-depth action plans aimed at leveling the playing field for women and girls and increasing sports access and opportunities for people with disabilities. The GSMP has impacted 310,000 individuals from around the world but has yet to reach Mongolia. The program would be a great way to reach out to Mongolia’s women’s basketball community, which is already making a splash on the international scene.

The International Sports Programming Initiative (ISPI) is a competition for US-based NGOs to pitch effective two-way exchanges that engage underserved youth, coaches, and sports administrators under the themes of leadership, excellence, tolerance and respect. The winners receive grants to administer these projects in their targeted communities and could provide a pathway for American NGOs to launch their basketball activities in Mongolia.

The Sports Envoy Program sends professional athletes for short term visits to less developed areas. Beyond engaging with young Mongolians, NBA envoys would meet with senior officials to discuss efforts to improve the administration youth basketball programs. For Mongolian government officials, the presence of a ‘global ambassador’ would be crucial to putting Mongolia ‘on the map,’ bringing international awareness to both Mongolian basketball and Mongolia’s geopolitical relevance. The US Embassy plans to bring Mike Sharavjamts back to Mongolia for a brief visit. If a tour is approved, Sharavjamts’ visit would not only inspire Mongolian kids, but also provide a patriotic victory for Mongolia’s national identity.

Embassy Ulaanbaatar could also host watch parties for NCAA March Madness or the NBA Playoffs at American Corners or stage events similar to its large-venue watch parties for presidential elections.

FIBA, the International Basketball Association, could establish a Mongolian chapter of the Basketball For Good program, which provides year-round basketball coaching to kids from underserved communities around the world.

Other American-backed NGOs could create “Train the Trainer” Programs in Mongolia, where local coaches would receive free coaching training from experienced coaches.

As these programs gain traction, the NBA itself might consider establishing its seeding programs in Mongolia. Examples include the basketball school the NBA established in Egypt, or the Basketball Without Borders NBA elite training programs, which has emerged as a fast track to cultivate local talent and popularize the NBA throughout Asia and Africa.

The NBA can also expand its current deals with Mongolian TV to include initiatives proven successful in other developing markets.  Similar to its Chinese reality show, “Mengniu NBA Basketball Disciple” the NBA could collaborate with Mongolian TV channels and create a countrywide competition for youth hoopsters. The winners would earn a tryout with an NBA Developmental League team and a chance to play in the US. Having recently hosted the “Candidate 2024” competition, Mongol TV is well suited to produce this show. Considering the popularity of basketball from Ulaanbaatar to Mongolia’s smallest bags, one could imagine value created for the NBA.

The NBA Global Games are a series of exhibition matches normally held in countries with rapidly developing basketball programs like France, Japan, and Mexico. If an NBA team could briefly stop in Ulaanbaatar for a game against Mongolia’s “The League” all stars, it would also be a major win for US soft power.

Conclusion

Basketball is emerging as the most popular sport in Mongolia, particularly among Mongolia’s media savvy youth, its future leaders.  When it comes to creating goodwill, basketball is also one of the US’s great superpowers, the NBA’s stars live in an aspirational halo full of American cultural values. Basketball diplomacy has been extremely effective in countries where the US aspires to win hearts and minds. Throughout the world, including in China, NBA players like Michael Jordan, Kobe Bryant and Jeremy Lin, achieved the kind of goodwill diplomats can only dream of. At the same time, Basketball is a universal language, non-threatening and aspirational to the US’s adversaries, among them Mongolia’s assertive neighbors, China and Russia. From Mongolia’s perspective, basketball is a natural medium to upweight its visibility on the global stage and build national pride. In that sense, basketball diplomacy can serve Mongolia’s key goals of building geopolitical relevance and its own soft power.

About Benjamin Nuland

Benjamin Nuland is a Jack Hachigian Scholar at Yale University currently studying history and international relations. Recently completing the Directed Studies Program, he’s received the Topol Silliman Grant and the Summer Experience Award to study in Mongolia the summer under the guidance of Professor Arne Westad and Professor Julian Dierkes.

Posted in Benjamin Nuland, Curios, Pop Culture, Sports, United States | Leave a comment

Change in the Countryside June 2024

By Julian Dierkes

For some years, I have now traced visible changes in Ulaanbaatar on my periodic visits.

I’ve kept a similar list for countryside changes, somewhat less regular as extended visits to the countryside don’t come nearly often enough for me. Earlier notes appeared in August 2023 | July 2023 | June 2019 | October 2017June 2017 | October 2015. Additions/edits to that list are marked in italics below, candidates for omissions in strikethrough.

Note that my last list appeared in August 2023, so this is an incremental update to that list.

Visible Manifestations of Social Change in the Countryside

What has Arrived?

  • Guardrails in some curves on major cross-country roads
  • While street signs (speed limits, warnings of curves, etc.) used to be a curious rarity (“when there hasn’t been a sign for 100km, why this one?”) they now seem to appear in clusters.
  • The state is reasserting its authority in some places. Roadside safety inspections of vehicles have returned. On a drive between Baruun-Urt and Chinggis (<3 hrs) we were stopped by police three times: marmot inspection (we weren’t carrying), tire disinfection, seatbelt check. The latter was really a bit of a local police extortion attempt.
  • Fences around large parcels of lands. As far as I can tell these are hayed for winter fodder as nothing seems to be planted there. Fences keep out animals in this case to let grass grow.
  • Pretty significant agricultural activity, esp. around Darkhan and Erdenet, but also towards Kharkhorin. Many locations and huge fields that I don’t remember seeing on first visit to the area in 2008. Entire valleys dedicated to wheat and rapeseed in particular in 2023.
  • Not all fences around xashaa (property lots) are wood anymore. There are some prefab concrete slabs, corrugated metals, etc. Some residents are also integrating shipping containers into their fence.
  • Virtually all aimag centres now seem to have at least one tall building (8+ stories).
  • New, modern houses are appearing in soum centres. Only buildings in towns that don’t have a big wooden fence around them.
  • “No littering” signs.
  • Motorcycle helmets. Perhaps a greater attention to personal safety more generally as some of the boats we rode offered life vests. Riding helmets for tourist horse/camel rides as well.
  • Even soum centres have significant tree planting programs going on. Freshly-planted trees in so many public and private spaces.
  • Bike infrastructure in towns and many kids riding around on bikes.
  • Very communicative drivers. For example, signal right means, “it’s clear, you can pass” and signal left “no, don’t pass”. Sometimes you get flashing hazards as a thank you, but they can also mean “animals in the road”. It was less clear to me what the flashing headlights mean. Sometimes they seemed to be the oddly-universal, “speed trap” ahead, but sometimes there wasn’t a speed trap after that. While you’re passing, flashing headlights mean, “cutting it a bit close there, buddy”.
  • Thule-style roof boxes in cars travelling between cities and towns. Roof-mounted canopies to roll out for camping have also appeared.
  • Real coffee has appeared at ger camps.
  • Some ger camps have also embraced green houses.
  • There are Khushuur (Хушуур) stands everywhere along the big roads.
  • We actually witnessed sun screen being applied to a Mongolian child!
  • I had heard mention of herders using their Prius to move a herd, but actually saw that. Highlight was when the door of the Prius opened to bark at a recalcitrant sheep. Now there are rumours of herding-by-drone, but I have not witnessed that.
  • Herders listening to podcasts. Well, at least I saw some herders with earplugs.
  • Ger-customized wall carpets. Generally, inside curtains on gers seem more common.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • Ger bed & breakfast, ger buudal. It is not clear to me whether some enterprising printing shop has simply delivered many printed signs for such ger rentals in the countryside or if they are a new phenomenon. I have yet to stay at one.
  • I noticed more monasteries in soum centres across Arkhangai, Khuvsgul and Bulgan.
  • Starlink receivers on car roofs. Perhaps these have replaced satellite phones (see below).
  • Paved roads to soum centres. With all aimag centres connected, some soum centres are bound to follow. For example, I saw a very smooth road from Bulgan to Orkhon Soum.
  • Capsule coffee machines. Given the volume of garbage they produce, this does not seem like a good development…
  • On the Darkhan road, I came across a cut-out cardboard police officer. It made me slow down!

What has Disappeared, or at least, Nearly Disappeared?

  • The clever move to simply drive cross-country around toll booths on major roads.
  • Satellite phones. Still necessary for country-side connectivity around 2010, now I haven’t seen one in some time.
  • 500ml water bottles. There has been a real push toward refilling from larger bottles to reduce waste. Still waiting for personal bowls to make a bigger comeback.

What will Appear in the Future?

  • Much more directional street markers.
  • Cross-country biking, hiking, and riding routes away from major roads. Drives designated as scenic routes.
  • Some kind of ultra- or other sonic device that will scare herds away from roads.
  • Straight dirt paths. Currently, some kind of path-is-better-over-there logic turns all tracks into slalom tracks.

What will Disappear in the Future?

  • Roughly in the 2000s, I would guess, more cars were beginning to show up in the countryside, but road-construction was not revving up yet. That meant that on big cross-country routes, entire valleys were scarred by multiple parallel tracks. Along the paved sections of major roads, these scars are slowly disappearing in the landscape. That is a very slow process, however, so even in spots where new roads now provide a good way of driving through valleys/over passes, the scars remain. In some areas the grated tracks that mark some inclines towards passes especially are now overgrown next to paved roads, still visible as ridges, but melting into the landscape slowly.
  • At construction sites, the paved roads are often simply blocked with large dirt heaps across the lanes. Effective, but scary at night.
  • Greeting of official visitors at city gates.
  • Fancy streetlight design must be a state socialist heritage somehow along with other forms of public art. There are vaguely futuristic designs throughout Mongolia, but they are even more surprising in provincial towns than in Ulaanbaatar. Somehow, I don’t think that they will continue to be built.
  • Lumber bridges on major roads. As roads are being built across the country, these – somewhat scary – bridges appear to be disappearing, though they are sometimes visible just up or downriver from newly constructed bridges.
  • Roadside sales of airag, pine nuts, berries, etc. Airag is inevitably offered in reused large soda bottles while the pine nuts are often filled into small plastic bags. Berries in particular seem to typically be offered by younger children, standing by the road.
  • People huddling with animals under bridges. 

What won’t Disappear in the Medium Term?

  • Composite electricity poles. In the countryside these consist of a concrete base to which a wooden pole is tied with wire/brackets which ends in a triangle that has space for three attached cables. Metal poles have appeared, but I know similar composite poles from the Yukon and Alaska, so they  must be well-adapted to extreme temperatures and will thus last.
  • Litter. Growth in domestic tourism will make the countryside more littered, but awareness of littering will ultimately build. Such a blight on Mongolia!
  • Buried tires to mark property lines. It seems that there are so many practical reasons (cheap, indestructible, visible to off-roading drivers) that this practice will continue.
Posted in Change, Countryside, Curios | Tagged | Leave a comment

How Unfortunate: Putin Visits Mongolia

By Julian Dierkes

Once again, geopolitical realities are catching up with Mongolia and there is very little the government of Mongolia can do about it, even if it wanted to.

Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin will be visiting Ulaanbaatar to commemorate the 85th anniversary of the battle of Khalkin Gol (Nomonhan). He will do so in defiance of an ICC arrest warrant. Mongolia ratified the Rome Statute in 2002. The first Mongolian judge to the ICC was appointed earlier this year. Apparently, the ICC has re-asserted Mongolia’s obligation to follow through on arrest to the BBC.

Yet, an arrest seems inconceivable from a Mongolian perspective.

Caveats

I have only a newspaper-reader-based understanding of Russian foreign policy, Russian politics generally, or the ICC. I am merely trying to offer some context and analyses that focuses on the Mongolian perspective here.

Khalkin Gol

Clearly, the battle of Khalkin Gol is a touchstone of Mongolian-Soviet/Russian relations. Soviet and Mongolian forces collaborated in the summer of 1939 to repel Japanese advances from Manchuria toward the northwest and thus the Soviet Union and Mongolia. The battle was significant for effectively ending any north/westward expansion of Japanese imperialism, but also as a testing ground for (later Marshal) Georgy Zukhov and his tank tactics for the Red Army.

Mongolian troops were involved with artillery and cavalry. Subsequently, Mongolian troops were only involved in World War II as volunteers.

Throughout the postwar era, the battle was commemorated on Sept 3 as a highpoint of Mongolian-Soviet collaboration and friendship. Given the close and emotional bonds with the Soviet Union and Russia felt by many Mongolians, this has been an important date.

Commemoration of Khalkin Gol Anniversary by Leaders’ Visits

Despite the importance of Khalkin Gol for Mongolia-Russia relations, the commemoration of its anniversary (beyond the routine exchange of congratulatory letters) is relatively recent and limited to Pres. Putin. The two visits that Leonid Breshnev paid to Mongolia, for example, came in January 1966 and on the 50th anniversary of the 3rd party congress of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party in November 1974, not for a Khalkin Gol anniversary.

However, Putin has visited Mongolia for the lasts three five-year anniversaries, 2009, 2014, 2019. Once-in-five-years visits seem to be about the extent of Putin’s attention to Mongolia. When it comes, it involves quasi-imperial grandstanding, but this attention is at best sporadic.

Geopolitical Circumstances

As is obvious to even the most casual observer, Mongolia is very much stuck between a rock and a geopolitical hard place given its overbearing two neighbours. Broadly speaking, the Mongolian foreign policy of striving for constructive relations with those two neighbours, but also building and deepening relations with “third neighbours” (primarily OECD countries), has been successful. There are occasional flare-ups in relations with the two neighbours, but no longer-term deterioration of relations. On the global stage, Mongolia grapples far above its weight class. Over the past ten years or so, this foreign policy has focused even more on the UN and international initiatives, but has also added some attention to regional, intra-Asian free trade.

That relatively stable situation has changed with the threat of a bipolar (U.S.-China) world, and with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, the gravest geopolotical threat to Mongolia is probably a sitation where the Chinese regime feels compelled to force Mongolia into an “us or them” choice. Mongolia’s utter economic dependence on China gives the country little leverage or even degrees of freedom.

The invasion of Ukraine has changed the situation in that it has pushed the Russian regime toward China, relying on the Chinese regime as a bulwark against international sanctions. To Mongolia, a diminished Russia that is somewhat subservient to China is probably more threatening that a sporadically-interested imperialist Russia because this situation implies a possible agreement of the two neighbours. The only concrete such agreement that has emerged is the plan for a Siberia-China gas pipeline that would run through Mongolia. To many, this seems like more of a pipedream (largely for Russisan sellers of gas) than a concrete project, but it will certainly be trucked out again in the coming days as evidence of trilateral cooperation.

Mongolian Options

Given the geopolitical context does the Mongolian government have any agency?

Clearly (to me), there is no chance of exercising that agency by arresting Putin. That would be almost suicidal with virtually no upside and no one to come “rescue” Mongolia. To expect such a move is almost willfully naive toward Mongolia’s reality.

Presumably, the initiative toward this visit has come from Putin, even though it is formally at the invitation of the government of Mongolia and Pres. Khurelsukh more specifically. The calculation of what this visit means in geopolitical terms must also be almost an entirely Russian one. Keeping the caveat of my relative ignorance of the Russian political context in mind, I doubt that bilateral relations between Russia and Mongolia or between Putin and Khurelsukh have entered much into these calculations. Putin wants to assert his power and defiance against the ICC and “the West” more generally, the Khalkin Gol anniversary provides the occasion, and Mongolia is a a bit of a victim to this calculation.

Regardless of how conversations about a possible visit might actually have unfolded, could the government of Mongolia have at some point said, “no, we’re not inviting you”. I doubt it. This is where this situation contrasts with last year’s BRICs summit in South Africa, where I can imagine that the South African government might have prevailed on Putin’s representatives that not-coming was the best option.

Protests

I do hope that there will be some protests during Putin’s visit, ideally on Sukhbaatar Sq or in front of the embassy. Some such protests have been going on since the invasion of Ukraine.

I will also watch how some of the opposition members of cabinet will behave as both the DP and KhUN have been critical of Russia and the government’s silence on the invasion of Ukraine in the past.

However, I also suspect that the Russian side will lean heavily on the Mongolian government to hide protests as much as possible. I don’t think Putin has any interest in showing that he allows dissent or criticism and his main purpose during the visit will be to gloat. I do not imagine that he will want that gloating spoiled by ugly posters.

On the other hand, the MPP government has faced some criticism for its sometimes heavy-handed response to protesters, particular from opposition parties who are now represented in cabinet. Could this be the equivalent of the UN abstention (see below), i.e. no overt resistance to the visit, but let protesters be the proxy to assuage international perceptions of a submission to Putin’s agenda?

I wonder if Khurelsukh will plant a tree with Putin? Ceremonial tree planting has become an element of state visits, in part to bolster Khurelsukh’s international credentials via his Billion Tree Campaign.

Some people jokingly refer to this campaign as a subotnik, i.e. state-required labour often of a ceremonial or perfunctory nature or purpose. Would getting a former-KGB-agent-turned-head-of-state to plant a tree be the ultimate diplomatic post-Soviet subotnik? Or, will Putin not plant a tree as a sign of subtle Mongolian defiance?

What Power does Russia Hold?

There are possible reactions that the Russian government might embrace immediately and there are more drastic possibilities that are likely only implied. I am not considering reactions to an actual arrest here, but rather reactions had the Mongolian government at some point indicated with any conviction that they would prefer for Putin not to come visit.

The obvious reaction would be that the diesel supply would be interrupted. Sure, supply chain issues might be blamed, but in terms of the import of fuels, Mongolia is entirely at Russia’s mercy, at least until the long-awaited Sainshand refinery is completed. The more existential threat that is likely only implied is some kind of military reaction or even invasion.

There have only been a few instances in the past where Mongolia has pushed back forcefully on a Russian powerplay, at least with some kind of public version of that dispute playing itself out. I have previously reviewed this 2008 defiance and concluded that that was possible at a specific time in specific circumstances.

Less public and less obvious resistance by the Mongolian government might be a bit difficult to discern. For example, I have come to see abstentions on UN votes aimed at Russia as defiance. Yes, Mongolia is not voting against Russia, but also not for Russia which is probably as far as this defiance can go. I have previously argued this in Foreign Policy.

Reactions

There will be some dismay at Mongolia’s unwillingness to carry out the warrant in the media and also among some officials, but largely based on ignorance of the Mongolian context or insistence on very dogmatic liberal internationalism. I have tried to offer some of the context to the current situation above to make the point that Mongolia’s calculation may be very different where its value commitments strongly point at the ICC while a realist assessment of its situation will demand that the visit goes smoothly.

I would be surprised if this dismay is strong enough to end the ongoing flurry of visits by European and Asian officials from the pope to the Slovenian president. That flurry is part of a strategy to counter authoritarianism prompted by Russia that has led to the “rediscovery” of Mongolia as a democratic outpost. That imperative of a value-driven foreign policy will remain strong despite next week’s actions and some statements that might come as a result.

The ICC will likely make statements on how it will be disappointed by the lack of enforcement of its warrant. As far as I can tell (not very far) the Rome Statue does not seem to have any obvious responses built in against signatories who do not enforce a warrant. Maybe this endangers the future appointment of Mongolian judges or will lead to discussions/censure at future ICC signatory meetings?

Some autocrats and Putinophiles particularly among the populist right in Europe will be somewhat emboldened, though they are generally quite ignorant about the world and will understand little of the Mongolian context.

Limits of Internationalist Foreign Policy

The current discussions do highlight one challenge for Mongolian foreign policy. One version of that foreign policy is “we’re friends with everyone”. That argument is strong when Mongolia claims to have some modicum of sway over North Korea where other nations have none. But it also means that a dictator like A Lukashenko is not only allowed to come visit Ulaanbaatar, but his visit this June was loudly celebrated by government social media. I much preferred Laotian and Bhutanese visits this summer.

Likewise, when Mongolia joins an international convention like the Rome Statue, there is some expectation from other signatories that this is not an act of joining for joining’s sake or to be friends with everyone and a joiner, but also out some understanding of and dedication to the substance of that convention.

Posted in Foreign Policy, Mongolia and ..., Russia | Tagged | Leave a comment

More on Oyun-Erdene’s Cabinet

By Julian Dierkes and Bulgan B

Marissa Smith has already provided an overview of the new cabinet. Here, we’re adding some more information in cabinet members as we had done for previous cabinets.

(new cabinet members in bold, if no party is listed in a bracket, the minister is from MPP)

Prime Minister – L. Oyun-Erdene, MP
Born 1980 in Ulaanbaatar
Journalist, Lawyer
Graduated from Bers Institute
Mongolian State National University, Mongolian Education University 2008
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 2015
Worked in Governors Office of Berkh city, Khentii 20012002
World Vision 2002-2008
Head, Social Development Department of Bayanzurkh District Governor’s Secretariat 2008-2009
MPP Governing Board Secretariat 2009
Head of Party Organization Department, MPP 2009-2011
Secretary, MPP 2011-2012
Acting Secretary-General, MPP 2012
President of MPP SDM Youth Association 2010 – 2015
(Sanders 217, 650)
Secretary of the Mongolian People’s Party 2011-2012
Acting General Secretary of the Mongolian People’s Party 2012
Member of Parliament 2016-Present
Cabinet Secretary 2017-2021
Prime Minister, 2021-present

Cabinet Secretary – N. Uchral
b. 1985 in Ulaanbaatar
Degree in law, Ikh Zasag International University, 2007
MBA, University of Gloucestershire, 2010
Master degree in history, Mongolian University of Education, Master of History, 2012
Doctorate degree in history, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013
General Director, Royal Academy and Royal International Institute, 2010-2016
Member of Parliament, 2016-Present
Minister of Digital Development and Communications, 2022

First Deputy Prime Minister and Economy and Development – L. Gantumur, MP [DP] 
Born in 1973, Ulaangom, Uvs province
Communication engineer, Sendai Denpa College, Japan, 1996
Electrical engineer, Technical and Technological University, Nagaoka, Japan, 1999
Member of Parliament (three terms), 2004-2016
Minister of Education, Culture and Science, 2012-2016
President of Mongolian Democratic Youth Association, 2007-2010
Vice President of Mongolian Democratic Youth Association, 2000-2007
Deputy director, “Setgeshgui Trade” LLC, 2000-2004

Deputy PMS. Amarsaikhan, MP
Born 1973, Nalaikh, Ulaanbaatar
Linguist and Lawyer, Fresno College (California) 1996;
English Metropolitan College, 1998
Los Angeles College, 2000
Master’s degree in law from Southwestern University
Staff at Science and Information Technology Center 1992-1994
Attache at the Embassy of Mongolia to PRC, 2000-2004
Manager of Investment and Foreign Trade at American Trade and Development, 2004-2007
CEO, President and Director of BOD, Oyunii Undraa Group LLC 2007-2017
Member of the Citizen Representative Council 2012-2020
Head of the budget, finance and economic committee of the Citizen Representative Council 2016-2017
Chairman of the Citizen Representative Council 2017-2019
Mayor of Ulaanbaatar 2019-2020
Member of Parliament 2020-Present
Deputy Prime Minister, 2021

Deputy PM for Trade and Investment – T. Dorjkhand, MP [KhUN]
Born 1977 in Ulaanbaatar
Bachelor in Public Finance, MUST in 1995
Master, Public Economic Policy, Hitotsubashi University, Japan, 2004
Trained in Public and Private Partnership in Infrastructure, Harvard University, USA, 2010
Trained in Financial Theory, Oxford University, UK, 2012
Specialist in the Fiscal policy in Ministry of Finance, 1999-2002
Intern in the Ministry of Finance in Japan, 2003-2004
Acting head, Loan and aid department, Ministry of Finance, 2005-2012
Head of the Financial policy and loan management department, Ministry of Finance, 2012-2015
Advisor to the Executive Director, Asia Pacific Region, International Financial Corporation, Washington, USA, 2013-2015
Co-founded the KhUN, headed the BOD, 2016-2020
Member of Parliment, 2020-Present

Finance – B. Javkhlan, MP
Born 1975 in Darkhan
Economist, graduated from MUST in 1997
University of California, Riverside, 2008
Indiana University, 2009
Controller, Mongolbank 1997-1999
Plenipotentiary Mongolbank Representative to Agricultural Bank 1999-2000
Senior Controller, Mongolbank, 2000-2004
Deputy Director of the Trade and Development Bank 2004-2007
Elected to MPP Little Khural, 2013
MP since 2016 to Present
Head of Parliamentary Subcommittee for Local Leadership, 2016-2020
Deputy Vice President of the Bank of Mongolia 2010-2016
Minister of Finance, 2021-

Defense – S. Byambatsogt, MP
born in 1974, attended secondary school in Khovd
Economist and manager, Institute of Finance and Economics, graduated 1998
Master’s degree in business studies, Maastricht university
MPRP Social Democratic Mongolian Students Association, 2006-2008
MPRP/MPP Little Khural, Member, 2005, 2007, 2010
MPP Leadership Council, 2013
Member of Parliament (Khovd), 2008 – 2020
2016, Minister of Justice and Home Affairs
2022, Minister of Road and Transport Development

Justice and Internal Affairs – O. Altangerel, MP [DP]
Born in 1981, Uvurkhangai province
Bachelor in law, MUST, 2003
Master, Public Management and Law, MUST, 2017
Training Officer, Mongolian Law Enforcement Authority, 2003-2006
Advocator, Association of Mongolian Advocates, 2007-2024
Head of the Policy and coordination department, Ministry of Justice, 2012-2014
Head of the Ethics, Judiciary, 2013-2015
Deputy head, Mongolian Democratic Party, 2023
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

Education – P. Naranbayar, MP [KhUN]
Born in 1976
Bachelor in International Relations, MUST, 2000
Master in law, Kioto University, Japan, 2007
PhD in International study, MUST, 2015
Specialist/officer in the Collaborative Relations Unit, Ministry of Environment, 2000-2002
Assistant to the Minister of Environment, 2002-2004
Head of the Japan Ecological Foundation Representative Office, 2002-2004
Officer in the Innovation Department, National Development and Innovation Committee of Mongolia, 2009-2011
Acting Head, Tourism Department, Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 2011
Director of the Shine Mongol Secondary Education School 2012-2020
Chair of the party’s Ulaanbaatar committee, KhUN Party
Representative of the Citizen’s Representative Khural, Head of Human Development Committee, 2020-2024
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

Roads and Transport – B. Delgersaikhan, MP
Born in 1964, Dornogobi
Bachelor in law, University of Law Enforcement, 1987
Detective, Dornogobi Police Unit, 1987-1989
Lead detective and Head of the unit, Police Office of Dornogobi, 1989-2002
Founder and director of “Dorniin Gobi” LLC, 2002-2016
Director, “Bold tomor Eroo gol”LLC, 2004-2015
Member of Parliament (three terms), 2014-2020, 2020-2024, 2024-Present

Tourism, Culture and Sport – Ch. Nomin, MP
Born 1983, Ulaanbaatar
Daughter of Chinbat, Director of Gatsuurt Company (gold mining and agriculture)
University of East Anglia in 2003, Economics and Accounting 2006;
Director of External Relations of the Gatsuurt Group, 2006-2007
Manager, Terelj Hotel (owned by Gatsuurt), 2007
Director of “Terelj Suikh” LLC 2008-2011;
Harvard Business School 2018;
Executive Director of Mongol TV 2011-2021
Minister of Culture, 2021-2024

Environment and Climate Change – S. Odontuya, MP [DP]
Born in
Bachelor in international law, University of Saint Petersburg, Russia, 1988
Master in Business Administration, University of Saint Petersburg, Russia, 1989
Officer at the Science Technological Center of Mongolia, 1988-1991
Director, “Sod Trade” LLC, “Lots Invest” LLC, 1991-2012
Head of the “Irgen Ta Baylag” foundation, 2010-2012
Advisor to the Minister of Health, 2010-2012
Mayor of Bayangol District, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament (Four terms), 2012-2016, 2020-2024, 2024-Present

Foreign Relations – B. Battsetseg, MP
Born in 1973 in aimag center of Bayankhongor province
Graduated secondary school, Darkhan
Graduated from International Relations School at MUST in 1996
Directors of publishing houses Az Khur LLC, and Munkhiin Useg LLC 1996 to 2004
Institute of Finance and Economy 2000; Maastricht University of Management in 2005
Unit Director at Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency, 2005-2007
Chairman of the board, Munkhiin Useg 2007-2015
Advisor to MPP Secretary-General, 2010-2011
Administration office, and Head of Foreign Relations and Cooperation Department of MPP 2010-2012
Director of the Board of Directors of Munkhiin Useg Publishing 2020 to Jan 28, 2021
Advisor to the Minister of Finance 2015-2016
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 2016-2020
Minister of Foreign Affairs 2021-present
Member of Parliament 2024-present

Mining & Industry – Ts. Tuvaan, MP [DP]
Born in 1972, Ulaanbaatar
Graduated from Comenious University, Republic Of Slovakia
Bachelor in medicine, Mongolian University of Medicine, 2000
Secretariat of the Chingeltei District Democratic Party Unit, 2000-2008
Advisor to the Minister of Health, 2008-2012
Deputy Minister of Industry and Agriculture, 2012-2015
Head of the Human Development and social welfare, 2015
Secretary General of Democratic Party, 2017-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-2024, 2024-Present

Family and Social Protection – L. Enkh-Amgalan, MP
Born 1970 in Khuvsgul; graduated secondary school in Murun
Economist and IT Engineer, Graduated from the University of Saint Peterburg in 1992; Dakota University [sic] in USA the in 1996; and Hangdon University in 2002
Director-General of Interpress LLC 1995-1996
Editor in Chief at Il Tovchoo Newspaper, Montsame Agency 1992-1995
Vice President of MCS Group, Board of Directors of Unitel Group 1996-2012
Advisor to the Prime Minister of Mongolia, 2011-2012
Member of Executive Committee of the MPP, 2012-Present
Member of Parliament since 2012-Present
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Education, Culture and Science, Deputy Speaker of the State Great Hural, 2016-2017
Deputy Speaker of the State Great Hural 2017-2020
Chairman of the Standing Committee on State Structure of the State Great Hural from 2020
Minister of Education and Science, 2021-2024

Urban Development and Housing – J. Batsuuri , MP [DP]
Bachelor, University of Finance and Economics, Mongolia, 1993
Master, Management Academy, Mongolia, 2003
Dealer, Mongolian Stock Exchange, 1992-1994
Director, Molor Impex, LLC, 1994-1999
Director, Dorvolt, 1999-2000
Deputy Director, Government Service Authority, 2005-2007
Head of the Sukhbaatar Province Unit of Democratic Party, 1997-2017
Governor of Sukhbaatar Province, 2008-2016
Advisor to the President of Mongolia on Rural development, 2017
Member of Parliament, 2020-2024, 2024-Present

Health – T. Munkhsaikhan, MP
Born 1983 in Ulaanbaatar.
Graduated from the Mongolian National University of Medical Sciences, 2006 and 2013, Medical Doctor, with master’s degree in Medicine.
Doctor, National Trauma and Orthopaedic Research Center of Mongolia, 2008-2014
Head of the surgery department, National Trauma and Orthopaedic Research Center of Mongolia, 2014-2018
Director-General, National Trauma and Orthopaedic Research Center of Mongolia, 2016-2018
Director-General, State Hospital Central Hospital #1, 2019-2020
Minister of Health, 2020-21

Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry – J. Enkhbayar, MP
Minister of Defense around 2012
Born 1973, Ulaanbaatar
Graduated from the Military school in 1991
Studied law at the MUST, 1999
MBA, Maastricht University, Netherlands, 2005
Director at “Gazar”LLC, and BOD at “Nekhii” LLC, and “Suljmel” LLC, 1992-2000
Director and Deputy Director at the Monitoring unit, Ulaanbaatar Customs Authority, 2002-2004
Advisor to the General Customs Authority, 2004-2006
Deputy director and Secretariat General at the General Agency for Specialised Inspection, 2006-2008
Member of Parliament, five terms, 2008-2012, 2012-16, 2016-20, 2020-24, 2024-Present
Minister of defence 2012

Energy – B. Choijilsuren, MP
b. 1970, Tes, Uvs province
Automation and telemechanics, Urals Higher Polytechnic, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinberg), graduated 1993
MPRP/MPP Little Khural, 2005-2015
Member of Parliament, 2012-Present
Minister of Finance, 2016
Minister of Energy, 2022

Digital Development and Communications –  Ts. Baatarkhuu, MP [DP]
Born in 1981, Binder soum, Khentii Province
Social Science, MUST 1999-2002
Khan-Uul University, 1999-2004
Management Academy, 2005-2007
Head of the Press, Government of Mongolia, 2005-2006
Director of the Lector Center, 2004-2012
Acting Mayor, 2012-2013
Citizens’ representative, 2012
BOD, MLS training LLC, 2013-2016
Advisor to the President of Mongolia, 2016
Advisor to the Urban Policy Research Institute, 2014-Present
Head of the DP caucus, Citizen’s Representative Council, 2016-Present
Director of MLS Training, LLC 2016
Citizens’ representative, 2016-2020
Secretary General, Democratic Party, 2020-
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

Twenty-Minute City – R. Erdeneburen, MP [DP]
Studied law, at NUM, 1999
Assistant to the MP, 2000-2004
Member of Parliament, 2004-2008
Advisor to the Minister of Environment, 2009-2010
Secretariat to the Ministry of Defence, 2012-2015
Secretariat, Ministry of Labour, 2015-2016
BOD, Songolt Design LLC 2018
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

National Monitoring and Evaluation Commitee – E. Odbayar, MP [DP]
Bachelor in Business Administration, School of Economy and Business, 2008
Master in economics, School of Economy, NUM, 2012
Master in public administration, Management Academy, 2015
Started as secialist, senior specialist and Director of the Unit, Mongolian Labour Exchange, 2007-2012
Director of the Internal Monitoring, Evaluation and Inspection at the Ministry of Human Development and Social Protection, 2012-2013
Director of the Secretariat, National Authority for Children, 2013-2015
Director of the Internal Monitoring, Evaluation and Inspection at the Ministry of Human Development and Social Protection, 2015-2016
Director of the National Authority for Children, 2016
Director of the DP secretariat, 2017-2019
Advisor to the DP Head, 2033-2023
General Secretariat of of the DP, 2023-2024
Member of Parliament, 2024

Posted in Democratic Party, Government, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Comment: Mongolia’s Democratic Party Gambit into Government

By Sugar Munkhtsooj

The Mongolian parliamentary elections of 2024, the first since constitutional amendments increased the number of parliamentarians from 76 to 126, concluded in June with results that largely aligned with predictions from pundits and pollsters. As expected, the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured victory, while several smaller parties made their way into parliament. However, it was the post-election developments that caught many observers by surprise.

A Surprising Move

Mr. L. Oyun-Erdene, leader of the MPP, which commanded a simple majority of 68 parliamentarians, made an unexpected gesture by inviting the leaders of the HUN Party and the Democratic Party of Mongolia (DP) to join what he termed a “Courage for Rapid Development” Government. This arrangement was not a formal coalition, which would have been governed by specific rules and regulations. Instead, it was framed as an invitation to opposition parties “to tackle the pressing issues facing Mongolia together.”

For Oyun-Erdene, this move makes tactical sense given the political environment. Appointed by his predecessor, Mr. U. Khurelsukh upon his ascendancy to Presidency, Oyun-Erdene spent the last three years navigating a tough post-COVID economy while simultaneously fighting to retain his position. His primary goal was to survive in office until the election, proving to skeptics within his party that he could deliver electoral success.

With victory secured, the decision to invite the two parties serves to strengthen the stability of his government and, by extension, his own position. Commanding just 68 seats, Oyun-Erdene was vulnerable to potential challenges from disgruntled factions within his own party, who could have easily sided with the opposition to topple the government by simple majority of 64 parliamentarians. By bringing opposition parties into the fold, he has effectively neutralized this threat. On a broader scale, this move allows him to present a unified front when dealing with neighboring countries on major projects, such as the long-discussed Tavan Tolgoi power plant, uranium deals with France, and railway infrastructure improvements with China and Russia.

The Democratic Party’s Calculations

For Mr. L. Gantumur, leader of the Democratic Party, the decision to join the government may have been driven by a different set of considerations. The DP’s choice to participate in the government faced much stronger criticism compared to that of the HUN Party, which many in the DP had long considered an ally of the ruling MPP.

Critiques came from various quarters, raising valid concerns. Even Mr. N. Enkhbayar, the third president of Mongolia and a long-time leader of the MPP, publicly disapproved of this arrangement, arguing that right-wing and left-wing parties cannot coexist effectively in one government. Voices within the DP feared a loss of the party’s distinct identity and its prominent position as one of Mongolia’s two major parties. Others expressed concern about the erosion of checks and balances that a healthy opposition provides.

Gantumur, elected as Party Leader in 2023 after a bitter leadership dispute that nearly tore the DP apart, may have seen strategic necessity in joining the government to save the party from obscurity. Several factors likely influenced this decision:

Party Rebuilding:

Joining the government allows Mr. Gantumur to break the vicious cycle of self-destruction that has plagued the Democratic Party (DP) and begin the process of rebuilding it into a modern organization. The discipline and structure required to operate within the government are expected to positively impact the party’s internal processes as well.

Maintaining party morale in opposition is challenging in any context, but particularly so in Mongolia. Unlike in Commonwealth countries, Mongolia lacks a state-provided systematic environment and ecosystem for opposition parties to operate effectively. Once out of power, a party must rely on its own resources to remain politically relevant until the next election. Like any thriving organization, a political party needs funds and new members to stay viable.

This challenge became increasingly difficult for the DP over the past four years due to a bitter leadership dispute at its headquarters. The internal strife caused many talented professionals to leave the party, with some abandoning politics altogether. Notable departures include Mr. B. Dulguun, who joined Mr. Oyun-Erdene’s team to become director of a government think tank, and Mr. S. Sanaser, who ran on a HUN party ticket in an Ulaanbaatar district. Both Harvard-trained economists were once considered the future of the party.

This exodus of talent, coupled with the increased dominance of extreme voices from the party’s fringes, has made it difficult for the DP to rebrand itself as a viable political force capable of governing. Not to mention that the weakening of Mongolia’s second-largest party poses a risk to the country’s political balance, as it becomes more susceptible to extreme political ideologies.

Rebuilding Cadre:

On a more practical level, joining the government allows the DP to position the next generation of its leaders to gain valuable governing experience. All political parties need to demonstrate their competence and ability to govern effectively. Being away from national government for the past eight years has left the party with a shortage of experienced professionals who meet the legal criteria for top government positions.

Indeed, the DP is already struggling to fill its allotted positions in the new government, often relying on individuals with experience from former DP administrations. Gantumur’s move can be seen as an attempt to bring a cadre of young DP members into mid-level government positions, providing them with crucial experience in governance and policy-making.

By participating in governance, even as a junior partner, allows DP to work towards rebuilding its reputation, attracting new talent, and preparing for future electoral contests with a stronger, more experienced team.

Risks and Opportunities

One major risk of this cooperation with the ruling party is the potential loss of identity and voter base, a common fate for junior partners in coalition governments. Some worry that the DP might face significant losses in the crucial local elections scheduled for October 11, 2024.

The upcoming local elections are particularly crucial, given the enhanced powers granted to local administrations by the 2020 legal changes. Moreover, they also serve as important political springboards for those eyeing national politics: in the 2024 elections, five district governors ascended to the national parliament.

Paradoxically, the DP’s decentralized structure may prove advantageous. Unlike the MPP’s rigid hierarchy, the DP’s factional nature allows local branches to maintain distinct identities in rural Mongolia. This grassroots strength was evident in 2020 when the party secured 10 aimag governorships despite heavy national losses.

At the parliamentary level, the DP isn’t entirely abandoning its watchdog role. A cadre of newly elected young MPs has voiced strong responses to recent national scandals—including the tragic death of a juvenile in custody and the controversial imprisonment of a prominent journalist—signaling a commitment to accountability that transcends political alliances.

Looking Ahead

The question now looming over Mongolia is whether this “cooperation government” will truly address the nation’s pressing issues or simply entrench a system rife with corruption. It remains to be seen how long this experiment in political cooperation will survive. However, in an age of increasing polarization, the Mongolian case of political unity stands out as a pertinent example.

About Sugar Munkhtsooj

Mr. Sugar Munkhtsooj is a management consultant and former Secretary for International Relations of the Democratic Party of Mongolia.

Posted in Democratic Party, Government, Ikh Khural 2024, Party Politics, Politics, Sugar Munkhtsooj | Leave a comment

CWGP and National Coalition Results

By Julian Dierkes

Beyond the DP’s success, the second great surprise (to me) of the election results was that the Civil Will Green Party re-entered parliament with four seats and the National Coalition gained four seats on its first attempt.

Of course, the threshold to gain seats via the party list meant that a single member was mathematically impossible while a two-seat share was improbable. CWGP and NC also benefitted from the equal redistribution of the over 200,000 votes cast for parties that did not clear the minimum thresholds. The 41,555 re-distributed seats (per party/coalition that passed the threshold) were thus a boost of more than 50% to the votes case for CWGP and NC while they had a proportionally much lower impact on KhUN, DP or MPP tallies. The four seats for both of these parties are thus close to the minimum representation made possible by the new system. However, it should still be acknowledged that those parties both garnered over 70,000 votes or just over 5%.

Note that the New Unified Coalition (Шинэ нэгдсэн эвсэл) just barely missed clearing the threshold of 5% (4.8%). Had that coalition received only 2,000 or so more votes, the redistributed votes would have dropped to around 20,000 (207,000 – 74,000 = 133,000 / 6 = 22,000), likely giving CWGP and NC only three seats rather than the current four, though that calculation is obvious hypothetical and I have not performed it to the last decimal place to come up with a precise estimate.

How many more Shine campaigners might have been needed to gain those 2,500 votes?

But in terms of the evaluation of the success of these two parties, I take note that the nature of the proportional system in the version adopted by the Mongolian parliament coupled with the particular configuration and the large number of votes cast for parties/coalitions not represented (nearly 14.3% of votes) led to the relative strong showing for CWGP and NC in terms of seats.

Civil Will Green Party

When I look through my photo collection from this election, I did not take a single photo of CWGP during the campaign. That is not representative of their presence, of course, but rather of the lack of attention I paid to CWGP.

With the departure from politics by former CWGP leader S Oyun, the party had no longer played a visible role, at least not to me. Glancing at their platform, there seemed to be nothing that particularly stood out about their appeal.

Yet, in driving across Tov, Arkhangai and Khuvsgul ahead of the election, we did see sporadic CWGP flags and signage in most soums, suggesting that there is some ongoing organizational presence.

In the end, however, as with the surprisingly strong result of the DP, I would speculate that it is name recognition that drove CWGP’s success. Not name recognition of any particular candidates, but rather a familiarity with the party name from its previous stints in parliament. Contributing to this name recognition may have also been D Enkhbat’s nomination and strong showing in the 2021 presidential election. While he had been nominated by KhUN at the time, he may still be somewhat associated with CWGP from his time in the 2008-2012 MP for CWGP.

National Coalition

Given the prominence of N Nomtoibayar, the National Coalition’s success was perhaps less surprising, but four seats was a strong showing. Nomtoibayar has been visible, though also notorious, on the national political stage for some years, guaranteeing him some name recognition by voters. In an election that largely was constructed as us (opposition) vs. them (MPP), Nomtoibayar’s notoriety may have made him a plausible foil to MPP dominance. While the Coalition was also present across the countryside, given its recent formation, I struggle to find any other explanation for its success beyond Nomtoibayar’s notoriety. His wealth may have also supported the recruitment of some credible candidates as well as the availability of funding for campaign activities.

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, National Coalition, Party Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Mongolian Participation in the Paris 2024 Olympic Games

By Zorig Bat-Erdene

Mongolia completed its participation in the Paris 2024 Olympic Games from July 26 to August 11, 2024. A total of 32 athletes competed in 9 different sports:

 

Sport

Number of athletes
Men Women
Athletics 1 2
Archery 1
Boxing 2
Cycling 1
Judo 5 5
Shooting 2 1
Swimming 1 1
Weightlifting 1
Wrestling 3 6
 

Total

14 18
32

Mongolia has won 31 Olympic medals (2 Gold, 12 Silver, 17 Bronze) since first participating in the Olympic Games in Tokyo in 1964. Known for strong performances in individual sports such as boxing, judo, and wrestling, Mongolia has earned all 31 medals in these disciplines.

This year, Judoka Bavuudorj Baasankhuu won a silver medal on July 26, 2024, the very first day of the Olympic Games, making her the only medalist for Mongolia in Paris 2024. Mongolians were filled with hope and anticipation for more medals from this Olympic Games. However, despite strong potential, five athletes in these individual sports closely missed out on medals, falling short in the final rounds for the bronze.

This situation underscores the unwavering dedication of our athletes, both men and women, who are physically well-trained and capable of securing medals. However, it appears they lacked sufficient psychological support, as all five athletes unfortunately fell short in the bronze medal round. Adequate psychological support is crucial for athletes to balance their emotion and psychology, especially at the Olympic level.

Much-needed Nutritionists and Psychologists may have been replaced by “Dignitaries”

Judoka Baasankhuu, Mongolia’s only medalist at Paris 2024, revealed in an interview that psychologists did not accompany the Mongolian team for some reason, leaving athletes to rely on online psychological support when needed. During the interview, an male voice can be heard to prompt her not to further talk when she said, ‘We received online support when needed.’ This incident, which was not further explained, caused her to glance in that direction and promptly wrap up the interview. It remains uncertain how much pressure or threats she may have faced since her interview for simply revealing the truth.

Adding insult to injury, a psychologist who has supported wrestlers for the past seven years traveled to Paris 2024 at her own expense, covering her flight and hotel costs. Unfortunately, she was unable to support her athletes before the bronze medal round, as she was not granted the necessary mandate to enter either the training area or the arena. By the time she finally managed to access to the arena, it was too late.

Surprisingly, numerous well-known politicians, businessmen, and their spouses or partners were granted mandates that were not extended to essential officials like psychologists and nutritionists. This sparked significant debate on social media, with many questioning whether these individuals covered their own expenses. The public criticized the situation, speculating that the Olympic Committee of Mongolia may have funded their costs. Even if they were in Paris at their own expense, it remains questionable why they were granted mandates while a psychologist, who paid all her expenses herself, was denied access to the training area and was unable to support her athlete.

Minister of Olympism and Olympic Committee of Mongolia

Former Member of Parliament B. Bat-Erdene was appointed as Mongolia’s first-ever Minister of Olympism, overseeing a significant annual budget (MNT 144.5 billion only in 2024). His appointment was met with widespread criticism, with many questioning the usefulness of the position and expressing doubts about its potential to deliver better outcomes. These criticisms intensified following the disappointing results at Paris 2024, where Mongolia secured only one medal, marking the worst performance since 2004, despite the largest Olympic budget in the country’s history. The public’s dissatisfaction with the Minister’s performance was evident in various social media platforms and public discussions, with many calling for reevaluating the Minister’s role and responsibilities.

Upon his appointment, B. Bat-Erdene stated that his main objectives were to increase the number of athletes participating in the Olympic Games and to boost Mongolia’s medal count. However, the results at Paris 2024 showed no improvement compared to the most recent two Olympics: Rio 2016 saw 43 athletes earning 1 Silver and 1 Bronze, while Tokyo 2020 also had 43 athletes bringing home 1 Silver and 3 Bronze medals.

Also, the current president of the Mongolian Olympic Committee (the son of a former politician suspected of being one of the most corrupt politicians in the country) along with the general secretary (who is Mongolia’s first Olympic gold medalist) have faced strong criticism since the start of Paris 2024. Both were seen with their spouses or partners, all of whom held mandates that were not granted to the essential officials.

Following the disappointing results at Paris 2024, where these promises were not fulfilled, there is now a strong public outcry for the Minister of Olympism and the management of the Olympic Committee to resign. The entire nation demands that they step away from the Mongolian Olympic Committee, as their leadership failed to deliver the improvements they had promised.

Mongolian Olympic Outfits

One of the positive aspects of the Mongolian team’s participation in Paris 2024 was their outfits. Initially, the public was critical of the design, arguing that it failed to reflect the symbolism, tradition, and spirituality of Mongols, with some feeling it resembled attire from another nation. Although the ‘deel’ is a traditional Mongolian garment that holds significant cultural and historical value, many suggested it was time to move away from the outdated ‘deel’ design in favor of a more modern Olympic outfit. However, despite the initial social criticism, most of the population eventually embraced the design, showing strong support for it. Additionally, several international news agencies recognized the Mongolian Olympic outfit as one of the most beautiful at the Games.

 

About Zorigtkhuu (Zorig)

Bat-Erdene ZORIG is a mining procurement and supply chain professional working at Galore Creek Mining Corporation in BC, Canada. He holds a Master of Applied Science degree in Mining Engineering from the University of British Columbia, where his research focused on Mining Local Procurement (Local Content) in Mongolia. Before pursuing his academic career, Zorig worked for the Mongolian Mining Corporation in Mongolia. Zorig’s experience in the mining industry, combined with his academic research, has given him a unique perspective on mining local procurement and its impact on the industry. He continues to be passionate about finding sustainable solutions for the mining industry and improving the lives of local communities affected by mining operations.

Posted in Author, Corruption, Fashion, History, Olympics, Pop Culture, Public Opinion, Social Media, Society and Culture, Sports, Zorigtkhuu Bat-Erdene | Leave a comment

Guest Post: A free but not a Fair Election: It Was All About Money

By Bat-Orgil Altankhuyag, Batkhishig Gankhuyag

Mongolia recently conducted its tenth competitive election since 1990 in June 2024 (the first multi-party elections). In general, various electoral observation reports, including the one conducted by OSCE-ODIHR, suggest that the 2024 parliamentary election was free, but not fair, primarily due to issues surrounding electoral campaign financing. Over the past two decades, the electoral competition in Mongolia has transformed into a money-marathon (Enkhtsetseg and Bat-Orgil 2024). According to the State Audit Authority of Mongolia (2024), the total amount of money spent by political parties and independent candidates on electoral campaigns reached 66.6 billion MNT. The Mongolian State Audit Authority establishes spending limits for electoral campaigns by political parties and candidates before each election. In 2024, parties and coalitions were prohibited from spending more than 6.4 billion MNT, while individual candidates were restricted to spending between 895 million MNT and 1.5 billion MNT, depending on constituency size. While this practice aimed to regulate electoral financing to some extent, it has been widely criticized for allowing money to play a significant role in electoral competitions.

During my interviews with candidates for the 2020 election, many of them claimed that undisclosed expenses were three to four times higher than the reported financial figures. One candidate even alleged that only those who spent over 3 billion MNT actually emerged victorious in the 2020 election. Given the increased size of constituencies in the 2024 election, it is likely that campaign funding in reality tripled or quadrupled compared to 2020. For instance, there was a well-known case involving Kh.Nyambaatar, a leader of the MPP, following the 2020 election. An actor and influencer claimed to have received 100 million MNT from Kh.Nyambaatar for the purpose of supporting his election campaign. Subsequently, Kh.Nyambaatar clarified that the funds were provided by his relatives who reside abroad, without his knowledge, to support his campaign.

Consequently, the electoral competition became an uneven playing field, favoring the ruling party over other parties. The ruling parties have access to various state resources for funding their campaigns, with even large corporations contributing to their campaign finances. State-owned mining companies, such as Erdenet Mining Corporation and Tavan Tolgoi coal mining, have been significant sources of party financing (Enkhtsetseg and Bat-Orgil 2024). Smaller parties, on the other hand, had to find alternative means to finance their campaigns. For instance, the DP notably employed the use of “Denchin” (Pledge money) in previous elections, a practice that was prohibited in the 2024 election. The short duration of the campaign period (17 days) posed a major hurdle for smaller parties in terms of financing their electoral campaigns.

Private funding

According to the Law on Parliamentary Elections, individual donations should not exceed 10 million MNT, while corporate donations should not exceed 30 million MNT. Donations exceeding 1 million MNT by individuals and corporate donations exceeding 2 million MNT must be disclosed publicly.

Table 1: Electoral campaign finance for 2024, billion MNT

MPP DP KhUN Party National Coalition Civic-Will & Green Party
Revenue 3.6 1.5 1.88 3.4 0.33
Individual Donations 2.1 0.06 0.84 3.0
Corporate Donations 1.5 0.85 1.04 0.45
Own Contributions (Party) 0.65 0.33
Expenses 2.4 1.4 1.78 2.0 0.32
Mass Media 1.3 0.13 0.02 0.47 0.18
Social Media Ads 0.5 0.23 0.18 0.016
Unspent Funds 1.2 0.13 0.03 1.44 0.007

Source: Based on the State Audit Authority 2024

From the analysis of the financial statements, it is evident that CWGP solely relied on private donations totaling 337 million MNT, without any form of funding from corporations. On the other hand, DP received donations from two companies, namely Mongol Teever Negdel LLC and Newcom LLC, amounting to 30 million MNT, with the majority of their revenue coming from individuals (846 million MNT). It should be noted that each candidate on the DP party list contributed 10 million MNT as private donations. In contrast, the party list candidates of MPP did not make any financial contributions to the party. As previously mentioned, the ruling MPP party had access to various sources of funding, including state-owned mining companies, making external donations unnecessary for their party list.

MPP received a substantial amount of funding from corporations, amounting to 1.5 billion MNT, with the largest contributor being the MCS Group, which accounted for 1.1 billion MNT (75%) of the total corporate donations. Interestingly, MCS Group also provided significant financial support to the KHUN party, with a similar amount of funding (960 million MNT out of a total of 1 billion MNT). In terms of MPP, it is understandable considering that there were MPP candidates who had previous affiliations with the MCS Group, such as L.Enkh-Amgalan. However, the donations to the KHUN party from MCS Group raised suspicions about the close association between the KHUN party and the ruling MPP. In terms of the National Coalition, individual donations amounted to around 3 billion MNT, with half of this sum originating from the personal funds of the coalition leader, N.Nomtoibayar. Notably, this reveals a loophole in the law on parliamentary elections, as a party list candidate is allowed to donate up to 1.5 billion MNT to their party, compared to the cap of 10 million MNT for regular individual donations. Furthermore, the National Coalition received donations totaling 452 million MNT from 22 corporations.

This trend of wealthy individuals being successful in elections is not unique to the 2024 parliamentary election. Previous elections demonstrate that individuals with significant financial resources often achieve electoral success. Mendee and Radchenko (2017) argue that ” there are deep links between political and business interests. Business visibly entered Mongolian politics in 1996 (in the DP’s case) and 2000 (in the MPP, in its earlier reincarnation as the MPRP). In the 1996 Parliamentary campaign, the [Democratic Union] sought out entrepreneurs both to fund their campaign activities and to attract qualified cadres to fill party offices” (p. 1040). Morozova also contends that the success of the MPP can be attributed to its ability to attract top businessmen in Mongolia since 2000.

Allocation of state resources to electoral campaigns

The Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) has effectively utilized significant state resources, taking advantage of their incumbency and supermajority rule. In a rapid and comprehensive manner, the government has employed the national civil service to implement a large-scale program called “New Cooperatives (Shine Khorshoo),” just 60 days prior to the elections. The genesis of this program can be traced back to the devastating dzud that occurred before the 2024 election. The dzud, a cold-season disaster, resulted in the deaths of around 7.4 million livestock and caused an economic loss of 2.2 trillion MNT. This calamity affected 70% of herder households, jeopardizing their means of subsistence and pushing them closer to poverty. Consequently, the dzud has emerged as a significant catalyst for poverty in Mongolia, compelling nomadic herders to abandon the steppe and migrate to urban areas.

However, this disaster presents both opportunities and risks for the incumbents. With a supermajority in parliament, the Mongolian People’s Party swiftly enacted the Law on Mitigating the Adverse Impact of Climate Change on Traditional Livestock Husbandry as a response to the dzud. Subsequently, the government introduced a disaster relief plan known as the “New Cooperatives Movement,” which bears resemblance to the political movement called “Saemaul Undong” or “New Village Movement” that took place in South Korea during the 1970s. Under this program, a subsidized loan of 5 trillion MNT will be made available over the next five years. Herder households have the opportunity to obtain a guaranteed loan of up to 50 million MNT through commercial banks. Additionally, cooperatives participating in the program can acquire 5 hectares of land. In response to these actions, the Democratic Party, the opposition, has appealed to the Constitutional Court. “The law was adopted as ‘urgent’ without sufficient preliminary research and approved a substantial amount of funding for the implementation of a cash-based program leading up to the elections.” argued Kh.Nomingerel, a lawyer and candidate from the opposition party list. Winning the support of rural voters is crucial for the incumbents to secure victory in the elections due to the electoral system’s bias, favoring rural districts where the ruling party enjoys significant support compared to urban areas.

Furthermore, the government has increased the salaries of all civil servants by 10%, as well as raised the pay for general service workers by 20%. These adjustments encompass a total of 225,200 public sector employees, with additional benefits afforded to civil servants employed in local administrations. While civil servants in soums (administrative subdivisions) have received a 40% increase in their monthly salary, government employees stationed in provinces and in three isolated districts of the capital have been granted a 20% local allowance.

Conclusion

Since the ruling party has access to various resources, they have an incentive to increase the amount of money in an election, resulting in the election becoming a money marathon. Firstly, the design of the electoral system such as block voting system used in the 2020 election favored big spenders. The increased size of electoral districts in the 2024 election tripled the electoral cost, making it difficult for candidates without significant wealth to cover such large constituencies that spanned three provinces. Secondly, it is apparent that private financing has become the primary means of funding. Big corporations such as MCS and MAC (N.Nomtoibayar) have been the main contributors to political parties. These corporations often end up benefiting from winning various licenses and concessions after the election. This is why one of the main recommendations from the experts at International IDEA (2018) was to limit or prohibit corporate donations. Thirdly, the strategy employed by the ruling party to win the election involved restricting companies from donating to opposition parties. This was evident in the case of DP, which only managed to secure donations from two companies, each contributing 30 million MNT. Therefore, it can be argued that the 2024 election was a free but not fair one.

About the Authors

Altankhuyagyn Bat-Orgil is a political analyst and PhD Candidate at the University of Bonn.

Gankhuyagyn Batkhishig is an independent analyst formerly worked as a Research Assistant at the DeFacto Institute.

Posted in Bat-Orgil Altankhuyag, Batkhishig Gankhuyag, Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Elections, Governance, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, National Coalition, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Observing Election Day: Bulgan and Orkhon Aimags

By Julian Dierkes

During the five days leading up to the election we had driven through Tov, Arkhangai and Khuvsgul, visiting polling stations and campaign offices along the way. We have reflected on the election preparations we saw during these visits elsewhere.

For election day, our intrepid observation team split into city and countryside pairs, reflecting that we had a single car available and were looking for a mix of polling stations around Erdenet. Marissa and Benjamin have already offered their observations of voting in Erdenet.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

Buyantogtokh D and I focused on the countryside surrounding Erdenet, in Orkhon and Bulgan aimags, all part of constituency 4.

In the course of the day, we visited seven polling stations, reflecting some of the considerable distances between rural polling stations. We observed the opening of a polling station on the outskirts of Erdenet, then two polling stations in Bulgan’s rural Bugat soum, one in Bulgan city, another in Bulgan’s Orkhon soum, one back on the outskirts of Erdenet, and observed the closing, transmission of results and the beginning of the manual count in Jargalant soum of Orkhon province.

Opening

The opening at polling stations has been a rather formal, but also celebratory event at polling stations I’ve observed over the past six elections. Elements of this are that voters begin to line up some time before opening. Most of these early voters were elderly reflecting their schedules, but also some of the event-focus of voting. Such elderly voters are often wearing their sunday-finest clothes, usually a deel, more often than not adorned with medals that have been awarded to them.

The head of the polling station reminded staff of procedures and the importance of their role. Then the election commission and voters who were at the head of the line joined in singing the national anthem, all turning to the flag that is inevitably displayed somewhere near the ballot box. In the station we observed on the outskirts of Erdenet there was a crowd of around 15 people already lined up when we arrived around 6:40h. After the formalities had been concluded, voting proceeded immediately and without any delays.

Just over a month ago, I observed the parliamentary #election in #Mongolia.
Polling stations generally open with the signing of the national anthem making for a ceremonial and serious atmosphere as voting starts.
#MGLpoli

[image or embed]

— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) Jul 31, 2024 at 11:09 AM

Voting Process

The voting process in rural stations generally works the same as it does elsewhere and as my colleagues have described. My observations confirm what they found regarding the time it took voters to complete the different steps of registration, receipt of the ballot, marking of the ballot, submission of the ballot, marking of their finger with indelible ink.

I also recorded similar times that this process required for voters. Voters took from 3-10 minutes in the polling booth given the number of choices they had to mark.

Daytime Voting

Because the total number of eligible voters in rural polling stations is so much smaller, the only lines I observed anywhere formed right at opening. There had been some fear ahead of the election that the longer time that voting itself would take would lead to long wait times in polling station, but I did not observe such lines.

At two neighbouring polling stations in Bugat soum, electricity was lost mid-day. When the outage became apparent, the generators were started up quickly and plugs re-plugged to prevent the vote counting machine from shutting down. While these outages thus demanded a response by the election commission and lead to some noise, they did not disrupt voting for voters at all.

Spoiled Ballots

The most common challenge to voters that we observed was that they did not choose enough candidates on the district election ballot as a full vote was required for a vote to be valid. If a voter had selected fewer than the required choices, the ballot box would return the ballot with an error. Voters were then given another opportunity to add the number of votes required for a full slate. While we saw several voters in the course of the day who did return to the polling booth to complete their ballots, we only observed a single voter who failed to correct the voting on their second attempt and thus lost their opportunity to submit a ballot. We also did not observe instances of too many votes requiring a new vote.

When ballots were spoiled, for example by more than one selection of a party on the proportional representation vote, voters were able to receive a replacement ballot and the spoiled ballot was marked by having its corner cut off. We later saw these spoiled ballots also account for during the manual count.

Election Observers

As had been my experience in previous elections, party observers were present in all stations that we visited. In rural stations this inevitably means observers from the DP and the MPP with little presence of other party observers. We saw one observer from Ikh Nam, one from CWGP, and one from KhUN in the course of the day. We did not encounter domestic civil society observers or other international observers.

Polling Station Atmosphere

As I recalled from previous elections, the atmosphere in polling stations can vary quite a bit, largely due to the personalities of the election commission, I would guess. This is no comment on the integrity of the election at all, but a reflection on the dedication that many members of the election commissions bring to their task.

Some polling stations were not only friendly in the design of the spaces to be used by voters (often including carpets placed at the centre, sometimes even with flower pots/plants to frame the ballot box, the ubiquitous offer of candy), but also in the extent to which voters were actively welcomed into the polling stations and how I interacted with staff as an observer. We were very careful to immediately ask for and approach the head of the election commission to introduce ourselves and offer an opportunity for information from our observer IDs to be recorded. To some our presence seemed liked a welcome distraction in a long day of work. In those instances, it was easy to engage staff in conversations about particular aspects of preparation for and conduct of the election. Other polling stations were much more bureaucratic in their appearance and atmosphere. Inevitably, they were also the polling stations where our somewhat sudden appearance looked to lead to nervousness and some reluctance in discussing the proceedings. Often these reactions were mirrored by other members of the election commission and the party observers.

Some of these atmospherics also carried over into relations among the commission members and the party observers. During periods of slack when no voters were coming through the polling station, some stations were alive with chatter among locals who knew each other and to some extent at least enjoyed collaborating on the running of an election. Other polling stations were very quiet when there were no voters.

Neighbours, Party Observers and Small Communities

Obviously, the voting process is designed to afford voters as much privacy as possible in filling out the ballot and depositing it in the ballot box to ensure secret voting. There are pragmatic limits to the extent that secrecy can be preserved in small communities. This is obvious and in no way a criticism of the organization of Mongolian elections and the local or the national level, but struck me more during this observation than in previous elections.

In rural parts of Mongolia, polling stations will often have fewer than 800 or even 600 voters assigned to them. That is in part dictated by a desire to offer every eligible voter an opportunity to vote within some reasonable distance, so that polling stations have to be spaced in such a way to offer that proximity to voters.

The small number of voters in small communities implies that voters will know each other, election officials will know most voters, and local party activists will have a very good sense of who may be voting for their party. In such small communities, the competition really is one primarily between the MPP and the DP, though other and smaller parties as well as independents obviously also do receive some votes.

The fact that neighbours will see each other in the polling station does not imply anything about the secrecy of the voting in and of itself, it just means that there is a layer of social relations among voters, but also between voters, officials, and party observers, that may not be governed by election laws entirely.

In such smaller polling stations, party observers often keep tallies not only of the number of voters, but also of names of voters. At one such station, party observers just asked voters as they walked past the observers’ tables what their name was. Clearly, the voters are under no obligation to divulge their name to observers, but it would have flashed up on the screen at the registration station a little earlier in any case, and when the person asking is an elderly party official, almost all voters seem to comply, even though some do not seem to be too pleased with this interaction.

When we visited a soum party headquarter on election day, party activists there confirmed that they were keeping track of voters by name in order to be able to call on voters, whom they thought of as supporters, in the course of the day if they had not voted yet.

Voters, especially elderly voters, often turn to election officials whom they know for help. We already mentioned some of the aides and tools available to voters, but even with these in place, the process of inserting ballots into the ballot box or the marking of the ballots themselves remains confusing to some voters. It is not surprising at all that they ask for help from neighbours whom they know who happen to serve on the election committee. In many ways, we would want all voters to be able to turn to familiar faces for help if that makes them more likely to vote. Yet, some of these interactions also hold potential for abuse, without there being much that can be done about that. Party observers may be perceived to be intimidating or “checking on” voters. Officials may nudge voters toward particular votes if asked for support. While we did not witness anything that looked like undue interference, that potential certainly exists.

Closing

Due to fears around the length of the process, there was also some concern that voters might not be able to enter polling stations before closing at 22h if they were waiting outside at that time. This was neither the case at voting stations throughout the day, nor at closing. The polling station that we observed in Jargalant soum was clustered with two other polling stations and there were no lines and thus no voters excluded at closing time.

In the station that I observed, the election Stab stuck very closely to instruction manuals that they had received and prepared for. Steps included the closing of doors, then the closing of registration and all the steps required for the shut-down of the ballot box as well as electronic communication of results.

I was somewhat surprised that the party observers collected the “receipt” documenting the voting at this polling station but then left as soon as the manual count started. Surprised because the whole rationale for conducting a manual count to confirm the electronic counting across all polling station was to dispel notions that there might be manipulations leading to disparities between these counts. Yet, party observers that were presented for the closing of this polling station – including the only party observer from the Civil Will Green Party – were clearly not interested in the manual count, strongly suggesting that local party organizations at least did not doubt the electronic results.

Given the complexity of the two ballots and the multi-member voting, the manual count was a very laborious process, obviously. Here as well, the election commission was provided with and closely followed their manual. I had wondered ahead of time how counting might be conducted. For the party vote, this was obviously relatively straight-forward, i.e. ballots could be sorted into piles of votes for all the parties on the ballot, then grouped into packets of 25 for tallying.

For the direct member election this was more complicated, obviously. Here, the first sorting was for piles of ballots that had straight party slate votes. Again, these were bundled into packets of 25. All this sorting was done and checked separately by two people and recording in protocols along with a numbering of the ballots as they were sorted.

My own energy flagged by 2h in the morning, especially knowing that I had to drive back into the centre of Erdenet for the night and sharing in the general reluctance to drive at night in Mongolia.

Posted in Countryside, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Mutton and Mahogany: Mongolia’s 62-year Friendship with Laos Continues

By Benjamin Nuland

On June 11th 2024, Mongolia welcomed the Laotian president to Sukhbaatar Square for the first time since 2007. Thongloun Sisoulith’s arrival celebrated a 62-year long friendship between Laos and Mongolia and decades of goodwill. In the 1980s and in 2018, a total of 1,200 sheep and a 60-bed hospital were donated by Mongolia, and in 2003, Laos donated 76 beautiful red mahogany desks for Mongolia’s Great State Khural’s Government Palace, pledging 50 more in 2024 for Mongolia’s expanded parliament. In hopes to create 60 years of ‘better friendship,’ the two nations signed a series of 10 agreements over two presidential visits. Despite the benefits to trade, the greater success for Mongolia lies not in economic and cultural cooperation, but rather in forming a protective pact against China and fulfilling its strategic goal in amplifying its voice in Southeast Asian regional dialogues.

2022-2024: 60 Year Anniversary and A New Vision of Cooperation

The 60th anniversary of bilateral relations in 2022 served as a momentous occasion for both Laos and Mongolia, as intercultural exchange programs and celebrations were hosted by both nations. However, the happy occasion also marked a reckoning that beyond gestures of goodwill, the relationship had never evolved into a full-fledged partnership. Therefore, a commitment to enhancing the friendship for ‘60 better years’ became a motive for action.

In a new vision for cooperation, the Laotian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saleumxay Kommasith, met with Mongolia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Battsetseg Batmunkh, in September 2022 to begin drafting new agreements on air travel and environmental cooperation, also signing the Agreement on Student Exchange 2022-2027. While Mongolia committed to increase its aid to Laos’s agricultural industry, Laos committed to combat climate change and desertification in Mongolia through the ‘One Billion Trees’ Program, targeting the reforestation of 16.6 million hectares of the Mongolian plateau by 2025.

After pre meetings in September of 2023 finalized the legal framework for inter-parliamentary cooperation, President Khurelsukh paid a visit to Vientiane in November to sign seven cooperation agreements. Focusing on a dual mandate of agricultural cooperation and interpersonal exchange, Laos and Mongolia’s agreements aimed to align animal and plant quarantine measures, investment in plant protection and veterinary medicine, and seal aviation agreement for direct flights. Of greater note was joint proclamations by the presidents on tourism, establishing the ‘Year to Visit Mongolia 2023’ and ‘Visit Laos Year 2024.’

President Sisoulith’s June 2024 visit to Ulaanbaatar cemented the agreements and marked the beginning of a new era in Laos-Mongolian relations. Sharing a joint vision on environmental protection President Sisoulith committed to creating a dedicated area within Ulaanbaatar’s  “International Eco Park ”to support the “One Billion Trees” National Project. Following the new mandate to increase bilateral agricultural trade, an agreement was signed to formalize veterinary certification for meat exports and hygiene requirements for animal products. To serve the second mandate, two agreements were signed to encourage technical exchange within health and medical sectors, as well as cultural exchanges, research, and joint trainings.

Potential Concerns with the New Agreements

Despite the two countries’ efforts to strengthen economic ties, Mongolia has found it difficult to create business interests in Laos. Except for the Mongolian doctors who traveled to Laos in the 80s, Mongolians have little to no knowledge of Laos.  More critically, Mongolia’s key exports have limited market potential in Laos. Though both Mongolia and Laos have relatively free economies, neither country has established trade in the other. In 2021-2022 the volume of trade between the two nations totaled just $45,700, with Laotian exports to Mongolia accounting for almost all of that amount.

While Laos and Mongolia are trying to address this issue by creating the Mongolian-Laotian business roundtable, it seems unlikely that this agreement will materialize into anything valuable for either nation. Prior to 2018 Mutton and Mahogany underpinned a friendship built on goodwill, but trading Mutton for Mahogany will never develop into a vibrant economic relationship.

The question then arises: Why push for this agreement at all?

A Third Neighbor Strategy?

Laos and Mongolia share very similar concerns about their constraints. Geographically, Laos and Mongolia are both landlocked countries surrounded by regional powers — Mongolia is enveloped between China and Russia, and Laos is surrounded by China, Thailand, and Vietnam. Economically, both are heavily dependent on single industries – mining in Mongolia, agriculture in Laos.  Both countries are concerned about their indebtedness to China and the increasing risks that result.  China has funded 815 projects in Laos since 1989 worth $16 billion, and invested $5.4 billion in Mongolia since 1990. Mongolia still owes $2 billion from its Currency Swap Agreement with China, while Laos’ debt exposure from railway projects alone is $12.2 billion, 64.8% of its GDP.  Meanwhile both currencies are devaluing versus the dollar (LAK -45%, MNT -30%), further complicating debt repayment.

Because of their similar struggles against China’s economic influence, Mongolia and Laos would both benefit from an unspoken alliance to protect both nations from the harms China could inflict. Institutionalizing legal frameworks for cooperation creates a more convenient system for direct dialogue and bilateral measures in response to China. The elaborate network built on a history of trust and mutual support also serves as a potential lever for debt forgiveness; both countries together can have a louder voice in appealing to the international community for debt forgiveness, term extension, or reduction in interest rates from China.

Because Laos is in a larger debt crisis, it may seem that this pact is more beneficial to Laos. In fact, Mongolia’s benefits far outweigh those afforded to Laos. By assuring a cooperative relationship with Laos over the past two years, Mongolia has been able to secure an opportunity to amplify their voice in ASEAN.  During its 2024 tenure as ASEAN president, Laos invited Mongolia to host a regional forum, the ‘Steppe Lotus Workshop,’ on countering biological warfare. While this could enhance Mongolia’s reputation as an advocate for peace, it also elevates Mongolia’s position as an arbiter of its neighbors’ interests in the face of China’s rise.  Over time that position could evolve into an intermediary role as conflict arises between regional powers.

Conclusion

‘Mutton and Mahogany’ is not about trade, but it does reflect Mongolia’s policy playbook — creating a framework for mutual protection based on history, goodwill and common concerns about dominant neighbors. Through partnership with Laos, Mongolia can expand its friendly networking to Southeast Asian nations.

The playbook directly addresses Mongolia‘s greatest fear: of being ‘forgotten’ by powers who could defend and protect them in case Russia and/or China violates their sovereignty.  The more Mongolia engages with its neighbors as it has with Laos, the better it  can attain an ‘insurance policy’ of international awareness and support. Therefore, ‘Mutton and Mahogany’ is not for economic benefit but for Mongolia’s security, through means of friendship, kinship, and goodwill.

By aspiring to take on an intermediary role in regional and international dialogue, Mongolia hopes to make itself uniquely valuable to the international community. With its non-adversarial positioning and commitment to universal neutrality, Mongolia believes it has the potential to become the global ‘golden retriever’ (i.e., trusted companion). Using its non-threatening economic and military stature to its benefit, Mongolia can create a comfortable space for discussion, free of concerns over leverage, unlike other intermediaries like the UAE, Qatar or China. Mongolia’s evolution as a ‘trusted’ moderator for international discussion would create vested interest in all nations to assure Mongolia’s sovereignty. Therefore, a step towards friendship is a step towards security. So while obtaining Laos’ support may seem like low-hanging fruit, Mongolia’s ‘Mutton and Mahogany’ project could serve as a stepping stone to a grander mission: To protect Mongolia against the risks of domination by their stronger neighbors.

About Benjamin Nuland

Benjamin Nuland is a Jack Hachigian Scholar at Yale University currently studying history and international relations. Recently completing the Directed Studies Program, he’s received the Topol Silliman Grant and the Summer Experience Award to study in Mongolia the summer under the guidance of Professor Arne Westad and Professor Julian Dierkes.

Posted in ASEAN, Benjamin Nuland, Diversification, Foreign Investment, Foreign Policy, Laos, Mongolia and ..., Policy | Leave a comment

Observing Election Day: Erdenet City

By Benjamin Nuland and Marissa J. Smith

In the week leading up to election day on June 28, Julian and Benjamin observed 10 polling stations in constituency 4 (Khuvsgul, Bulgan, and Orkhon aimags), traveling from Murun to Bulgan to interview the election staff on their confidence toward the smoothness of the electoral process (our findings can be found on the preparations post here).

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Marissa Smith (@marissas23)

On June 28th election day, Benjamin and Marissa stationed themselves in Erdenet City, Orkhon aimag, a major voting center for both constituency and nationwide elections. Throughout election day, we observed eight polling stations which administered voting for a total of around 8000 voters, also interviewing local voters and election staff in Mongolian and English. Almost all of the the polling stations in Erdenet were at local schools, including ones attended by former Mongolian President Ts. Elbegdorj and the current president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Here was how the election went down on election day:

Opening:

When we arrived at 7 AM, the election staff were already fully set up to begin the election process. Party observers from the MPP, DP, KhUN, and National Coalition also arrived early to take their seats in the first polling station we were at. Around 3 to 4 voters were lined up to cast their ballot, mostly elderly voters, party officials, or those super motivated to vote. There was also a local journalist at this polling station, though unfortunately he had left when we moved outside to go to our next stop and we were unable to learn more about his planned activities for the day. Here we also observed a local VIP (poll workers exclaiming about a “darga”) cast his vote between 7 and 8 AM (he announced loudly to the entire room that he didn’t know which side to have facing up when submitting the ballot to the machine; more on this issue below).

Voting Process:

At the beginning of voting at 7 AM, heads of polling stations conducted a 10-minute demonstration for both voters in line and party observers on the polling station processes, from voter registration to ballot submission.

Here was the demonstrated procedure: voters would arrive at the polling station with their IDs, and a finger scanning machine then validated the identity of a person and confirmed that they were at the right registered polling station. (A loud error sound would be heard if any voters were checking into the wrong station. We heard this a few times at larger school complexes that had three different polling stations at the same site, more on this below.) Voters would go to one of three or four desks depending on their registration number to exchange a receipt from the fingerprint-scanning station for a packet of two ballots (one for the constituency vote , the other for the party vote). After waiting in line, a voter would use a voting station to fill in the ballot. If a voter was struggling to fill it in, they could use the provided accessibility aids to help them (provided devices varied between polling stations). When done, voters would put their ballot in a prepared folder and line up at the voting machine to cast their vote. To insert the ballot, the voter would put the constituency vote in first, then the party vote in second, both facing down (a point of confusion in the voting flow, as we note below). When a light on the machine turned green, the voter moved on to the finger marking station, confirming one had voted. Julian provided a photo example in our post about election preparations.

We’ve inserted a map of an example polling station below:

The time it took voters to go through the whole process was relatively short, ranging from 5-10 minutes, out of which only 1-3 minutes was typically dedicated to filling out the ballot itself. Lines mainly formed at registration or between obtaining the ballots and sitting at one of the voting stations. The lines leading up to the ballot machines often moved pretty quickly because the machines were relatively efficient, accepting ballots in 40 seconds or less. However, at approximately 1:30 in the afternoon, when lines were long, we observed one voter wait almost 10 minutes between getting their ballot and sitting down in a voting station to mark their ballot.

One of the concerns we began to notice was the orientation of the voting machines; since the machines often faced the voters, we thought that a voter’s choices could potentially be seen by those in line to the voting stations.

Midday Mechanics 1: Long Lines

The lines really began to form at about 9 AM, as middle aged voters, some with young children, began showing up to form lines of 10 people. We noticed that after the voters collected their ballots, many were rigorously scanning the candidate names on the constituency vote, suggesting that perhaps many voters did not come in having made their decisions. When we spoke to her outside the polling station exit after she had voted, a young voter mentioned how she had three specific candidates they wanted to vote for, but picked the five others randomly based on her favorite party. She and other voters also talked about how they had done research on most of their candidates, making judgements based on candidate education, qualifications, and party affiliation. A young voter even showed us Songolt, an app that showed mock ballots of all the candidates and parties from all constituencies, making lists of all candidates more accessible to voters. But nevertheless, a large number of 87 candidates campaigning in total meant that it was hard for voters to have extensive knowledge of them beyond their qualifications and party affiliations. In the middle of the day when lines were long in Erdenet and voters were being admitted into the room one by one, a polling station head expressed to us that the size of the mandate was a concern in terms of keeping voters moving through the polling station, with voters having to take the time to select eight candidates.

Longer lines were observed during the middle of the day, late afternoon, and early evening. The lines reached a maximum capacity of 30-40 people at around 12:30 pm, prolonging voting processes from ten minutes to an hour. Yet despite this, the long lines did not seem to bother voters much, as all voters we observed stayed in line to cast their ballots. We began to notice that there was a presence of police and in a few cases soldiers on site, with every polling station employing about one to three police or military officers. These had various approaches and degrees of involvement in the electoral process; some were more laissez faire in only being a backup in case of an immediate security issue, others played a more active role in voter crowd control, letting in one voter into the polling station at a time to prevent overcrowding. One of the latter also checked our observer badges himself when we entered. A great concern that we had and observed among others was that there were at times 2-3 polling stations at the same school complex, making it challenging to locate the correct path to a particular polling station, meaning that at times people waited 30-40 minutes in line just for the finger scanning machine to tell them they were not in the right polling station and they would have to go to another line and start the process again (i.e. they were at the right school but not at the right part of the school). Even though this would create some frustration with voters, it evidently wasn’t channeled into a reason not to vote. We did not observe a single voter leave a line. By the end of the day, we noticed that poll workers had put up signage to help direct voters to the correct polling stations, and earlier in the day, voters were helping one another (and us!) to find particular polling stations.

Midday Mechanics 2: Party Observers

Overall, party observers were obviously very dedicated to their duties, and were generally open and welcoming to foreign observers. While some parties had alternating observers based on shifts, other party observers stayed for the whole day (7am to 4am). In Erdenet, observers represented a range of parties; in addition to MPP, DP, and KhUN, the National Coalition and Shine also had observers at poll stations. At one station in Erdenet, it was noted that the MPP had four observers; for the most part however there was only one observer per party.

Throughout election day, we noticed that party observers were taking timestamps of voter data, specifically the percentage of those registered who voted. That data was most likely collected to watch out for suspicious voting patterns, as a concern was that many voters, called or pressured by party members, would turn up in the masses at the last minute to vote. In some stations, party observers took on a more proactive role to gather data, taking photos of both voter identification and voter data on GEC-provided monitors. While this seemed like a standard practice, keeping record of voter information could suggest that some party observers had an expectation that certain people would show up to vote for their party, and if not, they could directly make a call requesting people to vote.

While Julian noted that the countryside in Bulgan and Orkhon aimags had party observers from the DP and MPP, there was more party observer representation in Erdenet, including KhUN and National coalition. But beyond noticing the diversity of party observers in Erdenet, we also noticed some people claiming to be “independent” observers, not seeming to be members of the press. One of the “independent” observers we saw was rather close with the observer for the MPP, taking selfies with the MPP representative and engaging in heavy conversation. While we could speculate about the impact of nonpartisan independent observers, it would be the case that with “extra” observers, parties would have more extensive data on voters who casted their ballot, and would have more resources to make phone calls to voters who had yet to come to the polling stations, pushing more people to potentially vote for their party.

Midday Mechanics 3: Election Management

All of those in charge of the polling stations were extremely professional throughout election day, but they had various reactions to our presence. Some heads actively approached us to give a general presentation about their polling station, update us on the proportion of registered voters that had cast their vote, and answer a few specific questions we had, while others seemed drained with the long day and left us on our own. Despite incoming thunderstorms in the midday and early afternoon, election management did not seem too concerned with voter turnout. One head of a polling station in Erdenet told us when asked about clouds and thunder that had just rolled in that voters would be “safe inside polling stations [from the thunder and lightning].” When we asked them about projected traffic at the polling stations after important shift-change times during the day (the Erdenet mine and mineral processing complex operates twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, including on election day), heads of polling stations said little; one indicated that it might be an issue (“magadgui”).

Despite the smoothness of the election process overall, election management for some polling stations were not observed to enforce the GEC’s “no-phone policy.” Phone baskets were observed at some voting stations and “no-phone” posters were posted around election rooms, but voters did not put their phones in the basket nor always put their phones away when in line. The policy was intended to prevent bribed voters from giving proof of their vote to a briber, but it is hard to say whether that was the case in the polling stations we saw.

A significant speed bump in the voting process observed throughout the day in Erdenet was that voters were unsure which side of their ballot should face up when being fed into the voting machine. We observed that poll workers were alert to this issue, however, and poll workers were quick to instruct voters who were getting stuck. At at least one polling station a worker was even observed to be focusing complete attention on watching this step and coming to the immediate aid of any voter getting tripped up.

Closing

Closing at 10 PM was fairly smooth, taking around an hour and a half to shut down machines and properly put away voter registration paperwork. The staff allowed party observers to collect election data in three ways: 1. by allowing observers to take photos of the flatscreen monitor showcasing all voter demographic data before shutting the screen off, 2. by distributing to party observers a voter data receipt printed from the registration station, and finally 3. by collecting party observers’’’ small USB flash drives and uploading voter demographic data into them. At the close of polling observed in Erdenet, the number of party observers was greater than the number observed earlier in the day, and by the time of the manual count, only one had left.

To stop the ballot machine from accepting more ballots, the staff took out the machine from the white box holding the physical ballots, ripped off the plastic seals in the front of the machine, and then proceeded to print multiple copies of receipts that contained preliminary election results. The receipts included the tally of votes each candidate won as well as the number of votes accumulated per party. One receipt was given per represented organization (party observer, independent observer, or foreign observer entity), and election staff required all observers to give a signature to confirm receipt of these election results. Election staff took photos of our signatures and sent them to the aimag election commissions. Upon receiving election results, party observers immediately contacted aimag election commissions, notifying them of the results.

Manual Vote Count

Before the manual count began, the head of the polling stations conducted another demonstration in front of the election observers on how the manual count would work. Two locations in the room were designated for four tables each, one for the constituency vote, and the other for the party vote; all the ballots within the “white box” were poured onto the table and divided by ballot type. For the table holding the party votes, piles were sorted by party selected. Two election staff, both women, hand-counted every ballot in each pile three times, before using a pen to label every ballot with a number to confirm their count. The constituency votes on the other hand were separated into three piles: the “party line” vote (those voted for all the candidates within a party), the “clumps” vote (those voted for groups of candidates from selected parties), and the “all over the place” vote (those who voted for candidates across various parties). Three women were situated at the table, the ballot sorter, the reader of ballot results, and the recorder. The recorder was given a grid with all the candidates, and, by listening to the reader recite the votes, tallied them up one by one.

Conclusions

Overall, the election process went very smoothly. Voters didn’t share concerns over long lines or bad weather, party observers showed up and were dedicated to their duties, and the election staff was professional and perseverant. All these concerns were relaxed because of a strong democratic framework put in place, with extensive protocols and an experienced staff guiding the electoral process. But nevertheless there were still a few concerns that arose: 1. Difficult voter choice with large mandates, 2. confusion over correct polling station locations within polling station complexes, 3. unenforced “no phone policy,”” and 4. the presence of “independent” party observers.

Posted in Benjamin Nuland, Elections, Erdenet, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged | Leave a comment

New to Ulaanbaatar June-July 2024

By Julian Dierkes

I’ve been keeping lists of things that are arriving to/disappearing from central Ulaanbaatar: August 2023 | May 2023 | November 2022 | August 2022 | December 2019 | June 2019 | April 2019 | December 2018 | August 2018 | October 2017 | June 2017 | May 2016 | December 2015 | May 2015 | November 2014 | May 2014 | October 2013 | June 2013 | October 2011 | August 2011. More informal versions of these observations also appear in the /ulaanbaatar/change/ category. I’ve also collected observations about change in the countryside.

Bulgan added her observations in Spring 2022.

I’ve copied previous lists here and am adding to them. New items since previous posts appear in italics. Since this list has been growing, I’m also beginning to delete some items that I’ve had on the list for some time. Strikethrough means that these items will be off the next list.

This list was cruelly interrupted by something that was new to the world in 2020, a global pandemic and thus restrictions on travel. After not being able to visit for 32 months, I finally made it back in August 2022.

What has arrived?

  • drive-home service for drivers who have been drinking. You call the service, they drop off a driver who drives you home in your car and is then picked up again. Given – fortunately – much stricter enforcement of drunk driving laws, a great service!
  • fixies
  • airport road is getting ever fancier, now there’s a giant overpass just before crossing the Tuul on the way into town. Lots of fancy on/off-ramps popping up everywhere on roads.
  • fully electric cars, charging stations, green license plates for electric cars, Tesla
  • street art (several years now, but I hadn’t noted this before) and newly commissioned public art Seeing more tags though. On buildings and in pedestrian tunnels. One particularly common one in one part of town: ‘to be or not to be’. Deep!
  • Prius-based delivery services around downtown for online orders, food, etc. Just like informal taxis, lots of Priuses (?) roaming central Ulaanbaatar to pick up/deliver orders, fleet of Prius clustered around restaurants in the evening to take diners (and drinkers?) home
  • several new parks: North of Winter Palace, Southeast corner of Sukhbaatar Sq, also astroturf on Sukhbaatar Square (summer 2022) seemingly quite popular as picnic spot, park in Yarmag. The park behind Government House is open to the public again.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • As a specific park: the redesign of the Children’s Park seems to represent commitment to preservation of that open space and greater incorporation into urban centre. The new park opened on July 4.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • Not just parks but also nearby urban recreation, such as municipal nature reserves and hiking.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • When I first started visiting Ulaanbaatar in mid-2000s, streets were tree/shrub-lined. Trees disappeared, perhaps for lack of watering, but are definitely back now in the urban centre
  • Oat milk and lactose-free milk. Of course, good health reasons for both, but still a little odd in the land of meat and dairy.
  • Eye makeup with small glittering tears in the corner of an eye. Note that I am not much of a fashion correspondent, but I remember seeing this first in Japan in the early 1990s when it was called ピカピカ, I think. Cat eyes have also arrived.
  • Coffee choices. Not just Korean chains, but more local choices appearing.
  • Taste for spicy foods. Surely this has arrived via Korean food, but quite the contrast to years ago when spices seemed entirely absent.
  • Movember
  • Solar panels on commercial buildings, also on balconies, in downtown core
  • The development of Mongolian brand consumer products, especially food products has been happening for years and I can’t pinpoint the moment they started appearing on grocery shelves in big numbers. While I still find New Zealand butter in Mongolia strange, most of the dairy shelf is now made in Mongolia, for example.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • So many renovated sidewalks with paving stones, benches, and planters.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • Yoshinoya – 吉野家. How obvious are beef bowls for the Mongolian market, but their appearance is sudden to me.
  • Shisha bars. I had seen these before, but neglected to note that down.
  • Convenience stores have become a very common sight in downtown Ulaanbaatar but also beyond. Currently, this is a duopoly of CU and GS25. Note that small grocery stores have disappeared from town with the rise of these convenience stores.
  • байхгүй (“we don’t have that”) has become a frequent response of waiters in restaurants referring to items listed on the menu, but not actually offered.
  • Some new buildings appear to be considering the public space that they’re providing, for example through setbacks from the street and parks in those setbacks. One example would be large office building/mall on the way into town from Zaisan on the right before Peace Bridge with its broad sidewalk, plantings.
  • In addition to the Northwest of town and the area around the power plants which have been somewhat industrial, Yarmag seems to be turning into an industrial zone in parts as well, with the surroundings of the old airport seeing some warehouse developments.
  • In terms of city planning, many of the very large developments in Yarmag and elsewhere seem to be stand-along neighbourhoods, rather than forming a part of a larger district. Note that they all seem to have a large supermarket as an anchor.
  • Visible Korean influences continuing to grow.
  • Imagery of Mongolian People’s Republic appearing as pop cultural reference point. Not sure whether that signals nostalgia for state-socialist days (Ostalgie).
  • Blue license plates for government cars. [More on license plates]
  • Men carrying umbrellas as protection from the sun.
  • Big bus procurement scandal in 2023-24, but some very modern buses around town and major busstop construction projects.

City busses (despite corruption scandals) and busstops looking quite nice in #Ulaanbaatar.

[image or embed]

— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) Jun 17, 2024 at 9:08 AM

  • Google Maps now offers transit connections as well as traffic updates. The former easier for me to use than local alternatives, as I’m familiar with Google Maps interface. Makes public transit that much more usable for visitors even before the Metro is “completed”.
  • There seem to be many more people using electric rental scooters in town. With them, the ringing of bells to warn pedestrians has arrived on bike paths.

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

  • for-pay scales (actually, they seem to be hanging on)
  • supposedly haunted house South of Choijin Lama Temple
  • Victims of Political Persecution Memorial Museum. Promised floor dedicated to museum in newly-constructed large building on site does not appear to exist!
  • private fences encroaching on public land/sidewalks
  • It seems like (Korean) convenience store chains are replacing the small grocery stores that were ubiquitous in the downtown core. Not gone yet, but waning.
  • Urban heritage core. One building at a time, heritage buildings in the centre of town are being torn down, largely replaced by generic glass-and-steel towers.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

What will appear in the future

  • navigation systems. Google now offers in-town traffic updates. Countryside systems still limited.
  • mental maps shifting to street names/addresses instead of landmarks
  • subway (really, I wish they had selected light rail instead, but who knows whether either will come)
  • urban renewal and historical restorations embracing district north of government house (National University of Mongolia, German embassy, etc.), but perhaps it will be too late for that

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • parking (meters), electric charging in parking spots/lots
  • Combined Heat and Power Plant #5 (yeah, right!)
  • hipsters discovering УАЗ (minivan and jeep), but also Porters, perhaps as platform for mobile raves?
  • giant hole blown into Bogd Khaan mountain to “drain” polluted air out of the valley (that actually is a proposal, but it will not appear! There also seems to be a proposal to blast away mountains on either end of the valley to let bad air escape!)
  • some kind of traffic routing system with overhead displays
  • Mongolia-themed coffee travel mugs
  • Mongolia-themed bicycle stands, for example roof structure of a ger as a steel structure
  • vending machines
  • Chinese cars
  • Misters at outdoor restaurants. Very attractive feature in cities like Almaty and Bishkek when it gets hot.
  • In the very long term, current young people (starting from 2000s birth cohorts) will think of themselves as the Prius generation, analogous to German Generation Golf.

What will disappear in the medium-term future

I’m going out on a predictive limb here… 2-3 years is what I mean by “near future”.

Actually, since I have been predicting this as “near future” change for some years now, I guess I was wrong with all these predictions, and have changed the listing to medium-term future.

  • stretched-out hand to signal for a car ride
  • that awkward extra half-step on most stairs
  • whitening make-up.

What will disappear in the long-term future

I mean beyond 7 years or so. None of these seems to be coming true quite yet, so I’ve changed the name of this category from medium-term to long-term.

  • new (to Mongolia) cars that are right-hand drive
  • the neo-classical Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, with its Stalinist (if that’s an architectural style) spire [Tough call to make as the MFA building is now dwarfed by its own annex]

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • deels in the city [actually, they seem to be making a bit of a fashion comeback among young people]
  • some of the downtown university campuses
  • buildings of 4 floors or less in the urban core
  • Russian minivans (УАЗ452)
  • the Winter Palace. It won’t disappear entirely, but it is more-and-more surrounded by a very urban and very tall landscape making it look somewhat forlorn, a fate it shares with many other buildings
  • heritage buildings
  • street vendors with their little cardboard boxes of tissues, lighters, soda, perhaps rounded out by pine nuts or other offerings
  • that colour in staircases and hallways of apartment and public buildings.
Posted in Change, Curios, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | Leave a comment

Double Deel Direct

By Julian Dierkes

As Bulgan B recently pointed out to me, every member of PM Oyun-Erdene’s new cabinet is an MP!

Maybe not surprising for many parliamentary democracies, but this has been a lingering topic of discussion for many years. Ministers who are also Members of Parliament are generally referred to as wearing a “double deel“, wearing two hats perhaps being the right English analogy.

On our blog, a search for “double deel” will point you at 18 posts many of which refer to proposed or envisioned constitutional amendments. This has been that big an issue for Mongolian political discussions.

Note that the first mention of “double deel” that the search generates is a 2014 post speculating about Ch Saikhanbileg’s cabinet, a very grand coalition. Other parallels from that post:

The rationale behind the super coalition (as opposed to a grand coalition of DP + MPP which would have a clear majority in parliament already) seems to lie in the recognition of the current economic crisis and the need for parliament to take responsibility for this crisis and to take collective action. It’s not clear to me in this logic why the DP and its coalition partners don’t bear primary responsibility for the crisis, but at the same time, I certainly welcome a super coalition as a constellation that seems more likely to tackle real issues by avoiding blaming each other. I can’t imagine that blaming the three-member opposition of independent MPs will fly as an electoral strategy in June 2016.

Also, note

Some of the prominent politicians who seem to be absent from speculation about cabinet posts: “Genco” Battulga, R Amarjargal, “Fortuna” Batbayar, L Bold, Kh Temuujin.

Two of those individuals, Kh Battulga and Kh Temuujin are back in parliament 10 years later, but not included in the cabinet.

People who ended up being appointed to Saikhanbileg’s grand coalition cabinet back in 2014 include: U Khurelsukh (then Deputy PM, now president) and L Gantumuur (then Minister of Education, Culture and Science, now DP chief and Deputy PM).

One of the elements of discussions of the double deel has been the size of parliament, or more importantly the relative size of cabinet vs parliament if there are many members of cabinet wearing the double deel. This is something that Julian Dierkes commented on in a 2015 post already. Given that that has been a long-standing topic in Mongolian discussions, one might say that fears about this relation in size have been alleviated by the enlargement of parliament. 22 ministers are only 1/5 of the membership of the new Ikh Khural when there are 126 members, not the nearly 30% that would have implied in a 76-member parliament.

Reflection of Power Balance

Direct Election vs Party List MPs

In the run-up to the election, we had already considered implications of the expansion of parliament for the status and power of individual MPs. To some political actors, it seems that a directly-elected seat counts for more than being elected off the party list. The cabinet appointment would seem to reinforce that view in that all MPP members of the cabinet were directly elected. For the DP and KhUN this may be less relevant, in part because party list-elected MPs make up a bigger portion of their MPs. Also, in the case of the opposition parties, some parts of the party leadership chose to run via the party list rather than in a constituency. For example, L Gantumuur for the DP and T Dorjkhand for KhUN were both named to the top spot on the party list for their respective parties as party leaders. Within the opposition, there might thus be less of a perception of a power differential between these two types of MPs.

Party Power within the DP

Following the surge of DP seats in the election and the apparent success of some candidates aligned with frm pres Kh Battulga, it was unclear who might even be conducting coalition discussions to speak for the DP. It may be noteworthy that neither Battulga, nor frm PM N Altankhuyag were included in cabinet. It is obviously impossible to know from the outside of these discussions whether the DP had proposed either and had been refused by the PM, or whether their names were not floated. This does seem to suggest that a renewed takeover of the party by Battulga and his associates may not have happened.

Posted in Governance, Government, Ikh Khural 2024, JD Democratization, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

PM Oyun-Erdene’s Multi-Party Cabinet

By Marissa J. Smith

After each winning shares of seats in the election, the MPP, DP, and KhUN signed a cooperation agreement to form a “grand coalition.” (The Civil Will Green Party and National Coalition also won four seats each).

The following Cabinet configuration including MPs from each party (every minister is also an MP) has just been finalized.

Heads of Parliamentary standing committees have also been announced, and include both MPP and DP members.

Key takeaways:

  • There are now three deputy PMs (shadar said), one each being held by DP (L. Gantumur) and KhUN (T. Dorjkhand). Both of these are designated for Economy and Development (DP), and Trade and Investment (KhUN)
  • A few major seats are now held by DP members. I would particularly highlight Justice and Internal Affairs and Mining Industry. This is interesting given that a major focus of former Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs Nyambaatar had been the resolution of the 2022 Coal Theft scandal. The DP is now also in charge of Housing and Urban Construction and the Twenty Minute City initiative, major areas of concern for residents of Ulaanbaatar, where the DP in fact did not perform well in the election. In contrast, besides the Deputy PM spot, a KhUN member holds only one other seat (Education, P. Naranbayar).
  • While Battsetseg and Nomin retain their seats, only one other woman has been included in the cabinet, S. Odontuya for Environment and Climate Change.

(new members in bold, reshuffled and returning members underlined)

Prime Minister – L. Oyun-Erdene
Cabinet Secretary – N. Uchral (Formerly D. Amarbayasgalan)

First Deputy Prime Minister and Economy and Development – L. Gantumur [DP] (Ch. Khurelbaatar was formerly minister of Economy and Development)
Deputy PMS. Amarsaikhan (formerly Ch. Khurelbaatar, who was not reelected, previously Deputy PM in 2022)
Deputy PM for Trade and Investment – T. Dorjkhand [KhUN]

Finance – B. Javkhlan
Defense – S. Byambatsogt (formerly G. Saikhanbayar, previously Minister of Roads and Transport)
Justice and Internal Affairs – O. Altangerel [DP] (formerly Kh. Nyambaatar)
Education – P. Naranbayar [KhUN] (formerly L. Enkh-Amgalan)
Roads and Transport – B. Delgersaikhan (formerly S. Byambatsogt, now Minister of Defense)
Tourism, Culture and Sport – Ch. Nomin (previously Ministry of Tourism and Environment was separate from Culture, and lead by B. Bat-Erdene)
Environment and Climate Change – S. Odontuya [DP]
Foreign Relations – B. Battsetseg
Mining Industry – Ts. Tuvaan [DP] (formerly J. Ganbaatar)
Family and Social Protection – L. Enkh-Amgalan (formerly Labor and Social Protection led by T Ayursaikhan, previously Minister of Education)
Urban Development and Housing – J. Batsuuri [DP] (formerly Construction and Housing, led by Ts. Davaasuren)
Health – T. Munkhsaikhan (formerly S. Chinzorig; Munkhsaikhan was previously Minister of Health in Khurelsukh’s Cabinet)
Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry – J. Enkhbayar (formerly Kh. Bolorchuluun)
Energy – B. Choijilsuren
Digital Development and Communications –  Ts. Baatarkhuu [DP] (formerly N. Uchral, now head of Government Secretariat)
Twenty-Minute City – R. Erdeneburen [DP] (formerly there was a Minister of Traffic Congestion, J. Sukhbaatar)
National Monitoring and Evaluation Commitee – E. Odbayar [DP]

Previous Oyun-Erdene Cabinet Posts on Mongolia Focus:

Oyun-Erdene Cabinet, Version 01/2023
Oyun-Erdene Cabinet, Post-Constitutional Change
Oyun-Erdene Cabinet

Posted in Elections, Government, Ikh Khural 2024, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment