Mongolia Focus | Strategic Analysis: Contemporary Mongolian Politics, Resources, Society

DP Results

Posted on July 8, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

To me, the success of the DP was one of the surprises of the June 28 election.

Below, I want to speculate about what might explain some of this success. I would note that in the absence of polling, especially exit polling, this remains speculation for now. Some obvious questions about this result, for example the concentration of non-MPP votes in Ulaanbaatar, perhaps, will remain unanswered unless the Central Election Commission releases further and more detailed results at some point. These results could be available to the parties themselves, as their party observers will have received scans of all ballots on a polling-station-by-polling station basis, but even that won’t link choices for the direct election in constituencies to choices made on the party vote. So, subsequent speculation must be rooted in conversations I’ve had in the countryside and Ulaanbaatar during election observation as well as afterwards.

The DP

The success? Exactly a third of seats in the new parliament! Of these, 26 were won in majoritarian district elections and 16 were won via the nearly 440,000 votes the DP received in the party election. In the constituencies, the DP did particularly well in constituency 1 (Arkhangai, Ovorkhangai, Bayankhongor) winning 7 of 9 available seats. Among these is S Ganbaatar returning to parliament, this time for the DP. Another DP stronghold is constituency 7 (Govi-Sumber, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Umnugovi) where the party won 5 of 7 seats. While the party capitalized on significant support in the city in the past, it only picked up 4 of 24 seats in the six Ulaanbaatar constituencies.

Of the people we had identified in our “notable candidates” listing prior to the election, the following won majoritarian seats:

N Altankhuyag (constituency 11)
Kh Battulga (4)
S Ganbaatar (1)
Ch Lodoisambuu (12)
L Munkhbayasgalan (7)

The most prominent candidate who was not elected from a district is perhaps frm party leader S Erdene (constituency 9).

Out of our notable candidates, the following were elected via the party list:

L Gantumur
E Odbayar
Kh Temuujin

Two women were elected directly: Munkhbayasgalan and Kh Bolormaa (40), while the 16 party list seats obviously lead to eight women so that ten of the 42 DP MPs are women a slightly lower percentage than parliament overall.

Run-Up to the Election

The DP has struggled with in-fighting for many years now. While it had been rife with factionalism even before the 2016 election, the resounding MPP victory in that election and the no-quite-widely-supported-nomination of Kh Battulga as a presidential candidate in 2017 only increased internal division that the party has been battling since then. Substantively adrift under the leadership of Pres Battulga, the party neither managed to continue a process of integration, nor was there even the beginning of a generational renewal under the leadership of such people as S Erdene.

There was a bit of turmoil around the announcement of the party candidate list and there were few people who expressed any kind of excitement about the list. This lack of excitement was also evident in the campaign event ostensibly focused on younger voters that I described.

A week into the campaign there was a death of a DP soum governor in Ovorkhangai. As far as could be ascertained this was a political event in the sense that the brawl that caused the death very unfortunately seemed to have erupted around the lack of attendance at a campaign event. The other party in the brawl was associated with the campaign of then-speaker of parliament G Zandanshatar. But both big parties were relatively restrained in reacting to this news and the DP did not explicitly try to frame this as a political attack. Marissa Smith had included this reaction in her impressions of on-line campaigning.

When we were driving across the countryside and visited campaign offices along our route, it was evident that the single pitch to potential voters was “It’s us vs them”, i.e. if you are frustrated with the MPP, vote for the DP. There was not a whole lot of nuance in that and substantive issues did not seem to be tied to that in any particular way.

By chance, we were in Murun to attend the final campaign rally for the DP with all eight candidates on the last day of campaigning. While a good number of party faithful turned up, this rally seemed neither particularly boisterous nor optimistic to me.

There was a bit of visual excitement toward the end of the event.

From these campaign impressions and the various looks at campaign platforms that colleagues had prepared, I was not expecting a particularly strong showing of the DP despite the long pattern of Mongolian voters to prefer some kind of balance between the two major parties.

Results

Clearly, I was wrong in my assessment that the DP had little to offer.

Instead, it appears that the DP continues to have a strong political “brand” of being the party opposed to the MPP that is most electable.

From my countryside impressions this was plausible in the sense that the other parties were simply not that visible in the country, including KhUN which obviously try to push into the most-electable-opposition slot. Visibility is partly effort, but it is also degree of organization. Since we did not travel through the Gobi aimags, I have to imagine that the degree of organization is what is behind the strong showing in the Khangai and Bayankhongor aimags. This strong showing may have also been helped by the incident I described above, but it is hard to imagine that that played a major role.

Outlook

Coalition talks appear to be on-going in Ulaanbaatar. This is puzzling. I cannot see any strategic argument for the party to enter into a coalition other than the personal ambitions of some of the leadership, call it political greed, i.e. the desire to secure a post in cabinet. If a coalition does materialize I would expect the cabinet posts that go to the DP to closely reflect the new power structure in the party.

Presumably the weight of power in the party has shifted (back) to frm president Battulga and his faction, though post-election jockeying for positions in or outside of a coalition will tell us more about that. Battulga has not focused much attention on specific political issues in the past, even less on any kind of theme, so I would not expect a clear policy focus from the DP in the coming four years. Also, as president he frequently seemed to shoot from the populist hip on particular issues (mining, but also capital punishment stand out in my memory). In a coalition, I would expect no more than power politics from the DP, and in opposition, the party would likely be ineffectual in terms of initiating a long-needed generational renewal, but also a more specific policy focus. Despite the electoral success, my perspective on personnel and policy orientation of the DP thus remains somewhat negative.

As will be the case with the MPP, there is some chance, however, that some of the MPs who were elected off the party list may emerge as leaders, or at least as dedicated legislators.

New City Park

Posted on July 4, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I have mentioned the increase of green space several times in my notes about how Ulaanbaatar is changing. One big new development is the opening of the large park that is South of the Shangri-la Hotel and West of the amusement park.

There had been a lingering threat for some time that this might be developed, losing yet another large parcel of open space in the downtown core, but the creation of the park seems to have averted that.

In a way this park also preserves the layout of Urga with an opening to the South and the Bogd Khaan Mountain, replicating the open door of a ger to the South.

The park opened on July 4 2024, with the likely raising of a large flag at its flagpole perhaps to come on Flag Day, July 10.

The Park

Given the size of the parcel of land, the park offers a lot of recreational opportunities.

From an initial first visit, I did notice the relative absence of benches or other places to sit down, but there are bathrooms. What also seems to be missing is some spaces for skateboards, bicycles, etc. activities that have become much more visible in downtown Ulaanbaatar and that might be particularly important to younger Ulaanbaatarites.

I was really very happy to see that apparently Tumen Ekh, the cultural ensemble whose building had been demolished, will have a new home in the park as well.

In its newly opened state, the park offers a lot of open space. There are many paths to go for a stroll, a large lawn area that looks to offer space for families to come together, and lots of other features

The Impact

As I have noted, the amount of green space in Ulaanbaatar has been increasing steadily over the past several years. There are several examples of public spaces that are either open for recreation or gatherings, or that offer some vegetation to urban residents. The largest of these are the National Park and some of the park areas along the Tuul river. From casual visits past these parks, it seems like Ulaanbaatarites are delighted by these recreational opportunities. Even the National Park which is somewhat outside of the very core of the city seems to be getting lots of traffic with joggers, strollers, and families.

I thus suspect that the new city park will be received with some enthusiasm. Its proximity to Sukhbaatar Square suggests that many people will wander over to the park in the summer and some of the energy from the Children’s Park immediately adjacent, will spill over into the city park.

All of that in turn suggests a possible migration of the centre of activity of the city core towards the park. The opening of the Shangri-la had a similar impact some years ago where activities along with retail and food offerings sprung up that were now two blocks of Sukhbaatar Sq. The restoration of the open space around the Chojin Lama Temple has further reinforced this shift.

If the focus of (summertime) activity will be drawn toward the new city park, what might this mean for further developments?

The southern border of the park is the large Narni Road that stretches along the railroad track.

The narrow strip between the road and the railroad tracks is currently filled with garages and other drive-by businesses. It would seem likely that despite the obstacle of a busy road, that strip might develop into food/retail options to serve park visitors, at least during the summer months.

If such a shift and development occurred, it might also bridge the significant divide that currently exists between the downtown core and anything that lies beyond the Peace Bridge, stretching toward Zaisan. To me, this would be a very welcome change with some recreational options, but also a further development of the city centre.

Posted in Architecture, Change, City Planning, Heritage, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

Preparing an Election

Posted on July 2, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Benjamin Nuland and Julian Dierkes

Leading up to the election on June 28th, 2024, we traveled as international election observers through Arkhangai, Khuvsgul, Bulgan and Orkhon aimags to observe the preparations for the election and the election campaign. We were impressed that despite the procedural complexities of this year’s election, public servants throughout the country were well prepared with proper machinery and training to ensure that the electoral process went smoothly. They were also genuine in their dedication and diligence in these preparations.

Testing

There was a nationwide test of election procedure on June 24th, testing various forms of machinery, including fingerprint scanning and 3,300 ballot-receiving machines. The staff who ran these tests were mainly women who are public servants like teachers or local administration officials, with extensive election-monitoring experience. If 10 staff in each of the 2,198 polling stations participated in the testing (as seemed about typical, including an IT officer and the 9-person election commission) that suggest that approximately 220,000 people were participating, about 1% of Mongolia’s total eligible voter population (2.2 million). Yes, five days before the election 1% of the voting population ran a test of voting procedures!

The testing included a powering up of all devices (registration laptop, fingerprint and biometric ID scanner, as well as receipt printer; election machine with all accompanying electronics and communications equipment, back-up generator, GEC camera) and sample submission of ballots and communication of results.

It seems that different Aimags ran their testing somewhat differently, possibly due to different delivery schedules of equipment, ballots, etc.; while Arkhangai ran tests in polling stations with all equipment and supplies delivered, testing in Khuvsgul seems to have been done centrally in soums before the equipment was distributed to polling stations. While testing centrally might cause concern over the machine’s functional ability on local internet connection, it didn’t seem to be too big of a problem during the election, as all electronic results were still successfully sent to the soum centres.

Technology

Mongolians often express doubts about election results, yet prosecutions for fraud are rare. The response to these allegations has been the deployment of technology designed to safeguard electoral processes and that has continued in this election. Julian has speculated about the likelihood of electoral fraud during the 2017 presidential election.

Machinery like fingerprint scanning machines, CCTV cameras, and a movable TV to display data and voter ID all continued from previous elections, though the display of voting statistics and an image of the inside of the polling station in the area outside of the station has been abandoned. Although there was some talk about the government sending over new generation voting machines for this election, it seems that the newer ballot machines resemble the same ballot machines from previous elections. In fact, even some of the old ballot machines were distributed with the new. Although we were initially told that the new generation of voting machines included cameras to record an image of the voter, this seemed to be a misunderstanding.

The innovation in this election was the deployment of Starlink connections, set up in over 400 bag locations. This enabled polling stations with no cell service to electronically transmit results quickly after the closing of polling stations. The greatest difficulty in bringing Starlink to these rural stations was in entering necessary precise coordinates for stations. Once the coordinates were set up, however, this mechanism seemed to work well, as there were no report delays when it came to submitting election electronic results.

Beyond the administration of elections, Starlink also seems to have been a tool for (well-funded) candidates. Installed on the roof of candidate’s cars, Starlink allowed big parties such as the DPP or MPP — who had the resources to afford it — to reach targeted rural voters on social media as they traveled in between rural areas, notifying any rural voter of any last minute rally coming up.

For every polling station, there was a backup plan in case any technical issue arose. Most stations had a backup generator or large batteries for voting machines in case of power outages, and an IT member of staff on standby to fix any technical issues. And although this might seem unnecessary at first glance, it must be said that they were extremely useful during the election, as in two rural voting stations we visited, power did go out, but the electoral process did not stall.

Staffing

The staff had gone through extensive training and knew their 2024 election manual well. In many polling stations, the 9-member election Stab was either predominantly or entirely female. Each staff member was assigned a task to their subsequent stations: A person sent by the statistical office was in charge of the registration and ID station, 3-4 women were in charge of issuing ballots, and a person was in charge of marking fingernails with an ink pen at the exit to ensure no double voting could occur. Knowing that the equipment can be difficult to operate, a person was specifically delegated to aid voters in inserting ballots into the counting machine. Lastly two people were staff on standby in case of technical issues or elderly voters or voters with disabilities needed assistance.

What was most impressive was the professionalism of the election commissions. When we asked whether they would support a youth or new candidate, the staff was strongly impartial, and believed any position they shared would jeopardize the election process.

The safeguarding of locations and equipment also requires a major staffing effort. Polling stations are under 24h police guard from when materials are delivered. In one polling station that meant that the just-out-of-the-police-academy officer and had stayed at the polling station for the three days prior.

Accessories

Similar to the last election, the government had provided accessories to various disabled and elderly voters, including lights, magnifying glasses, wheelie chairs, plastic mats to hold down ballots. It must be said that although voting stations did have accessibility aids, not all of them were uniformly provided for every polling station. For example, some voting stations had lights and magnifying glasses, while others had magnifying glasses and wheelchairs. Furthermore, on election day it seemed that few users made use of the magnifying glasses, those with difficulties seeing/reading being perhaps more accustomed to reading glasses. What was constant however was the presence of back-up staff to aid those in need to vote.

The GEC also promoted accessories to support the ‘no-phone policy’ at the polling station. This has always been intended as a mechanisms by which bribed voters could give proof of a vote cast to a briber. Polling stations set up phone baskets by voting booths for voters to deposit their phones. But while these phone baskets were at every voting station, they were not used consistently.

The greatest dedication to creating voter accessibility was the election staff’s commitment to attain the ballots of every immobile (hospitalized, infirm) voter. Policies were set in place for the first time in a couple of elections that allowed Mongolian expatriates to vote from their respective embassies or consulates from June 20th to the 23rd. For attaining mobile votes by elderly or infirm voters teams of mobile ballot collectors, consisting of electoral staff and party observers, travel to these voters. We were told in one bag voting station that they travelled 160 km to collect 6 votes, bringing with them all the necessary accessibility equipment and party observers to do so. Apparently, this was also a practice during state socialist times.

It must also be said that bad weather, including rain and thunderstorms, posed a great difficulty in traversing these lands to reach those voters in this election. But nevertheless, by Election Day the staff was able to collect all the mobile ballots of those who registered to do so. Even though missing out on such ballots due to logistical difficulty wouldn’t significantly change the results of the election, the electoral staff still commits itself to cover great distances to secure every vote.

Dedication to Democracy

The dedication of election personnel to ensuring a smooth election was impressive and, in some areas, inspiring given the infrastructural, procedural and geographic challenges that this effort faces. If Mongolian voters have little confidence in political parties and the parliament, or if there are concerns about democratic backsliding, this is likely not due to the on-the-ground process of voting.

About Benjamin Nuland

Benjamin Nuland is a Jack Hachigian Scholar at Yale University currently studying history and international relations. Recently completing the Directed Studies Program, he’s received the Topol Silliman Grant and the Summer Experience Award to study in Mongolia the summer under the guidance of Professor Arne Westad and Professor Julian Dierkes.

Posted in Benjamin Nuland, Democracy, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

How Much Power and Legitimacy Do New Women MPs Hold?

Posted on July 1, 2024 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

As already noted in Bulgan’s post, the new Parliament has the highest proportion and number of MPs ever, with over a quarter of the new Parliament being comprised of women.

While this is certainly a result worth celebrating and it holds great potential, I write here to make some important caveats.

Unfortunately, a closer look at which women were (re)-elected and how suggests that their legitimacy and power is such that these almost all new women MPs are starting from a tough place.

Majority of Women MPs Were Not Directly Elected

In this year’s election, voters both selected individual candidates on one ballot, and selected a party on a second ballot. Seats were distributed to parties from an ordered list of candidates based on their results from the second ballot. The lists were mandated to have a “zipper” format, with female and male candidates alternated in the list.

Of the 32 female candidates elected, only 8 (1 in 4) were directly elected, i.e. voters specifically chose those individuals on their ballots. As Bulgan noted, 316 women candidates ran for direct election.

None of the parties winning seats started their “zipper” with a woman candidate.

Majority of Women Incumbents Lost Their Seats

As I noted in my initial reaction to the election results, only 3 of 9 female incumbents retained their seats. Only 2 were directly elected (Ch. Undra and Kh. Bulgantuya; S. Odontuya was elected from the party list). This speaks to difficulties women face in their ability to gain and maintain political legitimacy.

Take-aways and Caveats

The fact that so few women were directly elected and that such a large proportion of incumbents lost their seats points to the fact that individual women candidates struggle to successfully campaign in Mongolia. As pointed out in recent books by former MP and minister Ts. Oyungerel and anthropologist Mandukhai Buyandelger, in the contest to garner party and popular support for their campaigns, women lack resources and access to spaces of networking and negotiation. (I am working on a post to show this leveraging public financial statements candidates were required to submit to register for candidacy.) This is of course a reflection of broader trends in Mongolian society what roles women are expected to play and in what manner.

Of course, such a large number of women MPs, especially if working cross-party, might be able to shift some dynamics. However, it remains to be seen how much latitude women MPs will have to operate independently of parties or factions within parties. One of the first conversations I observed on social media when candidates were first announced focused on whether or not party list candidates, particularly from the MPP, would be able to act independently. Many participants in this conversation argued that they would not, and perhaps the most stringent version of this view called the MPP party list “make-up,” with young, new faces hiding an old guard running for direct election. See Julian’s prior post thinking about directly-elected vs. list-elected candidates here.

As Julian has noted, in 2012-2016 a cross-party women’s caucus was formed, and this is something we will be watching for. We are also eagerly watching to see which seats in the new Cabinet will go to women and will provide updates here on Mongolia Focus.

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged Marissa Smith | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Voter Participation

Posted on June 29, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Benjamin Nuland

Working as an official foreign observer team with Marissa Smith, I visited nine different polling stations across all six of the urban bags of Erdenet on election day (including polling stations at schools attended by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and former Mongolian President Ts. Elbegdorj).

Voter turnout had a relatively slow start but gradually increased throughout the day. By 10 o’clock on election day, only about 15% of registered voters had voted, with voters 55 and above dominating voter representation. Around half way into the election at 3pm, 30-35% of voters had already cast their ballot. Long lines of up to 40 people and 60-minutes of total polling time didn’t discourage voters to leave, as many middle-aged voters between the ages of 30 and 40 showed up to the polls to overtake the elder vote. At 6 o’clock, around 60% of registered voters had voted. By then the polling stations were mainly empty, with some staffers submitting their votes to make up for lost time. By closing, around 70% of voters had cast their ballot, with middle aged voters making up the majority of those votes, and the elderly vote in second.

The gender split seemed even across the day. The gap tilted male in the morning making up about 55% of voters and women 45%. Around half way into the election, the gender gap began leaning towards the female vote, as small families, including mothers with their children, came in to vote; 55% of voters were women by then and 45% were male. By 6pm, more single women began showing up to the polls, growing the ratio to a 60-40 split. By 10 pm closing, the male vote seemed to close the gap a bit.

Results

Age

Voter turnout for this parliamentary election has fallen from 73.6% in 2020 to 69.3% in this election. The most notable contribution to this is decreasing voter participation from the youth, with voters ages 18 to 25 falling in participation from 62.5% to 56.23%. All this while the elder vote of those ages 56 and above saw a voter participation increase, rising from 78% in the 2020 election to 82.35% in this election. But while some might assume that a lack of youth participation was the defining reason for the overall rate drop, this isn’t fully the case. Voter participation has also surprisingly decreased for the middle-aged voters, with voter ages 26 to 40 years and voter ages 41 to 55 years falling from 69% to 64.45% and from 83% to 75.3% respectively. Both cases saw a decrease of about 4 to 6%, similar to the amount decrease of the youth voters.

As expected from our observation, more votes came from women than men, with about 796,000 female votes compared to 652,000 male votes, a percentage ratio 54.95% to 45.05%. Looking at gender distributions, more women eligible to vote chose to vote (74.1%) compared to that for men (65.9%). Seen as a significant difference for voters between the ages of 25 and 55, the difference in percentages consistently reach around a 10% gap. For voters above 65 years old more eligible male voters vote compared to that of women.

Region

There was a mixture of predictions and surprises when looking at voter turnouts for aimags and constituencies. Similar to previous elections, Bayan Ulgii, the Kazakh constituency, had the highest voter participation out of all constituencies, coming in with 73.6%. yet this number seems lower than normal, especially compared to their 80% turnout in the 2020 local elections. Aimags like Zarkhan and Uvs also had some of the highest voter participation, both with 73.8%, a constant compared the rates of 2020 elections. The greatest surprise was the high turnout for Ulaanbaatar, with over 70% voter participation on average across all districts, with its constituencies making up 5 out of the top 7. Keeping on with the trend of previous elections, northern regions had suffered the lowest voter participation, with various northern aimags, like Khovsgol and Selenge, sharing a participation of about 67% and below. Despite these changes and differences across aimags, it seems there is no great deviancy between the most participating participating regions and the least; the gap between the highest and the lowest is 9% when gaps for local elections can be as high as 20%.

Sources for this post include:
ikon.mn/elections/2020
ikon.mn/elections/2024/turnout

About Benjamin Nuland

Benjamin Nuland is a Jack Hachigian Undergraduate Scholar at Yale University currently studying history and international relations. Recently completing the Directed Studies Program, he’s received the Harold Silliman Topol Grant and The Summer Experience Award to study in Mongolia for the summer under the guidance of Professor Arne Westad and Professor Julian Dierkes.

Posted in Benjamin Nuland, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Leave a comment

Election Results: How Did Incumbents Fare?

Posted on June 28, 2024 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

The 2024 Parliamentary Election has resulted in prominent MPP MPs from specific constituencies losing their seats. Especially of note here is Zandanshatar, the Speaker of Parliament, in the Khangai district (1), and Ganibal from the eastern steppe constituency (6), and Ch. Khurelbaatar (Minister of Finance and longtime MP) from the western aimags (exclusive of Bayan-Ulgii) (2). However, overall, incumbents fared well outside of those constituencies and number 7 (the Gobi). Notably, the DP also took the majority of directly-elected seats in the Khangai and Gobi constituencies, a trend that we intend to analyze further in a coming post.

Despite a huge gain in the percentage of women candidates elected (see Bulgan’s post), women incumbents also lost a significant number of seats, with only three of nine women incumbents retaining their seats. This is also an issue we expect to take up soon.

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged Marissa Smith | Leave a comment

Quick Overview of Election Results

Posted on June 28, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

After this morning’s very hot takes, I want to offer a slightly expanded summary of the results of the parliamentary election. For those of you wanting to look at various aspects directly, the Ikon.mn website is my go-to for presentation and accuracy.

Bulgan has already taken a look at women in the new parliament, we will have posts focusing on turnout and incumbency later this morning.

Bottom Line(s)

I am basing this on numbers around 9h on June 29 with 99.95% of polling stations reporting.

Democracy lives. Turnout is roughly stable at 69.3%, voters have voted against the myriad incumbency advantages of the new election system to weaken MPP dominance. The proportional representation system has diversified party voices in parliament.
MPP’s supermajority reduced to mere majority. To some extent this may have been part of the point of the changes to the election system, but PM Oyun-Erdene might have wished for a slightly larger majority than just 68 of 126 seats.
Policy substance still does not matter much. There was no single issue that seemed to capture the imagination of the public. On a trip through the countryside during the campaign, the recurring theme from all opposition parties was “replace them with new people”, not policy on topic X needs to change. Choice of individual candidates and teams continues to trump policy directions.
The DP is back. Despite being in organizational shambles for years now, a somewhat disappointing party list set of candidates and a weak campaign, the DP has come roaring back to claim a third of the seats in the new parliament.
KhUN did not triumph. Even though voters seem to have indicated a desire for change (though not enough to lead to a change in government), KhUN seemingly was not able to capitalize on that to really establish itself as the opposition choice. Just over 150,000 votes out of just over 1,450m is a strong showing, but note that the KhUN presidential candidate received just under 250,000 votes in 2021, so the party has not grown its voter base. It will be represented in parliament with eight seats.
Proportional representation diversifies parliament. The Civil Will Green Party comes back to life after being last represented in the 2012-16 parliament. It had seemed moribund when charismatic leader S Oyun left politics, but will be represented by four MPs. The National Coalition led by N Nomtoibayar will also be represented by four MPs.

Outlook

As expected, this result implies government and policy continuity. Even with rumours of coalitions, the MPP will be leading the government for the next four years. Cabinet will be reconstituted and as has been in the case, ministers will bring personal agendas and projects to their portfolio, but the overall direction of government in central areas of policy-making is unlikely to shift.

If anything, the election has (re)solidified the dominance of MPP and DP in a two-party system, though proportional representation has led to a diversity of parties in parliament.

Questions

Lots of questions remain:

How much of an advantage has incumbency been in the larger constituencies/short campaign period?
What about prominence/name recognition?
Are there individuals who did well?
What about rural vs urban voter behaviour?
Can we deduce anything about vote splitting strategies and what this implies for future campaigns?
…

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, National Coalition, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

Women MPs in 2024 election result

Posted on June 28, 2024 by bulgan batdorj

By Bulgan Batdorj

The results are in, and Mongolia has made history—a record-breaking 32 women have secured seats in the country’s 126-member parliament, representing 25.4% of the total. Of the 32 women elected, 8 were chosen directly through constituency votes, while the remaining 24 gained seats through the party list system. All represent five political parties: MPP 15, DP 10, KhUN 3, Civil Will Green Party 2, and National Coalition 2.

Table 1: Women Parliamentarians 2024-28, Mongolia.

Name	Elected from	Party
B. Battsetseg	1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor	Mongolian People’s Party
Kh. Bolormaa	10 – Sukhbaatar, Chingeltei	Democratic Party
Ch. Nomin	11 – Songinokhairkhan	Mongolian People’s Party
E. Bolormaa	2 – Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, Uvs	Mongolian People’s Party
D. Uuriintuya	4 – Bulgan, Khuvsgul, Orkhon	Mongolian People’s Party
Ch. Undram	5 – Darkhan-Uul, Selenge, Tuv	Mongolian People’s Party
L. Munkhbayasgalan	7 – Govisumber, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Umnugovi	Democratic Party
Kh. Bulgantuya	8 – Bayanzurkh	Mongolian People’s Party
B. Narantuya – Nara	Party List	Civil Will Green Party
S. Zamira	Party List	Civil Will Green Party
S. Odontuya	Party List	Democratic Party
S. Tsenguun	Party List	Democratic Party
J. Bayarmaa	Party List	Democratic Party
D. Enkhtuya	Party List	Democratic Party
B. Punsalmaa	Party List	Democratic Party
P. Batchimeg	Party List	Democratic Party
B. Jargalan	Party List	Democratic Party
Ts. Munkhtuya	Party List	Democratic Party
L. Enkhsaikhan	Party List	KhUN
G. Uyangakhishig	Party List	KhUN
B. Munkhsoyol	Party List	KhUN
M. Enkhtsetseg	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
O. Saranchuluun	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
D. Ganmaa	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
M. Mandkhai	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
B. Uyanga	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
A. Ariunzaya	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
B. Kherlen	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
O. Nominchimeg	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
Kh. Baasanjargal	Party List	Mongolian People’s Party
A. Undraa	Party List	National Coalition
M. Sarnai	Party List	National Coalition

According to our previously written article, this number falls under the “modest setback” scenario—as the number of women elected directly is 8 out of 316 women candidates in the 13 constituencies, representing a success of only 2.5%. However, the party list mechanism allowed for the maximum potential of 24 women to be elected, demonstrating the importance of the zipper system. While the direct constituency results represented a setback, the overall outcome of 32 women securing seats in Mongolia’s 126-member parliament is still a historic achievement. This 25.4% representation shatters the previous record of 15%, significantly increasing the number of women parliamentarians from 13 to 32.

These women parliamentarians now have the opportunity to leverage their positions to champion the concerns of Mongolian women and promote gender equality, in addition to the expertise they bring to their respective areas. I also hope they can come together as a group to leverage their collective influence for meaningful reforms and solidify this success to pave the way for continued success in future elections.

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Election Hot Take: Change but not Quite

Posted on June 28, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Everything points to a reduced MPP majority with a surprisingly strong showing by the DP and no major surprises on individual candidates.

Mongolian voters have thus opted for personnel change, but even that not quite. There were no issues in the campaign that suggested a programmatic change, even with a stronger opposition showing, but really the change that was embraced was change for change’s sake and particularly change in the people governing, even if the DP’s offering of potential MPs was not exactly reformist or exciting.

The relatively strong turnout also suggests that desire for some change.

More detailed analyses will have to wait tomorrow, particularly in terms of more solidified results, the showing of DP and KhUN in Ulaanbaatar vs the countryside, the number of women MPs elected, and any strong showing by individuals in more solidified results.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, National Coalition, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Guest post: Election Platforms on Extractive Sector Governance

Posted on June 25, 2024 by bulgan batdorj

By Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan

While political party platforms play arguably a limited role in the final outcome of elections in Mongolia, they are nonetheless important since the aspirations of the ultimate winning party stated in them end up forming the basis of the government policies for the coming four years and beyond. In this article, I comment on policies voiced by political parties in their platforms in the run-up to the parliamentary elections to be held on 28 June 2024.

Overall, 21 political parties and coalitions presented their platforms to the General Election Commission. In this blog, I focus on the extractive sector governance of five that are seen as having greater chances to grab some of the 126 seats available in the new parliament. These are the incumbent ruling party, the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP); the main opposition, the Democratic Party (DP); the third party in the current parliament, KHUN; the National Coalition (NC); and the New United Coalition (NUC).

I use the framework promoted by the Natural Resource Charter, which looks at four key parts in the chain of decisions that determine the quality of governance of mineral resources in any country. These include the discovery of resources, getting a good deal for the country, managing volatile revenues, and investing in sustainable development, as well as two cross-cutting pillars, that of domestic governance foundations and international stakeholders. I simplify this framework by focusing on three aspects of mining governance, namely policies related to (1) discovery, exploration, and extraction of minerals, (2) maximization and management of extractive sector revenues, and (3) good governance and institutions.

The comments provided below are not exhaustive and reflect the personal view and positions of the author and are not related to the institution the author is affiliated with.

Discovery, exploration, and extraction of minerals

In recent years, the country has suffered from dwindling interest from foreign and domestic investors to invest in the exploration and development of new projects in Mongolia’s extractive sector. Licensing is stalled, and investors fear potential expropriation amid a lack of clarity on ownership of projects in light of potential state intervention in the mining business through various channels. In terms of mining, Mongolia has actually increased production and exports of coal and copper, the main mineral commodities for the country. Mongolia has largely failed to engage in downstream processing and producing a final product, as most of the exports to China are in the form of raw commodities and concentrate. The sector suffers from poor infrastructure related to access to efficient power, water, transportation, and border services. Negative environmental impacts and perceived lack of local benefits create resistance to mining at the local level.

Let me look at what plans political parties and coalitions participating in the parliament have on these issues.

The incumbent ruling party, MPP, focuses on large-scale or strategic projects in its exploration and mining policy. It pledges to expand the geology and exploration work aimed at attracting investments for large-scale deposit development. In doing so, the party would focus on ensuring transparency in the licensing process. In terms of the mining sector, the strategy is to focus on high-technology and strategic projects. The platform calls for better control of environmental rehabilitation work and sanctions against violators.

At the same time, the policy promotes large national companies and channels investments from the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to strategic projects, which are likely to be in the mining sector as well. Investments would also be promoted through the expansion of infrastructure facilities and streamlining of government services. For instance, the stated goals include increasing border capacity, streamlining government services to businesses through digitization and automation, and transferring the responsibility of delivering some public services to professional associations. Value addition in the extractive sector is given a high priority, including coal-based projects, copper smelter, iron and steel processing, and fluorspar processing.

DP also included important pledges in their platform. One pillar for DP to bolster the economy is through “the energizing of exploration in the extractive sector”, including improving capacity to carry out geology and related survey and research work, and improving guidance and methodologies for such work. In addition, like the MPP platform, DP plans to focus on large-scale projects in mining and the use of progressive technology for exploiting mineral deposits in full, with the separation of as many mineral elements as possible. In terms of the processing of minerals, the focus is on those with export potential; specific minerals that are to be processed include copper, gold, iron ore, and rare earths. Support for processing is explicitly aligned with the infrastructure support, such as energy and water.

The pledge also includes improvements in the control of mining operations and focus on rehabilitation and the closure of mine sites. For instance, the responsibility for mine rehabilitation and closure will be placed squarely on license holders.

KHUN party, the current minority in the parliament with its single member of the parliament, stressed “the energizing of exploration work.” In doing so, it stressed two policies, namely, to delink the exploration work from the business cycle and price fluctuations in the mining sector and to expand the exploration in line with the global green transition. In addition, the promise is to limit irregular license trading. Other support for business would be through the renovation of mining royalty regime, stabilization of the legal environment including ‘reducing non-tax burden to business operations’, and promotion of processing. Channeling mining revenue back to the implementation of mega projects in the sector is also envisioned, and so is the sharing of mining revenue with local communities. A pledge to diversify export destinations for mineral commodities is also included. On the environmental side, clarity over responsible mining and environmental criteria would be required. The Gobi desert region would be singled out to address environmental and social impacts.

NC does not have specific pledges for the exploration of minerals on its platform. As for mining, the sector would be promoted through clarity on taxes. At the same time, revisions to the royalty regime are foreseen, apparently with the aim to maximize royalty collections. The coalition also stresses strategic investments and mega projects as well as processing of coal, and development and processing of hydrogen, rare earths, copper, iron ore and other minerals.

NUC’s platform also seeks to energize the geological surveying and focus on strategic and mega projects including processing of coal, copper, iron ore, fluorspar and gold processing.

Maximization and management of extractive sector revenues

The current ruling party, MPP, starts its platform with the pledge of using mining revenue to address the issue of housing of citizens. The platform pledges to operationalize the Sovereign Wealth Fund and improve the governance of SOEs, which are critical to fiscal spending and revenue generation. Plans include earmarking some mining revenue towards investments in science, innovation, and expansion of exports. For SOEs, the plan is to raise funding by floating their shares in international markets.

DP proposes to engage citizens in decisions over mining revenue and spending and limit politically motivated cash transfers. It also proposes to reduce the debt burden of the government and SOEs using surplus mining revenues and privatization of SOEs, respectively. The platform pays significant attention to the SWF governance, including a dedicated section on the subject. Issues such as limiting political interference and politically motivated spending, focusing on economic diversification, and using the funds for future generations are part of the policy proposed.

KHUN platform stresses megaprojects aimed at both mining and mining linkages and revenue sharing with local communities and limiting off-budget spending through SOEs. Interestingly, KHUN does not specify any explicit policy on the SWF.

NC proposes government guarantees for the implementation of large-scale projects, alluding to the use of mineral revenue for that purpose. The platform includes objectives to operationalize the SWF with the focus on mobilizing funds to it from the privatization of SOEs.

NUC plans to improve the legal environment around the SWF and presumably use the fund for the support of non-mining businesses.

Good governance and institutions

All parties and coalitions stress the importance of governance and anti-corruption efforts. MPP pledges to ensure the mining sector’s transparency, especially in licensing and the use of mineral exchanges for commodity trading. SOE reforms through floating their shares on stock exchanges and allowing public and civil society scrutiny are envisioned. Pledges on fighting corruption include establishing a special corruption court, introducing the whistleblowing mechanism, and the continuation of policies aimed at retrieving assets lost due to corruption. Automation and digitization of government services will also be a priority.

DP pledges to improve public participation in decisions related to the mineral revenue collection and spending, and focusing on improving governance of SOEs and special government funds. The anticorruption efforts would focus on whistleblowing, scrutiny of tax payments and spending alignment of high level officials, and stricter sanctions for corrupt officials.

KHUN pledges to eliminate corruption, and improve governance, and reform SOEs by reducing their number, mostly through turning them into public companies, and the state participation in business.

NC would privatize SOEs and use technology and public-private partnerships to eliminate opportunities for corruption.

NUC pledges to improve the current Glass Accounts system to improve the transparency of state entities, including SOEs.

Comments on platforms

Almost none of the pledges by the MPP, or for that matter by other political parties or coalitions, are new, as they have been included in various policy documents or discussed at various policy platforms over the years.

MPP focuses on Mongolia’s aspirations to move large-scale projects ahead, be they in mining or mineral processing. Similar aspirations have often failed over the years due to a lack of funding, especially from foreign investors. A few successful projects, like coal hauling railway and road, coal processing, or Oyu Tolgoi underground mining, have been the result of many years of wrangling, cost overruns, and delays. Reliance on SWF to fund such projects may be overoptimistic, as the current high revenues from coal may not last long, and the use of SWF is somewhat scattered, as it consists of three different spending channels and only a small portion may go back to domestic industry investments. In terms of downstream processing, coal or other fossil fuel-based investments will likely fail to attract foreign investments and result in the country’s over-dependence on the mining sector while limiting investments in alternative priorities like education or health sector.

In addition, many of the platform pledges are not specific enough, risking that there will be no accountability over the pledges should the MPP win the elections and the platform pledges become the new government policy.

DP’s platform pledges are more specific than the MP’s on some aspects, like geology and exploration policy, making it easier to track should the platform become the government policy. DP policy to prioritize debt repayments using mineral revenue may be a testament to high borrowing rates and lack of profitable projects that these borrowed funds could currently be used for. One can see DP’s accent on preventing mining revenue from flowing into and influencing politics, but the platform is not detailed enough to see how this could be implemented. This can be seen by the DP’s interest in reopening the mandate and purpose of the SWF. DP’s platform stresses public participation as an important mechanism for how mining revenues should be spent.

KHUN goes into greater detail in terms of how exploration and mining can be revitalized. The platform does not go into that level of detail when it comes to managing mining revenues, for instance through the newly legalized SWF. The accent on promoting mega or large-scale projects in mining and mining linkages, i.e. downstream processing and infrastructure is the backbone of the policy on mining for the party.

NC, headed by the owners of one of the largest private mining companies in Mongolia, focuses largely on tax incentives for mining and downstream processing while restructuring the sector by significantly limiting SOEs’ role and streamlining the government’s oversight burden.

NUC’s plans for the mining sector are limited, but stresses economic diversification and use of Glass Accounts for transparency in its few pledges.

The parties’ platforms all stress the importance of downstream processing. This has been an aspiration or policy pledge for many years now, but the actual results have been limited. It should be noted that all parties still stress investments in fossil fuel mining and processing, although investments in cleaner minerals are also included. Especially with fossil fuels, the risk of investing public funds into potentially stranded projects is high, and the government needs to provide details every time such projects are funded by public resources. While platforms also include extensive pledges on anti-corruption efforts, they still do not provide enough details on the level of transparency that needs to be achieved to ensure public scrutiny over government policies and actions by all parties.

About Dorjdari

Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan is an economist and the country manager for the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. In this role, he works with the Mongolian government, civil society, and industry to address challenges faced by the country’s mining sector through policy research, analysis, capacity building, and dialogue.

Dorjdari’s experiences span over two decades, during which he has witnessed the mismanagement of natural resources during mining booms and busts. His interest in public policy was sparked by the monumental changes he observed during Mongolia’s transition from one political and economic system to another.

Dorjdari recently completed his SPPGA Practitioner Fellowship at UBC, where he engaged with the academic community, deepened his knowledge about energy transition challenges, and shared his experiences with others.

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan, Governance, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mining, Mining, Mining Governance, Oyu Tolgoi, Party Politics, Populism, Reflection, Tavan Tolgoi | Leave a comment

Gendered Trends in Candidacy for Mongolia’s 2024 Parliamentary Election

Posted on June 25, 2024 by bulgan batdorj

By Bulgan Batdorj

There are total of 1,340 candidates across 13 constituency regions and the party list. Of these candidates, 498 (37%) are women and 842 (64.3%) are men. It looks that the women quota and the zipper system in the party list have helped increase the number of women candidates. Women comprise 32% (316/969) of the candidates at the constituency level. On the party list, women account for 49% (182/371) of the candidates. The 2020 Ikh Hural election had a 20% of women quota, and there were 151 or 24.5% of women out of 606 candidates. The quota increase to 30% have helped to bring out the number of women candidates by 12.5% (see here for the new election system here)

Women candidates at the party level:
The party with the highest number of women candidates is the KhUN party, with 57 women (46%) out of 92 candidates. The Civil Movement Party is second, with 54 women (43%) out of 125 candidates.

The Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party and Motherlanders United Party have one woman candidate, thus making them 100% women’s parties. The CUP party has the highest percentage of women candidates, at 60%, with 34 women out of 57 candidates. The Good Democratic Citizen’s United Party and KhUN party have 47% of women candidates.

Party	Women	Men	Total	Women Percentage
Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party	1	0	1	100%
Motherlanders United Party	1	0	1	100%
CUP	34	23	57	60%
Good Democratic Citizen’s United Party	26	29	55	47%
KhUN	57	65	122	47%
Civil Movement Party	54	70	124	44%
Civil Will Green Party	30	42	72	42%
Mongolian Conservative Party	9	13	22	41%
National Coalition	28	41	69	41%
True and Righteous Party	32	48	80	40%
Republic Party	21	33	54	39%
People’s Power Party	23	37	60	38%
People’s Majoritarian Governance Party	26	45	71	37%
Motherland Party	15	28	43	35%
For the Mongolian People’s Party	14	28	42	33%
Mongolian Social Democratic Party	2	4	6	33%
New United Coalition	28	62	90	31%
Freedom Implementer Party	9	21	30	30%
Freedom Coalition Party	14	33	47	30%
Democratic Party	37	89	126	29%
Mongolian People’s Party	37	89	126	29%
Independent candidate	0	42	42	0%

The ruling MPP and opposition DP party have 37 women candidates, representing 29.4% of their total candidates. All the other 19 parties have reached the quota of 30% women representation.

Women candidates at the constituency level:
The constituencies with the highest number of women candidates are Constituency 5 (Darkhan-Uul, Selenge, and Tuv), with 41 women out of 119 candidates, and Bayanzurkh, with 36 women out of 83 candidates. The constituency with the highest percentage of women candidates is Constituency 12 (Baganuur, Bagakhangai, Nalaikh), where 14 out of 32 total candidates (44%) are women who are competing for two seats only.

Constituency	Female	Male	Grand Total	Number of seats per Constituency
3 – Bayan-Ulgii	4	19	23	3
13 – Baganuur, Bagakhangai, Nalaikh	14	18	32	2
9 – Bayangol	16	34	50	3
12 – Khan-Uul	19	30	49	3
6 – Dornod, Sukhbaatar, Khentii	22	54	76	7
2 – Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, Uvs	25	90	115	10
4 – Bulgan, Khuvsgul, Orkhon	25	61	86	8
1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor	26	54	80	9
11 – Songinokhairkhan	27	58	85	5
10 – Sukhbaatar, Chingeltei	30	63	93	6
7 – Govisumber, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Umnugovi	31	47	78	7
8 – Bayanzurkh	36	47	83	5
5 – Darkhan-Uul, Selenge, Tuv	41	78	119	10

Constituency 3 (Bayan-Ulgii) has the fewest women candidates, with four out of 23 candidates running for 3 seats. Constituency 2 (Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, and Uvs) has the second-lowest female representation, with 25 out of 115 candidates running for ten seats.

Women candidates in general:

It is disappointing that the ruling party, MPP, and the main opposition DP have not only a broken zipper in the party list, nominating 23 women and 25 men instead of 24 each but also have not met the quota of 30% overall. They have nominated 37 women, representing 29.4% of women. The reasons behind this are not the lack of qualified women candidates but rather an entrenched/paternal party culture and old-boys networks in these parties and the lack of these parties’ institutional commitments to gender equity.

Among the remaining 19 parties, two met the 30% quota, and 16 exceeded this quota with an average representation of 47%. Even if the two parties have only one woman representation removed, the average women representation is 40%.

Another interesting thing with the candidates is that all 42 independent candidates are male, and two women candidates are running from two minor parties, the Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party and Motherlanders United Party.

Note: I used the Сонгууль 2024 (ikon.mn) and supplemented the information with candidate.mn – Бие Даагч in identifying the genders.

Posted in Bulgan Batdorj, Democracy, Democratic Party, Gender, Ikh Khural 2024, Inequality, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Politics | Tagged Batdorj BULGAN | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Analyzing the Environmental Strategies of Five Parties

Posted on June 23, 2024 by bulgan batdorj

Jangar Ts. and Bolormaa P.

Overview of Natural Resources and Ecosystems

Mongolia, renowned for its vast steppe grasslands, abundant water resources, forests,
wetlands, and rich mineral deposits, faces significant environmental challenges. Key threats include environmental degradation, desertification, unsustainable water extraction, air and water pollution, and soil and habitat loss. Seventy percent of pastures are degraded, threatening livestock and resilience to climate change. These threats are primarily driven by overgrazing, urbanization, mining, and climate change.
Despite having high per capita water availability, Mongolia’s water resources are under stress:
• Freshwater Withdrawal: Accounts for only 1.5% of total renewable water resources, with
uneven demand and extraction, stressing rivers and groundwater in urban areas.
• Pollution: Freshwater sources are increasingly polluted by industrial effluents,
inadequate sanitation, solid waste, and livestock access.
Climate change exacerbates drought and water scarcity. Efforts to expand Mongolia’s protected areas network are ongoing, supported by Local Protected Areas established by provincial and district governments.

Environmental Issues in the Mining Sector

Mining activities have caused significant environmental damages:

Land Damage: 8,147.58 hectares affected by gold-placer mining, with excavations and quarries occupying 21.1% of these lands.
Surface Water Damage: Accounts for nearly 90% of environmental damage in the Zaamar zone.
Soil and Plant Cover: Significant damage in Eastern regions and Selenge province, varying by local environmental features.

Selenge province has suffered substantial damage in, with MNT 28.2 billion lost, representing 40% of total damage. Mining activities are prohibited in 35,900 hectares of river and stream sources, with significant damage in Zaamar zone and Khangai region. 17,400 hectares of protected forest funds have been affected, predominantly in Selenge province.

Mongolia’s rich natural resources and ecosystems face severe threats from environmental degradation, water scarcity, pollution, and climate change. Efforts to improve water governance, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable tourism are critical. Addressing mining-related environmental damage is essential for preserving Mongolia’s natural heritage and ensuring sustainable development.

Here, we provide a brief analysis of the proposed environmental strategies by the following parties: Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), the Democratic Party (DP), KhUN Party (HP), Civic Courage & Green Party (CC&GP), and the National Coalition (NC).

MPP. New Revival Policy Regional Development Reform (Шинэ сэргэлтийн бодлого бүсчилсэн хөгжлийн реформ)

Chapter 6: Human and Environment

6.1.4. Renew environmental monitoring, introduce high technology, AI in natural disaster projection and prevention.

6.2.1. Pass “Pasture management” law to protect water, soil and pasture and prevention from land degradation and desertification.

6.2.5. Pasture irrigation, continue well work.

6.3. Water – precious resource

6.3.1. Create environment to ensure water security

6.3.2. Collect water from snow, ice, build 140 ponds, water reservoir to improve water access for local community, wild animals, livestock, and industry.

6.3.4. Limit use of groundwater in mining and promote use of surface water

6.3.5. Promote responsible mining: technologies for water re-use, re-cycle, use of grey water.

6.3.6. Promote wastewater use through recycling.

6.3.7. Expand water exploration to supply drinking water for local population.

6.5. Green Economic Transformation

6.5.3. Promote Green product, sustainable consumption, green lifestyle through introduction of environmentally friendly technologies in waste reduction, resource use.

6.5.4. Increase investments in green jobs and businesses.

Key Strategies:

• Environmental Monitoring and Disaster Prevention: Renew environmental monitoring systems and introduce high technology, including AI, for natural disaster prediction and prevention.
• Pasture Management: Pass the “Pasture Law” to protect water, soil, and pasture from degradation and desertification, and continue well irrigation projects.
• Water Security: Enhance water security by collecting water from snow and ice, building 140 ponds and reservoirs, and promoting responsible mining practices that include water reuse and recycling.
• Green Products and Jobs: Promote sustainable consumption through environmentally friendly technologies and increase investment in green jobs and businesses.

Analysis:

Integrating technology and AI into environmental monitoring systems offers an effective approach to predicting and preventing natural disasters. However, recent years have shown inefficiencies in environmental monitoring systems, with significant gaps in data collection and analysis. Limiting groundwater use in mining operations may face opposition from stakeholders in regions like the Gobi, where groundwater is crucial resource for both mining and local communities.

The proposed “Pasture Management” law to be effective, it must be part of a broader, integrated strategy that includes sustainable agricultural practices, pasture water management, and soil conservation efforts. Without this integration, the law alone may not achieve its intended outcomes.

The construction of dams and canals for flood management and the collection and storage of rain and snow water are crucial for water resource management. These efforts are effective with good governance and adequate funding.

MPP’s tenure has been marked by economic and social challenges.

Democratic Party. Full Mongolian, Complete Democracy: Steadfast Development Plan (Бүтэн Монгол, Бүрэн Ардчилал)

Chapter 5.7.1 Water

5.7.1.1. Build Engineering infrastructure for clean water supply and water sewage.

5.7.1.2 Implement “Kherlen – Gobi”, “Orkhon – Gobi” and “Tuul – Gobi” projects

5.7.1.3. Build water reservoirs and implement projects to increase water resources.

5.7.1.4. Support the project of building an additional hydroelectric power plant.

5.7.1.5. Built Dams in large rivers.

5.7.1.6. Increase the use of grey water.

5.7.1.7. Implement projects to reduce/stop groundwater use

5.7.1.8. As part of the “Billion Trees” national movement and the fight against desertification, create 50-100 hectares of green spaces/facilities in every soum.

5.7.6. Hydropower station, nuclear power station

5.7.6.1. Increase domestic production of energy

5.7.6.2. Build a large reservoir, artificial lakes, floating ponds, and accumulate water to supply water to desert and grassland areas

5.7.6.5. Intensify research on hydroelectric power plants and build hydroelectric power plants within PPP.

5.7.8.15. Improving the supply of economical and environmentally friendly technologies to water supply to increase crop harvest

5.7.8.17. Implement solar and wind renewable sources for greenhouse farming and drip irrigation.

Chapter 6.1.1 Local Development

6.1.1.7. Promote Intensive animal husbandry and irrigated agriculture.

6.1.2.5 Renew and put in operation irrigation system near Gahanch River in Biger, Sharga, Taishir and Bugat Sums.

6.1.2.6. Build a 50 m³ capacity water treatment plant in Jargalan, Chandman, Togrog, Darvi sums, Guulin, Bayantooroo soums

6.1.2.7. Build a new flood dam on the west of Yesenbulag Sum.

6.1.2.10. Create a waste processing system based on PPP, implement an eco-environment program.

6.1.2.12. Build Erdeneburen hydroelectric power plant

6.1.4.1.Build Egiin hydropower station

6.1.6.5. Build dams and canals in province centres to manage and mitigate floods.

6.1.7.2. Implement “Water for Gobi region” program

6.1.7.6.Collect and store rain and snow water for agriculture irrigation.

6.1.7.8. Resolve drinking water purification

6.1.7.10. Implement water projects to protect wildlife, and prevent desertification.

6.3.29. Introduce automated system for monitoring and measuring of water, electricity and heat use.

Key Strategies:

Water Infrastructure: Build engineering infrastructure for clean water supply and sewage, and implement significant projects such as “Kherlen – Gobi”, “Orkhon – Gobi” and “Tuul-Gobi for water resource enhancement.
Hydropower and Renewable Energy: Support for hydroelectric power plants and renewable energy sources like solar and wind for greenhouse farming and irrigation.
Desertification and Afforestation: As part of the “Billion Trees” national movement, create green spaces in every district to combat desertification and improve environmental quality.
Waste Management: Develop a comprehensive waste processing system through public-private partnerships, including building new water treatment plants and flood control infrastructure.

Analysis:

The Democrats focus on large-scale infrastructure projects and renewable energy to provide sustainable solutions to environmental challenges while promoting economic growth. However, the strategy lacks a unified framework that integrates these initiatives into a cohesive plan.

KhUN Party “It’s Time to Change” (Өөрчилнө цаг нь болсон)

Chapter 4: Close to nature development

Key initiatives include expanding protected areas, integrating environmental data into digitized system, and collaborating with the private sector to boost financing and community participation. A public environmental management and reporting system for mining operations will be established, along with a legal framework for a mineral deposit system to fund rehabilitation.

Sustainable land management practices, such as afforestation, reforestation, and advanced agriculture techniques, will restore degraded lands and enhance ecosystem resilience. Create opportunities to generate revenue from the ‘Billion Tree’ program, aiming to attract private and foreign financing for tree planting.

Urban-rural ecosystem services will be updated to reflect the value of land use. A stable and financing model will reduce reliance on the state budget, ensuring foreign investment and private sector participation. An Environmental Trust Fund will be established with and international investments. The government will also work on implementing international agreements such as the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species, the Human and Biodiversity Program, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Natural resources management will prioritize installing bio-sanitary facilities and identifying locations for renewable energy. The “Ezentei Garbage” program overhaul waste management, improving recycling standards. Land along the Selbe and Tuul rivers will be protected and developed for recreation with private investment.

Climate change policies will expand water, climate, and environmental monitoring, integrating technical innovations. A smart monitoring network will protect natural resources, supported by technology and transparency. Professional resources will be developed for environmental restoration in urban areas.

A natural disaster prevention system and comprehensive risks assessment will be established. Emissions from harmful vehicles will be banned, and a monitoring system will be implemented. Water policy reforms will manage cross-border and domestic water, including urban water management policies.

Public awareness campaigns will promote natural resources conservation and green development initiatives. Efforts to reduce waste, save resources, and promote recycling will be supported. Environmentally friendly technologies and a Circular Economy policy will be introduced. Households will be encouraged to plant trees, supported by a legal frameworks. Incentives for green consumption and green government will be introduced.

Key Strategies:

Protected Areas and Ecosystem Services: Increase protected areas and integrate environmental, social, and economic data for better management. Promote sustainable land management practices such as afforestation and sustainable agriculture.
Environmental Finance: Establish an Environmental Trust Fund with private and international investments, reducing dependency on state budgets.
Waste Management and Renewable Energy: Update the waste management system to improve recycling standards and identify appropriate locations for renewable energy generation.
Public Participation: Increase public awareness and participation in environmental conservation through educational campaigns and community-led projects.

Analysis:

KhUN Party focuses on innovative financing and community engagement, involving private and international stakeholders for sustainable funding. Public participation and awareness could enhance policy effectiveness, with comprehensive initiatives aimed at creating a sustainable environment. Integrating modern technologies, fostering private and community participation, and promoting international cooperation are key to managing natural resources.

Civil Will and Green Party. “Have the Courage to Make a Change” (Шинэчлэлд Зоригтой бай)

3.1. Sustainable development

3.1.1. To balance environmental protection and economic growth

3.3. Nature and Environment (forestry)

Launch afforestation campaign to increase forest cover, carbon sequestration, soil stabilization, water basin protection, increasing efficiency, reducing sand migration in the Gobi

3.1.6. Implement circular business/economic practices, reduce waste, Increase recycling.

3.3.1 To protect wildlife biodiversity, and their habitat, redefine protected areas and natural reserves

Key Strategies:

Sustainable Development: Balance environmental protection with economic growth, focusing on circular economic practices and waste reduction.
Afforestation: Launch campaigns to increase forest cover, stabilize soil, and protect water basins, particularly in the Gobi region.
Biodiversity Protection: Protect wildlife biodiversity by redefining protected areas and natural reserves.
Green Economy: Implement policies to promote a green economy through sustainable consumption and increased recycling.

Analysis:

CC&G’s platform emphasizes ecological sustainability and biodiversity protection, balancing environmental and economic goals through circular economy practices.

National Coalition. “Let’s Support National Industry, Let’s Make Nation Rich”

Chapter: Regional Green Development, Rural Revival

Reforming the government’s water policy, develop master plan, collect water, use water resources for energy generation, build hydropower station.

Key Strategies:

Water Policy Reform: Reform the government’s water policy, develop a master plan for water resources, and build hydropower stations to generate energy and improve water management.
Green Development: Emphasize regional green development and rural revival through sustainable resource use and environmental protection measures.
Economic Integration: Integrate environmental concerns with industrial development, ensuring that economic growth supports environmental sustainability.

Analysis:

The National Coalition aims to integrate environmental sustainability with industrial growth, focusing on water policy reform and green development to address environmental issues while promoting economic growth.

Conclusion

Each party addresses key environmental issues such as water management, desertification, forest cover, waste management, and sustainable development. They offer varied approaches with infrastructure projects, innovative financing, community engagement, and green development. Some difference, however, can be seen on methods of implementation; by creating a legal framework to promote e.g. public with private partnership, or just old school way when government takes control on steering.

While the MPP has focused on water security, environmental monitoring and disaster prevention, green product and jobs, their current governance raises concerns about economic and social impacts. One strategy recommends limiting the use of groundwater in mining operations and encourages the use of surface water for mining activities. However, this strategy may raise concerns and potentially lead to opposition from different stakeholders involved in ongoing mining operations in regions like the Gobi, where groundwater is a crucial resource for both mining and local communities.

The Democratic Party continues previous water supply projects to Gobi region, supporting mining and hydropower. These projects were proposed over eight years ago and seems finding a broad political support these days; when pre-feasibility study on Herlen-Gobi project was concluded in 2007, then MP from Khentii Aimak B. Bat-Erdene was strongly opposing this project, seizing any further initiatives.

The Civic Will Green Party’s program is well-articulated and integrated, promising impactful results upon implementation.

KhUN party proposes a unified framework for sustainable and resilient environmental management through modern technologies, private and community participation, and international cooperation. These initiatives promise positive results by ensuring participation and long-term financing opportunities.

About Bolormaa Purevjav

Dr. Bolormaa Purevjav is a researcher at the Mining Engineering Department of UBC. Her PhD research focused on integrated water resources management, stakeholder engagement in sustainable water management, and water governance in the context of mining.

About Jangar Tsembel

Jangar Tsembel is a Ph.D. candidate at University of British Columbia (UBC) in Vancouver, Canada. His master degree was focused on effect of land use change on generation of floods in B.C. interior, Canada. His doctoral research is also focused on hydrology where he investigates how environmental controls of watershed can play synergistic or antagonize the generation of peak flows in small catchments and floods in a bigger watershed.

Posted in Air Pollution, Author, Bolormaa Purevjav, Civil Will Green Party, Climate Change, Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Environment, Garbage, Ikh Khural 2024, Jangar Tsembel, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Policy, Policy | Leave a comment

Speculation about Post-Election Scenarios

Posted on June 22, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Of course, there is lots of speculation about what election results next week might mean for the next four years.

Coalitions?

Long-time Mongolia watchers have heard this story before: rampant speculation around Ulaanbaatar that regardless of a probable-seeming MPP victory, the MPP might reach out to the DP or KhUN to form a “unity government” of some kind.

Why would the MPP govern in a coalition if it ends up with an absolute majority? That question obviously becomes a very different question if the MPP does not win a majority, but here I will focus on a scenario where it does hold a majority.

To some extent, this may link to the challenges that the MPP has experienced in governing with a supermajority. These are primarily two-fold: maintenance of party discipline in parliament, and the lack of an opposition to foist some blame off on for policy gone awry.

A coalition would address the party discipline issue only partly, but some of that will depend in the new Ikh Khural on the role that MPs who have been elected via the party list will play. But the shared responsibility and thus shared accountability may make a coalition government attractive to the MPP. The public presentation would focus on some kind of argument that big changes need to be made (whatever those may be) and that a coalition of political forces and the implied near-consensus around those changes, are needed. As a German, this sounds familiar to the arguments that had been made for the Grand Coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, though the number of “big projects” that coalition took on was actually quite limited. But, this coalition argument is likely to resonate with many Mongolians who expect pragmatic and single-best solutions to political challenges rather than a competition of values approaches.

The precedent for all of this is the coalition government following the 2008 parliamentary election where the then-MPRP secured a majority of seats, but formed a coalition with the DP. That coalition was primarily aimed at concluding the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement which was signed in 2009. Note that while Mongolia is facing a number of policy challenges, there currently is no single issue that is demanding a decision the way that the OT IA was 15 years ago, though perhaps one might wish that aspects of a climate change response, particularly the reliance on coal might be recognized as such an issue.

MPP-DP

Why would the DP want to enter into a coalition with the DP? First of all, there are few real ideological/policy differences between the two parties. Occasionally, the MPP veers slightly more toward state involvement in the economy and the DP has a slightly more liberal economic bent. Similarly, there are more Russophiles in the MPP than the DP, but these differences are not large, so there is no ideological gulf between the two parties.

Secondly, Mongolian politics is very much focused on winning executive power of some sort (on balance, more than bringing about change). A coalition would allow the DP to negotiate some appointments for its leadership, something they have been locked out of since the 2016 election.

Finally, the DP continues to be in disarray. It does appear that frm president Kh Battulga has reasserted some of his hold over the party, note his own candidacy in the Bulgan-Erdenet-Khuvsgul constituency. He does not have a discernible political agenda other than the quests for power and immunity and has previously been rumoured to be in various conversations and alliances with MPP leaders, making this scenario somewhat plausible.

MPP-KhUN

Among the many conspiracy theories and rumours that always circulate, the insinuation that KhUN leader Dorjkhand has somehow been collaborating with the MPP has been persistent recently. KhUN’s claim of having initiated a fairer and more inclusive election system with proportional representation obviously depended on the MPP championing this change as well, given its supermajority.

After the election, KhUN may well be open to offers of a coalition to fulfill their aspiration to participate in government. The trajectory that KhUN has taken since its “arrival” as a possible third party would point toward such a decision as well. Whereas I had initially hoped that a new party might champion a change of political culture, including a more substantive, perhaps even more ideological debate and competition between parties, KhUN has seemed focused more on winning seats than on changing politics, other than emphasizing their own outsider status would bring an obvious change. For a number of its leaders, the offer of ministerial appointments, should that come with coalition discussions, may be too tempting and they might argue that this would give them access to some levers to implement their change agenda.

Cabinet

There is little sense in speculating about the make-up of any cabinet post-election cabinet as cabinet appointments have always been somewhat mysterious and linked more closely to party factions than any particular interests in portfolios from potential ministers or a balance of regional and gender representation (a principle that is important in Canadian cabinets, for example).

Some portfolios may change and that would seem especially likely if any coalition came about.

Cabinet appointments may also represent linkages between individuals and the MPP leaders who seem most powerful at the moment, Pres Khurelsukh, PM Oyun-Erdene, General Secretary Amarbayasglant, and MP Uchral.

The only appointment that seems likely even if only temporarily after the election is FM Batstsetseg, regardless of the outcome of her election campaign, as she would be hosting the World Women’s Forum some time in August 2024.

President

There is also a lot of talk about Pres Khurelsukh trying to engineer a constitutional change in the next three years that would make the President elected by parliament and would effectively allow him to run for a second term. I am not sure what to make of this especially as I am obviously not privy to any agreements that may be being made between Mongolian politicians. I do not find the talk of such a plan surprising. Somewhat like former pres Battulga, Khurelsukh does not appear to be driven by political ideas. Yes, the 1 Billion Trees campaign is a big project, but it is not a political project of change/reform or a (new) direction for Mongolia. Pres Khurelsukh thus does seem interested in staying in office for the sake of being in office. However, we have heard many similar rumours of engineered continuity (“doing a Putin”) in the past regarding other politicians which makes me skeptical on the likelihood of this scenario coming about. Yes, Khurelsukh might see himself as a “strong man” and might appeal to voters and the public in that way with some resonance, but power remains highly fragmented among political and business leaders, so it seems somewhat unlikely that enough power centres would agree to such a continuation of a Khurelsukh presidency or the constitutional change that would be required.

Foreign Agents Law

Unfortunately, there does seem a widespread expectation that the MPP will introduce some kind of “foreign agents” law after the election. This may be called something else to make it less obvious that it might be a close copy of the Russian law that has been enacted across Central Asia and has led to such civil society mobilization in Georgia, for example. It remains entirely unclear to me why anyone in democratic Mongolia would want such a law, the allegation of foreign interference would primarily apply to the origins of his law, i.e. Russia, and perhaps China, but there does seem to be a sense in Ulaanbaatar that the conflict around the introduction of such a law is likely to reappear in the first year after the election.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, JD Democratization, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Election Platforms on Health

Posted on June 21, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Tsogtbaatar B

Health stands among the most essential and common social goods in Mongolia. Yet, there is often displeasure among the Mongolian public for how health services are delivered and doubts where the overall sector’s policies are headed. The public health concept as the most promising gateway to better development of health sector and population health is still understudied and underutilized. Quickly analyzing the health platforms of several parties with seemingly comprehensive proposals on health that were submitted to the National auditing office I offer the following categorization of priorities and loopholes.

Progressive

SMART (specific-measurable-attainable-realistic-timebound) approach seen to be considered within some objectives: “Enact policies specific to improving access of mobile clinic, telemedicine and public health centers’ services to remote and marginalized communities.” (KhUN)
Logical continuation of a strategy or an intervention that has previously been successfully or adequately implemented such as the next phase of risk-based health screening and early detection that was proposed by the MPP, “National programs – Healthy liver, Healthy teeth” (MPP), “Improving the implementation of performance-based financing” (DP)
Innovation and recognition of healthy environment for population health took place in “mitigating the environmental health impacts through the advancement of technology and PPP” (NC), use of AI in disease prevention , “Introduction of national program-Cervical cancer free Mongolia” (both MPP)
Specific interventions proposed such as further developing the emergency care to the international level through PPP on air-emergency care (MPP and NC), “establishment of Health promotion centers to mitigate post-COVID impacts” (DP)
DP has declared mental health problems as an underlying challenge and proposed to strengthen national capacity to diagnose, treat, monitor and prevent. AI is proposed to be used in doing so.
DP has identified a need to revise and implement the State Policy on Health, necessary treatment guidelines and regulations in line with international standards. 80+ Ageing strategy and very important health professionals’ liability insurance law proposed to be developed.
Highlighted the need to develop and implement comprehensive human resources program including capacity building, social aspect and job security (DP)
NC segregated its activities based on demographic groups which makes their target and resources more efficient and realistic. Such public health interventions by the same coalition such as “Monging Milk” and “Nutritious Lunch” are specifically targeted at lowering the child obesity and poor dental health among children.

Stagnant

Generic such as “Modernization and standardization of health facilities and infrastructure” (KhUN) “establishment of New diagnostic centers at the regional level to save people’s time and hassle” or “Provide policy support to the establishment of traditional medical hospitals by the private sector” (NC) which all have been works-in-progress for few decades in the health sector with varied success rates.
Inaccurate word selections, crude literal translations, disengagement, typos such as “Improving diagnostic capacity, treatment choice and patient’s result through improving quality assurance for health equipment, technology and pharmaceutical products” (Khun), “To reform health sector’s administration system and improve regulatory environment-..Эрүүл мэндийн салбарын удирдлагын тогтолцоонд рефорт хийж..” (MPP). This is very confusing and begs for better wording and conceptualization in the latter sentence which could be “To reform/refine develop health system governance” as it is the overarching concept that refers to processes, structures and institutions that are in place to oversee and manage overall healthcare system including administration and leadership aspects within.

Too vague, general, obvious or unclear such as decreasing the burden of preventable disease through the promotion of prevention initiatives including health education and detection (Khun), “Building capacity of health professionals and improving coverage of care through investment of specialized and continuous training” (Khun),“Reforming the health insurance system to alleviate financial hardship for citizens” (MPP), “Strengthening the public health system to prevent from diseases and to promote healthy lifestyles such as exercising regularly and eating healthy” (MPP). Wish these were not too symbolic and vague, Instead, were direct, targeted and segregated.
Too symbolic, impractical or misleading: “Promotion of universal health care so that all citizens can receive necessary health services without any financial barrier” (KhUN). Over the few decades, Mongolia has gradually been attempting to move away from the Universal health system free-of-charge by systematically introducing a balanced mix of social health insurance system and out-of-pocket system. “To decrease morbidity and mortality of preventable diseases by 35%” (DP)
Flat-out ineffective, not-cost-efficient or overpromising: “To increase financial support of those who are required to be treated overseas due to certain illnesses that are not treatable in Mongolia. And to sign collaboration agreement with hospitals overseas to send Mongolians to” (MPP). This non-cost-efficient overpromise, triggered by politicians in the past, would simply go against the very objective of State Policy on Health to invest into and build national capacity in decreasing the number of medical procedures that are not diagnosed and treated within Mongolia. Unmet need in this regard can be unbearable under the current morbidity burden and scarce economic capability, nationally, as well as the general public’s very critical approach on the selection of a few who ends up getting the monetary support.
“To implement policies to train 3000 doctors, 10000 nurses and 500 care takers internationally and locally” (MPP). Apart from nurse practitioners, Mongolia is regarded to have more than enough health professionals per capita. Instead, the main flaw rests upon equal distribution and improving the quality of existing undergraduate, graduate and residential level training at the national academic and teaching medical institutions as well as improving their fair compensation in line with the workload and labor security.
“Building the reference level hospitals in every regional center” (MPP). This can be better conceptualized as Strengthening the current capacity of health professionals, equipment and financial mechanisms of Regional Diagnostic and Treatment Centers (RDTC) and improving the patient-referral system between the provincial health facilities and RDTCs, since RDTCs have been built in all 5 regions, years back.

Lack of current scenario, data, and clarity: “bring the state portion of social health insurance premium to a medium level” (KhUN, DP)

Overall, these portfolios can be applauded for their mention of leading causes of mortality and some morbidity and their relevant interventions among the general population. A largely vague but very common mention of how crucial public health and prevention of disease are. MDP provocatively believes that some hospital buildings need to be auctioned off and modernized. Health is rightfully prioritized and positioned in the opening sections as a standalone chapter.

However, they generally and chronically lack the following: 1) Accurate diagnosis of Mongolian health system, its current state and challenges, and threat to population health 2) Accumulated and emerging flaws in governance, financing and service delivery 3) Prioritized, clear strategies and actions to fix existing flaws at the national policy level as well as service delivery levels 4) Failure to link and address inadequate social determinants of health and adverse environmental health problems as triggering factors of particular diseases and their preexisting health risks. There are no clear division nor linkage between the layers of proposed policy/challenges/ intervention/ activities /objectives/expected result.

These flaws were further weakened by the absence of sound data, clear implementation strategy, achievable goals/targets as well as both adequate financial resources and motivated human resources, within the next 4-year timeframe.

Grades

KhUN: C (innovative, jumped throughout, vague, lacks backbone)

Green party: F (seemingly complete cloning of the Khun’s proposal which is a big red flag)

MPP: B (innovative, continued implementation proposed, vaguely written, left pores, over promising)

DP: B+ (better summarized and systematized, emphasized on policy level, redundancy of vaguely “improving” concept, vague in areas, overpromising)

NC: C+ (progressive, didn’t cover broad policy areas, but specific in those touched upon, overpromising)

About Tsogtbaatar

Dr. Tsogtbaatar is an experienced PhD with a demonstrated history of working for the Academic, State, Non-profit and International institutions in the areas of Public health, Health policy and Health Administration. He was involved in the development of the State policy on health as well as Election flatforms back in 2016 and 2020. Dr. Tsogtbaatar has received 3 degrees in health from prestigious institutions in 3 countries and is currently residing in Colorado.

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Democratic Party, Health, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics, Public Policy, Public Service, Tsogtbaatar Byambaa | Leave a comment

More Election Talk Around Town

Posted on June 20, 2024 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I was about to head to the countryside until election day with likely fewer opportunities to post but now, inclement weather has led to delay of that plan, so a quick set of notes before I leave the city.

General Calm

Compared to what I recall from previous election, downtown Ulaanbaatar seems not to be involved in the election very much.

The new central posterboards for election posters have led to a lack of visibility of the election in the street. I noted in a previous post that there seemed to be many more campaign offices in more residential areas, but they remain absent from the city centre.

It is difficult to tell whether this calm is a sign of apathy among political parties or just the impact of changes to the electoral law. If it is the latter – i.e. the mandated focus on the official poster boards where parties have to equally show all district candidates – then this would seem to be another hurdle for smaller parties to climb. When campaigning is restricted in this way, how can you get a message to voters. The answer given is, of course, social media which Marissa has taken a closer look at. But surely, this cannot be the entire answer as there are some voters who will not be reached by a social media campaign and some who might not be persuaded by such a campaign.

But, this calm may also be restricted to the city centre.

Where’s Waldo, the Candidate

A “where’s Waldo”-style image is called a Wimmelbild in German, wimmeln is to crowd, probably an onomatopoeia, Bild is image. I always liked that word.

Anyway, candidates and their campaign events are hard to find. I and others have tried to reach out to candidates we know individually, as well as to campaign organizations to try to get schedules of appearances and rallies, but are not getting answers. It is unclear why that might be. Schedules are only being released day-of, and various contacts seem to be hesitant to give out information. It is unclear whether they are nervous about foreigners attending election events (it is not like I am looking to be on stage, I quietly stand in the back, take in atmosphere and speeches), or generally nervous about candidates’ schedules. What that also means, however, is that it seems unlike that voters are very aware of candidates’ plans.

DP

According to most views around town, the DP continues to be in disarray. One event that was advertised online and which I was therefore able to attend, seemed to indicate this as well. It also pointed to the struggle to let voters know about events, or to rely on social media entirely for such announcements, as this event was very poorly attended and did not seem to capture casual pedestrians’ attention.

In principle, this was an event I was especially interested in as it involved candidates from the party list. One of the strategic challenges I had been thinking about is how a party list candidate might campaign and how party organizations might allocate resources to party list candidates. Obviously, as a party list candidate, one would want to build the general appeal of the party and could therefore be a candidate anywhere. Given variable places on the list and thus likelihood of being elected, that may mean that candidates are campaign not only for others, but also may be campaigning for others who have a much higher likelihood of being elected.

In the case of this event, it was three younger candidates from the DP party list who were campaigning. The DP lists is generally being criticized for offering very little to voters to capture an “out with the old” sentiment among voters, in contrast to the MPP list that seems designed to do just that. But these three younger candidates were probably meant to exude a freshness or innocence given their ages and lack of previous political experience.

This kind of voter segmentation might make a lot of sense from the campaign’s perspective as well, i.e. if you are trying to promote the party generically to increase the vote share in the proportional representation, perhaps useful to segment voters and offer particular focus areas. In this case, this was youth, under the slogan of “Democracy Calling”. Given the lack of a crowd that came, the puns on that slogan are obvious.

All in all, only about fifty people turned up, many of them wearing DP-insignia t-shirts and carrying DP tote bags, suggesting that they were working for the campaign not unrelated voters. Perhaps the purpose of this event, right in front of the Beatles statue with the State Department Store as a further background, was to film it for social media or other use. Surely different camera angles might mask the absence of an audience. But even more shocking – to me – than the lack of an audience and the apparent lack of surprise or frustration with the lack of an audience, the candidates delivered a very “traditional” campaign event, i.e. they stood on a stage and lectured voters. This is Gen Z campaigning? It did not elicit a single moment of applause, until E Bat-Uul showed up.

I have seen this in previous campaigns as well, i.e. an event where each of the three candidates could have easily sat down on a park bench and had a conversation with <10 voters, maybe even solicited their views or challenges and offered some discussion of how the DP program responded to those. Instead, the three candidates lectured.

MPP

Many of the discussions that I have joined have centred on interpretations of the MPP party list. The consensus remains that the composition was strategically very astute in that it has countered the impression of the MPP as the staid incumbent, instead signalling some kind of departure. Conversations then focus on identifying individuals on the list who are closely associated with Pres Khurelsukh, while others are more closely affiliated with PM Oyun-Erdene or MPP General Secretary Amarbayasgalant, perhaps even MP Uchral who is happy to tell all listeners that he was the second highest vote-getter in the last parliamentary election.

Vote Splitting

One of the unfortunate things about the absence of exit polling is that as researchers we will not be able to tell how voters behaved. Given the changes in the electoral system and especially the enlargement to 13 electoral districts, that would be particularly interesting.

For example, one might imagine some kind of typology of voters: straight party slate, split vote of major party + additional parties, split vote between major parties, split vote across additional parties (perhaps while voting a major party on the party vote). All of these seem plausible, but we can only speculate about voter behaviour. Where this will be relevant to the current election is to understand what frustrated voters might do if they go to vote. On the one hand, one might expect voter frustration to hurt the MPP, but perhaps also the DP. On the other hand, there may be some district races where frustrated voters are looking for alternatives and either converging on some such alternatives, or splitting their votes across multiple alternatives. The former scenario would lead to some candidates who are not MPP, DP, or even KhUN to be elected to parliament, while the latter would reinforce big party, perhaps MPP-dominance.

Party Finance

One of the changes that the recent party law introduced is more public funding for parties. That funding will be based on how well parties do in the party vote. This might explain why so many parties have chosen to nominate candidates for the party list even when their chances at gaining a seat will be slight. I’m hoping that we will have a post on this topic in the near future.

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, Politics | Tagged Julian Dierkes | Leave a comment

The DP

Run-Up to the Election

Results

Outlook

The Park

The Impact

Testing

Technology

Staffing

Accessories

Dedication to Democracy

About Benjamin Nuland

Majority of Women MPs Were Not Directly Elected

Majority of Women Incumbents Lost Their Seats

Take-aways and Caveats

Results

Age

Region

About Benjamin Nuland

Bottom Line(s)

Outlook

Questions

Discovery, exploration, and extraction of minerals

Maximization and management of extractive sector revenues

Good governance and institutions

Comments on platforms

About Dorjdari

Overview of Natural Resources and Ecosystems

Environmental Issues in the Mining Sector

MPP. New Revival Policy Regional Development Reform (Шинэ сэргэлтийн бодлого бүсчилсэн хөгжлийн реформ)

Democratic Party. Full Mongolian, Complete Democracy: Steadfast Development Plan (Бүтэн Монгол, Бүрэн Ардчилал)

KhUN Party “It’s Time to Change” (Өөрчилнө цаг нь болсон)

Civil Will and Green Party. “Have the Courage to Make a Change” (Шинэчлэлд Зоригтой бай)

National Coalition. “Let’s Support National Industry, Let’s Make Nation Rich”

About Bolormaa Purevjav

About Jangar Tsembel

Coalitions?

MPP-DP

MPP-KhUN

Cabinet

President

Foreign Agents Law

Progressive

Stagnant

Grades

About Tsogtbaatar

General Calm

Where’s Waldo, the Candidate

DP

MPP

Vote Splitting

Party Finance

Recent Posts

Topics for Mongolia Focus

Archives