2013 Presidential Candidates: Foreign Policy Proposals

With the election right around the corner, we thought it would be helpful to offer a brief comparison of the foreign policy proposals from the three candidates. Since setting foreign policy measures is one of the primary roles of the president as head of state, it is not only a pertinent topic, but one which the candidates can directly effect, should they choose.

(All information from official Mongolian-language action plans as found on official websites or Mongolian news sites, if I incorrectly translated anything, please do let me know).

For other posts on the respective platforms see

Ts. Elbegdorj – Democratic Party

Incumbent President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj’s action plan saves his foreign policy plans for the last of its 5 sections. The proposal is primarily concerned with Mongolia’s international image, probably in response to some notable scandals lately, including the money laundering issue, and perhaps even the one-sided reporting on Enkhbayar’s arrest last year.

The header to section 5 says that special attention will be paid to Mongolia’s international reputation, as well as the development of policies that strengthen the country’s security, independence, and autonomy. The predictable statements of developing multilateral and bilateral relations (5.1), and cooperating with neighbors and other countries (5.2) are referenced. Attention will be paid to Mongolia’s participation in the regional economy, infrastructure, and security apparatuses (5.3). Specific reference is made to Asia, the Pacific, and Europe (5.5), perhaps setting the parameters of Mongolia’s main geographic focus. He states that Mongolia is committed to strengthening human rights, rule of law, and transparency throughout the Asian continent, with specific attention to Northeast Asia (5.6), which further supports Mongolia’s identity as a Northeast Asian country, as opposed to Central Asian. Foreign and Domestic policy cross paths with reference to Mongolia’s cooperation with internationally backed health initiatives including those against alcoholism (5.8). Section 5.9 and 5.10 support the development of Mongolian studies internationally, although I am bit confused as to how exactly this would be done, and would suggest that it is in large part a concession to more nationalist-leaning voters. Section 5.12 is related, with a proposal to increase Mongolian participation in the in global arts and culture, as well as sports.

 

B. Bat-Erdene– Mongolian People’s Party

Candidate for the MPP, B. Bat-Erdene, makes significantly less focus on foreign policy issues. While foreign policy will undoubtedly be central to Mongolia’s economic, environmental, and physical security, the section of the action plan devoted specifically to foreign policy is significantly shorter than Elbegdorj’s proposal. He titles the section “It is the president’s responsibility to (to ensure) balanced and friendly foreign relations”.

The obligatory statement that government policy will continue Mongolia’s valued peaceful relations is first on the agenda (7.1). Mongolia’s dignity in the international community will be strengthened (7.2). He seems to place additional emphasis on relations with Mongolia’s neighbors by devoting a separate subsection to the issue (7.3), but he is still devoted to furthering Mongolia’s “third neighbor policy” (7.4). He calls for an integrated government foreign policy (7.5), which I find really odd, since Mongolia’s foreign policy has always seemed centralized and united. Like Elbegdorj, he also makes reference to supporting Mongolians abroad, which is likely in reaction to recent incidents against Mongolian citizens in China, but aimed at increasing voter participation in the Mongolian ex-pat community.

 

N. Udval– Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party

N. Udval, candidate for the MPRP, presents an action plan that differs significantly from the rest of the competition. As we saw in the 2012 Parliamentary elections, the MPRP is a largely reactionary party, and seeks broad reforms throughout the country coupled with a decidedly non-subtle appeal for resource nationalization. Foreign policy is covered in number 4 of her 5 action pillars. The MPRP showed an interesting play on numbers in 2012 by using the phrase шударга ёс (justice) coalition, while also presenting 9 candidates (ёс also being the Mongolian word for nine and numerologically significant as 3×3). This year, the party presents 5 policy pillars each with 5 subsections (organization a social scientist is happy to see, I dare say!). Oddly enough the section is not even labeled foreign policy/relations, but rather “Ways of protecting and strengthening national independence and the economy”.

She gets off to a classic enough start calling the enrichment of friendly relations with Russia and China as well as the expansion of the third neighbor policy (4.1). After that, however, the proposals become more specific and interesting than the broad proposals of the other two candidates. The next proposal (4.2) makes specific reference to the importance of access to international markets for landlocked countries, and that she will strive to enhance international cooperation on this front. Subsection 4.3 declares that foreign investment must be helpful and fair to the country, as well as stating that domestic investors should have the upper hand. This is pretty striking and rather odd, considering the still limited avenues available for domestic investors. Subsection 4.4 proposes the implementation of Mongolian majority ownership for strategic mineral resources, such as Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi. 4.5 calls for refurbishing rail and road links from Mongolia to Europe and Asia. This is certainly an important consideration and goes hand in hand with 4.2; however, I am unsure what effect this might have on rail links from OT into China/Russia, considering differing rail gauges and Russian joint-ownership of the Mongolian railway system.

 

Conclusions

Looking at these summaries and combining information from other posts on this blog, three important points come up.

1)    Mongolia has limited policy options. None of these proposals are particularly revolutionary when it comes to the basic tenants of Mongolian foreign policy. All three support continued good relations with Russia and China, balanced by support to the «third neighbor policy». No serious political party can possibly seek to upset relations with Russia or China as the country’s top economic partners, but no one wants to see a Mongolia economically or politically dominated by either or both neighors, necessiting the continued engagement of outside powers, regional and global.

2)    Most of the proposals are made to appeal to voters, not policy makers. By this I mean that for the most part the limited changes proposed seem to be aimed more at attracting voters with vague statements that change is necessary rather than meaningful policy measures. B. Bat-Erdene’s proposal calls for more consistency in policy measures, but I have yet to see any evidence of disjointed policy making from Ulaanbaatar. Rather this seems aimed at dicrediting Elbegdorj’s policies. N. Udval does make reference to some radical proposals (such as the nationalization of stategic resources and the role of domestic investors) that would change the Mongolian landscape significantly, but I can’t see anyway that as president she or her party could effectively implement such measures. The MPRP is in coalition with the DP for the time being, so nationalization is off the table, although some re-negotiation might be a possibility. The role of domestic investment is still limited in a country where the per capita GDP is just over $5,000. Rather, she seems keen to capitalize on the MPRP voter base, which has included a more nationalist-leaning segment of the population since its creation last year.

3)    Third parties make Mongolian politics more interesting. The status-quo DP and MPP are making far more moderate proposals than the MPRP, and while international investors might be worried about her proposals, it certainly does add a strong new voice to the political arena. Her approach is decidedly different, and the move for infrastructal integration and policies to mitigate the country’s landlocked status are laudable (although her role in these policies as president is limited). The MPRP got slightly over 20% of the vote last year, which is significant as a third party. I would certainly like to see some counter proposals by other thrid parties, such as the Social Democrats or the Civil Will, Green Party. While they might not want to waste resources on a campaign they cannot hope to win, new voices and action plans can certianly contribute to Mongolia’s political development.

Posted in Elections, Foreign Investment, Foreign Policy, International Relations, Nationalism, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 5 Comments

Bat-Erdene Election Platform

[This post was researched and co-written by Brian White at The Mongolist blog.]

Bat-Erdene’s platform begins similarly to Udval’s by describing challenges facing the country. He does not go as far as Udval in labeling them as “dangers,” but the same message is being conveyed about the social and economic conditions in the country. He describes a divided government not meeting the needs of the people, a deteriorating natural environment, stagnant wages and high prices, disappointment in Oyu Tolgoi not living up to its promise, an unfair legal environment, and the lack of broad-based government policy.

Eight Responsibilities

The platform is divided into eight sections categorized by “responsibilities” the president has to the country. These are: 1. promote national unity, 2. lead a fair society, 3. promote correct economic policies, 4. implement policies that protect the environment and shore up the national wealth equally and fairly, 5. make the law and courts equally and fairly serve the people, 6. stabilize government employees’ working conditions to provide the people equal and fair services, 7. maintain balanced and friendly foreign relations, and 8. adhere to democracy and elevate the national character.

Within each section he outlines specific policy positions. There is significant overlap in policies with the other two candidates, but there are areas in which the platform is distinct. Under section three, for example, Bat-Erdene emphasizes support for agriculture and animal husbandry. Elbegdorj also outlines policies to support domestic industries but in much broader terms. Udval is more concerned with the social safety net and work conditions.

Mining Policy

Section four includes a promise to more aggressively manage environmental and mining policies. He supports reexamining all mining licenses and debating which projects benefit the country’s development (and presumably eliminating those that don’t) and establishing tough government control over those projects. Oyu Tolgoi is mentioned directly under its own policy position in this section with a call to improve the investment agreement to make it more profitable and balanced. Tavan Tolgoi is conspicuously absent in the any of the policies areas. Udval does include Tavan Tolgoi along with Oyu Tolgoi in areas concerning large strategic deposits, and Elbegdorj does not mention any of the large projects by name, only referring to the mining industry in general terms.

His choice of words is interesting with some policies in section two. Instead of saying “I support policy X,” he says “I support examining policy X.” Examples are reducing the cost of public transportation for the poor in Ulaanbaatar, reducing the costs of higher education, and creating services to support ex-military personnel. The way these issues are presented gives the impression of wanting to strike a populist chord without actually committing to any of them. Given the president’s limited ability to  implement specific policies one could argue that most positions taken in the platforms are empty promises, so equivocal statements with a positive tone stand out against the other unequivocal positions the president has little real power to implement.

Social Media and Images

Both, Bat-Erdene’s homepage as well as his election platform page display logos for Facebook and YouTube very prominently. They also include a Twitter feed. Interestingly, this feed displays messages from Bat-Erdene (fairly sparse), as well as messages that are tweeted at him or mention him. When I tweeted about this post, for example, my tweet showed up immediately on Bat-Erdene’s feed. Such an unfiltered stream means that – surprisingly – criticism as well as praise and random mentions show up on the campaign webpage.

Most of the images on the website show Bat-Erdene among large crowds of people, though they don’t particularly seem to play up his wrestling past or any claims to traditional values.

See also Bat-Erdene’s foreign policy platform.

Posted in Elections, Environment, Inequality, Judiciary, Mining, Mongolian People's Party, Oyu Tolgoi, Party Politics, Policy, Presidential 2013, Social Media | Tagged | 1 Comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #2: May 26-June 8, 2013

Here is the 2nd installment of our new bi-weekly series, the Foreign Policy Roundups. In every roundup, I offer a very brief 1-2 sentence  summary of foreign policy news, with a link to the original article. Most of the articles are from Mongolian-language sources. As a non-native Mongolian speaker, I welcome comments on any mistakes, especially if I incorrectly translated ministry names or other governmental institutions. I am still tinkering with the formatting, but trust that the new layout is a big step forward.

 

Mining

The Mongolian Ministry of Mining signed a memorandum with the French Geological Service on scientific and technological cooperation.

Minister of Mines, D. Gankhuyag made an official visit to Australia. During this trip, he discussed scholarship agreements for Mongolian students to study in Australia.

As Mongolia marked UN World Environment day, President Elbegdorj stressed Mongolia’s potential as a source of wind power, not just mineral resources.

CSIS ran an article on China’s impact on Mongolia’s resource policies.

 

Incidents

Over the past several weeks, the E.U. has been investigating 5 counts of money laundering in Mongolia. One incident involved 5 transfers of 201,000 euro each to B. Davaadorj, Mongolia’s ambassador to Germany.

 

Diplomacy

Mongolia decided to open new consulates in Jakarta, Pusan, and Hailar; plus, embassies in Brasilia, Kabul, Istanbul, and Bishkek.

Robert Reid, Country Director of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, was awarded the Mongolian presidential medal of friendship.

Presidential Advisor, R. Bold, received Baatar Ochirov, the Deputy of the Citizen’s Council of the Republic of Kalmykia. They exchanged opinions on topics ranging from education and economic development to Oirat history.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Bold, met with Adriana Poveda, at the Mongolian Consulate in Madrid.

North Korea and Mongolia marked 65 years of diplomatic relations. 

Minister of Health, J. Amarsanaa, attended the WHO’s 66th annual meeting in Geneva.

May 27-29, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations D. Gankhuyag attended the Proliferation Security Initiative meeting in Warsaw, Poland. During the meeting, D. Gankhuyag met separately with the Polish and Belarusian representatives, to discuss bilateral diplomatic and economic relations.

Mongolia’s Ambassador to the European Union, Kh. Davaadorj, presented his credentials to the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso.

The “Ulaanbaatar Declaration” announced at the 2013 Community of Democracies meeting has been adopted by the UN.

 

Security

Minister of Defence, D. Bat-Erdene represented Mongolia in Singapore at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Posted in 2013, Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Roundup | Tagged | Leave a comment

Presidential Election as Test of DP Dominance

The upcoming presidential election will be the first occasion for the DP’s claims to stand for clean government to be tested in an election campaign since the party’s predecessor dominated the 1996-2000 parliament.

This will be the first election that the four highest (constitutionally and de facto) offices in Mongolia are held by the DP: president, prime minister, chairman of parliament, mayor of Ulaanbaatar.

With these offices comes the power of appointments and executive direction for various state institutions.

Historical Precedents

As Mendee wrote in his argument doubting that a run-off is likely, current DP dominance is the third example of a such dominance by a party in democratic Mongolia after 1996 and 2000.  For each case, the winning party went beyond the political transition of the government as prescribed under the 1992 Constitution and other relevant legislation.

Parties politicized government services by appointing party-affilliated officials beyond political posts in each ministry and agency, took over state-owned enterprises such as the airline, railway, mining companies, and increased their influence over the judiciary.  This competition over the state bureaucracy, provincial and county offices, and state-owned enterprises were slowed down in 2004 and 2008 because of the relatively balanced election results (no single party became majority).

The DP as Underdog

Throughout its existence (and the history of its predecessors), the DP has portrayed itself as an antithesis to the MPRP/MPP’s entanglements with the state bureaucracy. These claims (election shenanigans, use of the bureaucracy for political purposes, etc.) have always had some credibility, simply because of the strength of the MPP, especially in the countryside and of the large number of MPP appointments within the state apparatus.

The DP has thus frequently portrayed itself as an underdog of sorts, fighting against entrenched MPP sympathies within the bureaucracy. Well, it is no longer an underdog, so let’s see how it behaves when it is in charge.

Of particular relevance in the upcoming presidential election will be the General Election Commission and the security apparatus.

In the 2012 parliamentary election commission the GEC played a prominent role, not only for its controversial blocking of the candidacy of now-convicted Enkhbayar, but also because it enforced some stricter innovations in the election law with some vigour and managed the election fairly effectively. Important areas of activity were the feasibility check on parties’ platforms, the approval of candidates, improvements to voter registration, the deployment of electronic vote counting machines, as well as the post-election procedures for re-counts and the certification of election victories. Some of these areas are less critical in a presidential campaign with only three candidates running and the greater simplicity of candidate approval, monitoring and the actual counting of votes in this set-up.

At the same time, there may be greater expectations of the GEC in terms of is supervision of the media which has come to be seen as increasingly politicized through the purchase or control of media outlets by parties and even individual politicians. Any attempts by the MPRP to bargain with the DP or MPP over the candidacy of N Udval may also attract the scrutiny of the GEC.

The Make-Up of the GEC

5 out of 9 members of the GEC are appointed by the Parliament, 2 by the President, and 2 by the Supreme Court.  Only Chairman and Secretary of the GEC are permanent positions.  Although the Law of GEC requires these posts to be filled by civil servants, political parties – especially when they are majority in parliament or hold the presidency – appoint their high-profile party members of the GEC.

The GEC includes two of such politicians at the moment: Ch Sodnomtseren, a former MP from the DP (2004-2008) and member of the DP-led cabinet (1999-2000), and B Bilegt, Chief of the Police Department (Mr. Bilegt was appointed when he was working as Chief of the National Security Council Office, which works for the President). The remaining members are public servants, without notable party affiliation.

The Security Apparatus

The Police Department and the General Intelligence Agency are two critical parts of the security apparatus for the election.  Besides their main tasks, the Police Department maintains safety whereas the General Intelligence Agency ensures security of vote-counting systems and investigates election-related fraud and offenses under the crimes against the state institution statutes.

Logically, any political party and politicians have a strong desire to have influence over these institutions; therefore, both organizations need institutional safeguards from being used by the political parties and to maintain professional integrity.

However, the DP is overriding some of these institutional checks. For the first time, the DP-led government appointed an influential DP member as a head of the Police Department. Although it was an important effort to install civilian oversight over police organizations (just as the DP appointed the first civilian defence minister in 1996), the President awarded the brigadier general rank to this civilian, political party-affiliated chief of the Police.

This certainly undermine the principle of professional merit for police professionals while instigating a desire among police professionals to cultivate connections with political parties for promotion or simply to maintain their posts.

The DP-led government also appointed a party-affiliated official as the Chief of the General Intelligence Agency.  Even though the Prime Minister appeared to accept the decision of the Constitutional Court when appointing the current chief for the Deputy Chief’s post, he later re-appointed his protege as the Chief of the General Intelligence Agency.  The Prime Minister, first, neglected the relevant legislation to keep intelligence appointments out of the parliamentary elections, and second, downplayed the rulings of the Constitutional Court.

 A DP Take-Over?

Some might see the decisions on appointments to the GEC and to posts overseeing the security apparatus as the typical efforts of a party to assert control. This assertion of control by the DP would undoubtedly continue if Elbegdorj is re-elected to a second term. The question will be what use the DP will put this control to? Will it be for (personal) enrichment (or awards for party supporters)? Will it be for the manipulation of voters’ opportunities to express their views? Will it be as a lingering threat to political opposition? Or, will the DP give these institutions the independence and non-political character that would lend credibility to their claims of the mantle of clean governance.

Posted in Corruption, Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Governance, JD Democratization, Law, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013, Security Apparatus | Tagged , | 2 Comments

Udval Election Platform

Speculation about some kind of Udval retreat notwithstanding, based on information contributed by and co-written with Brian White at The Mongolist, we discuss Udval’s election platform here.

Broad Goals

Similar to the other candidates, Minister of Health N Udval intends to fight corruption, reform the judiciary, reduce partisan influence and improve services in governance, protect the environment, make effective use of natural resources, reduce alcoholism, promote investment in schools and hospitals, and continue a foreign policy of good relations with Russia and China and an active courting of “third neighbours.”

Local participation in governments is one of the areas that is addressed by all candidates, including Udval who is calling for the direct election of provincial and city governors (who are currently elected by local parliaments). Udval also emphasizes improvements to the election law. She would like proportional representation introduced to Mongolia’s electoral system (presumably to replace the current mix of proportional and direct election ridings), and she intends to fight electoral fraud and corruption.

In terms of social issues, she emphasizes the need to improve health care, reduce domestic violence, and increase education opportunities in a less business oriented way than her opponents. She also supports a transition to hourly wages instead of the current standard of monthly salaries for most workers. She has a rather strident position on tightening the criminal code to put more people behind bars. On security issues she describes herself as a “security watchdog” who will put the country first.

“Five Dangers” and Twenty-Five Policies

Udval starts her platform by outlining “five dangers” she’ll address as president: 1. Economic dependence and insecurity from foreign influence and domestic corruption, 2. Degradation and exploitation of the working class 3. Divided government characterized by partisan graft and patronage, 4. Degradation of the environment and society, and 5. Lack of faith in a corrupted judiciary and press. The other two candidates have similar assessments of the economic and social challenges facing the country, but their approaches are different. Elbegdorj addresses them less directly in the body of his platform without a point-by-point list of challenges. Bat-Erdene outlines a list of challenges in the opening of his platform just like Udval but with a slightly softer tone and not nearly as extensively as her.

The rest of her platform is divided into five broad policy positions with five issues each, making a total of twenty-five policy points. The structure of the policy areas does not appear to exactly mirror the five dangers portion of the platform, and presumably it is left to voters to make the connections between specific policy prescriptions such as supporting an independent press or improving the conditions of the border protection force and any of the five dangers.

The five broad policy positions are:

  1. The basis of Mongolian political policy is the Mongolian people,
  2. Provide for citizens equally, offer welfare with a mother’s heart, and maintain the national security,
  3. Make the national security “watchdogs” work
  4. Protect and bind the state’s independence through economic means, and
  5. Improve the national justice system.

A Latecomer to Social Media

The imagery of the campaign website is difficult to classify. The first noticeable element of the website is the heavy emphasis on social media. Udval’s Twitter feed takes up the right quarter of the homepage (not the campaign platform page).

This is somewhat surprising as Udval has not been an active tweeter until the beginning of the campaign, having posted a mere 120 messages as of June 9 and gathered not even 450 followers. Even Bat-Erdene, who has also not been terribly active, has tweeted over 700 times and has over 9,000 followers, while Elbegdorj occasionally gets involved in Twitter discussions and has over 60,000 followers. Many of Udval’s tweets thus far also merely lead to photographs or videos rather than engaging potential voters on policy issues, making the prominence of the Twitter feed on the home page an odd choice.

While the front page shows Udval in a traditional deel, further photographs show her primarily at work in business suits.

See also Udval’s foreign policy platform.

Posted in China, Corruption, Elections, Foreign Investment, Governance, Judiciary, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Policy, Politics, Presidential 2013, Social Media | Tagged | 1 Comment

Is Udval in it for Real?

Here are some speculative musings from around the international ger stove…

When the MPRP was deciding on whether to run a candidate in the election some weeks ago, there was a fair bit of speculation that this decision was a calculated one to extract concessions from either the DP or MPP in return for not running a candidate. This is what happened with the MNDP which first announced that it would run a candidate but then endorsed Elbegdorj. One might imagine that the DP offered concessions in cabinet or parliament.

However, the MPRP was unable to strike a deal at the time and nominated N Udval.

Now, there is some talk that perhaps Udval might not really carry through with her candidacy.

How Udval Might Withdraw

It’s still unclear to me what that means as a formal withdrawal is expressly prohibited by the election law (27.8), but I imagine that there could be some announcement of, “Oh, we’ve changed our mind, now we’re endorsing Elebgdorj/Bat-Erdene” from the MPRP. Udval would still appear on the ballot and probably receive some votes, but would not continue to contest the election.

Why Udval Might Withdraw

Such a withdrawal clearly only makes sense if the MPRP is able to strike a bargain with either the DP or the MPP.

Bargaining with the MPP

As the MPP is in disarray and out of power, the MPP currently has relatively little to offer, unless the MPRP was bargaining under the assumption that an MPRP endorsement for Bat-Erdene would be very likely to produce a Bat-Erdene election victory. If this were to come about, the victory will have hinged on the MPRP endorsement and concessions might be substantial.

Clearly, some kind of pardon for Enkhbayar is in the mix of discussions here.

However, as the president does appoint officials to a number of functions, especially in foreign policy and the judiciary, a significant number of positions could be at stake as well. Presumably, securing the presidency would offer a lot of potential appointments for the MPRP.

The longer term potential offer could also be some kind of re-merger of the MPP/MPRP with an eye toward the 2016 parliamentary election, though probably not much sooner as such a re-merger would imply either a grand coalition in parliament joined by the MPP or an awkward continuation of the current coalition despite a party realignment.

What would be the downside to the MPRP? Only the cabinet complications if Bat-Erdene wins. If Elbegdorj still wins despite an MPRP endorsement for Bat-Erdene, the DP would obviously be very displeased with the MPRP. That might mean no pardon for Enkhbayar (which Elbegdorj may be contemplating in any case, independent of any negotiations with the MPRP), and marginalization in cabinet, though the DP can’t really kick the MPRP out of the coalition.

Bargaining with the DP

The DP could obviously offer an Enkhbayar pardon (if that is not already a done deal). Beyond that most likely concessions would have to do with presidential appointments (as in the above scenario with the MPP), and possibly some realignment in cabinet.

By initially running Udval as a candidate, the MPRP would also have laid the groundwork to emphasize its independence for the 2016 Ikh Khural election, though that seems far off and whether voters will still remember this act of seeming defiance is unclear.

Concessions from the DP would also very much depend on Elbegdorj’s perception of his campaign chances. If he feels pretty confident, why offer any concessions to the MPRP and why not take his chances with voters? In a run-off, his chances would probably still be good, even if the MPRP were to endorse Bat-Erdene in this run-off. So if Elbegdorj is happy with his chances, he would seem unlikely to offer concessions.

This is especially true as Elbegdorj may not have much to offer in terms of concessions in parliament. While the DP appears to be united behind Elbegdorj, that might not mean that he has a lot of power to persuade other parts of the party, especially the parliamentary factions, to offer concessions on his behalf.

This speculation is further complicated by the on-going whispers about a post-election replacement of Altankhuyag as PM either in a negotiated fashion or through a party revolt. Given the precarity of the current cabinet arrangement, why would another faction leader saddle himself with a strengthened MPRP in cabinet just to support the president?

Another scenario would be that anyone who is scheming to replace Altankhuyag may try to secure the support of the MPRP in this scheme. In such a scenario this schemer might well be happy to offer concessions in a package for an Udval withdrawal & support for a run on the prime minister.

If Elbegdorj is worried about his campaign, of course, then concessions to the MPRP become much more likely.

MPRP Miscalculation

There is also an interpretation of the rumours about an Udval withdrawal that looks at her nomination as a miscalculation on part of the MPRP, namely that such a nomination would extract concessions, but in the end neither DP or MPP has bitten on that bait.

There may be some realization within the MPRP that Udval as a surrogate Enkhbayar may not be a very strong candidate, that concessions are not forthcoming and that some kind of withdrawal is thus a way to avoid an embarrassing showing in the election.

Conclusions?

In the above, I’ve tried to think through some of the political logic of various scenarios after running these thoughts by some trusted fellow observers of the political scene. I’m not (yet) in Mongolia to be able to pick up direct political vibes and thus can’t offer an assessment of the likelihood of any of these scenarios unfolding, but though that these discussions were worth sharing to offer more of an understanding of the current political dynamics.

Posted in Elections, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 2 Comments

Presidential Election Platforms

[This post was researched and co-written by Brian White at The Mongolist blog.]

A cursory examination of the platforms of all three presidential candidates (incumbent Ts Elbegdorj, Member of Parliament B Bat-Erdene, and Minister of Health N Udval) gives the impression of considerable overlap in policy positions.

All the candidates intend to fight corruption, reform the judiciary, reduce partisan influence and improve services in governance, protect the environment, make effective use of natural resources, reduce alcoholism, promote investment in schools and hospitals, and continue a foreign policy of good relations with Russia and China and an active courting of “third neighbours.”

Note that of these general topics, it is only the areas of the judicial system and foreign relations that fall under the direct powers of the president, while the other policy areas frequently mentioned are areas where the president has at most persuasive powers.

There is so much overlap between the published platforms that it makes it difficult to pick out how these campaigns are different. But, examining the platforms point-by-point, they are not exactly the same. Each candidate emphasizes some areas more than others producing a distinct tone for each platform.

In terms of tone, Elbegdorj’s platform can be summed up by paraphrasing his opening campaign remarks with “we have done a lot, and we have much more to do.” It does not come across as negative or scary, and it is outward looking and future-oriented. This, obviously, is the campaign pitch of an incumbent who has had a relatively successful four years in office, not suffering any major scandals, and seeing his own party win the 2012 parliamentary election.

Bat-Erdene and Udval both start their platforms by outlining the many problems and dangers facing Mongolia. Minister Udval goes as far as outlining “five dangers” she’ll address as president. In general, both of the two challengers see uneven economic development, insidious foreign influence, corruption, a deteriorating environment, and social degradation as dangers to the future of the country.

It is easier to conceptualize the platforms by thinking of them as arranged on a spectrum from the most positive about the current state of affairs to Mongolia, to a more critical assessment. Elbegdorj is enjoying the benefits of incumbency by employing high-minded and positive (yet not terribly specific) rhetoric intended to inspire on one end. Bat-Erdene is then a few paces down the spectrum. He is using his public persona and status as a sports celebrity to express an inspiring message in safe policy areas like national pride but also employing a darker, scarier tone for more controversial policy areas such as the environment and mining. Udval is then at the other end predominantly focusing on the challenges and failures of the country and framing the future as full of dangers.

The considerable overlap in policy positions lends credence to arguments that the election will hinge on personality and perceptions of leadership ability. President Elbegdorj has the advantage of incumbency with a record of experience in national leadership positions. Mr. Bat-Erdene has much less experience, but has the advantage of personal charisma and celebrity. Minister Udval has much more professional and managerial experience than Mr. Bat-Erdene having served multiple times as a cabinet minister and the head of national organizations, but she lacks the benefit of President Elbegdorj’s incumbency and Mr. Bat-Erdene’s personal charisma and celebrity.

Platforms, of course, exist on paper, and each candidate’s position and areas of emphasis may evolve in the course of the campaign as they challenge each other publicly on specific issues. It is also important to remember that the president’s constitutional power is limited, and a candidate’s support of or opposition to issues in policy areas does not necessarily imply (s)he would have any ability to act on those preferences as president. The platforms are interesting reflections of the candidates’ personalities and the political parties’ priorities, but their effectiveness as a guide to how each will govern is arguably weak.

The candidate’s platforms are available here:

 

Posted in Corruption, Democracy, Democratic Party, Education, Elections, Foreign Policy, Health, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Policy, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 6 Comments

I’m Still Thinking Run-Off…

Mendee has posted some very good reasons why he thinks a run-off following the June 26 presidential election is unlikely. At least until we see another Sant Maral poll (I’m hoping there will be one more before the June 19 ban on further polling) that indicates tendencies and directions about voter preferences, I will stick with my earlier expectation (not prediction) of a run-off.

What Triggers a Run-Off?

There are actually two conditions under which additional voting is triggered, one that is focused on participation by electoral district, one that is focused on the vote share garnered by the winning candidate.

1. If fewer than 50% of the eligible voters in a given electoral district vote, there will be additional voting one week after the initial vote (ie July 3). [Article 61.7, Law on the Presidential Election of Mongolia] No matter whom voters have voted for in a given district (= roughly 800 to 3,500 voters), 50% of them have to cast a vote to validate that district’s result.

2. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes cast in the entire country, a run-off between the top two candidates will be held two weeks after the initial vote, i.e. July 10. [Article 62, Law on the Presidential Election of Mongolia]

I am interested in the second kind of run-off here, i.e. the leading vote-getter on June 26 only gets a plurality of votes, not a majority, triggering a run-off between the top two vote-getters, i.e. Ts Elbegdorj and B Bat-Erdene, unless something really dramatic (and unlikely) happens in the campaign.

Electoral Math

 Third (and more) Candidates

In my post previewing the election for the Financial Times’ ‘beyond BRICS’ blog, I had initially mistakenly written that N Udval was the first third candidate in a presidential election because the 2009 election when I was an election monitor only involved N Enkhbayar and Ts Elbegdorj.

Let’s quickly look at the vote share of 3rd and 4th candidates in previous elections (I’m taking all the figures below from the nicely organized Wikipedia pages on Mongolian presidential elections).

1997: 6.8% (J Gombojav, Mongolian Conservative United Party)
2001: 3.6% (L Dashnyam, Civil Will)
2005: 14.1% (B Jargalsaikhan, Republican Party); 11.5% (B Erdenebat, Motherland Party)

If we assume for a moment that there is some continuity in voters’ behaviour when faced with a choice of more than two candidates, independent of the party affiliation and the party candidates themselves, we would expect Udval to receive some share of the votes that lies between 3 and 15%, roughly. [If there are any election specialists out there, I would welcome comments on whether such an expectation of consistency across elections is reasonable.]

Thinking purely about the numbers then, every percentage point of votes that Udval receives, means that one of the two other candidates has to win that many more votes relative to the other candidate. If Udval wins 10% of the votes, for example, Elbegdorj would have to win over 56% to Bat-Erdene’s 44% among the remaining 90% of voters who didn’t vote for Udval in order to avoid a run-off. The number of votes Udval can garner thus has a significant impact on the likelihood of a run-off.

Put another way, winning candidates in multicandidate elections in the past have been able to avoid the run-off by decisively beating the 2nd place candidate.

1997: N Bagabandi’s 62.5% vs. P Ochirbat’s 30.6%
2001: N Bagabandi’s 59.2% vs. R Gonchigdorj’s 37.2%
2005: N Enkhbayar’s 54.2% vs. M Enkhsaikhan’s 20.2%

1997 and 2001 seem particularly relevant here as both elections involved three candidates and the 3rd candidates received relatively few votes, a scenario that is likely this year. In both elections, Bagabandi received around 60% of the votes.

Udval Candidacy

The question of how strong Udval will be as a candidate is what I devoted the first post in this series to. The early days of campaigning have not given any indication that she is building any significant momentum by turning out to be a candidate that holds a (surprising) appeal to any specific groups of voters. I will thus stick with my guess of a result of more than 3%, but probably less than 10% for her for the moment. Obviously, that is quite a range when taking the electoral math above into account.

Let’s look at results from last year’s parliamentary election as a guide. Udval appears to be widely perceived as a stand-in for Enkhbayar so we might assume that she will receive a good portion of the Enkhbayar loyalist vote. I also assume that most Enkhbayar loyalists are fairly motivated to vote as they are disgruntled about Enkhbayar’s fate. They may also be concentrated in the countryside where participation rates are higher.

To estimate the share of Enkhbayar/MPRP loyalists, it is the share in the popular vote in the parliamentary election that is relevant as direct mandates in specific ridings might be subject to a different dynamic. The Justice Coalition received 22.3% of the popular vote in the 2012 parliamentary election.

Obviously, these are not all MPRP or Enkhbayar loyalists as the Coalition also includes the Mongolian National Democratic Party and I don’t see any obvious way to take a guess at the share of the 22.3% that might have been MPRP vs. MNDP voters. However, my above estimate of 3-10% for Udval looks low when we look at the Justice Coalition’s 22.3% as that would suggest that as few as 10% or only as many as 40% of Justice Coalition voters were MPRP voters.

Despite the lack of excitement around Udval or her “Five Dangers” platform, the above does lead me to expect that she will get a share of the vote that might well force a run-off unless Elbegdorj can really outpoll Bat-Erdene.

Elbegdorj Candidacy

This is the part that makes me hesitate to actually predict a run-off rather than to merely think it likely. I think that Mendee is absolutely right that Elbegdorj may well campaign very effectively and simply win the election, no matter what mathematical hurdle the Udval candidacy throws in his way.

He could win the election by a) running a very strong campaign himself, b) Bat-Erdene’s campaign faltering, or c) (perhaps most likely) some combination of a) and b).

Obviously, Elbegdorj has been in Mongolian politics for a long time and has a lot of experience campaigning. He continues to be a rousing speaker, and Mongolians seem to find him engaging (if not personable) when they see him from afar or on TV, as well as more up close. His presidency has not seen any major scandals or disasters that are tied to him in any way. There are some areas where he will point to achievements. In the absence of any mistakes during his first term, Elebgdorj will presumably enjoy some incumbency bonus.

Bat-Erdene Candidacy

Unlike Elbegdorj, Bat-Erdene is relatively untested as a candidate. Yes, he’s been elected to parliament, of course. But, even in 2012, he was elected via the Khentii aimag constituency. In some local races, the campaign may well amount to perceptions of a candidate as strongly rooted locally (I imagine that Bat-Erdene’s wrestling career helped here, as wrestlers often seem to be closely identified with their aimag of origin), as well as face recognition. His election and re-election in Khentii thus doesn’t necessarily signal that he’s a strong campaigner in the way that Elebgdorj’s involvement in multiple national campaigns does.

It thus remains to be seen whether Bat-Erdene runs into any scandals or gaffes along the way in the campaign that seriously hurt his chances. And, as is evident from previous elections, a weak second choice can certainly propel a frontrunner past the 50% hurdle.

DP Strength

Finally, Mendee’s argument about the strength of the DP organization and its strength in various state bodies is very interesting and perhaps most worrying. This will be one of the important aspects to watch about this election. Policy differences between Elbegdorj and Bat-Erdene might not amount to very much, but an Elebgdorj win would clearly cement DP domination for the next three years. Mendee’s reference to the winner-take-all aftermath of the 1996 or 2000 elections is thus a warning sign of what may be going on at the moment. This surely deserves a post of its own, in addition to a focus on this topic on this blog and by election monitors.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Run-off Is Unlikely

Politics in Mongolia is always interesting, dynamic, and puzzling – especially, towards  elections.  I like to challenge Julian’s earlier post about the potential for a run-off in the presidential election and argue that the incumbent has a strong likelihood of winning outright; therefore, runoff is unlikely.

Elebgdorj’s Popularity

First, President Elbegdorj, despite the small margin of victory over the MPP candidate in 2009, still leads the public opinion polls – regarded one of the strongest politicians.  Of course, with doubts in public opinion polls (without clear understanding of their methodology and degree of objectiveness), Elbegdorj appears to hold a relatively high ratings.

Second, Elbegdorj didn’t made any visible mistakes in last four years.  His attempts to strengthen the mining regime, to increase  public participation in the policy-making processes (e.g., Citizen’s Hall), to advocate the devolution of power to locality, to discourage alcohol consumptions, and to promote Mongolia’s international image (e.g., extensive travels, visibility in foreign media and forums) were important contributions to our democracy, governance, and sovereignty.

Third, his critical approach to the MPP-led government was appealing.  However, as the election nears, he seems to be caught up in constraints of the current political and economic structures.  He became noticeably silent about questionable behaviours of his former party (technically, he must be politically neutral when he is holding the power of presidency).  On these three points, he would easily get enough votes to secure his second term.

DP Dominance of the Political Structure

Then, there are reasonable beliefs about the DP dominance in the political structure – which provides protection at minimum and support at maximum.  Clearly, the DP is not playing by  key governance principles (e.g., rule of law, transparency, equal opportunity).  Following the MPRP’s ‘winner take all’ principle of 2000, the DP has already used similar tactics. Now we see repeated pattern of ‘winner take all’ from the DP take-over in 1996, the MPRP in 2000, and now in 2012.

First, the DP and its coalition didn’t consult with other political actors and public when changing the key electoral laws (Law on Local Elections and importantly, Law on the Presidential Election).

Second, the DP now took over all key agencies in charge of organizing, monitoring, and enforcing the elections.  DP-affilliated politicians are now heading the General Election Commission, the Police Department, the General Intelligence Agency, and Chief Prosector’s Office.  The DP has already taken over key state-owned enterprises and  financial institutions.  All these institutions, in principle, should be politically neutral and professionally administered.

Third, the majority of provinces are now lead by the DP-affilliated politicians.  Although it is difficult to know how much influence these DP-affilliated politicians are asserting at the local level, the likelihood is very high when one looks at behaviours of the DP politicians in the national government.

With his own mostly positive profile of the last four years and the DP’s dominance in  domestic politics, Elbegdorj is likely to win a  second term presidency; therefore, run-off appears to be unlikely – especially, when the economy is enjoying growth and bonds.

 

 

Posted in Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 2 Comments

New Book: Does Everyone Want Democracy? Insights from Mongolia

Does Everyone Want Democracy? Insights from Mongolia by Paula L.W. Sabloff. Left Coast Press 2013. 266 pp., 282 pp. / 6.00 x 9.00 / Apr, 2013, eBook (978-1-61132-719-9), Hardback (978-1-59874-565-8)

Do all people desire democracy? For over a century, the idea that democracy is a universal good has been an article of faith for American policymakers. Anthropologist Paula Sabloff challenges this conventional wisdom about who wants democracy and why. Starting with the psychological literature, she explains that certain values (personal dignity, self-determination, and justice) appear to be universally esteemed today, partly because they match up with some universal human such emotions as hope and fear. She argues that people can live these emotions and values better under democracy, which promotes economic and political freedom, than totalitarianism, which does not. Thus the principles of democracy may, indeed, be universal. However, the data collected from 1,283 interviews of Mongolian citizens suggest that how people want their government to act is idiosyncratic. Mongolians’ culture, history, current circumstances and future aspirations influence how they want government to support them and how they view their role in maintaining democracy.

The book begins with an historical chapter, for one cannot talk about governance in Mongolia without understanding Chinggis Khaan and his place in the hearts of Mongolians today. Photographs from the archives of the National Museum of Mongolian History illustrate the historical chapter.The book then describes people’s changing attitude toward human rights, political rights and freedoms, economic rights and freedoms, government’s responsibility toward its people and citizens’ responsibilities toward their government. Tables and original photographs illustrate this part of the text.

This fascinating study of Mongolia – feudal until it became the first country to follow Russia into communism and now struggling with post-socialist democratization – is a model for investigating how everyday people around the world actually think about and implement democracy on their own terms.

Paula L. W. Sabloff is a professor at the Santa Fe Institute. She is a political anthropologist who has conducted research in Mexico, the United States, and Mongolia. She has taught at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Pennsylvania. She curated the exhibition “Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan” at the University of Pennsylvania Museum and the National Museum of Natural History (Smithsonian Institution). She is editor of several books including Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan (2001), Mapping Mongolia (2011), and Higher Education in the Post-Communist World (1998). She is currently applying network theory to Mongolian and Mexican databases.

Posted in Democracy, Elections, Governance, Politics, Publications, Research on Mongolia, Society and Culture | Tagged | Leave a comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #1: May 12-25, 2013

This is the first in a bi-weekly to weekly series, that I am calling the Foreign Policy Roundup. In every roundup, I offer a very brief 1-2 sentence  summary of foreign policy news, followed by a link to the original article. Most of the articles are from Mongolian-language sources. As a non-native Mongolian speaker, I welcome comments on any mistakes, especially if I incorrectly translated ministry names or other governmental institutions. Future posts will include commentary on important developments and stories.

…………………..

5/12: Ts. Jambaldorj was named Mongolia’s representative to ASEAN. http://politics.news.mn/content/143834.shtml

5/12: The President of “Russian Railways”, V. Yakunin arrived in Mongolia and met with President Altanhuyag and Minister of Transportation, A. Gansukh, to discuss joint projects and planning. http://politics.news.mn/content/143838.shtml

5/13: Foreign Minister L. Bold met with the General Secretary of the OSCE, L. Zannier. During the meeting Zannier expressed his happiness that Mongolia had become an official member of the OSCE, and L. Bold thanked the organization for their help in organizing the Community of Democracies meeting.  http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2436%3A2013-05-13-09-31-03&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/13: State Secretary J. Bayartsetseg represented Mongolia at the UN General Assembly on the question of Human Trafficking, where he presented Mongolia’s legal measures to stop human trafficking. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2436%3A2013-05-13-09-31-03&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/13: Mongolian Minister of Labor, Sanjmyatav signed an MOU with his South Korean counterpart on an official visit to the ROK. http://politics.news.mn/content/144145.shtml

5/14: Ministry of Justice State Secretary J. Bayartsetseg met with the director of the UN Drug Department Yu. Fedetov. During the meeting they discussed options to jointly address technical and legal issues on this topic. Drug trafficking’s connection to human trafficking and corruption was also mentioned. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2438%3A2013-05-14-07-04-59&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/14: The Mongolian consulate in Eren, China (Inner Mongolia) met with Chinese officials to discuss a recent attack on a Mongolian citizen in the city. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2439%3A2013-05-14-08-12-43&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/14: Mongolia’s Parliamentary Director, Z. Enkhbold received the North Korean ambassador, Hon Gyu. http://politics.news.mn/content/144164.shtml

5/14: Foreign Policy reported on a Mongolian-led project with Myanmar at Mozambique to form an group of resource-rich countries bordering on BRICS nations. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/14/mongolia_myanmar_mozambique_alliance_m3

5/20: The Senate Marshal of Poland’s Parliament, B. Borusevic, made an official visit to visit with members of the Mongolia’s Ikh Hural. This was his second visit to the country, and he commented on the remarkable changes he observed on Ulaanbaatar since 1999. Both sides noted the importance of Parliament-to-Parliament relations.  http://politics.news.mn/content/144851.shtml

5/21: During B. Borusevic’s visit, he signed off on four projects, dealing with Mongolia’s natural environment, child welfare, and “green development”. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2445%3A66-4-&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/21: Deputy Minister D. Terbishdavga attended the 13th Mongolia-China Government Relations Commission in Beijing. http://politics.news.mn/content/144989.shtml

5/22: Parliament Director Z. Ekhbold met with CEO Mike Jones of Jenny Oil, where they discussed recent surveys in Mongolia. Survey research results indicated that Mongolian resources might be of higher quality than Arabian oil reserves. http://politics.news.mn/content/145199.shtml

5/22-5/24: Mongolia’s Minister of Transportation, A. Gansukh, was in Germany for the International Transport Forum. http://politics.news.mn/content/145461.shtml

5/24: Mongolian Minister of Energy, M. Sonompil, discussed energy issues in Vienna, Austria at the Austrian National Parliament. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2453%3A2013-05-24-07-23-16&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/24-30: Vice President of the German Parliament, Edward Oswald, is on an official visit to Mongolia, during which he will be meeting with the Mongolia-Germany Parliamentary Working Group. http://politics.news.mn/content/145281.shtml

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Udval Candidacy

It appears that the MPRP is pressing on with the nomination of Health Minister N Udval for the presidential election.

There had been some doubts about the sincerity of the nomination and speculation that the MPRP was merely trying to use the nomination as a bargaining chip with the DP and MPP, just as Enkhsaikhan had earlier in the month. While the official announcement from the General Election Commission won’t come until May 23, it now looks likely that the announcement will point to three candidates, Ts Elbegdorj (DP), B Bat-Erdene (MPP) and Udval (MPRP)

Significance of Udval Candidacy in Campaign and Election

While this is very significant in that Udval will be the first woman to run for president, what does her candidacy imply for the election?

The most likely impact may be that it will make the necessity of a run-off election between the top two candidates very probable.

Why? If past election results offer any guidance, Elbegdorj and Bat-Erdene are likely to be  close in the votes that they will garner. There’s nothing about either candidate that suggests at this point that this will be otherwise in this election.

In 2009, for example, Elbegdorj won with just over 51% of the votes against N Enkhbayar in an election where Enkhbayar clearly didn’t have the full support of the then-MPRP. The current scenario is similar in that Bat-Erdene has the full support of the MPP, but Udval will collect some of the votes that Enkhbayar received in 2009. These votes will come disproportionately from the MPP, rather than the DP, but there may also be some DP and coalition-supporters who could conceivably vote for Udval.

Support for Udval

How many votes will Udval get? This has to be a very speculative discussion at this point, in part because Udval had not really been anticipated as a likely candidate (the Sant Maral Foundation did not include questions about her in the PolitBarometer, for example) and in part because a three-way race may well change the dynamics of the campaign in a significant way. Also, it’s unclear whether Udval’s candidacy might attract significant support from women voters. In the past, there don’t seem to have big blocks of women voters for one candidate or another, but that may not be a reason for such a block or voting differentials to emerge in this election. Not only is Udval a female candidate, but she is the Minister of Health, an issue that is ranked higher in importance by women around the world. Of course, she has been a relatively quiet member of cabinet and is really primarily seen as a stand-in and loyal supporter of Enkhbayar.

Given the perception of Udval as a stand-in for Enkhbayar it is to be expected that Enkhbayar loyalists will vote for her, especially if a run-off is likely. If the campaign leads to an expectation of a run-off then an Udval vote is low-risk for an Enkhbayar supporter who might otherwise prefer Bat-Erdene to Elbedorj.

Given the MPRP’s electoral success in last year’s parliamentary election and other potential supporters for Udval, it strikes me as unlikely that she would received fewer than 5% of the vote.

Electoral Math

It seems to me that Udval is likely to gain more than 5%, but that a share much beyond 12% is unlikely. That, however, implies the necessity of a run-off.

Why? For argument’s sake, let’s assume that Udval wins 10%. That leaves 90% of the votes to be distributed (to avoid a run-off, a candidate needs 50% +1 votes of the valid votes, I believe). For Elbegdorj (who continues to look like the likely winner) that would imply he would have to win approximately 55% of the remaining votes vs. Bat-Erdene’s 45%.

Given past differentials and the current look of the Elbegdorj-Bat-Erdene race, it strikes me as somewhat unlikely (but entirely possible) that Elbegdorj would receive that many of the non-Udval votes. The campaign seems set to unfold primarily on personality issues and here it seems unlikely that either Elbegdorj or Bat-Erdene is going to make enough headway to really distance himself from the other candidate.

While they are very different personalities, Elbegdorj primarily ran on his oratory skills and “clean government” claims in 2009 along with a Obamaesque message of hope and change. He is gearing up for a very similar campaign now.

Bat-Erdene, on the other hand, is largely relying on his wrestling-fame and reputation as someone who is in touch with and supportive of “traditional Mongolian values”. His only major policy initiative has been the “Law with the Long Name” which remains mired in implementation struggles.

Neither of these profiles currently, i.e. ahead of the beginning of the official campaign, looks like it will produce a margin of victory that would avoid the run-off.

This in turn would lead me to conclude – tentatively and for the moment – that a three-way race under the current circumstances looks to make a run-off election (on July 10) very likely.

Note

Note that my fellow bloggers disagree with some aspects of this analysis. I would therefore particularly welcome comments, especially on the potential power of Udval’s campaign as well as the math involved in a run-off.

Posted in Elections, Gender, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 2 Comments

Book Chapter: Democracy and Risk

Democracy and Risk: Mongolians’ Perspective

Paula Sabloff in J. Dierkes, ed. Change in Democratic Mongolia – Social Relations, Health, Mobile Pastoralism, and Mining Leiden: Brill.

Brill: Change in Democratic Mongolia“Democracy and Risk” uses statistical analysis to suggest correlation between Mongolians’ evaluation of democracy and their concerns about the future. Those who say that democracy is good for Mongolia or that Mongolia will be able to sustain democracy also say that they expect their country and their family to survive or thrive in the new capitalist system. Those who state that democracy has bad traits or that it will not work in Mongolia are frequently pessimistic about the country’s economic future. Based on a subset of 1,283 open-ended interviews conducted among voting-age citizens in 1998 and 2003, this analysis contradicts other social scientists’ and policy-makers’ idea that democracy can only survive in a nation that has already reached a certain level of economic development. Maintaining democracy seems to be linked more with education level than economic level. And socialism left Mongolia with a very high literacy rate (ca. 98 percent).

Paula Sabloff writes further:

Since writing this chapter, I have had two thoughts about the relationship between democracy and risk. First, I wonder if some Mongolians were optimistic because they expected the country’s rich mineral deposits would soon boost the Mongolia’s GDP and all citizens would benefit. And second, the more I read, the more I believe that risk is another human universal–like a sense of fairness and resistance to dominance. If all humans have the innate ability to project into the future (which they do), then we all think about the future, and future thinking is one mode of thought that permeates our ideas of governance.

Posted in Book: Change in Democratic Mongolia, Democracy, Governance, Public Opinion, Research on Mongolia, Social Issues | Tagged | 1 Comment

The Mongolian Presidency

As three parties in the Ikh Khural have now nominated candidates for the presidential election to be held on June 26 (DP: Ts Elbegdorj; MPP: B Bat-Erdene; MPRP: N Udval), it might be useful to review the role of the president in Mongolia’s democracy to understand the nature of the looming campaign.

Powers of the President

When a new constitution was adopted in 1992, it set up a bit of a mixture of a presidential and a parliamentary system.

To offer some quick comparisons, the Mongolian president is less powerful than the U.S. or French president, but more powerful than the German president or the Canadian Governor General. The Mongolian prime minister is less powerful than a German chancellor, or a Canadian or British prime minister, but more powerful than the French prime minister. The Mongolian semi-presidential system is more similar to hybrid systems in Central and Eastern European, and the Baltic states.

The Mongolian presidency is endowed with a symbolic, ceremonial role as a head of state and at the same time, with ‘checks and balance’ responsibilities in legislative, executive, and judicial affairs of the state.  In legislative affairs, the president has ceremonial duties (e.g. summoning the first openning session of the parliament) as well as significant powers over the legislative process.  The president has the right to initiate legislation, to veto (partially and fully), to bring any issues concerning domestic and foreign policies to the parliament (at any time), and to dismiss the parliament if it fails to appoint a Prime Minister within 45 days of the initial nomination).

Although the President has a limited powers over the executive, parliament requires consent (endorsement) from the President to appoint the Prime Minister,  and members of the cabinet.  The President has a unique entitlement to give directions to the Prime Minister on issues pertaining to national security, foreign policies, national unity, and other areas, to require the Prime Minister’s reports on implementation of his directives, and to attend Cabinet meetings.

If the President perceives the Prime Minister and his cabinet to be pursuing policies contravening parliament-approved domestic and foreign policies, or the government action plan and/or fail to implement Presidential directive, the President has the right to introduce a motion of no confidence to the parliament.

Presidential power is most significant when it comes to the judicial system.  These powers include the nomination of three out of nine members of the Constitutional Court,  the Prosecutor General and Deputy Prosecutors to the Parliament, to appoint/relieve members of the General Council of the Courts as well as judges at all level.

In addition, three other domains increase the President’s responsibility significantly.  The first is the position as Head of National Security Council, which is the highest consultative body of the government to discuss issues pertaining to national security matters.  The President, as a head of this consultative body, which includes the Speaker of the Parliament and Prime Minister, calls for meetings and issues directives for any government entities.  It also adds an institutional capacity for the President through the Office of the National Security Council and by requiring key government officials to report to the Council.

Second, the President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.  This includes the right to appoint the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (in consultation with the parliament), to maintain control of the Armed Forces during war time and national emergencies, to declare national emergencies and mobilization, and to approve key documents concerning the structure and employment of the military force.

The final area of presidential power is foreign policy.  As head of state, the President represents the state in the international arena, appoints ambassadors, and recognizes foreign ambassadors.

Election Procedures

Posted in Democracy, Foreign Policy, Governance, JD Democratization, Judiciary, Law, Politics, Presidential 2013, Public Service | Tagged | 3 Comments

Major Revision of Mongolian Mining Regulations Is Underway

The first public debate on the proposed revisions of Mongolia’s mining regulations was conducted at the Citizen’s Hall of the Mongolian government on January 18, 2013. Although the revisions are long overdue, legislators appear to be in agreement that more deliberations are necessary in order to reflect the concerns and suggestions of miners, investors and the public prior to submitting the final bill to the parliament. As stressed by Tsagaan Puntsag, the head of the presidential office, lawmakers avoided politicizing the revisions, opting instead to push for a more comprehensive, long term regulatory framework (Minutes of Debate, Citizen’s Hall of Mongolia, www.irgen.org).

Since 1994, the Mongolian parliament has revised the mining regulations several times to attract foreign investments in the 1990s and later to ameliorate domestic concerns over corruptions and irresponsible mining activities in 2000–2010. Although the Mongolian government concluded the first major investment agreement with the Western companies Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. over the Oyu Tolgoi copper deposits in 2009 (Press Releases of the Mongolian Government, Rio Tinto, October 6, 2009), the country’s mining sector has experienced three major challenges.

The foremost issue of concern is environmental damage. Due to loose environmental standards and limited bureaucratic capacity to enforce environmental laws and regulations, artisanal mining—which began with the government’s “Gold program” in 1990—as well as exploration and mining activities by domestic and foreign companies have caused extensive environmental harm. In particular, herders experienced increased pollution of their normal water sources and pastures. Pushed by demands from environmental and local activists, the parliament quickly approved the Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration in Water Basins and Forested Areas (known as Law with the Long Name) in 2009. Under the law, the government cancelled over 200 mining and exploration licenses that operate within 200 meters from water and forest sources (http://politics.news.mn/content/110242.shtml). However, this sudden measure caused intense opposition from miners while raising public expectations for stricter enforcement and revisions in the major mining and environmental legislation.

Corruption is the second challenge. As a result of the politicization of the public service and transitional difficulties experienced by the judiciary and bureaucracy, corrupt practices became widespread in the government agencies—in particular, the provincial authorities as well as the Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM), which oversees mining licenses. According to various corruption assessments, the mining sector was regarded as one of the sources for corruption (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE136.pdf). A recent trial of a number of MRAM officials illustrates this widespread corruption. After a yearlong investigation, the former director and officials of MRAM were sentenced for illegally issuing 120 mining licenses, including the extension of four licenses of the SouthGobi Sands Company (News.mn, Bloomberg, January 31). Although some suspect the investigation was one sided and politically motivated—and clearly only addressed activities from the last two years—it will certainly appease the public’s call for transparency and accountability in mining licenses.

Local communities as well as domestic businesses have generated the final challenge. Under current mining regulations, local communities who are most affected by mining activities are left out of the decision-making process. Moreover, small- and medium-sized mining companies contribute less to local economic development, but their activities cause more local damage given the weak environmental protection regime and limited state capacity to deal with irresponsible mining practices. In comparison to the 1990s, domestic business entrepreneurs and entities have increased their demands that the government support their initiatives to play a broader role in the mining sector. For example, a consortium of Mongolian companies was established in 2010 to participate in major mining projects such as the Tavan Tolgoi coal deposit (Unuudur, November 24, 2010). Furthermore, the Mongolian business community increasingly demands legal mandates that would force foreign investors to contract with local businesses.

In response to these challenges, President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj suspended the issuance and processing of both mining and exploration licenses in 2010, until comprehensive revisions were made to the existing regulations. The presidential decision was subsequently endorsed by members of the National Security Council and the parliament (Parliamentary Resolutions to Extend Suspension of License Issuance in 2010, 2011, 2012, Legal Data Base of the Government, www.legalinfo.mn). Consequently, the earlier working group on mining law revision was expanded to include parliamentarians, government officials and experts and began to work under the auspices of the presidential office from 2011.

Unlike earlier mining legislation, the current law-making procedure has several unique features. First, Mongolia is relying heavily on its own experts and experience of mining in comparison with its reliance on foreign experts in the mid-1990s. The lawmaking capacity of the government bureaucracy was also noticeably enhanced by the inclusion of professionals educated in developed countries, in particular Australia. Moreover, the government has accumulated substantial experience in dealing with both foreign and domestic investors at different scales. Second, as indicated by the president and working group members, Mongolia has studied the practices of resource-based economies like Australia, Canada and Scandinavia, in addition to the examples of Chile and other developing states (http://president.mn/eng/newsCenter/viewEvent.php?cid=&newsId=711&newsEvent=). Third, the lawmaking process has been very inclusive and avoids the dangers of politicization. By comparison, the Windfall Profit Tax Law (2006), the strategic deposit amendment to the Mining Law (2006), the Law with the Long Name (2009), and the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (2012) were passed with little deliberation and limited consultation from miners, activists and the public because the law-making process was driven by the political calculations of parties and politicians. This time, the draft was debated at the National Security Council, parliamentary standing committee and, importantly, the Citizens’ Hall since April 2011. The Citizens’ Hall, established by the presidential office in 2009, is a key venue to facilitate public deliberations on the revision of the mining law. Meanwhile, in order to address public concerns, the working group has engaged civil society activists, local governments, government agencies and various professional organizations.

The new mining law will introduce stricter environmental requirements (in particular relating to mine closures and rehabilitation), increased local participation by delegating the initial approval authority to local communities, improved control and enforcement by the government bureaucracy (especially in license issuance), and greater requirements for local development and local sourcing. Broad agreement exists on the need for comprehensive revisions to the mining law, although some criticism remains over the new proposed license classifications and increased role for government as well as local community participation. Nevertheless, the government is finally responding to public discontent over the consequences of decades of weak mining regulations. Consequently, Mongolia will likely avoid both resource nationalism as well as the resource curse.

Note: re-posted with the permission of the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, for the original news, Eurasia Daily Monitor (March 6, 2013) – link

Posted in Corruption, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Governance, Law, Mining, Mining, Oyu Tolgoi, Social Movements | Tagged | 2 Comments