Rio Tinto in Mongolia

By Julian Dierkes

Recently, Bulgan B and I pointed out that there have been as many CEOs at Oyu Tolgoi over the past ten years as there have been PMs of Mongolia.

I also appeared on a live BBC radio show from Oyu Tolgoi (I was patched in from the CBC’s studio in Vancouver), “Business Matters”.

So, Oyu Tolgoi has been on my mind, as it always looms large in discussions of contemporary Mongolia.

When a Twitter follower pointed me to an interview with Rio Tinto CEO JS Jacques (previously overseeing Oyu Tolgoi as part of Rio Tinto’s copper group), I was keen to check it out.

Resource Nationalism

I was disappointed to see this discussion of “resource nationalism”. Apparently, Jacques talked about this “topic” at a Miami conference in May, but I haven’t been able to locate a recording/retelling of that speech.

I have previously attempted to examine the claims made that Mongolia is falling victim, home to rising, [pick your verb] resource nationalism. Jacques seems to fall entirely into the category of using this term as a way to scare the world about governments that are asking for a greater share of profits, dividends, business in large mining projects. Apparently, Jacques even called for a UN of the mining industry to counter this “threat”. He also seems to have mentioned Mongolia/Oyu Tolgoi in this context.

In the interview that appears in the video above, Jacques talks about this around 11′. He talks about governments wanting a greater share. However, that is the constitutional duty of any government so if Jacques and Rio Tinto want to “counter” this, good luck! Mongolian resources belong to the people and the state acts as a caretaker of this property. This is the same in Australia, Canada, the DRC and elsewhere. As the owner of this resource, every people or the government that acts on the people’s behalf, should absolutely strive to maximize the benefits from granting a private investor the right to explore/mine this resource. Obviously, this investor has every right to negotiate about the distribution of benefits. However, there is no political ideology, movement or anything that I recognize in how Jacques describes “resource nationalism”, nor do I understand how this could be “on the rise”.

Rio Tinto in Mongolia

Interestingly, Jacques stated that “we [Rio Tinto] don’t do politics as a matter of principle” (around 7′). To me this is problematic and this is where the frequent turnover of Rio Tinto-sent executives to Oyu Tolgoi is problematic. Just like politics can’t be kept out of sports (the World Cup or other events), so it is silly to pretend that a company that is involved in a project that will at some point account for 1/3 of a country’s GDP “does not do politics”.

In Jacques’ terms, I think that Rio Tinto is not doing very well at the “B2P business”, the business-to-people business in Mongolia. One of the reasons may be executive turnover or the type of executives that have been sent to Oyu Tolgoi, but for many Mongolians I interact with, the contributions that Oyu Tolgoi makes to their material well-being are not clear, even though I see many such contributions. That is a challenge to Rio Tinto/Oyu Tolgoi and the claim that an executive who has spent time at Oyu Tolgoi that he doesn’t do politics does not give me much reason to expect that Oyu Tolgoi will be successful in creating more stable regulatory environment for itself in Mongolia until the B2P business is taken more seriously and the company engages the concerns, understanding and aspirations of the Mongolian people more directly. Note that I would not suggest that Oyu Tolgoi meet all these expectations which can be somewhat outlandish at times, but that it engage in a discussion about them.

Yes, as Jacques points out, Rio Tinto has been a transparency leader by disclosing contracts, including the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement, but it has been lagging in helping Mongolians understand this agreement and in engaging them in discussions about this agreement.

One example of this also showed up in this video. Jacques discussed the importance of technological innovation, AI, etc. for Rio Tinto (around 25′). Later on he also mentioned the large proportion of Mongolians on Oyu Tolgoi’s workforce. Many Mongolians look at employment as a central element of benefits that project will provide. So, here’s Rio Tinto priding itself in providing employment, but also selling itself to investors as striving to reduce the number of employees. That, I think, requires some more discussion in the Mongolian context.

Posted in Foreign Investment, International Agreements, Mining, Mining, Mining Governance, Nationalism, Oyu Tolgoi, Policy | Leave a comment

Job Rotation in the Mongolian Cabinet, at Turquoise Hill and at Oyu Tolgoi

By Julian Dierkes and Bulgan B

Any observer would agree that the development of Oyu Tolgoi has been a winding and meandering path. In the foreign press and from an international investor perspective, mentions of the frequent turnover of Mongolian prime ministers are almost as frequent as the totemic invocation of the vacuous “resource nationalism” label. While those observations are correct in pointing to frequent turnover in Mongolian prime ministers, they rarely note the matter that CEOs of Oyu Tolgoi – ultimately appointed by Rio Tinto – have been almost as numerous as Mongolian prime ministers. In fact, since 2007, there have been an equal number of PMs as Oyu Tolgoi CEOs!

Prime Ministers

Nov 2007 – Oct 2009: S Bayar
Oct 2009 – Aug 2012: Su Batbold
Aug 2012 – Nov 2014: N Altankhuyag
Nov 2014 – July 2016: Ch Saikhanbileg
July 2016 – Oct 2017: J Erdenebat
Oct 2017 – present: U Khurelsukh

Note that we’ve excluded the very brief “acting PM” interlude of D Terbishdagva in 2014.

Oyu Tolgoi CEOs

Keith Marshall: Feb 2008 – Dec 2010
Cameron McCrae: Dec 2010 – Oct 2013
Craig Kinnell: Oct 2013 – Oct 14
Andrew Woodley: Nov 2014 – Sept 2016
Stephen Jones (Acting CEO): Sept 2016 – May 2017
Armando Torres: May 2017 – present

Turquoise Hill CEOs

Robert Friedland: founder – Apr 2012
Kay Priestley: May 2012 – Nov 2014 [July 2012 name change from Ivanhoe Mines to Turquoise Hill Resources]
Jeff Tygesen: Dec 2014 – June 2018
Luke Colton (acting): July 2018 – present


While the turnover in government executive is rooted in a) electoral politics, and b) factional politics, why have there been so many Oyu Tolgoi executives?

Much has been written about turnover in the Mongolian government, but less attention has focused on turnover that is initiated by an investment partner like Rio Tinto. In their recent open letters, SailingStone Capital has criticized the lack of independence of Turquoise Hill management vis-a-vis Rio Tinto, but a similar argument could surely be made regarding Oyu Tolgoi management.

All OT CEOs have been placed in their positions from previous roles within the Rio Tinto organization. Their appointments have often come with claims that they bring specific skills to the job that are well-suited to the context that OT is operating in, like a focus on construction and development or a specific kind of operation.

That may well be the case, but it means that there is very little continuity among the OT leadership. Rio Tinto has repeatedly claimed that their financial investment is matched by a commitment to Mongolia as a location for its investment, but executive turnover is one aspect among several that casts some doubt on that commitment.

It is fair to criticize the Mongolian government for several kinds of lack of continuity (changes in taxation, governance requirements, etc.), some of those discontinuities are a natural and, ultimately, desirable aspect of democracy, i.e. this lack of continuity represents expressions of Mongolians’ political will.

But in businesses like Rio Tinto, Turquoise Hill, and Oyu Tolgoi, turnover is not induced by democratic processes, or external actors (at least not typically). So, it is difficult to fend off the impression that Oyu Tolgoi is often treated by Rio Tinto as a business unit that does not exist in a particular social and political context.

Presumably, Rio Tinto is planning to operate Oyu Tolgoi for many decades. Mongolians certainly are counting on a mine life of many decades for Oyu Tolgoi. Given that longterm relationship and the acute need for social license to operate for mining operations around the world, more continuity in the management personnel sent by Rio Tinto could not only signal commitment but allow the company to engage with Mongolia as a social and political context more seriously than they have in the past. Yes, the company is hiring Mongolians, of course, as specified by the Investment Agreement, but also to reduce costs. Yes, important agreements have been reached with the population of South Gobi. But the turnover in executives has added to the impression that Rio Tinto has resisted treating Oyu Tolgoi as anything other than a specific column in a global spreadsheet, without personality and without locally specific expectations.

Posted in Business, Mining, Mining, Mining Governance, Oyu Tolgoi | Tagged | Leave a comment

The UB Dialogue at the Crossroads

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan

The designation of Singapore for the historic summit of US President Donald Trump and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-Un probably relieved Mongolian government officials, security personnel, and capital city residents. It would not add any financial pressures like hosting the ASEM summit, which is still the under close auditing investigation. Instead of running the annual Khaan Quest peacekeeping exercise, the Mongolian military and security personnel would be mobilized for the additional security tasks for the summit. And, city residents would be distressed because of road blocks and increased traffic delays. Therefore, Mongolians, especially those in UB, are happy to be recognized as the only neutral destination for belligerent parties in North East Asia and watching the historic meeting in Singapore just before the much-awaited World Cup in Russia. Indeed, the Mongolia’s bid for hosting the summit caused many to search Mongolia on the map and to wonder “why Mongolia?” Frankly, if the summit had scheduled in Mongolia, Mongolia’s steadfast, modest initiative, which is known the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue,” could be interrupted for this year. Since we’re having another UB Dialogue at the interesting moment of International Relations, Mongolia needs to nurture its very own creation for the multilateral dialogue mechanism. [Earlier, Julian and I raised a similar point.] A gradual, sustained, small effort would make contribution to the regional cooperation.

A Brief History of the UB Dialogue

In 2008, the Mongolian Institute for Strategic Studies along with the George Marshall Centre for European Security Studies organized a conference, titled “Ulaanbaatar as Helsinki?” The concept paper of conference (written by O Mashbat) drew an interesting analogy between Helsinki effort and potential Ulaanbaatar initiative.

After multiple failed attempts at creating a bridging dialogue between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 60s, the Finnish government offered Helsinki as a venue for conference for such purpose. As a result of a series of negotiations, 35 nations of divided Europe signed the Final Act for the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. Later, this conference was transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which operates in Vienna, Austria. Why did Finland make such an offer? First, Finland, because of its troubled relations with its two powerful, populous neighbours (Sweden and Russia), had always attempted to be a part of the larger European region. Second, Finland maintained a policy of neutrality to any issues and conflicts between Western Europe and Communist Bloc. Therefore, the neutrality and dream of regional integration had resulted in an innovative policy of hosting multilateral dialogue.

Like Finland, Mongolia is a small state between two powerful, populous, and nuclear powers. This ‘regionless’ fate pushes Mongolia to reach out countries in the closest region, which is North East Asia. At the same time, Mongolia has avoided to be a part of conflicts between two neighbours as well as proximate region. This requires the country pursue neutral, friendly foreign policy. Probably, with this logic in mind, several small workshops and discussions were followed. In 2013, the President endorsed the ‘venue for multilateral dialogue’ idea and coined the UB Dialogue – as a part the wider foreign policy initiatives to engage all Northeast Asian countries, including those in tenuous relations.

Why Is Mongolia So Eager to be the Host?

For one, the geographical fate dictates its foreign policy move to increase its international and regional visibility. This is quite self-explanatory. The other important reason is historic. From 1911 to the present, Mongolia always made efforts to reach out to states in Asia Pacific in general, Northeast Asia, in particular. [Here is also a link for more detailed post on historical perspective.] Its attempts had often hindered by geopolitical competitions and behaviours of Great Powers. However, Mongolia was a part the Asian community of communist countries in 1950s. It invited many newly independent small states of the Asia Pacific Region in 1960s-70s to share its experience of the CMEA-aided economic development. It was a hub for the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace.  In 1980s, it pursued a quite aggressive policy for offering itself as a dialogue venue for peace and cooperation in Asia. Regretfully, its attempt to advance itself as the North East Asian Dialogue venue in 1989, at the 50th anniversary of Khalkhyn Gol Battle (Nomonhan), was failed as the country experience domestic political turmoil and economic crisis. Nevertheless, Mongolia’s desire to be the host for multilateral dialogue recharged from the early 2000. Therefore, Mongolia’s multilateral approach to North East Asia is recurrent.

Tangible Results?

Capitalizing on its successful foreign policies and neutrality, Mongolia facilitated bilateral talks between hostile parties of North East Asia. On May 23, 2014, Mongolia first-ever hosted the track 1.5 meetings between the United States and DPRK. This event was attended quite senior level officials from both governments along with scholars. And, of course, Mongolia was shortlisted and recognized the most neutral country for the US and DPRK summit in North East Asia. Similarly, like Vietnam, Malaysia, and China, Mongolia provided the venues for the Japan – DPRK intergovernmental meetings twice (2007 and 2012).

Besides hosting the bilateral talks, Mongolia became the only place which welcomes military personnels of China, Japan, South Korea, and United States for an annual peacekeeping exercise, Khaan Quest. At the Five Hills Peacekeeping Training Centre, these militaries join for the UN peacekeeping spirit and collaborate through the command post and tactical exercise and humanitarian drills. More interestingly, North East Asian countries, excluding North Korea, have been supporting the Mongolian military’s peacekeeping capacity building efforts. For example, Russia provides armoured vehicles, China renovates the recreational facility for peacekeepers and provides equipment for the engineering units, and the United States gives funding for the development of the peacekeeping training centre, training and education, deployable hospitals, and other necessary equipment. Moreover, Japanese Self Defense Force engineers build roads for the peacekeeping training centre whereas South Korean companies built some training facilities. This makes the peacekeeping is one of the most tangible results of Mongolia’s multilateral cooperation with North East Asia.

What’s Next for the UB Dialogue?

The UB dialogue is arriving at the crossroads – whether it would continue or disappear like many other multilateral initiatives. Even though unlikely, major powers would transform the six party talk as a new regional security dialogue mechanism or re-energize the Asian Regional Forum. Or, trilateral forms (e.g., Russia – North and South Koreas, China – North and South Koreas) emerge. Most of regional players want to be visible and agenda-setters. Within this larger, competitive regional security dialogue initiatives, the UBD must find its place and continue its modest contribution. Because of the geographical pressure (‘regionless’ fate) and foreign policy patterns of projecting itself as a multilateral dialogue venue would never disappear. It may wane at one point, but recur quite often. Therefore, Mongolia needs to set a vision, roadmap, and plan for longer term beyond the presidential and parliamentary elections. In that way, the UB dialogue would represent the country’s foreign policy continuity and attempts to be a part of the North East Asian region. This requires a sustained modest funding and resources to take an complete ownership and agenda-setting either alone or with partners. With a lead agency (i.e., Institute for Strategic Studies and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the UB dialogue could pursue a specific niche topic or theme and seek partners to collaborate over 3 or 5 years. For instance, the recent decision of the de-nuclearization process of the Korean peninsula opens an interesting area for the academic cooperation on the nuclear weapon free zone – stretching from Mongolia to Korean Peninsula to Japan. This dialogue on North East Asian nuclear weapon zone discussions could be rotated between the UB dialogue and potentially, Pyongyang Dialogue. Or, Mongolia further expands its UN peacekeeping experience by inviting the Korean People’s Army for the dialogue and research – which would eventually result in KPA peacekeeping deployments or even establishing North East Asian peacekeeping standby force. Similarly, building on Mongolia’s current disaster-relief exercise, Gobi Wolf, which already have international participants, Mongolia should welcome and share experience with North East Asian partners. All these themes could be discussed, investigated, and developed at the UB dialogues. Therefore, the UB dialogue could present modest contribution for bringing Mongolia together with North East Asia and North East Asian states closer to UB.

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Mongolia doesn’t need to join the SCO

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan and Julian Dierkes

Like Switzerland for NATO, Mongolia’s absence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) creates a neutral spot in the Chinese-led regional grouping. But, Mongolia neither hinders any dreams of the creators nor presents any benefits to the SCO.  We argue that Mongolia shouldn’t attempt to seek a membership in the SCO for three reasons:

For one, the SCO and agendas of its members are irrelevant to Mongolia.  For China, the SCO is a multilateral framework to combat the ‘three evils’ (i.e., terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism) and a forum to secure access to natural resources, especially oil and gas. For SCO members, it is a venue to seek endorsements for their authoritarian rule and to accommodate differing priorities of Russia and China. Although sharing Chinese concerns over religious extremism, Russia assertively defends its geopolitical privileges in the former Soviet republics against rising Chinese interests. Mongolia neither possesses oil/gas nor does it experience religious extremism.

Second, the institutional structure of the SCO are still not clear to Mongolia. Decision-making processes and financial aspects are not transparent. Clearly, Beijing and Moscow have more agenda-setting power than all other Central Asian states with the regional leadership rivalry between Astana and Tashkent challenging to collaboration of the SCO members. Mongolia’s entry to the SCO would create more complexity for the country’s foreign policy objectives. Like 2005, Moscow and Beijing are seeking ways to deal with the United States; thus requires all other peripheral states to serve the Sino-Russian agenda.

Third, the SCO is still considered an ‘’authoritarian club” (except for India) and new aspirant members – Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran – all would strengthen this authoritarian club image. Mongolia is the only democratic state in the periphery of Russia and China. All human rights, importantly political and religious freedoms, have been upheld and protected. The state hasn’t used any violence (with exception of July 1, 2008) against its population.

Therefore, joining in the SCO would bring less benefit to Mongolia, rather than constraining its space for foreign policy maneuvers and darkening the image of democracy – if one understood as a process of reaching consensus without violence and respecting human rights.  A neutral, domestically stable, and economically prosperous Mongolia has been the interests of Sino-Russia. Mongolia’s economic link to Central Asia is very unrealistic than Mongolia’s outreach to North East and Southeast Asia. 

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Present and Past of Mongolia: 15 Years of Changes as Observed by a Civil Engineer

By Kenji Maruoka
Translated from Japanese by Ts Jangar
Originally published as 「谷川, 聡. (Tanigawa Satoru).(2017). モンゴルの今と昔2000 年から土木技術者として見てきた15 年の変遷~. KON BAINA UUNo16

It was my first visit of Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, where I came to work for Japan’s ODA program in the early May of 2000. It was snowing, when I went for morning walk. There I saw a kid, going to school and eating an ice-cream. I realized an astonishing difference with the sense of cold.

Ruts before construction of interstate road.

Same location with single paved road.

The center of the city was compact; few cars on the street made it easy to drive. Since we came to implement a Ulaanbaatar City road maintenance project, we visited various places in the city and noticed that streets in urban areas, other than the centre of the city, were paved poorly, had a lot of potholes and shattered sidewalks, and there was a surprisingly high number of unpaved gravel roads.

Urbanized area of Ulaanbaatar in 2000.

Urbanized area of Ulaanbaatar in 2015

In addition, paved roads in the rural suburbs were quite limited, few ruts in the prairie appeared to be a national road, promising time-consuming travel with a high risk of getting lost.

East end of the former Teeverchid road (2000).

East end of Narny Zam in 2007.

The construction of standard highway, instead of these dusty ruts, would increase the travel speed, reduce the risk of getting lost in the winter and no risk of endangering lives.

The population of Ulaanbaatar increased from 780,000 in 2000 to 1.4 million in 2015 at a galloping annual rate of 3.9%. Meanwhile, the number of cars increased from 42,000 to 331,000, an increase by eight times. Urbanization in 15 years is significant but the pace of change is hardly remembered.

Social Change over 15 Years

15 years is long enough to make a 15-year old girl become a 30-year old woman. In this period of time the number of cars and people increased, but the number of drunk people and street children living in manholes has decreased. The fashion outfits of people walking the streets significantly improved. The variety of foods on menus has been enriched as well as quality of goods in the stores has improved.

A two-lane road with no buildings along road, changed to four lanes. It is one of the visible results of development effect.

A two-lane road with no buildings along road, changed to four lanes. It is one of the visible results of development effect.

Life expectancy has improved for women from 65.9 to 74.2 and for men from 60.1 to 65.6. The social changes that took place were partially the result of urban development and improvement of infrastructure such as roads.

On the other hand, a decade-long migration of people from rural area and concentration of them in Ulaanbaatar from 2003 to 2013 (in the 2009 increase by 11.7%), raised urban problems such as air pollution and traffic congestions. Considering the current state of infrastructure development, which is a premise for everyday life, it is important to pursue convenience and increase an effect of development in terms of the quality of life.

In my opinion infrastructure development, such as a road construction, as a part of the public projects, had a development-inducing effect within 15 years of changes.

Development inducing effect has a great potential for a developing country such as Mongolia, supporting not only the growth of the city and the people who live there, but also supporting environment and improve the landscape, aiming to become a green city.

Peace bridge area in 2000.

Narny Zam and Peace bridge area in 2007.

Narny Zam near Peace bridge in 2017, using bridge pierce we were able to construct four lane road. Improvement of road dragged many businesses alongside of the road.

The pursuit of the convenience of a car society gave negative results such as traffic congestion, air pollution, parking problems, and increased traffic accidents due to ignorance of traffic law and poor driving manners. These reduce all positive effects of development.

I think, in order to maintain comfort in the city, while preserving the natural environment, we should not forget the circumstances that brought us from 15 years ago to present. And it’s also important to look 5 to 10 years ahead and not neglect efforts that derived the effect of development.

West side of central railway station in 2000.

West side of Narny Zam in 2007.

West end of Narny Zam in 2017. West end of Narny Zam in 2017. The dusty gravel road with impassable mud after rain transformed into four-lane all-weather road irrelevant to dust

Narni Zam (the road named after Japan as “road of Sun”), three main intersections (Eastern intersection, Western intersection, and intersection at the Geser temple), and Narni guur (Bridge of Sun, named after Japan) have became a part of Ulaanbaatar urban life and common objects of everyday use. But as someone who participated in the realization of these projects, as well someone who constantly was involved in infrastructure development since 1978 throughout South-East Asia, such problems tend to be solved when society becomes wealthier.

Infrastructure development never goes smoothly; there is always a sense of certain trade-off when society gains but at the same time loses something. Moreover, this lost part is always left behind and never experiences an efficacy of development.

I would like to believe that generation raised in society under wealth and prosperity will eliminate these negative losses.

About Kenji Maruoka

Born in Tokyo in 1949, Mr. Maruoka is a graduate of Hokkaido University, Faculty of Civil Engineering (1973). He became a construction consultant and since 1978, for 40 years was engaged in overseas projects, particularly in Asian countries. Since 2000 Mr. Maruoka is involved in road and other development projects in Mongolia.

His long-standing achievement in Mongolia was recognized and the Order of the “Polar Star” (video news) was awarded by the Mongolian government in December 2017.

About Ts Jangar

Mr. Jangar Tsembel was born in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (1974). After graduation from the School of Foreign Services of the National University of Mongolia (1996), Jangar worked as an interpreter in ongoing development projects in Mongolia and since 2000 was employed in a consulting company as assistant of Mr. Maruoka until 2014. Currently he is graduating from the program of Natural Resources Conservation, Faculty of Forestry, UBC and planning to continue for a master degree in the same faculty.

Posted in Bilateral Aid, Change, Development, Infrastructure, Social Change, Ulaanbaatar | Leave a comment

Virtual Nomination of Anti-Corruption Leaders: Political Innovations?

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan and Julian Dierkes

The role of social media continues to be something that we are watching closely. The most notable example of social-mediated democracy was Ch Saikhanbileg’s 2015 SMS poll. But, despite Mongolian politicians’ early embrace of social media (see my list of current MPs on Twitter as an example), we’ve also noted that the influence of social media in the 2016 parliamentary election, for example, was limited.

Social Media Polling for Anti-Corruption Appointments?

On April 24, the President’s Chief of Staff Z Enkhbold officially announced President Battulga’s “unique” decision of sharing his responsibility of nominating Chief and Deputy Chief for the Independent Authority Against Corruption with the public. According to Enkhbold, citizens would nominate their candidates for Chief and Deputy Chief separately through the presidential office website ( For more on the general structure of the IIAC see our previous blog post.

After a week, on May 2, the presidential website noted that 6,405 people responded to the nomination.  6,382 people nominated 179 candidates for the post of Chief while 5,657 people nominated 317 candidates for the post of Deputy Chief.

The top ten nominees included five former police colonels and others, including Z Enkhbold, “Buyan” Jargalsaikhan, Chairman of the Mongolian Republican Party, and G Baasan, a civil society activist, as the only women among these most-nominated individuals. Since the Anti-Corruption Law requires a minimum of years of public service experience (i.e., 15 years of public service experience for the Chief’s nomination and 10 years for Deputy Chief), legal training, and not holding political posts for 5 years prior to the nomination, only police officers seemed to meet the requirements.

On May 4 the President submitted the nominations of D Davaa-Ochir (police colonel) as Chief and J Batsaikhan (police colonel) as Deputy Chief to parliament. Davaa-Ochir is a former Deputy Chief of the Authority for Implementation of Court Decision (the marshal service) and Chief of the Secretariat for the National Security Council, which falls under the President’s portfolio. Batsaikhan used to work as a Chief of the Department of IAAC in 2007-2016 and Deputy Chief of the marshal service afterwards.

Social Media Democracy?

Following the presidential submission of candidates, on May 8, the parliamentary Standing Committee on Justice voted in favour of not discussing the presidential nominations because the president had violated the prescribed nomination procedures for senior leaders of the IAAC.

This seems an odd response since the President seems to have only solicited nominations. He did not put these nominations to an SMS or Twitter poll popular vote, but let himself be inspired by the list of individuals suggested by citizens. Were Davaa-Ochir and Batsaikhan on any short list that might have been prepared in the President’s office prior to the call for nominations? We don’t know.

It seems like anti-corruption agencies are a particularly thorny governance challenge. They need maximal independence from incumbent politicians to be credible in investigating government-linked corruption, but there is also a sense of “who watches the watchers” and a need for democratic legitimation for anti-corruption activities. The nomination poll is a very minor step toward a reimagining anti-corruption governance, but it seems worth further consideration.

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What to Call a Trump-Kim Summit?

By Julian Dierkes

Yes, an actual meeting between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump still seems somewhat unlikely, and the chance that it would happen in Ulaanbaatar is even smaller. But if it did happen … there are some plans to be made! After thinking about logistics, here are some not-so-serious suggestions.

The Brand

What would we call the meeting?

  • Steppe Summit
  • Grassland Summit
  • UB Summit
  • 22UB Summit (get it, 2 to Ulaanbaatar?)
  • Ger/Yurt Summit
  • Tuul Summit (as in the Tuul River, but also the two participants…)
  • Chinggis Summit
  • Khaan Summit
  • Kharkhorin Summit

No clear winner in this list yet. For now, I’ve started using #SteppeSummit on Twitter.

Most likely, the world and its journalists will come up with something cringe-y like the many variants of Minegolia and Moncoalia we’ve heard over the past decade. Surely, Chinggis Khaan will feature prominently in reporting. In the end, as condescending toward Mongolia as some of those puns and labels are, there’s probably little to be done about them.

Please leave more suggestions in the Comments!

Any Marco-Polo-inspired suggestions, John Fusco?

The Tag Line

And, the meeting would need some kind of slogan…

  • Come wrestle the Mongolian president and world peace!
  • Come talk among the (greyish) clouds
  • If Chinggis could have nine places of worship in his capital, we can handle two nutty leaders!
  • When a double-deel just isn’t enough.

Activities, Photo Ops, Program for Accompanying Spouses

Some ideas:

Obviously, Trump and Kim would both have to try their hands at archery and be photographed doing so.

Also quite obviously, Pres. Battulga would not miss the opportunity to take the leaders to “his” giant Chinggis Khaan statue.

For accompanying first ladies – if any – cashmere would probably be the obvious choice, but horses could be an alternative.

For the state dinner, everyone seems to assume that a common like for burgers will win the day, but I enjoy the kimchi khushuur that have been popping up, but I’m not sure that Donald Trump can handle that kind of fire. Airag would obviously be the drink of choice.

Posted in Curios, Mongolia and ..., North Korea, Tourism, Ulaanbaatar, United States | Tagged | Leave a comment

Sounds of a Ger

By Julian Dierkes

For any visitor to Mongolia who has the chance to sleep in a ger, that is probably a highlight. I enjoy it every time I have a chance.

One of the aspects that often makes it a very enjoyable experience are all the little noises around the ger.

Sometimes you’ll be able to see stars through the roof flap and that makes listening to the noises even more enjoyable.

Obviously, a free-standing ger is more likely to provide the audio soundtrack than a ger camp ger, but still.

There’s nothing quite like a herd of small sheep and goats moving around the ger as you’re lying inside. Their bleating comes in so many different varieties and then there is also the sound of so many small hooves….

If yaks are around, their strange snorting, snuffling grunts are pretty fun to listen to.

Dogs near and far will set each other off in a barking fit at some point in the night or in the morning.

Cows will honk angrily in the morning, perhaps impatient for milking to commence.

And then there’s horses. Obviously their hooves are more formidable sound than those of small animals.

In many areas of Mongolia there are a lot of birds as well. Cuckoos are quite common in wooded areas, craws everywhere. Lots of birds of prey as well who sometimes let you know they’re around.

More likely than not, you’ll have a crackling fire in the stove. With a bit of luck it’s even a dung fire that adds the herbal grass scents to the sounds.

There’s probably some kind of flap loose somewhere around the ger, so if it’s windy, you’ll hear that.

Chances are that whatever you’re sleeping on is creaky.

All of that adds up to a sometimes wonderful soundscape. No wonder, Mongolians will tell you that after sleeping in a ger you will wake up with a clear head.

For a much better written rumination about the sound (or its absence) of the steppe, see Pico Iyer’s “The Heart-Clearing Stillness of the Mongolian Countryside

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Elevate Ulaanbaatar Dialogue


By Julian Dierkes and Mendee Jargalsaikhan

Mongolia is in a good position to contribute to renewed dialogue with North Korea in order to avert confrontations and, in the long run, lead to more constructive interactions. In an eventful Spring 2018 and with the emotional footage from the Interkorean Summit in mind, an upgraded Ulaanbaatar Dialogue in June could make an important contribution to international dialogue to enhance Mongolia’s steadfast efforts of promoting itself as a Northaast Asian ‘Helsinki’ – ultimately aiming to get rid of its regionless fate.

The North Korea Challenge

The DPRK remains a significant challenge to the emergence of Northeast Asia as an economic region of intensified exchanges that capitalize on geographic proximity, an uneven distribution of natural resources, and, in Mongolia’s case, the challenges that come with landlocked status.

For Mongolia in particular, the challenges that arise are a) threats to peace, b) challenges to its economic integration with Northeast Asia.

Regional Peace as an Aspiration

Mongolia has a very direct stake in the uncomfortable stalemate that exists on the Korean peninsula because of the large community of Mongolians who live and work in the region outside of Mongolia itself, especially in South Korea, but also in Japan and China. Any military conflict would directly impact these Mongolians. Mongolia would also be directly impacted by threats to its transportation routes, especially all rail and plane traffic that moves to the South and East, i.e. to Beijing, Seoul, Narita, and beyond. In the catastrophic event of any kind of nuclear confrontation, Mongolia would obviously suffer as much as the rest of the world.

Northeast Asia as an Economic Region

Mongolia remains an isolated economy and neglected actor despite its attempts of integrating into the regional and global economy. Tensions on the Korean peninsula create pressure for Mongolia to take a side in this conflict and to derail all, even modest, steps of reaching out beyond Chinese and Russian markets. Currently, Mongolia has a free trade agreement with Japan, is deepening economic ties with South Korea, securing favourable deals to use Chinese ports for its trade with East Asian economies, and maintaining low-scale economic interactions with North Korea. Mongolia has devoted steadfast diplomatic efforts and resources in a newly active economic diplomacy over the past several years.

Current Events

The Spring of 2018 has seen a series of events that make this a moment for action. After the first year of the Trump presidency had led to an escalation of name-calling, sabre-rattling, and missile tests, the Olympic Truce suddenly seems to have opened a window to a new kind of engagement of the DPRK. Now the world is waiting for the inter-Korean summit, possibly including a peace declaration if not treaty, and after that, some kind of meeting between Trump and Kim, followed by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in June where a trilateral summit between Pres. Battulga, Putin and Xi has been announced already.

If any of these meetings go well at all, they are likely to lead to further engagement and further meetings.

Mongolia’s Role

Mongolia provides a neutral atmosphere because it does not have any direct interests in the process, except for providing the good offices and proximate neutral ground. Mongolia maintains friendly relations with all parties and has remained outside of any multilateral mechanisms to resolve the Korean conflicts.  In a nutshell – Mongolia is the most neutral, friendly country in Northeast Asia.

Beyond direct involvement in hosting a Kim-Trump meeting in Ulaanbaatar, any kind of follow-on meetings and discussions may be of even greater significance to the region and a reengagement of the DPRK. One existing forum for such meetings is the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue.

Ulaanbaatar Dialogue

Mongolia has had a long-lasting desire to reach out to Asian countries, but its desire was constrained due to the Cold War ideological divide, Sino-Soviet rifts, and, of course, lack of resources to maintain such efforts.

As the Mongolian economy grew during the commodity boom, Mongolia began to host international events:

In April 2008, Mongolia’s Institute of Strategic Studies organized the “Present and future Security Environment in North-East and Central Asia: Ulaanbaatar — New Helsinki” international conference in cooperation with the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies.

Building on these efforts, on 29 April, 2013, at the 7th Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies, held in Ulaanbaatar, President Ts.Elbegdorj formally initiated the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security.”

Since then the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue has been held annually as a track 1.5 (meaning that some governments officials have participated, and some independent voices, especially academics as well) forum for discussion.

The most exciting Ulaanbaatar Dialogue meeting occurred in 2017 when the Deputy Foreign Minister of North Korea participated and held bilateral meetings with some of the other governments represented, including Canada and Japan.


  1. Given the moderate success of past Ulaanbaatar Dialogue meetings, Pres. Battulga should renew the presidential commitment of his predecessor, Ts Elbegdorj, immediately to integrate planning for any meetings between North Korea and other countries into an accelerating Spring schedule.
  2. Whether the Institute for Strategic Studies is tasked again, or whether the organizational role is passed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dialogue should be planned in an upgraded way with a series of substantive discussions and the involvement of Pres. Battulga and FM Tsogbaatar.
  3. The Mongolian government should approach international donor organizations and governments who have contributed funding in the past to assemble a package of funding making the participation of North Koreans and of academics and civil society leaders from other countries possible.
  4. The Mongolian government should make a concerted effort to inform parties to tension on the Korean peninsula and interested third neighbours about the Dialogue and to solicit their participation.

P.S.: Sharing Our Opinions

While we are opinionated, we generally focus on analyses in our blog posts. Here, we are explicitly offering an opinion and recommendations and have therefore marked the post as such.

Posted in Canada, China, Germany, International Relations, Japan, Mongolia and ..., North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Ulaanbaatar, Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, United States | Tagged | Leave a comment

Implications of Power Politics for OT and Elsewhere “Offshore”

By Marissa Smith

About a week ago, Mendee and I agreed to write a pair of blog posts on the question of how OT and the current wave of corruption investigations and arrests, most recently involving former Prime Ministers Ch. Saikhanbileg and S. Bayar, and this week new actions related to the murder of S. Zorig (involving not the ATG but the General Intelligence Authority and the State Prosecutor’s Office).

In his post, Mendee discusses the many ways that Mongolian politics is fractured — OT is only one of many factors.

I fully agree.

However, in this post I point out that these “power politics” do have implications for OT, especially in terms of how Rio Tinto and other Western mining companies and associates (investors, financial institutions, governments) react to and are positioned in relation to them.

Oyu Tolgoi has itself been the center of a number of accusations in recent months. These have been widely understood and deliberately situated, however, to not really be about any malpractice on Rio Tinto’s part, at least not in Mongolia specifically. Investigations by Swiss regulators, or at least developments related to them in Mongolian contexts, have piggybacked on the “offshoring” controversy around S. Bayartsogt to separate the issue of who took money from who gave it, and explicitly stated that Rio Tinto was not under scrutiny. The SOMO reports, though highly critical of the OT Investment Agreement, were directed at critiquing such practice, which are currently conventional and legal, at a global scale.

In short, the corruption controversies involving Oyu Tolgoi are being used in Mongolian “power politics” while the role of Rio Tinto and other Western institutions is being downplayed. But this does impact how OT and similar Western-led projects proceed.

Understandably, there is a collective interest in not “scaring away” those institutions (again, the practices described by SOMO are largely legal and conventional in the multinational extractive industry). But as Undarya Tumursukh points out in her recent post, there is more at play in the bracketing of Mongolian politics from multinational corporate ethics. The sense that “Western companies are intrinsically good,” as Undarya puts it, is strongly present, and I have often discerned, including recently, the sentiment that there is nothing worth investigating about the OT Agreement at all, and that Mongolian politicians have siphoned off the kind of money that SOMO attributes to lost taxation from Rio Tinto. When asked for what they mean, interlocutors do point to the houses owned by S. Bayar in the United States or the ten million dollars in S. Bayarsogt’s Swiss bank account, in other words a few millions rather than hundreds of millions. My attempts to turn the conversation to larger systematic factors, involving Mongolia/Mongolians’ ability, in relation to international companies and IFIs as such relations are currently structured, to not only raise tax revenue but also to spend it, to answer the question of why Mongolia has crumbling (at best) rather than developing physical and social infrastructures*, often lead to a complete change of subject.

In any case, placing the blame and our analytical focus solely on Mongolia and Mongolians (as also Undarya does in the end of her post) does encourage the country and its inhabitants (not just politicians) to be further seen as bad actors, not suitable for investment (and more). Though excited conversation (much more extensive than any I saw or heard about the SOMO reports or Swiss investigations involving Oyu Tolgoi) about Mongolia as possible host for a summit involving the US and DPRK has been ongoing for over a month now, I see little chance that Mongolia’s involvement in such a summit would have much impact on Mongolia’s image as “corrupt” or not.


*(to elaborate on this, I may write another post to engage with Julian’s post on OT and “political risk” and Mendee’s post on OT Agreement as wrestling match and I hope this post encourages the same from others!)

Posted in Corruption, Development, Foreign Investment, Infrastructure, International Agreements, International Relations, Mining, Mining, Mining Governance, North Korea, Oyu Tolgoi | Tagged | Leave a comment

Some Thoughts about Logistics of a Steppe Summit

By Julian Dierkes

Can Ulaanbaatar and the Mongolian government handle hosting a Trump-Kim meeting? Yes, of course, though it would stretch some resources.

Past Summits

Mongolia involved itself very actively in a number of multilateral organizations and meetings during the Elbegdorj years. The biggest of these events was clearly the Asia-Europe Meeting in 2016.  The summit brought literally dozens of heads of state and government to Mongolia. The summit was much larger than a Trump-Kim meeting would be in terms of the number of delegations who attended, including their airplanes, support staff, etc., but it had none of the underlying tension that a meeting between two volatile leaders prone to name-calling has.


Pres. Trump would obviously travel by Airforce One which can be accommodated at Chinggis Khaan International. He would also arrive with his limo, probably helicopter, etc. Travel to Asia would allow him to visit allies like Japan or South Korea, and also other countries like China or Russia’s Far East.

For Kim Jong-Un, travel is not quite as easy. His decision to visit Beijing by train suggests that even for shorter distances he prefers the train over planes and this, in fact, is one of the reason, Ulaanbaatar is under consideration.

Train travel for Kim would mean a 2-day trip via Beijing, and a 2-3h stall at the Chinese-Mongolian border to change the undercarriage of his train out for the Russian railroad gauge needed for travel in Mongolia. See what the process looks like:

And notice the colour scheme of the Transsiberian! Already looks like Kim’s train (see this image in a Chosun Ilbo report)!

Presumably, the relative remoteness of the Erlian border means that the wait there can be secured by Chinese security forces working with DPRK security, I imagine.

For the press and other members of the public who do not travel with official delegations, seats on flights to Ulaanbaatar would be in short supply. Direct flights are offered by Aeroflot, Air China, KAL, MIAT, Turkish Airlines. If you don’t mind state airlines of authoritarian states, Air China from Beijing and Turkish from Istanbul might be the most convenient transfers from North America or Europe, respectively. My favourite would always be MIAT.


[Section added Apr 21 2018]

A discussion on CNN raised the issue of visas necessary for travel to Mongolia as a hurdle to the selection of Ulaanbaatar as a site.

This is a bit of a self-serving issue to raise by journalists, rather than a concern that may be prominent in the DPRK’s preference of possible sites, for example. As fraught as Trump’s relationship is with real journalists, he is concerned about the splash that the meeting will make, one imagines.

Given visa-free travel for Americans, the question does not really arise for the US media. However, a large number of journalists from other countries, including the EU other than Germany, but also South Korea, for example, would require a visa. As a German citizen, I have not needed a visa for travel to Mongolia for some years, but even before then, the process was always relatively easy, other than requiring a visit to the embassy or (honorary) consul. Since most relevant journalists would be based in a capital, that would be a minor inconvenience only.

I could also imagine that if Ulaanbaatar were selected the Mongolian government would at least consider expedited visa processes for accredited journalists.

Of course, the efficiency of any such processes would be weighed against security needs as discussed below.


Presumably, the Trump entourage (security, staff, etc.) would be quite large. They might be best housed in Ulaanbaatar’s Shangri-La which offers 290 guest rooms. This is one of the very few hotels in downtown Ulaanbaatar that I have not stayed in, but from coffee in the lobby, I would guess that there is enough gold in the hotel’s design to satisfy Trump’s taste. Of course, the Shangri-la would be a very short drive (especially with all roads closed) to potential meeting sites like Government House, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Ikh Tenger, the president’s palace.

That would leave either the Blue Sky or the Best Western Tuvshin for the DPRK delegation which would be somewhat smaller, one might presume. Both would be equally close to any meeting venue. The Best Western would offer experience with state visits, but would be easily identified as an American brand.

There probably are enough overflow hotel rooms in downtown hotels to accommodate the numerous members of the world’s press corps who would arrive.

One of the challenges in terms of accommodations might be who would pay for hotel rooms for a large DPRK delegation. I am guessing that the DPRK would not want to (possible under UN sanctions?), but the Mongolian government would also not want to get stuck with this tab.

Ideally, of course, a meeting would take place at Maidar Eco-City, in part because Pres. Battulga is also involved in that project. Unfortunately, when I visited the site last June, there was very little happening, making the project seem like a bit of a mirage. Perhaps, a Trump-Kim Ger could be built at the site, like the ASEM Ger for the ASEM summit.

A Summit Ger would also offer attractive symbolism for this meeting. It can be built (and dismantled) quickly, and on the inside of a ger, there is no place to hide, as visitors have to face each other in the round room. Who knows? A summit ger might re-energize the Maidar project and thus provide a blessing to Pres. Battulga. It is also easily reached from the new Ulaanbaatar airport, which could probably be activated for a summit meeting.

Diplomatic Infrastructure

The fact that the DPRK and the US both have an embassy in Ulaanbaatar is one of the factors that recommends the city as a location.

The US embassy is somewhat large, somewhat removed from the downtown area, and a pretty ugly collection of container-like buildings hidden behind somewhat overblown security measures as is the norm with US diplomat missions. But, the embassy has been in place since 1988, so it is well-equipped in terms of connections to and experience with the Mongolian government as well as Ulaanbaatar as a location. Of course, the embassy is somewhat hampered by the absence of an ambassador who has not been nominated by the Trump administration.

The DPRK embassy is much smaller, but equally well-established in historical terms.

All the other “players” in tensions on the Korean peninsula are also represented by embassies in Mongolia.


Car traffic in downtown Ulaanbaatar would likely come to a complete standstill during a meeting if it was not banned outright. But that is okay (except for residences who would be massively inconvenienced), as downtown Ulaanbaatar is compact enough to walk most places, especially in May-June when the weather is quite variable (often four seasons in a day), but not very cold.


Not something I know a whole lot about, but the biggest question is probably to what extent the Mongolian security apparatus is able to collaborate with US and DPRK security forces. I have few insights into operational details, but can imagine the process in a general way.

For the US, that should actually be very possible if the military is involved, as there are extensive links between the Mongolian and US military, including joint service in Iraq and Afghanistan, and regular joint exercises like the the Khaan Quest multinational peacekeeping exercise.

But the Mongolian military does not operate domestically. The Mongolian Secret Service would be in charge of providing security for a meeting. It is a department of the General Intelligence Agency. Most likely, some kind of Interagency Group would be created to coordinate different security needs, including paramilitary border troops, as well as the police which would provide the bulk of the manpower for an event. The military might be called upon to provide the communications infrastructure.

There are occasional consultative talks and non-combat exchanges between Mongolia and the DPRK, but these are on a small scale and probably not much of a basis for operational collaboration.

Given the lack of foreign travel by Kim, it is pretty unclear what exactly security for him and his entourage would be expected to look like.


A major meeting of this sort would obviously require some significant communications infrastructure.

It is unclear to me how much translation a host might be expected to provide. For example, Messrs Kim and Trump would obviously arrive with their own interpretation teams for Korean-English interpretation, but how much more of that translation would be needed? There are many Korean and English-speakers in Mongolia, of course, in part because the largest Mongolian diaspora is in South Korea, but also because of the attractiveness of South Korean higher education. For the same reasons and for a general push towards English, there are many, especially younger, English-speakers in Ulaanbaatar. This availability holds for the general public as well as government officials.

In terms of communications infrastructure for visiting journalists, for example, that is not much of a challenge. Smartphones are in very wide use in Ulaanbaatar, data is widely available via cell phone services and there are numerous restaurants and public venues that offer WiFi.

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UB Dialogue Initiatives from the 1970s to 90s

by Mendee Jargalsaikhan & Julian Dierkes

According to global speculation, Ulaanbaatar is still under consideration as a location for the envisioned meeting between US Pres Trump and DPRK Chairman Kim, Mongolia’s desire to be a part of a broader Asia Pacific region, especially of East Asia or Northeast Asia, is nothing new, however, but one can see interesting foreign policy patterns, that are mostly shaped by interests and interactions with neighbouring powers (i.e., China and Russia).  Even though Mongolia revised its foreign policy directions substantially in the early 1990s, the objective of furthering its engagement with the Asia Pacific remains a priority, after relations with the two immediate neighbours, and the development of ties with “third neighbours”.

A Socialist Model & Buddhist Hub

Mongolia’s wish to develop a relationship and eventual membership in the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s failed due to the Sino-Soviet rift and Mongolia’s military alliance with the Soviet Union.

However, Ulaanbaatar pursued two interesting foreign policy initiatives: The first was the Kremlin’s desire to promote Mongolia’s developmental model for newly independent countries, especially former colonies. Mongolia was accepted as the only Asian member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, also COMECON) in 1962 and provided with extensive economic aid, especially in mining, light industry, and agriculture. As a result, in the 1970s, Mongolia was considered and supported to promote itself as a CMEA’s model for Laos, Afghanistan, and other smaller countries.

The other initiative was to make Mongolia a hub for the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace. Despite its own brutal suppression of Buddhism in the 1930s, this was an interesting foreign policy instrument to reach out to India, Vietnam, Laos, and Buddhists in Japan, Sri-Lanka. However, Thailand did not favour these initiatives, partly because of its alignment with the US. But, this move was in accord with the Kremlin on two fronts – one it irritated China as Mongolia got closer to the Dalai Lama and India while projecting the peaceful image of the communist bloc, and secondly, especially bringing Indochina countries to align against the US. Mongolia hosted a number of events, including two visits of the Dalai Lama (1979 and 1982) and organized the capstone conference in 1982.

1980s – Version of UB Dialogues

Mongolia made agreat progress in reaching out to the Asia Pacific in 1980s at two fronts. For one, Mongolia became a visible venue for the communist bloc’s activities in the Asia Pacific region. In 1981, Mongolia approved the first-ever comprehensive policy to reach out to Asia Pacific countries and to provide a dialogue venue for peace and cooperation. Within the period from 1983 to 1987, Mongolia hosted a series of ministerial (inter-governmental), youth, trade union meetings with extensive participation from the Asia Pacific region. Mongolia’s party congresses and events welcomed delegates from Asian countries – pursuing socialist developmental strategies.

The other front was (re)establishing its relations with China, US, Japan, and Australia.  Mongolia established bilateral relations with the US in 1987. This helped to reach out to US allies, especially Japan and Australia. In 1989, Mongolia ended two decades of hostility with China. Also, MPRP Party Chair J Batmunkh proposed to establish the North East Asian Dialogue at the 50th anniversary of the Khalkhyn Gol (Nomonhan) Battle in August 1989. Even though this foreign policy initiative was overwhelmed by domestic political turmoil in 1990, Mongolia successfully continued its dream of reaching out to the Asia Pacific.

It might be worthwhile to highlight Mongolia’s approach to the two Koreas. In 1986, North Korean President Kim Il Sung personally greeted Mongolian President Batmunkh at the Pyongyang International Airport mostly to suppress the rumour of his death. Then, in 1988, Kim Il Sung visited Mongolia, for the second time since 1956, to discuss the possibility of establishing a joint mining project at the Tavan Tolgoi coking coal deposit. President Batmunkh formalized bilateral relations with South Korea in March 1990. This was the first-ever foreign policy decision that Mongolia took without consultation with the Kremlin. Or, it marked the beginning of Mongolia’s foreign policy freedom.

1990s – Reaching out Asia Pacific Region

Amidst international as well as domestic turmoil, Mongolia was not in a position to continue its efforts of hosting events, welcoming Asia Pacific countries just after its democratic revolution and the sudden withdrawal of Soviet support in 1990. It was economically in a dire situation, which forced Mongolia to seek donors and international aid. At the same time, Mongolia was unknown to many regional players and the economy was not (yet) attractive for investors.

Although Mongolia reached out along with newly formed Central Asian states to the EU, OSCE, and NATO, none of the major powers supported Mongolia’s formal inclusion in this project – for its geopolitical sensitivity and financial burdens for even accommodating former Soviet republics in addition to Central and Eastern European states.  Mongolia’s reach to the East Asian Summit and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was not supported by the majority of influential members.

However, Mongolia was admitted in three major regional cooperation efforts.

One was the Canadian North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, a track two initiative, from 1989 to 1993.  Both countries were striving to find their place in regional cooperative mechanisms as both are on the periphery of the Asia Pacific region.

The second was UNDP’s Tumen River Area Development Programme (also known as the Greater Tumen Initiative) to enhance economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. But, the initiative slowed down due to bilateral relations and tension on the Korean Peninsula.

The last, and only successful one, has been Mongolia’s participation in the US Pacific Command’s multilateral events.  Gradually, the Mongolian military has become a participant in all multilateral activities, ranging from the Chiefs of Defence Conference, to peacekeeping exercises.

By 2000, Mongolia succeeded in developing political and economic ties with newly found friends – Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, deepening ties with older friends – North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and finally, gaining the ARF membership in 1999.

Initiatives to promote Mongolia as a potential mediator in tensions on the Korean peninsula are thus not only rooted in the country’s constructive relations with all the players in these conflicts, but also in long-standing foreign policy priorities and Mongolian efforts to position itself in the Asia Pacific region.

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It is not about OT, it is the Power Politics

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan

The Mongolian anti-corruption agency, known as the Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC), arrested former Prime Ministers Bayar and Saikhanbileg, Finance Minister/MP Bayartsogt, and several other former executives.  The Mongolian politics is presenting similar patterns of other East Asian democracies, such as South Korea or Taiwan, where former presidents are often brought to the justice.  But, in the Mongolian case, it is more likely the result of the power politics between two major parties (MPP and DP) and also factions within these parties.

Is it about OT?

Although many assumed and attempted to link these corruption allegations to the Oyu Tolgoi investment agreement, it doesn’t look like all about the OT.  Unless, the IAAC investigators present strong evidence of the investors bribing these influential politicians.  Otherwise, the OT agreement was openly debated in multiple rounds and approved by the parliament within the revised legal framework, namely the 2006 Mining Law. Since this was the country’s first-ever agreement with a global giant, Rio Tinto, many criticize the negotiated settlements (both initial and second-phase agreements).  Therefore, the re-negotation attempts would remain on the table for all succeeding governments and the OT agreement would be criticized by populist politicians and concerned civil society organizations.  Thus requires more transparency from the investors in this already perceived unequal match.

Power Politics – Intra and Inter Parties 

These arrests are effects of the power politics.  First, it is a struggle among three power centres – Speaker M. Enkhbold (MPP), whose faction controls the half of the parliament and the cabinet, Prime Minister Khurelsukh (MPP), who recently secured the control of cabinet as well as the MPP, and President Battulga (DP), seeking all ways to increase his influence over the judiciary and law enforcement.  The recall of former Prime Ministers Bayar and Enkhsaikhan from ambassadorial posts in UK and Sweden was initiated and pursued by President Battulga.  Battulga’s pressures to change the head of the IAAC might have resulted in the IAAC’s quick arrests.  One could easily see these collaborative moves of the IAAC and Chief Prosecutor’s Office for these recalls, 72 hour arrests, and the extension of detentions.   Even though initially, these investigations were perceived one-sided (i.e., only going after DP members), the arrest of former Prime Minister Bayar indicates the transactional cooperation between these power centres although it is hard to prove.

Second, the DP Chairman Erdene’s decision to expel Bayartsogt from the party and Speaker Enkhbold’s twitter statement of not interfering in the criminal investigations were quite new in the Mongolian party politics.

In the past, political parties usually either aggressively defend their influential members or  avoid issuing any types of statements.  However, this time, it is clear that both parties are experiencing intense power struggles among their major factions.  The MPP, albeit its dominance of the parliament, is divided between two major factions – of Speaker M. Enkhbold’s versus Prime Minister U. Khurelsukh’s (one controls the parliament and the  other controls the cabinet). Back in 2007, former Prime Minister Bayar marginalized Enkhbold’s faction and later a similar competition occurred between their successors Khurelsukh and Erdenebat in 2017.  The DP is also having similar fate.  The Polar Star faction, for which Bayartsogt and Saikhanbileg belong, dominated the DP politics from 2008 – 2015, and then shattered due to its own internal power struggle. Now the DP comes under the control of the Falcon Faction (former Speaker and current presidential secretariat Z. Enkhbold and S. Erdene) jointly with the MDU faction of President Battulga.  It seems that factions with access to some type of state power are attempting to increase their control  and influence over the party by simply marginalizing their opponents.

True Causes

Clearly, it is challenging to make assumptions about causes for current political events.

First, it is not a fight to clean the party or a move to improve the party’s institutions.  It is a struggle to improve their standings before the 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential elections.  These factions are no longer driven by shared political values or ideological commitments rather than shared economic interests.  Although recently there have been several noticeable attempts of strengthening the party institution within the MPP, it seems these efforts are running out of steam as the majority of members inside and outside the parliament/cabinet have started pursuing their self-interests of running in upcoming elections and competing for public offices.

Second, it is not an attempt of eradicating the corruption or bringing those to the justice.  If these arrests finally resolve all allegations – (i.e., hidden offshore accounts of Bayartsogt, seven houses of Bayar, non-transparent rush take-over of 47 percent of the Erdenet copper factory, money-laundering through Erdenet, and kickbacks for the OT investment agreements), it would be victorious, historic, and landmark steps towards Mongolia’s dream of becoming Inner Asian Tiger or Qatar. But, given today’s political dynamics, it is unlikely.  Those, who are in power, are trying to defend their economic interests and to marginalize potential opponents within and outside of their respective parties.

At the end of the day, the politics of Mongolia appears to be the power politics – in order to (1) control the state institutions for factional advantages and protection, (2) take over the state-owned enterprises, ranging from the Erdenet factory, to railroad, airline, infrastructure, and, of course, to Tavan Tolgoi mine, and (3) gain access to big loans, bonds, tenders, and grants.

Things would look differently – only when political leaders with true morale commitments of not making or involving in these alleged corruptions in the first place and same political leaders invest into formal institutions by endorsing and upholding the written, formally agreed rules.

Posted in Corruption, Economics, Erdenet, Judiciary, Oyu Tolgoi | Tagged | 1 Comment

A Primer on АТГ – the Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) of Mongolia

by Mendee Jargalsaikhan & Julian Dierkes

“Авилгатай Тэмцэх Газар” (АТГ) or Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) of Mongolia has been all over the media – some describe it as ‘useless’, ‘politicized’, some compare with the ‘До Яам’ (Mongolian equivalent to KGB) of 1930s, and others wish for the best in the АТГ’s fight against the corruption.

Directors of the АТГ

The Anti-Corruption Agency became a functional organization in 2007 under the Law of Mongolia on Anti-Corruption (2006) and has evolved to be a central law enforcement institution.  The first head (lawyer) suspiciously passed away, the second (police) was prosecuted for misuse of authority, the third (police/intelligence) requested early retirement just before the parliamentary election in 2016. Now, the current head (police) is walking on a tightrope.  The appointment procedure of head and deputy head have been clear and logical in the law.  The president nominates, parliament approves for a 6-year term avoiding the politicization due to presidential and parliamentary elections.  Three main criteria for the job are: (1) a lawyer by profession, (2) 10-15 yrs of prior government service experience, and (3) no political appointment for the 5 years prior to the appointment (Law on Anti-Corruption).  Senior officials of the Ministry of Justice, Police, and/or General Intelligence Agency usually meet these criteria and all past heads and deputy heads came from these judicial and law enforcement organizations.

Staffing and Areas of Focus

Your principal bloggers, Mendee & Julian, looking very inquisitive in front of the entrance to Mongolia’s General Intelligence Agency

Similar patterns of recruitment are observed for staff positions at the IAAC. Despite standard professional criteria for recruitment, the most important requirement for the staff recruits is ‘no record of being investigated for corruption with disciplinary, administrative and criminal records’ (Law on Anti-Corruption). All staff must take an oath to combat corruption while receiving slightly more privileges and support from other law enforcement agency and public servants. The oath of the IAAC personnel, as stated in the Law on Anti-Corruption, “I, servant of the Anti-Corruption Agency, independent from any undue influence, swear to honestly combat corruption and will be guided solely by the law.  Should I break this oath, I shall be punished under the law.”

According to the IAAC statement, IAAC employees are paid 50 percent lower than judges and 1.5 percent lower than prosecutors.  If one follows parliamentary sessions and interviews of the IAAC heads, the organization is significantly under-staffed to conduct four sets of activities:

  • to increase anti-corruption public awareness and education and corruption prevention work (requiring nation-wide engagement on public awareness and education; just imagine driving around 21 provinces)
  • to accept and analyze the submission of assets and income declarations of hundreds of political officials (ranging from members of parliament to all senior officials to senior public servants to 21 governors, city mayor, and local council heads)
  • to investigate corruption cases (including all complaints that have been made through the IAAC hotlines or delivered personally)
  • to do research (for example, regular surveys on corruption perception in political and law enforcement agencies and integrity level of government organizations and youth integrity surveys

Moreover, the ATG, as an government organization, responds to inquiries of the president and parliament, conducts press conferences to keep the media and citizens informed, including via Twitter, and participation in international initiatives (e.g., OECD reporting).  The IAAC provides background checks for all candidates for parliamentary (~600-700) and presidential elections. Plus, the IAAC needs to be on top of any legal and policy initiatives (either drafting or responding to legislative and regulatory proposals) and must receive all reports coming from all government agencies under the National Anti-Corruption Strategy  by February.  The IAAC will collect them, compile them, and submit them to the Subcommittee on Special Control of the State Ikh Khural.  This is the only political institution, which oversees its funding closely.

These immense tasks would clearly challenge the staff of 145 (in 2014) and 172 (by 2017). However, the IAAC investigated 2207 criminal cases and only 233 of which has been prosecuted. Its investigative power appears to be curtailed by Prosecutors. Prosecutors at different levels can stop any criminal investigation and courts could return or delay cases – submitted by the IAAC.

Civilian Oversight

The 2006 law also creates a public council (not paid) providing a forum for citizens to voice their opinion and to advise on implementation of the anti-corruption law.  Fifteen members of the Public Council (АТГ-ын Олон нийтийн зөвлөл) are appointed by the president for a four-year term. A key requirement for candidates is not being career public servant or holding government posts at the time of candidacy and during the four year tenure.  However, the selection process is still not clearly institutionalized.  Therefore, it is a double-edged sword for the IAAC: the Council can either increase pressure from the presidential office or increase public support from society.  At worst, it could also generate additional work hours for the small staff to accommodate their needs (esp., when populist ones search for momentum.

In 2009, President Elbegdorj renewed the public council members, appointing a civil-society activist, current MP Batzandan as the chairman and mostly DP-affilliated civil society activists.  The council members were changed again with more neutral members in 2014.  Similarly, in 2017, President Battulga renewed the council appointing another civil society activist Baasan as the chief and DP-affilliated politicians – Oyungerel and Burmaa.

Because the Presidential appointed Public Service is supposed to represent the public interests, the IAAC also created another structure, which is called the sub-Public Council (Олон нийтийн дэд зөвлөл) in 2017.  The IAAC would appoint volunteers, mostly retired at organizational levels and would receive limited monetary incentives for their service supporting activities of the IAAC at their organizations.  Currently, the sub-Public Council have  about 108 members.

It seems premature to label the IAAC either ‘useless’, ‘politicized’, or ‘KGB-style’.  With such a small staff, the IAAC – institutionalized the legal, regulatory, and administrative of the anti-corruption efforts, increased public awareness and accumulated data base (esp., those signed income disclosure by public officials), and done the general mapping and identified ‘grey zones’ (esp., political parties and parliament).  However, the effectiveness of the anti-corruption in Mongolia appears to be totally dependent on the political will of politicians.  Are there courage and determination to combat against corruption?  Or, the majority of them want the IAAC remain at this crossroad and enjoy mocking ‘toothless АТГ’?

Posted in Corruption, Judiciary, Security Apparatus | Tagged | Leave a comment

Mongolische Beziehungen zu Nordkorea und USA

Julian Dierkes

[Eine kürzere Version dieses Artikels ist bei Internationale Gesellschaft und Politik am 3.4.2018 erschienen.]

Im Laufe der letzten sechs Monate hat sich die koreanischen Halbinsel wieder zu dem globalen Brennpunkt entwickelt. An der Situation in Nordkorea selber scheint sich nicht unbedingt viel verändert zu haben, doch die Drohgebärden zwischen Donald Trump und Kim Jong-un haben zugenommen und im Zuge dieser Entwicklung auch konkretere Drohungen mit neuen und „verbesserten“ Waffentypen.

Dann hat die Olympiade dieser Eskalation aber anscheinend ein Ende gemacht. Erstaunt stellt die Welt fest, dass auf unbedeutende Eishockeyspiele (für Korea, umso bedeutender für ein deutsches „Wintermärchen“) die überraschende Ankündigung kam, dass sich die Herren Trump und Kim in den nächsten sechs Wochen treffen wollen. Kims Besuch in Beijing Ende März war eine weitere Fortsetzung dieser Entwicklung auf irgendeine Form von Dialog hin.

Seoul Pavillon on Seoul Street. State Department Store in Background.

Details zur Planung eines Treffens und noch viel mehr zum Inhalt eines Treffens werden wohl ebenso wie das Treffen überhaupt im Verborgenen oder sonst – einseitig – auf Twitter ausgehandelt werden. Trotzdem stellt sich die Welt und  die Region Nordostasien auf ein solches Treffen ein und Gedankenspiele zum Ablauf und zu den Folgen eines solchen Treffens tragen zu den Abwägungen um das Treffen bei.

Die Mongolei als Treffpunkt

Am 16. März hat sich der Chef des mongolischen Präsidentschaftsamts, Z Enkhbold, separat mit amerikanischen und nordkoreanischen Diplomaten getroffen um das Interesse der mongolischen Regierung an einer Ausrichtung eines Kim-Trump-Gipfels zu bekunden. Diese beiden Treffen deuten an, warum die Mongolei eine Rolle in den Gesprächen mit Nordkorea spielen kann, denn in Ulaanbaatar gibt es immerhin eine amerikanische und eine nordkoreanische Botschaft. Das trifft auch für Berlin zu, aber wann hat der letzte Besuch eines deutschen Außenministers oder irgendeiner Ministerin in Nordkorea stattgefunden? Der mongolische Außenminister D Tsogtbaatar war Anfang Februar in Pjöngjang, unter anderem um das 70jährige Jubiläum der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Nordkorea und der Mongolei zu feiern. Z Enkhbold war kurz vor den Terminen mit den Botschaftsoffiziellen von einer Reise in die USA zurückgekehrt.

Ob der Protagonisten der derzeitigen Planungen für einen Trump-Kim-Gipfel ist überhaupt nicht vorherzusehen wie, wo und wann solch ein Treffen stattfinden würde. Als Ort ist dabei die Grenze zwischen Nord- und Südkorea am Wahrscheinlichsten. Sollte es aber Gründen geben, solch ein Treffen nicht auf der koreanischen Halbinsel abzuhalten, so drängt sich Ulaanbaatar als eine der Alternativen auf.

Für Ulaanbaatar sprechen in diesem Zusammenhang viele Gründe, aber der gewichtigste ist wohl, dass die Mongolei zumindest im Hinblick auf einen Austausch zwischen den USA und Nordkorea als neutral gilt. Die lange bestehenden Beziehungen mit Nordkorea sind seit der demokratischen Revolution in 1990 nicht abgebrochen, aber seitdem haben sich auf freundschaftliche Beziehungen zur USA entwickelt. Die Mongolei ist eines der wenigen Länder, in denen sich nordkoreanische Offizielle einigermaßen wohlzufinden zu scheinen. Ob dies auch für Kim Jong-un selber gilt, ist nicht bekannt, aber der nordkoreanische Vizeaußenminister Ri Jong-ho, der im März in Schweden zu Besuch ist, hat noch letztes Jahr am Ulaanbaatar Dialog teilgenommen und sich bei dieser Gelegenheit mit einzelnen Vertretern z.B. der japanischen und kanadischen Regierung getroffen und an öffentlichen Diskussionen mit südkoreanischen und amerikanischen Akademikern teilgenommen. Die nordkoreanische Weltsicht ist auf einer akuten Bedrohung durch die USA aufgebaut, so dass dieses vermeintliche Wohlfühlen in der Mongolei ein wichtiger Faktor in der Planung sein könnte.

Die Geografie spielt auch im Internetzeitalter noch eine Rolle, denn es scheint unwahrscheinlich, dass Kim eine längere Strecke mit dem Flugzeug auf sich nehmen würde. Es ist zwar nicht bekannt ob er die Flugangst seines Vaters geerbt hat, aber der nordkoreanischen Regierungsmaschine wird er sich wohl kaum anvertrauen, wie wir gerade bei seiner Reise nach Beijing gesehen haben, und ein ausländisches Flugzeug scheint auch unwahrscheinlich. Ulaanbaatar ist hingegen mit dem Zug zu erreichen. Der „direkteste“ Weg würde dabei über Beijing führen. Die Alternative wäre der lange Weg durch Russland von Wladiwostok über Ulan-Ude nach Ulaanbaatar. Umständlich aber machbar ohne durch oder über das Territorium von direkten USA-Verbündeten zu reisen.

Dazu kommt auch noch eine historische Komponente, denn während des Koreakrieges wurden Hunderte nordkoreanischer Kinder in die Mongolei evakuiert und der mongolische Botschafter ist als einziger ausländischer Repräsentant während der Bombardierung Pjöngjangs in der Stadt verblieben, zwei Gesten und Umstände, die der Mongolei in Nordkorea immer noch hoch angerechnet werden. Beide Aspekte der gemeinsamen Geschichte werden in Nordkorea offensichtlich immer noch sehr wertgeschätzt, was die Beziehungen weiterhin positiv beeinflusst.

Die mongolische Außenpolitik und Nordkorea

Seit 1990 orientiert sich die mongolische Außenpolitik um drei Bezugsgruppen: 1. die beiden direkten Nachbarn, Russland und China, 2. weiter entfernte „Drittnachbarn“, 3. internationale Organisationen. Auf allen drei Ebenen decken sich diese außenpolitischen Ziele mit dem Versuch als Vermittler zwischen Nordkorea und der Welt zu fungieren.

Kim Jong-il Kindergarten in Darkhan City


Die Mongolei hat nur zwei Nachbarn, weshalb das oberste Gebot der Außenpolitik sein muss, die Beziehungen mit diesen Nachbarn positiv und konstruktiv zu gestalten. Das gelingt größtenteils. Hindernisse, wie sie anderswo existieren, gibt es hier für die Mongolei nicht. Z.B. gibt es keine Grenzkonflikte und auch keine russische oder chinesische Diaspora in der Mongolei. Das Interesse der Mongolen in der Inneren Mongolei (VR China) an der Mongolei, oder der Buriaten in Sibirien an der Mongolei hält sich auch in, äh, Grenzen. China dominiert die mongolische Wirtschaft sowohl als Kunde für Rohstoffe, als auch als Lieferant für Konsum- und Investitionsgüter. Die wirtschaftliche Beziehung zu Russland beschränkt sich auf Energiezufuhr.

Für beide Nachbarn hat sich Nordkorea über die Jahre von einem Alliierten zu einem Problem gewandelt. Die derzeitigen Spannungen mit den USA beruhen z.T. darauf, dass das chinesische Regime lange auch keinen Zugang mehr zu Kim und seiner Führungsclique hatte. Das scheint sich mit dem Besuch Kims in Beijing vielleicht geändert zu haben, aber es ist unwahrscheinlich, dass dieser eine Besuch, den Verfall der Beziehungen über die letzten zehn Jahre wieder gutgemacht hat. Deshalb scheinen Teile des chinesischen Regimes mongolische Initiativen zur Einbindung Nordkoreas willkommen zu heissen, wie an einer Meinungskolumne im Propagandablatt Global Times am 16.3.2018 zu erkennen ist.


Zu den dritten Nachbarn gehören Länder in der Region, also Indien, Japan und Südkorea, aber auch weiter entfernte Partner wie Australien, Deutschland, Kanada und die USA. Die Beziehungen zu diesen Ländern beruhen auf dem Status der Mongolei als isolierte Demokratie in einer nicht sehr demokratiefreundlichen Umgebung. Diesen Status hat die Mongolei in den letzten Jahren durch die Teilnahme an und Ausrichtung von internationalen Foren wie der Community of Democracies, aber auch dem Asia Europe Gipfel ausgebaut. Alle Angebote der Mittlung mit Nordkorea würden diese Drittnachbarn in ihren Bemühungen einer Vermeidung von weiteren Konflikten unterstützen und damit auch willkommen heißen.


Auf der internationalen Ebene hat sich die Mongolei vor allem im Kontext der Vereinten Nationen als Land etabliert, das weit über seine politische oder wirtschaftliche Bedeutung hinaus wahrgenommen wird. So ist die Mongolei seit 2012 als atomwaffenfreier Staat anerkannt, nimmt rege an UN Friedensmissionen teil, und kandidiert für einen Sitz im Weltsicherheitsrat für 2022. Gerade im Bezug auf Atomwaffen würde die Mongolei im Konflikt USA-Nordkorea eine besonders bedeutungsvolle Rolle spielen.


Hinzu kommt auch noch, dass die Mongolei sich in den letzten Jahren in außenpolitischen Initiativen immer mehr auf (Nord)Ostasien konzentriert hat. Bestes Beispiel hier ist das Freihandelsabkommen mit Japan, 2015 unterschrieben und 2016 in Kraft getreten. Dieser regionale Bezug ist noch nicht formell zu einer vierten Säule der Außenpolitik erklärt worden, kristallisiert sich in diesem Sinne aber immer weiter heraus. Das größte Hindernis in der Entwicklung der Wirtschaftsregion Nordostasien bleibt aber weiterhin Nordkorea. Alles, was die Mongolei tun kann, um dieses Hindernis auf friedlichem Wege zu nivellieren, dient dieser Außenpolitik. Auch wenn der Versuch über Investitionen in Nordkorea Fuß zu fassen gescheitert zu sein scheint, würde eine Entspannung im Verhältnis um Nordkorea der Mongolei evtl. direkteren Zugang zu Häfen (wenn auch über Russland oder China) verschaffen. Ganz langfristig könnte so auch ein ostasiatisches Stromnetzwerk aufgebaut werden, über den ein vermeintlicher Reichtum an Solarstrom aus der Mongolei in die Region verteilt werden könnte.

Weitere Schritte

Nach dem Angebot an die USA und an Nordkorea könnte die Mongolei weitere Schritte gehen. Über internationale Medien könnte das Verhältnis der Mongolei zu Nordkorea erklärt und damit die Argumentation für die Mongolei als Standort etwaiger Nordkoreainitiativen gestärkt werden. Der ehemalige mongolische Präsident, Ts Elbegdorj, hat vor ein paar Jahren den Ulaanbaatar Dialog ausgerufen, eine jährliche Zusammenkunft von regierungsnahen Repräsentanten aus Ländern mit einem Interesse an Sicherheitsfragen in Ostasien. Letztes Jahr hat bei dem Forum auch ein Vizeaußenminister Nordkoreas, Ri Jong-ho, teilgenommen, und sich im Laufe der Veranstaltung mit Regierungsvertretern aus Kanada und Japan getroffen und mit Wissenschaftlern und regierungsnahen Organisationen aus China, Südkorea, den USA und auch Deutschland diskutiert. Die Veranstaltung ist auch durch Mittel der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung unterstützt worden. Bisher wurde die Veranstaltung vom mongolischen Institute for Strategic Studies organisiert, dessen Direktor, D Ganbat, jetzt der mongolische Botschaft in der Bundesrepublik ist.

Seit der Wahl letzten Sommer steht die Frage im Raum, ob der neue Präsident, Kh Battulga, den Ulaanbaatar Dialog auch unterstützt. Die Initiative zu diplomatischen Gesprächen im März legt nahe, dass der Präsident das strategische Potential des Dialogs erkannt hat. Unabhängig davon ob es letztendlich zu einem Gipfeltreffen Kim-Trump kommt, könnte der Dialog ein weiterer und wichtiger Schritt in einer Deeskalation der Spannungen in Nordostasien sein. Die Mongolei hat sich hier strategisch geschickt positioniert und es sollte auch anderen Ländern klar sein, dass diese Position viel positives Potential birgt.

Posted in Foreign Policy, Mongolia and ..., North Korea, United States | Tagged | Leave a comment