Notable Candidates

By Julian Dierkes, Marissa J. Smith and Bulgan B

Below are some of the notable individual candidates running in the election. “Notable” in this context means individuals who are known to us to have played a prominent role in politics in the past or who are otherwise notable to us. That includes all current cabinet members, for example, but is not limited to them (even for the MPP). Obviously, this is a pretty loose criterion, but some of these individuals are worth pointing to in terms of party choices to nominate them at all and to nominate them for party lists vs. direct election seats.

MPP

  • D Amarbayasgalan, constituency 2. General Secretary of the MPP and current Cabinet Secretary.
  • S Amarsaikhan, constituency 13. “Mayor” (Governor) of UB.
  • B Bat-Erdene, constituency 4. Minister of Environment and Tourism.
  • J Bat-Erdene, constituency 4. Former Minister of Roads and Transportation.
  • E Batshugar, constituency 11. Son of former president N Enkhbayar.
  • B Battsetseg, constituency 2. Minister of Foreign Affairs.
  • D Bum-Ochir, party list place 15. He is an anthropologist who received his PhD from Cambridge. He has been Cultural and Religious Policy Advisor to Pres. Khurelsukh for the past three years.
  • S Byambatsogt, constituency 2. Minister of Roads and Transport.
  • G Damdinnyam, constituency 5. Past Mongolia Focus author.
  • S Chinzorig, constituency 1. Minister of Health.
  • Ts Davaasuren, constituency 4. Minister of Construction and Urban Development.
  • B Dulguun, party list place 25. Deputy Director of Mongolbank.
  • J Ganbaatar, constituency 9. Minister of Mining and Heavy Industry.
  • B Javkhlan, constituency 5. Minister of Finance.
  • Ch Khurelbaatar, constituency 2. Deputy PM and Minister of Economy and
  •  Development.
  • Ch Nomin, constituency 11. Minister of Culture. Daughter of director of Gatsuurt conglomerate.
  • L Oyun-Erdene, constituency 6. Prime Minister
  • R Regdel, party list place 5. former head of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences
  • G Saikhanbayar, constituency 1. Minister of Defense.
  • T Sainjargal, party list place 33. Deputy Director of Erdenes Mongol LLC [Tavan Tolgoi]
  • L Soronzonbold, constituency 6. Director of M Bank
  • D Tsogtbaatar, constituency 10. former Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • B Tsogtgerel, constituency 10, known as Шилэн/Glass Tsogoo for his investigations using glass/transparency account law.
  • N Uchral, constituency 10. Minister of Digital Development and Communications.
  • G Zandanshatar, constituency 1. Speaker of Parliament

DP

  • N Altankhuyag, constituency 11. Former Prime Minister of Mongolia, 2012-2014, and senior advisor to President Battulga, 2017-2019. In 2020-2024 Parliament, independent MP representing Erdenet/Orkhon Aimag (now in constituency 4)
  • R Amarjargal, party list 19. Former Prime Minister, 1999-2000, MP 2004-2016
  • M Amarjin, constituency 11, comedian and prominent protestor
  • O Baasankhuu, constituency 10, former MPRP leader
  • Kh Battulga, constituency 4. Former President of Mongolia, 2017-2021, and Minister of Roads and Transportation, 2008-2012
  • J Batzandan, constituency 4. Democratic Party MP, 2016-2020, founding member of Shine Esvel (political party/movement)
  • S Erdene, constituency 9. former head of Democratic Party, 2016-2023
  • S Ganbaatar, constituency 1, independent presidential candidate, 2017
  • L Gantumur, party list 1. head of Democratic Party
  • Ch Lodoisambuu, constituency 12, journalist (“Ulaan Bal”)
  • L Munkhbayasgalan, constituency 7, journalist (“Tsenzurgui Yaria”)
  • E Odbayar, party list 11. founding member and leader of Demos Party
  • Kh Temuujin, party list 9. Former Minister of Justice
  • M Tulgat, constituency 8, candidate for the head of DP during the 2021

KhUN

  • T Dorjhand, party list 1, Head of the KhUN, MP
  • B Naidalaa, party list 2, co-founder of the KhUN
  • G Javkhlantugs, party list 15. Director of Policy and Advocacy, American Chamber of Commerce in Mongolia

Other Parties

  • Ts Oyungerel, constituency 12. Former Minister of Culture, Tourism and Sports and DP MP
  • N Nomtoibayar, Former MPP, and founder of the National Coalition (*as of 6/13, Nomtoibayar is not listed as a candidate according to ikon.mn)

So far, we have identified 25 candidates from MPP, 14 from DP, 3 from KhUN, and, two from Other parties. We will continue to reflect the lists as we continue to monitor the candidates.

Sources for this post include:

M. Khulan, [“From the current Parliament, 54 members are being nominated again”], Lemon Press, May 21, 2024, https://lemonpress.mn/post/xuri3V3GARh

Sanders, Alan J. K., Historical Dictionary of Mongolia, Fourth Edition, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Incumbents

By Julian Dierkes and Marissa J. Smith

Incumbency has been a big factor in past elections in Mongolia regardless of (changes to) the electoral system.

Given the “choice” of nomination for direct election or the party list, what are incumbents doing this time?

In total (as of May 28, see our table of candidates), there are 49 incumbents running for re-election. That is just under two thirds (64%) of previous members.

For the MPP, 36 incumbents are running. All are running for direct election seats, none have been nominated via the party list.

For the DP, 12 incumbents are running. That includes N Altankhuyag who had previously been elected as an independent but is now running for the DP, though he is a candidate in Songinokhairkhan, not in Erdenet (now in constituency #4, including Orkhon, Bulgan and Khuvsgul aimags) where he was elected in 2020. 10 are running for direct election seats, while 2 have been nominated via the party list, S Odontuya (2nd on party list) and J Batsuuri (3rd).

The lone MP for KhUN, T Dorjkhand, heads up the party list.

Observations

Regardless of their election result in 2020, incumbents have thus broadly been chosen to run in direct election races.

Besides N Altankhuyag, only two other incumbents are also changing constituency: P Anujin (moving from Songinokhairkhan district of UB to constituency #6 – Dornod, Khentii, Sukhbaatar), S Ganbaatar (also from Erdenet/Orkhon to #1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor). Two of the three moving onto the list from directly-elected seats are doing so from districts of UB (Dorjkhand from Khan-Uul and Odontuya from Bayangol).

Not only are most of the incumbents running in the same geographic areas where they were before, several do or have held the position of local governor – Amarsaikhan for Ulaanbaatar, Batlut for Orkhon, Sandag-Ochir for Baganuur, Enkhtuvshin for Dornogovi, Odontuya for Bayangol district of UB, Naranbaatar for Umnugovi, Batjargal for Tuv, Ganbold for Uvurkhangai. (Batsuuri was also formerly governor of Sukhbaatar aimag, but he is moving onto the party list.)

Take-Aways

The fact that so many incumbents are running not only for election in particular constituencies, and in ones in which they have established local presence, fits with a long-time trend contributing to the MPP’s staying power, at least beyond Ulaanbaatar. (See Marissa’s peer-reviewed journal article on this topic here).

For the Ulaanbaatar vote, however, there may be greater contest. In the wake of the “big three” parties announcing their lists of candidates through the media, a prominent thread of comment that emerged on social media called the composition of the MPP party list a “trap”, or in a more extreme case observed, “make-up.” In this line of reasoning, the MPP list “distracts” with new, non-Party career candidates, while the incumbents occupy directly-elected spots. The presentation of young, well-educated, professional candidates also strongly characterized KhUN’s “Right Person” campaign in the last election, and that former DP MP and minister Ts. Oyungerel’s CUP is carrying out on social media presently.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Women Candidates 2024 Election

By Julian Dierkes, Bulgan B and Marissa J. Smith

Thanks to Marissa Smith‘s initiative, we’re building a table of candidates running in the June 28 parliamentary election. One of the characteristics we included in the table right away is gender.

Women via Proportional Representation

As we explained in our primer on the election system, 30% of all candidates must be women, and the party lists follow a “zipper system” with alternating male and female candidates. That raises the question whether this decision about the electoral system is likely to increase the number of women MPs in the parliament, as is intended.

Given the 48 seats that will be elected through proportional representation, that in itself will mean around half of the candidates elected via the party list will be women. “Around half” because all three major parties (MPP, DP, KhUN) for whom we’ve collected information so far have a man in their first party list position, so there could be a scenario where not exactly half of the proportional seats are filled by women. Even then, that implies a minimum of 22 women elected via proportional representation which would surpass the current absolute number of 13 in the 2020-24 parliament.

Percentage-wise that would be a bit less clear, of course, since the parliament is expanding from 76 to 126 seats. If no women are elected via direct election (obviously an unlikely scenario), the 24 women that are likely to be elected via the proportional vote would make up would make up 19% of MPs. That would be more than the current 17%, but obviously not a distribution that would reflect the population especially given the high proportion of women in post-secondary education with most of MPs having attended university of some kind. Note also that 19% would not return to the levels seen in socialist parliaments that were in the low 20%, though obviously given the lack of a competitive election for those seats, that is a skewed comparison.

Women via Direct Election

At this point, it’s obviously very hard to predict how many women might be elected via direct seats. As far as we’ve been able to determine (we’ll keep checking, revising and adding to the table over coming weeks) the female incumbents running in this election will be:

  • B Bayarsaikhan (MPP)
  • D Unurbolog (MPP)
  • Ch Undram (MPP)
  • P Anujin (MPP)
  • B Saranchimeg (MPP)
  • G Munkhtsetseg (MPP)
  • S Odontuya (DP)
  • A Adiyasuren (DP)

Given that incumbency has been a big advantage in past elections, it would seem like a fair assumption that a number equal to the female incumbents would be elected again, though that is very speculative.

If the number of women who succeed in direct elections were roughly the same as the number of incumbents running that would mean 8 additional female MPs.

With the 24 female MPs likely to be elected via the party lists, that would lead to 32 or so women which would be just over a quarter of the new 2024-2028 Parliament.

There are a number of prominent women running for direct election who are not incumbents, of course (for example, Foreign Minister B Battsetseg and Minister of Culture and Tourism Ch. Nomin), so if the incumbents are successful in their re-election bids and additional women are elected, that proportion could rise further.

We are also watching for Ts. Oyungerel and her new third party, the Civic Unity Party (CUP), to announce their party lists and candidates for directly-elected seats. While they have been active on social media and have released materials such as this video on Facebook and X, the CUP have not released a list as the “big three” parties have at this time. (Update: The CUP list is available here. Ts. Oyungerel has registered, and the list is predominantly female, including 35 women and 24 men.)

One of the interesting questions that will arise for the next parliament will be the perception of (the relative power of) directly elected MPs vs their colleagues who will have been elected via party lists. Julian previously speculated about this and gender may also play into that perception.

As a final caveat, we also note again that these candidate lists are lists of the names of those individuals whom parties are submitting for registration. All candidates still must be cleared by the General Election Committee and candidates will not receive their official candidate card and official go-ahead to start campaigning until next month.

Women Parliamentarians, Mathematical Representation and Outlook

The above parameters lead us to consider the following likely results in terms of women’s representation among MPs. Let’s use simple math to predict the number of women in the parliament for the 2024-2028 term. The proportional seats of 48 secure 17-19% of female parliamentarians, depending on whether we get 22 or 24 women. Only 14 (out of 78) candidates are women in the MPP and DP candidates in the 13 constituencies. The KhUN party has the highest number of women nominated in direct representation, at 34.  In the proportional system, the KhUN Party has nominated 24 out of 48 seats for women, while the MPP and DP have nominated 23 women each.  With these numbers added, MPP and DP just met the 30% quota with 38 women candidates according to the amendment (see all the changes to the election legislation here). KhUN party has the highest number of women at 57, or 45% of women.

If we focus on possibilities rather than probabilities, we can propose three distinct scenarios for the representation of women in parliament. These would give us about 25-30% of women’s representation in the parliament, the possibility of almost double the existing number or a slight increase.

Type of Representation Number of Seats Scenario: Stagnant Parity Scenario: Modest Progress Scenario: Modest Setback
Proportional 48 22-24
(Based on zipper system, max # of women is 24, min is 22)
24
(maximum number of women)
22
(minimum number of women)
Direct 78 11-13
(Based on previous two elections of 15-17% of elected MPs are women)
14
(19%, increment of 2% based on last two elections)
10
(13%, decrement of 2% from maintained)
Total 126 33-37
(This represents 26-29% of  elected MPs are women)
38
(30% of the parliament)
32
(25% of the parliament)

Given the number of women nominated by both parties from direct representation, it will be difficult to have up to 11-13 women, meaning at least one woman from each constituency. However, if we look at the superficial calculation, we see that many factors play into the election.  Anyway, we will continue to analyze the situation further.

* Edit, 5/30/24: Female incumbents also include Kh. Bulgantuya (MPP)

Posted in Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Gender, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Table of Candidates, Parliamentary Elections 2024

By Marissa J. Smith

I’ve put together an Airtable of candidates, available at this link:
https://airtable.com/app4qRxMRvaDmDLsg/shrJ1RxjGJL3QeSWz

(Click here to see detailed changelog)

7/6/13: Most parties removed from spreadsheet to meet account type requirements, added four Civil Will-Green Party party list members (these were not in the spreadsheet earlier as this party’s party list was not available). ALL ELECTED CANDIDATES included and indicated.

6/12/24 – 6/13/24: The table has been updated based on the elections coverage platform at ikon.mn. Changes here:

Democratic Party
#24 – N. Javzanpagma -> N. Baigalmaa
#28 – I. Narantuya -> E. Badamgarav
#29 – D. Amartuvshin -> Ts. Tserentogtokh
#38 – L. Otgontsetseg -> T. Tsatsral
#39 D. Altangerel -> B. Munkhgerel
#43 S. Yumenkhuu to #48
Toirog #5 – Darkhan, Selenge, Tuv
S. Bayartsogt replaced by L. Odbayar
Toirog #9 – Bayangol
B. Battulga replaced by Ts. Tavanchuluu

KhUN
#29 U. Unenkhuu removed [not replaced, party list now has only 47 candidates]
Toirog #2 – Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, Uvs
S. Byambaasuren replaced by M. Byambadorj

Civic Unity Party
Toirog #1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor
D. Bas-Orgil Removed

National Coalition
#1 Nomtoibayar removed
#6 N. Khulan removed
#13 D. Enkhbat -> D. Bekhbat
Toirog #1 – Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor
D. Odontuya -> D. Odontungalag
Toirog #10 – Sukhbaatar, Chingeltei
L. Bayarkhuu removed
D. Ganbold removed

Mongolian Conservative Party
Toirog #4 – Bulgan, Khuvsgul, Orkhon
T. Erdenetsetseg added

5/31/24: We’ve added candidates for Oyungerel’s Civic Unity Party and the National Coalition and will continue to add other candidate listings as they are announced by parties and as we have time to input them.
5/22/24: For now, this is based on information from three parties (MPP, DP, and KhUN) and the media; these candidates have NOT obtained their final candidate cards, i.e. their candidacy is still being reviewed by the General Election Commission.

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2024 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Balance of Power in Expanded Parliament

By Julian Dierkes

The 2019 constitutional amendments were partly aimed at shifting the balance of power toward parliament and cabinet, away from the presidency. For example, the prohibition on the double deel was intended to strengthen the prime minister by offering them a bit more independence from parliament. Conversely, powers to create parliamentary committees were meant to strengthen parliament’s ability.

For some of these amendments, we won’t know whether they might have had the desired effect as they have been overturned already last year, i.e. the double deel prohibition. An MPP prime minister coexisting with an MPP president – despite the regular discussions of divisions and rivalry between them – during an MPP supermajority is probably also not the time to really put the desired shift of power to a test. That is not because the MPP can railroad any changes through, but because of the ongoing fragmentation of power and some of the surprising challenges in governing with a supermajority.

What will parliamentary vs cabinet power look like in the next UIX?

The expansion in the number of seats seems likely to shift the balance of power in parliament. The split between 78 majoritarian districts and 48 proportional representation seats suggests that the status of these “different” MPs might differ and their role in potential cabinets and in legislative activities with that.

Abstract arguments about the relative power of directly-elected and party-list MPs are easy to construct. On the one hand, directly elected MPs have a constituency that serves as the basis of their power and they can potentially turn to that constituency in justifying decisions that might even counter party positions. While they are beholden to the party (leadership), on the other hand, MPs elected by a national list might point to their relative national prominence and the importance of political parties in justifying their decisions.

Early discussions ahead of the next election suggestion that the former rationale might play a more significant role. But the nomination of candidates in coming weeks will also offer some indication. I have previously speculated about some of the decisions in nominations. If many prominent incumbents are nominated in their (expanded) electoral districts, we might conclude that they see more of a logic that points to the power rooted in a direct electorate, but if any incumbents or prominent new candidates choose the party lists, that might suggest that national prominence and a national constituency might also serve as a perceived power basis. That logic would primarily hold for the MPP, of course, perhaps also for the DP which is likely to nominate a full slate of 126 candidates as well, though conclusions regarding the DP would be less drawn from incumbency, more prominence, given the small number of incumbents.

By contrast, one might suspect that prominent KhUN candidates might prefer to be nominated for high spots on the part list where their chance to be elected via proportional representation might be significantly higher. They might therefore see their opposition mandate as being more of a national mandate, rather than being rooted in a specific constituency.

It does not seem like there is any more inherent power in directly elected seats compared to those elected from a party lists. In practice, newly introduced proportional representation seats might seem to be diminished by comparison, but decisions by incumbents and parties in this and future elections could easily shift that perception.

Posted in Democracy, Democratic Party, Governance, Ikh Khural 2024, JD Democratization, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Will the parties consider what the electorate wants to see on the ballots? There is a TV show for that. 

By E Lkhagva

As far as I can remember I don’t think there has been election coverage in Mongolian democratic history where the public felt there has been enough debates between candidates, real  interviews or fair coverage in general.

When you think about how local media cover general elections one can point to the lack of debates, badly organized interviews or over-produced glossy candidate profiles which leave the electorate disengaged wondering how misrepresented they are in the Ikh Khural. Add social media trolls and known influencers and artists openly endorsing the Prime Minister an act netizens of Mongolia are calling “Хиамчин, Хиамрах” ham or to act of hamming this year’s election would be tough for the average voter to make sense or to make an informed decision. The role of the media in elections has been an aspect that has been identified repeatedly by OSCE Election Observation Missions.

This is especially true for younger voters. There have been efforts to engage them to come out in the past namely the Ugloo campaign. A large poll of 11,000 respondents by MMCG this spring shows Mongolians would like to see someone “new, young and clean”. This is true for previous polls done by Sant Maral Polit barometers and IRI youth perception survey. But are the parties listening? Will they send fresh new faces to the 13 electoral districts this year or will they prefer more established candidates whom the constituencies’ awareness level is higher. Many are claiming that the party list would be a welcome addition to include younger and female politicians to access the legislative arena. However, the party list has yet to be finalized as the parties scramble to align their platforms to get the seal of approval from the National Audit Office. And, even if female, younger and/or new candidates are nominated by the MPP and DP, if they are nominated for lower spots on the party list or in more competitive electoral districts, their chances may be very unclear. KHUN’s ability to have representatives elected via a party list and proportional representation also remains untested.

Rules of the game. No country for new candidates.

This year the rules of the game have changed. Again. Districts are larger. The campaign period is shorter. Parties will need to present a 48 person list for the proportional vote and 78 candidates to be nominated in the electoral districts. The local elections in October remain the same districts as 2020.

New Coverage

Returning back to journalism after 5 years in the ripe election season, my editorial and production team at MongolTV decided to put together a political reality show to demonstrate how the political process unfolds and to introduce new, young and clean candidates to the public and ultimately to provide a national platform for them to share their stories. We are offering half a billion tugriks for the winner to devote to their cause.  This is not an original idea. In 2015 UBS television has produced a  “Улс төрд шинэ манлайлагч” which introduced many DP, MPP and even business and civil society leaders at the time. The 8 episodes of political reality format will be profiling 100 out of 520 applications we received from a diverse backgrounds all around Mongolia  and the hopeful future candidates will need to complete 8 tasks for their chance to be recognized nationally and to earn 500 million tugriks.

The production team has put in efforts to balance the representation in terms of gender, social minority groups and political parties and walking a tight rope to stay within the legislative red lines on not showing party affiliation of candidates to be within the guidelines of the new election law.

Whether we succeed in producing a show which elevates voter education, demonstrate that young, new politicians are in fact capable of making tough decisions, and offer solutions to national and local issues will be for you to judge from April 26th Saturday evening. We hope the show achieve its goal to nudge parties to consider more representative candidates to their lists and drive political discourse on the subjects that matter for this election cycle.

About E Lkhagva

Lkhagva is a journalist, Editor-in-Chief of MongolTV based in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. He holds a Master of Journalism degree from Journalism and Media Study Centre of the University of Hong-Kong and currently serves as a Board Member for Independent Fund for Media Self-Regulation.

Posted in Democratic Party, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Lkhagva Erdene, Media and Press, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics, Younger Mongolians | Leave a comment

Parliamentary Elections 2024: Note on Third Parties, #1

by Marissa J. Smith

While we wait for the State Audit Office to review and approve party platforms (I will be looking for them to appear on the General Election Commission’s website around April 26), I have prepared some observations about third party participation/applications to participate so far.

Interestingly, of the parties that went through the process to participate in the 2020 elections, all but four (Mongolian Green Party, Mongolian Traditionally United Party, Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, Love the People Party) have submitted platforms to the Audit Office. The Mongolian Traditionally United Party is listed as a member of the United New Coalition, which is one of two coalitions that submitted platforms this year. This party and the Green Party were still listed as official political parties on the Supreme Court website in February.

There are also six parties that submitted platforms for this year’s election that did not participate in the 2020 elections.

The table below shows parties with platforms currently under review by the State Audit Office and parties that participated in the previous (2020) Parliamentary Elections (see Mongolia Focus post here). Links to live and active Facebook pages are included (though comment on social media and elections more broadly is beyond the scope of the current post). Only four parties appear to have live websites with recent (2024) activity: the Mongolian People’s Party, “Shine” New Unified Coalition, United Party of Civil Participation, and the Freedom Alliance (FKA Demos). (The Democratic Party does not have an active website that I have been able to locate and the website listed in their official registration is not accessible).

(English Translation) Parties/Coalitions That Submitted Platforms to State Audit Office (2024) Parties Cleared by Audit Office to Participate in Elections (2020)
Civil Movement Party Иргэний хөдөлгөөний нам
Civil Will-Green Party Иргэний зориг ногоон нам
Иргэний зориг ногоон нам
Democracy Renewal Party Ардчилал шинэчлэлийн нам
Ардчилал шинэчлэлийн нам
Democratic Party Ардчилсан нам Ардчилсан нам
Development Program Party Хөгжлийн хөтөлбөр нам
Хөгжлийн хөтөлбөр нам
Freedom Alliance Party Эрх чөлөөний эвсэл нам/Зон олны нам
Эрх чөлөөний эвсэл нам /Зон олны нам/ [aka Demos – Mongolia Focus post here]
Freedom Implementation Party Эрх чөлөөг хэрэгжүүлэгч нам
Эрх чөлөөг хэрэгжүүлэгч нам
Ger District Development Party Гэр хороолол хөгжлийн нам
Гэр хороолол хөгжлийн нам (see Mongolia Focus post)
Great Unity Party Их Эв нам Их Эв нам
Republican Party Бүгд найрамдах нам
Бүгд найрамдах нам
Justice Party Зүй ёс нам Зүй ёс нам (see Mongolia Focus post)
KhUN Party ХҮН нам ХҮН нам (see Mongolia Focus post)
Masses’ Majority Governance Party Ард түмний Олонхийн Засаглал нам
Ард түмний Олонхийн Засаглал нам /АТОЗ/ (Mongolia Focus post here)
Mongolian Conservative Party Монгол Консерватив нам
Монгол Консерватив нам
Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party Монголын либериал ардчилсан нам
Mongolian Liberal Party Монголын либериал нам
Mongolian People’s Party Монгол Ардын нам
Монгол Ардын нам
Mongolian Renewal Party Монгол Шинэчлэлт нам
Motherland Party Эх орон нам Эх орон нам
National Coalition Үндэсний эвсэл Үндэсний эвсэл
New Unified Coalition (New Party and Mongolian Traditionally United Party Coalition) Шинэ нэгдсэн эвсэл/Шинэ нам, Монголын Уламжлалын нэгдсэн нам эвсэл
Шинэ нэгдсэн эвсэл /Шинэ нам, Монголын Уламжлалын нэгдсэн нам эвсэл/
Party for Mongolian Humanity Монголын хүний төлөө нам
Монголын хүний төлөө нам
Power of the Masses Party Ард түмний хүч нам
Ард түмний хүч нам
Social Democratic Party Социал демократ нам
Социал демократ нам
Truth and Justice Party Үнэн ба зөв нам
Үнэн ба зөв нам
Civic Unity Party Иргэдийн оролцооны нэгдэл нам
United Party of Good Democrats Сайн ардчилсан иргэдийн нэгдсэн нам
United Patriot’s Party Эх орончдын нэгдсэн нам
Эх орончдын нэгдсэн нам
World Mongolian’s Party Дэлхийн монголчууд нам
Дэлхийн монголчууд нам

Here is a list of parties registered with the Supreme Court of Mongolia that are not listed among the parties having submitted platforms to the Audit Office:

Монголын Ногоон нам
Монголын Уламжлалын Нэгдсэн нам
Монголын эмэгтэйчүүдийн үндэсний нэгдсэн нам
Ардтүмний нам
Монголын Ардчилсан Хөдөлгөөний Нам
Хамуг Монголын Хөдөлмөрийн нам
Тусгаар тогтнол, эв нэгдлийн нам
Миний Монгол нам

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Expectations of Coming Election

By Julian Dierkes

With Marissa Smith and D Enkhtsetseg, I have set the stage for the coming parliamentary election in terms of the changes to the electoral system. I have previously offered some thoughts of what these changes might imply for electoral strategies for parties. But what about elections as a contest of ideas, as the opportunity for Mongolians to contribute to decisions about the future development of their country?

What to campaign for when elections are not a contest of ideas?

To me, Mongolian democracy is primarily defined by the freedoms it affords citizens, less by the opportunity to define future directions and contribute to collective decision-making about that future. The dominant political parties are generally not defined by ideological positions, but instead offer a broadly pragmatic approach to political decisions that maintains the fiction that there are single best solutions for given policy challenges. I do not find the MPP to be particularly social democratic, nor the DP particularly business-friendly, and KhUN has also not built a clearly defined policy agenda.

Of course, the parties have submitted their platforms to the audit agency for approval. Mongolia is somewhat unusual in this regard in that the audit agency submits election platforms to a feasibility tests that is intended to prevent outlandish claims and promises. Parties are then restricted to items that had appeared on their election platforms and were approved in their campaign activities.

So, yes, parties will campaign on election platforms that will allow voters to have a sense of some of the substantive directions that future governments might take. But, these directions are unlikely to amount to any kind of coherent policy theme (eg market liberalization, support for rural regions, climate emergency mitigation, etc.). Broadly speaking, I therefore do not anticipate substantive debates and controversy during the campaign, nor a significant shift in overall policy as an outcome of these elections.

Elections under a Super Majority

The lack of ideological or substantive focus is exacerbated by the two-term supermajority that the MPP has held. Contrary to my expectations, it looks like PM Oyun-Erdene will not only serve out a term, but will also be able to enter the election to campaign on his record of governing. Given the past turnover in prime minister (albeit largely without any real change of political direction), this is unusual. It also means, that Oyun-Erdene and, by extension, the MPP will not have a strong claim as to new directions that they would pursue. Instead, their campaign will largely focus on the relative stability that their government has brought. That includes governance during COVID19, though perhaps that is fading in voters’ memories. Perhaps most prominent in the campaign will be the relatively good economic situation that Mongolian seems to find itself in at the moment. Yes, anecdotal evidence suggests that many younger, professional Mongolians may be frustrated by the perceived lack of opportunities for them, and there is significant unemployment among the urban poor, but the beginning of underground production at Oyu Tolgoi coupled with the unfortunate (in environmental terms) boom in coal production and export, places Mongolia on a seemingly solid economic footing, at least in the medium term.

While many Ulaanbaatarites continue to suffer under severe air pollution during the winter months, that issue somehow seems less virulent than it has in the past. The desulphurized coal along with the promotion of electric sources of heat as well as some resignation, may have led to this issue being less prominent than it had been in some previous years. Of course, June blue skys also contribute to air pollution perhaps never quite being top-of-mind during elections.

Opposition Topics

It is unclear to me that the DP is really engaged in any kind of renewal of its dominant voices or policies. If the old guard and the “golden swallows” of the revolution continue to dominate, or worse, in policy terms, former president Battulga asserts some authority over the party, I have no expectations that substantive initiatives are likely to come from the DP. In all likelihood, the campaign will be built around, “the MPP is bad, we are the good guys [sic!], vote for us” and the hope that past patterns of voters alternating between the two big parties return. If the DP nominates a full slate of 126 candidates as might be expected, this surely will include a number of younger and fresher voices, but they will be bound by a party establishment that will restrict any real substantive advances.

Beyond the generic, “the MPP is bad” narrative, KhUN seems likely to focus on their previous themes of their substantive, technocratic preparation for office and the need for a personnel change in government. Neither of these necessarily make for a strong substantive focus.

Corruption may be a topic that KhUN might push hard. It is clearly linkable to an overall “out with the old, in with the new” appeal, and the “coal theft” case has left the MPP and the government vulnerable to accusations even when there has been a blitz of anti-corruption measures over the past year. The recent revival of the legal case against former prime minister Su Batbold in the U.S. attracted some international attention, but will be hardly new or surprising to Mongolians, so seems somewhat unlikely to play a significant role. Yet, a focus on corruption seems unlikely to go beyond claims of “we’re better than them” to extend to actual substantive changes around transparency of contracts or general transparency at state-owned companies.

Linked to a corruption narrative might be an opposition focus on specific policy failures of recent times. That would include examples like the long drawn-out construction of the Darkhan road or the flooding in Ulaanbaatar last summer that seemed to point so clearly at corrupt practices in building permitting. Given the large number of seats available in the Ulaanbaatar ridings, these seem like they will be active topics, esp. in case June rains bring any additional instances of flooding. However, they are also somewhat unlikely to be linked to a larger policy agenda, say around urban public transport or protection of green spaces.

Unlikely Topics

As is true in many elections, it seems unlikely that foreign policy will play a significant role. While Mongolia’s position remains somewhat precarious caught between aggressive neighbours and the fear of a hardening of global blocks, there are no real divisions between the parties on foreign policy. Sure, some older MPP politicians might easily be portrayed by the opposition as Russophile, but they also stand for a perspective that may well be shared by a significant part of the electorate. In any case, it seems like there is very little wriggle room for Mongolian foreign policy that would energize voters.

Environmental issues seem increasingly visible to Mongolians, whether that is urban air pollution or the deterioration of grass lands or frequency of natural disasters, but these remain discussed primarily as particularistic issues, not as the basis for a broader ecological agenda.

For once, it would also seem that other than claims of corruption, Oyu Tolgoi and the agreements between the government and Rio Tinto may not be much of an issue in this election.

 

Posted in Corruption, Democratic Party, Elections, Foreign Policy, Governance, Ikh Khural 2024, JD Democratization, KhUN, Mining Governance, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Policy, Politics, Public Policy, Social Issues, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | Leave a comment

Self-Guided Travel to Mongolia

By Julian Dierkes

Despite my many visits to Mongolia, I usually do not come for vacation. But, in late July 2023 I spent a week with my brother touring the countryside. Perhaps some of these observations will inform others planning future travel…

 

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Our trip gave us some experience and insights into the tourism industry from the particular perspective of a knowledgeable-about-Mongolia tourist travelling without a tour. With this being the officially proclaimed years of tourism to Mongolia, perhaps these observations will be of interest as an update to a post I wrote about the experience of traveling around Mongolia on a tour.

One of the great surprises was that ger camps were nearly empty in the last week of July. In the process of trying to make reservations (see below) I had had the impression that some of the camps were nearly booked, but that turned out not to be the case. We learned that the busiest time for the camps had been the week after Naadam, as many Mongolians travelled that week. As much as we really enjoyed the lack of crowds, it does make you wonder about the continued viability of this kind of travel when seasons are short and camps are investing into infrastructure.

Driving

I have been driven around the countryside for over 10,000km, I would guess, but I had never driven myself. This was my chance! But, it turned out to be a more ambitious plan than I had anticipated. Rental cars without a driver are very difficult to find. In the end, I had to rely on the advice of some experience travel professionals, and managed to rent a car from Drive Mongolia that served us really well.

We relied on cell phone-based navigation and that worked just fine.

Roads are much better now than they had been ten years ago or so, but there are still many spots that are only reached by gravel roads which vary between washboards (<30km/h) to highways (<80km/h). I’ve noted some of the complex communication patterns that one adopts in a post about recent changes in the countryside.

Ger Camps

We stayed in three ger camps. I would classify all of these as “destination camps” in that they were not along the way of major routes, but instead would be locations that travellers would aim at specifically.

 

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Harganat River Lodge

Harganat River Lodge is located near Murun. It sits high on a river bank with a 270º view over the entire valley stretching out to the West from Murun. One of its distinguishing features is a dome structure that houses a large open room (used for yoga class, for example), but also shower and toilet facilities as well as a sauna. Obviously, we couldn’t say no to a sauna!

Av Darhar Eco Lodge

Av Darhar Eco Lodge is on the eastern side of Lake Khuvsgul. It was the only occasion that I’ve ever had travelled to a location that could only be reached by boat in Mongolia! This is a great spot inside a national park. At other times of the year, there is an abundance of wildlife of whom we only saw the droppings.

Tultiin Tokhoi Camp

Tultiin Tokhoi Camp is also located near Murun, on the same river as the Harganat Lodge. It includes gers as well as really nicely-constructed small blockhouses.

Reservations/Communications

This is a weak spot if you’re making your own arrangements. The camps seem to largely be catering to Mongolians and international tourists on organized tours, i.e. relying on the good services of travel companies.

Since most camps are out of cell/data range they struggle in replying to contact attempts and some of the other camps we considered did not have much of an online presence either.

Of course, this is also terrific as we did not have WiFi in any of the camps and only had cell data connections by climbing a hill in all. Peaceful.

Food

To me, one of the great attractions to summer-time ger camp travel is fresh yoghurt and we got that. The orum (өрөм) at Av Darhar was fantastic, especially as it came with freshly-made rhubarb jam. But camps also seem to continue to offer a toned-down version of Mongolian food or somewhat generic meals that don’t include Mongolian aspects.

My foodie brother was very curious that none of the Mongolian dishes (he happily took to mutton soup) include any local herbs, as the steppe seems to offer abundant plants, and some of those are likely to be tasty. The curious answer we got from a Mongolian guide staying at the same camp: “We don’t have to season our meat because the animals already eat all the herbs!”

Experiences

I was really pleased to find that the ger camps we stayed in offered experiences. This had not been the case when I had taken notes about previous tours. In this case, the activities included a map for local hikes, including archaeological sites, and rafting. With these kind of activities, ger camps might become more of a multi-day destination, rather than just a stopover. Other facilities such as saunas added to the sense that it would be really nice to spend some days at a camp, explore the local surroundings, and relax.

Gers

All of the camps offered electricity. Some of them were hooked up to the grid, elsewhere this was provided via car batteries fed by solar collectors. Some camps also offered WiFi, though, who wants it, when you’re traveling in the Mongolian countryside.

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Parliamentary Elections 2024: Yet Another New Election System

By Marissa J. Smith, Julian Dierkes, and Enkhtsetseg Dagva

As many observers have noted, Mongolian election systems have changed from election to election for the past 20 years. In this post, we detail the form of the June 2024 Parliamentary elections as currently discernable from measures by the Parliament and compare these to prior elections and associated structures of Parliament.

For this year’s election expected in late June, eligible voters will have two votes to elect a total of 126 members of the Ikh Khural: a vote in one of 13 electoral districts to directly elect 78 MPs (distributed unevenly across constituencies, see below), and a party vote to elect 48 MPs from party lists. The shift is thus an expansion of the total number of MPs as well as a return to a mixed majoritarian-proportional election system.

At the end of 2023, the Parliament also established a new structure of constituencies, a radical departure from previous systems, in which aimags have been combined into large territories (except for Bayan-Ulgii) with different numbers of mandates. This was not established in the constitution, but rather in a Parliamentary resolution, and appears to be designed to shift with each election to account for demographic changes across Mongolia and government regional development goals.

Legal Measure Date Description
Constitutional Amendment (21.1) May 31, 2023 Define the structure of Parliament as a single-chamber body with 126 members
Constitutional Amendment (21.1) May 31, 2023 Define elections for Parliament as mixed majoritarian-proportional, with 78 proportionally-elected members and 48 majoritarian-elected members
Parliamentary Resolution No. 112 December 21, 2023 Define the number and makeup (combination of aimags) of constituencies (тойрог)
Attachment to Parliamentary Resolution No. 112 No date Define the number of mandates (мандат per constituency тойрог)

Map of constituencies with number of mandates

Map of constituencies with number of mandates, General Election Commission, “Election Education,” No. 1, 2024, pg. 5.

Expansion to 126 seats and Return to Mixed Majoritarian-Proportional

An expansion of the number of seats in parliament has been under discussion for many years. On this blog, Julian wrote about some of the debates surrounding the double deel and the size of Parliament as early as 2015. Arguments for an expanded parliament have included the committee (over)load on 76 individual MPs and the number of MPs relative to the size of cabinet.

A decision for expansion was finally made in summer 2023. While different proposals for the precise extent of expansion had been floated for years, there does not appear to be a specific rationale for the number of 126, nor for the 48:78 split between proportional:majoritarian seats. In the end 126 appears to be a pragmatic compromise between the current number of 76 members and a doubling to 152 members.

This decision for expansion was coupled with an elevation of the electoral system as mixed majoritarian-proportional into the constitution. The determination of the number and form of constituencies and seats/mandates per constituencies, i.e. how to distribute the 78 directly-elected seats now mandated in the constitution, specifically for the 2024 election, was established in December 2023 in a parliamentary resolution and attachment to the resolution. According to state broadcaster MNB this structure was based on a count of voting-age citizens by administrative unit current as of November 30, 2023 provided by the General Authority of State Registration.

It remains interesting to observe that a party that has won landslides in the last two elections, the MPP, and has a strong power base in rural election districts that carry more weight per vote than urban districts, has perhaps chosen to open the possibility that a well-established but self-destructing main opposition party, the DP, and a still-upstart KhUN party gain more seats in Parliament.

To capitalize on this opportunity, the DP and KhUN would have to demonstrate abilities to campaign in the countryside that they have not had to in prior years. While in the new constituency structure, six constituencies are urban and seven are provincial, mandates will not be allocated evenly across these constituencies – almost 70% of the mandates will be outside of Ulaanbaatar (and “Ulaanbaatar” also includes outlying mining communities Nalaikh, Bagakhangai and Baganuur). Outside of a few select aimags – which have since also been commanded by the MPP – the MPP has always had significantly more presence in the countryside and been able to conduct more impactful campaign activities there; MPs such as Speaker Zandanshatar have already been visiting constituencies (not as official campaign events, of course, which are allowed only during the fourteen days prior to the election). Additionally, while the DP has recently appointed younger “Gen X and Y” members to leadership positions, the MPP is the only party that boasts a robust youth organization presenting candidates that win seats and produces young appointees to administer an expanding government apparatus. It is also notable that the Parliamentary Election Law now allows five times as many party and coalition employees to work nationwide and at the aimag/capital area level as it did previously (37.2).

Proportional Representation

48 seats in the new Parliament will be filled from countrywide party lists. To qualify for these seats, parties and coalitions must have candidates running in 50 percent or more of the total mandates per constituency (74.2.1). Single parties must obtain at least 4 percent of the vote, two-party coalitions at least 5 percent of the vote, and coalitions with three or more parties, at least 7 percent (74.2-74.4).

Majoritarian Districts

The Parliamentary resolution distributing the aimags and capital area among thirteen constituencies states that formula of thirteen constituencies with unequal distributions of mandates was done in line with plans for regional development (Para. 2). As this resolution only covers the 2024 election, and as the Mongolian state broadcaster also reported that data on the distribution of voters by administrative units also was taken into account, one presumes that the current idea is that the number of constituencies is intended to change with each election.

Votes in each of the constituencies will be tallied per candidate and mandates distributed to candidates with the most votes. Additional rounds of voting will be organized within a week in case of 1. ties or 2. a voter participation rate below fifty percent in the constituency (78).
Independent candidates are treated no differently from party/coalition candidates in terms of how their votes count for the majoritarian mandates/seats.

Women Candidates

As in past elections, new legislation for the 2024 elections includes measures towards increasing the number of female candidates. The “zipper system,” i.e. alternating female-male candidates on lists has been instituted (30.6 of the Parliamentary Elections Law). Additionally, 30% of candidates for a party must be women (or men) (30.2), and the law also stipulates that in 2028 this will increase to 40%.

Voter Education

General Election Commission has been successful in past elections to explain voters about changes in electoral systems. We expect that this effort will be resourced and receive a fair bit of attention again for this election. At this time the GEC website section addressed to voters (the “сонгогч танаа” tab here) contains only information about voter registration and residency. The GEC also released a new 60-page issue of “Election Education” announced on Facebook (link to post here) on March 1.

Election Timeline

The election has been scheduled for June 28th. The campaign season will be slightly shorter this year than it was in 2022, as the amount of time before the election that the General Election Committee will grant candidates their cards has been shortened from 22 days before the election to 22 days before the election.

The table below is a schedule of key election-related dates, based on the Law on Parliamentary Elections. The General Election Committee also has a more detailed schedule available here.

Expected Timing Timing As Defined In Legal Measure Description
March 1 March 1 Deadline for audit organization to set campaign finance limits (50.1)
End of March March 25 Deadline for parties to submit election platform (сонгуулийн мөрийн хөтөлбөр) (38.6)
Beginning of April First week of April Deadline for parties/coalitions/candidates to submit donation reports to state auditor (38.7)
End of April 60 days before election Deadline for parties to submit intention to participate (26.1)
Mid-May 45 to 38 days before election Parties nominate candidates (and self-nominees nominate selves) (29.1)
Mid-June 18 days before election (previously 22 days) GEC issues candidate card (and official status as candidate) (32.12)
Late-June From issuance of card to 24 hours before election day (previously this would have been slightly longer) Campaign period (39.1)
June 28 Election Day Election Day
Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Enkhtsetseg Dagva, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Chingeltei Khairkhan – The Closest Getaway from the UB Bubble

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan

Hiking is becoming a favorite activity especially for those who live in the UB bubble. During weekends and holidays, you would find more people in public parks near the city and see many families driving to their summer places, resort areas (Terelj, Ski Resorts), or to the countryside. A few years back, during the pandemic, my friend drove me to the closest mountain range within a 30-minute drive from the center of the UB bubble.

This is called a Chingeltei Khairkhan Park – which is in the Chingeltei District and at the southeastern edge of the Chingeltei Khairkhan mountain – one of the four mountains surrounding the capital city. It is on the north side of the city and a part of the Khentii Mountain Range – a long range runs through the northeastern Mongolia.

How to Get There?

It is about 12 kms from the downtown. You can simply drive or take a bus (Number 23 or 24). Or, if you are serious hiker and know the locals, you can hike up to the mountain  from several different routes. But you need to walk over 6-10 kms. For me, the bus is the most convenient one. From this state-of-art bus stop, you need to walk about 1.7 kms to reach the main entrance of the park.

A brand new bus stop at the Chingeltei Zurkh Uul.

Entrance

What could you do?

It is slowly becoming a well-established public park. If you are a hiker, you can hike to several different points. One is going to southeast get a view of the UB city. This hike is a bit rough and slippery in the winter or after the rain. But, in summer, you will enjoy the wild strawberries. The other route is going up to the 13 ovoos (shamanistic ritual place) and antennas.

This hike has two parts: the first part is easy, gradual slope up to the Wild Boar board and the other part requires you to climb over the boulders. If you are curious, you can walk down to the sacred place for wild boar worship. The wild board is believed to be the guardian of this mountain. At the end of this hikes, you would have breathtaking views of the mountain range and glimpse of the city and ger districts. If you are not serious hiker, you just enjoy in the playground, fitness and picnic areas all year around. The highest attitude of the mountain is around 1950 meters.

Walkway

Picnic Tables Everywhere

Fitness Area

Fitness Area

Thirteen Ovoos

Scenic Views

Some Thoughts

The Chingeltei Khairkhan park is a good example of how the government (national and local) and public working together to preserve the nature, especially near the Ulaanbaatar city, after a messy period of the land rush in 1990s.

Before 1990, just like some other outskirts of the city, there were summer houses of several organizations. During the socialist period, each organization had similar summer cottages (3×4 or 3×5 meters) for their employees. From June till September, a transportation was provided since these summer cottages were located away from the public transportation to the outskirts. In the winter, a herdsman family guard these cottages. Chingeltei had several these summer cottages, and you would spot the old sign for the summer cottages and a few torn-down cottages.

As the nation experienced the economic hardships, these cottages were abandoned. People wandered around to vandalize and loot these summer cottages, cut woods for fuel or money, and damage the nature as they went crazy collecting pine nuts and berries. At the same time, many people fenced large areas and built big houses without any official permits. These fences make for public to hike or go sightseeing in these mountains. Also, going to the mountains in the 1990s was not really safe because the widespread alcoholism and increased crime rates – especially related to alcohol usage.

Today – the park has well-marked pathways and CCTV monitoring. Nicely, all these lights and cameras are powered by solar panels. Coming to this area many times, it is truly nice to see families, friends, and hikers enjoying the nature – in the peace (without heavy drinkers and noisy brawls). The only challenge for all seems to be the waste management.

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The ONE Challenge

By Julian Dierkes

Because few other people focus much of their attention on Mongolia, I often get asked questions that are more fundamental then I might be on other topics. In a conversation recently, sparked by the state visit of German president Steinmeier, I was asked, “What’s the one challenge that Mongolia is facing?”

Obviously, the academic déformation profesionelle is to complexify rather than simplify, and the obvious answer to that question is, “that depends”.

But, taking this challenge seriously, I would have to answer that the primary challenge for Mongolia is the development of a resource economy. While there are other pressing and important issues (democracy, inequality, climate change, herding economy, gender relations etc.), most of these are impacted directly by the shape of the resource economy.

And, the development of a resource economy is both tricky as well as complex.

Challenges to the Development of a Resource Economy

Obviously, Mongolia is not alone in facing this challenge. It is important to note that many other jurisdictions are grappling with this challenge across the Global South, but also in OECD countries, take for example the resource economies of Canadian provinces, but also places like Alaska or Norway. Some of these jurisdictions have not been that successful in terms of populations benefitting from resource developments, others – like Norway – may not be all that relevant for their experience.

Some common challenges in the quest to rely on natural resources to power economic, political and social development:

  • distribution of benefits
  • attracting investors
  • reliance on resources vs diversification
  • environmental impacts
  • fluctuations in world prices
  • corruption

Mongolia has been grappling with these since the prospect of a resource economy arose in the late 1990s.

The path of development has been meandering. The most pointed example of this is the Oyu Tolgoi mine. To many observers, esp. foreign observers, this meandering path has delayed the flow of revenues from that mine to state coffers which is expected to enable most initiatives toward developments that the government might embrace. At the same time, Mongolians (policy-makers and the population) have learned more and more about the resource sector, and policy choice are now much better understood for the delays that the meandering path has caused.

But, many questions remain. Along the lines of the challenges listed above, some of these questions include:

  • state ownership vs taxation, investment of revenues vs distribution to the population, management of debt
  • need for international investors vs desire to maintain as much control over resources as possible
  • benefitting from the bounty of resources vs recognizing that resources will ultimately be exhausted
  • local impacts of resource projects vs national benefits, environmental damage (potential and actual) caused by resource projects
  • stabilizing revenue flows despite dependence on global prices and developments
  • licensing regimes, protection of revenue flows

Impact of the Resource Economy on other Issues

Politics and Democracy

Many of the decisions about a resource economy have to be made with the input of the population, especially in a democracy. Yet, expectations also have to be managed, something that has been a significant challenge to governments of the past decade. While some specific challenges are recognized, political parties have not aligned along the lines of choices about these challenges. There is no party that makes a coherent and consistent case for more state involvement, for example. Yes, the MPP seems to be generally more inclined toward greater state involvement than the DP and KhUN, but this has not been a consistent position that has been carried out by MPP governments and the need for foreign investment often appears to clash with state involvement.

Questions around the distribution of benefits also have to be politically mediated. The recent decision to bundle direct election seats in parliament into regional groupings is just one indication of how the challenge around the distribution of benefits is shaping politics. Here, the expectations for some kind of compensation of local communities impacted by mining clashes with a unitary state that seeks to distribute benefits to all Mongolians. These benefits are also easily politicized as is visible in the recent payment of a Tavan Tolgoi dividend to Mongolians where the timing of this dividend six months before a parliamentary election is no accident.

Inequality

No doubt, mining has created wealth in Mongolia. Ignoring distributional inequality for a moment, per capita GDP has grown from $560 in 2002 to $4,400 in 2012 and $5,045 in 2022 (current US$, Worldbank). While this income has benefitted some segments of society disproportionately, some of it at least has benefitted all Mongolians. Note the shift in countryside transportation as an example over this time, from horses to motorcycles to cars. Yet, significant inequality remains. There is an urban poor population, especially but not only in Ulaanbaatar, there are threats to the herding economy, and there is a lack of economic development outside of the capital and mining projects, that remains a challenge in this regard. However, any attempts to combat inequality by a social welfare state or redistribution will rely on revenues from the mining sector.

Climate Catastrophe

Clearly, Mongolia is being impacted by the global climate catastrophe without contributing significantly to it (despite the horrendous air pollution in Ulaanbaatar and other urban centres caused by the continued burning of fossil fuels). Apparent impacts include desertification, deterioration of grasslands (also caused by overgrazing of course), increases in violent weather events, esp. precipitation, melting of permafrost, changes in plant and animal species’ habitat and range, etc.

Since COVID, Mongolia’s economy has come to rely even more on coal exports to China. This is where resources are contributing to the climate catastrophe through the supply of lignite and by thus continuing to enable a fossil fuel-focused Chinese economy. But despite the castigation of Mongolian governments by international organizations on this matter, they face the challenge of entrenched corporate elites that have stakes in the coal industry, and the need to generate revenues to address other pressing challenges.

In terms of likely developments, this is an area where we might think of the development of a resource sector in terms beyond minerals. Mongolian sunshine is likely to turn into such a resource that will resemble the mining industry in the space that industrial-scale solar projects will take up, in the need for huge investments, but also the possibility of significant revenues.

Herding Economy

Herding remains central to Mongolian society at a symbolic level, but also as a livelihood for a significant portion of the population. The herding economy intersects crucially with other challenges that Mongolia is facing, for example the impact of the global climate catastrophe. The herding economy is also changing rapidly. There are no political voices that are advocating for an exclusive focus on development of the herding economy. Initiatives focused on the potential of meat production for export to diversify away from minerals have not been successful. While many other projects (regional development, educational opportunities, infrastructure, etc.) are linked to the herding economy, any investments in the sector are largely dependent on revenue flows from the resource economy and policy decisions at the central government level to prioritize rural development.

International Relations

To the extent that Mongolia remains threatened in its existence by its somewhat overbearing two neighbours, this threat is also increasingly tied in with the development of the resource economy. Russia is not only a threatening presence to the North but it is also a competitor as a source of resources on a global market and Mongolia’s primary source of energy imports. China dominates Mongolia in terms of exports and imports, even the further development of the resource economy will not change that. Yes, foreign policy, particularly the efforts to balance constructive relations with the two neighbours with more global efforts to intensify relations with Third Neighbours, is made somewhat independently of economic developments, but this policy continues to be interwoven tightly with the resource economy.

A different kind of resource economy is also on the horizon, that is rooted in the development of Mongolia’s potential to produce alternative energy, esp. solar. That trajectory will shore up Mongolia’s energy security, but it will also require foreign investment and domestic in ways that will not be dissimilar to the minerals-based resource economy.

Implications for the 2024 Parliamentary Election

If my sense of the development of the resource economy as a primary challenge is correct, one might expect that answers to this challenge might be the most prominent element in the competition of political parties and candidates for votes this June.

Yet, this strikes me as unlikely. As I mentioned above, political parties have not developed a coherent policy program focused on the resource sector and views on its development have not emerged as the primary political cleavage that one might expect given the primacy of this sector.

Instead, the election will largely be fought on the merits of individual politicians and a pragmatic assessment of the record of the MPP government. As is the case for the past 20 years, policy on the resource sector will thus likely continue to be made on the basis of specific challenges as they present themselves, dominated by individuals who occupy particularly powerful positions, yet their power will also continue to be checked by the fragmentation of power.

Posted in Corruption, Countryside, Democracy, Demography, Development, Diversification, Economics, Environment, Foreign Policy, Ikh Khural 2024, JD Mining Governance, Mining, Mining Governance, Policy, Politics, Public Policy, Reflection, Social Issues | Tagged | Leave a comment

The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue: A Time to Talk About Climate Change

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan 

The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD) is gradually becoming an inclusive dialogue platform for Northeast Asian diplomats and academics to openly debate challenges and opportunities for the region. As the organizers – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia – prepare for the upcoming ninth dialogue (June 6-7, 2024), we recommend that the dialogue provide some discussion on climate security issues. We argue this is a timely move for all regional countries to strengthen their cooperation on increasing regional resiliency for dealing with the impacts of climate change.

Brief Background on the UBD 

Although the UBD initiative was declared in 2013, the idea was built on the country’s long-standing efforts of multilateral foreign policy and promoting peace and stability in the region. In the 1960s-70s, when the country’s foreign policy had been dictated by the Soviet Union, Mongolia managed to organize events – welcoming newly independent small states in the Asia Pacific Region. Also, in the 1970s, Ulaanbaatar became a center for the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace. Then, in the 1980s, as the geopolitical tensions among the great powers waned, Mongolia promoted itself as a dialogue venue for peace and cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region. However, due to challenges from the political, economic, and social transition in the 1990s and early 2000s, Mongolia’s foreign policy efforts were directed towards developing equidistant (or balanced) relations with its two neighbors, bilateral ties with so-called ‘third neighbors’ – mostly developed democracies (or Western countries) – and joining multilateral organizations and initiatives beyond its immediate neighbors.

But the idea of becoming a neutral platform for international cooperation did not die. In 2008, the Mongolian Institute for Strategic Studies along with the George Marshall Centre for European Security Studies organized a conference titled, “Ulaanbaatar as New Helsinki?” to promote Mongolia as a neutral venue for the regional security dialogue. After the idea was endorsed by the president, the first UBD was held in June 2014. Henceforth, the UBD has become a flagship event that has inspired other sub-regional, inclusive initiatives ranging from the Northeast Asian Women Parliamentarians Meeting to the Northeast Asian Mayors’ Forum, and even sporting and cultural events.

What Happens at the UBD?

It is a 1.5-day event welcoming policy-practitioners and academics from Northeast Asia. On the first day, the main sessions are usually devoted to providing a neutral platform for representatives from Northeast Asia to identify current security challenges and discuss practical ways to deepen confidence building and collaboration. Prior to the pandemic, the UBD was known as an event where you could witness debates by representatives from “not-so-friendly” countries, namely Japan and the two Koreas. Several times, the host nation facilitated a bilateral talk between Japanese and North Korean officials during the UBD. Since 2022, amidst heightened geopolitical tensions between the United States and China as well as Russia’s war in Ukraine, the UBD has offered a neutral venue for academics from these great powers. In the past, the UBD also provided sessions on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and invited youth representatives to present their views on regional cooperation.

Since the UBD welcomes not only researchers but also diplomats and policymakers from Northeast Asia and those states interested in Northeast Asian affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia hosts a closed door – also known as Track One – session with policymakers. The last two years’ Track One sessions were attended by senior foreign ministry officials from 13-14 countries and the United Nations. In 2023, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Seyfullah Hacımüftüoğlu, Secretary-General of the National Security Council of the Republic Türkiye, and Mr. Kim Gunn, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the Republic of Korea, attended the dialogue. It was clear that all these dignitaries made their way to Ulaanbaatar amidst their busy schedules to deliver messages to key regional players.

The event on the second day is co-organized with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). The UNESCAP session primarily focuses on power grid connectivity for energy transition in Northeast Asia, where global and regional experts exchange their views on the development of the Green Power Corridor Roadmap.

Now the UBD attracts participants from the wider Asia Pacific Region, Europe, and North America as well as delegates from the immediate Central Asian region (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic). In the past two years, international and regional organizations, such as the United Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and various non-governmental organizations have attended and observed the dialogue.

Why is Climate Security Important?

This year, the UBD should organize a session to discuss climate change and its related security challenges. As global experts argue, if we do not pay attention and resources to climate change now, the impact will become more devastating in the coming years. Here are three reasons why the UBD is a choice venue. First, all countries in the region are experiencing the impacts of climate change. Some examples are vivid – dust storms, droughts, floods, and extreme weather conditions. Second, the region has more to offer in terms of new technologies – artificial intelligence, cyber, machine learning, and biotechnology – to deal with the challenges of climate change. Third, dealing with climate-change-induced disasters, extreme weather events, or reducing carbon dioxide emissions are not necessarily geopolitical matters but transnational issues. Despite geopolitical tensions, the UBD could bring professionals to find ways to encourage cooperation, or at the least, confidence building. Therefore, the UBD could begin testing the water by inviting climate change experts and regional professionals who are coping with the immediate impacts of climate change to attend the dialogue.

Conclusion 

The UBD demonstrates a unique feature of Mongolia – a peaceful country in a complicated geopolitical terrain. Because it has avoided any serious issues with all countries in the region, Mongolia serves as a neutral, amicable venue for all to put aside their animosities and historical baggage, and converse in dialogue. Albeit facing heightened geopolitical tensions, regional militaries conduct exercises for the United Nations peacekeeping objectives, and states have sent their delegates to discuss ways to advance gender equality matters in Mongolia. The UBD is gradually making its way to becoming a regional platform to address the trust deficit and to promote dialogue for understanding and cooperation. Building on this progress, the UBD can contribute to initiating regional cooperation on climate change with experts and professionals.

Acknowledgement: The author would like to thank Mr. Hesu Song, a Princeton in Asia fellow in Mongolia, for being a peer reader and the copy-editing.

Posted in Foreign Policy, International Relations, Mendee Jargalsaikhan, Ulaanbaatar Dialogue | Tagged | Leave a comment

Party Strategies under a Mixed Electoral System in 2024

By Julian Dierkes

Recent constitutional amendments will have a profound impact on the 2024 parliamentary election especially as they will change candidates’ calculus about their nomination. Individuals seeking office or re-election will have the option of attempting to win one of 78 majoritarian seats or be placed high enough on the party list to win one of the 48 proportional representation seats. While it is a bit early more than half a year ahead of the election to speculate about specific individuals’ choice in this regard, there may well be some broad patterns across the three parties that are likely to context most seats, the MPP, DP, and KhUN. Strategic opportunities may align similarly for potential candidates across DP and KhUN in this case, but given the MPP supermajority based on the majoritarian 2020 election, there may be a different dynamic there. It also remains to be seen what impact party finance will have on all of this, for example restrictions on candidates’ spending of private monies, etc.

Choices in Securing Nomination

If candidates had free reign in selection a majoritarian vs a proportional candidacy it would seem like there might be two different sets of factors that would determine that choice:

  1. likelihood of election
  2. relative power/influence of seats.

MPP

Current incumbents have been elected in a majoritarian election in 2020, so those incumbents that won significant shares of the vote in that election are likely to try to secure nomination in majoritarian races, I imagine. On the other hand, there may be new calculations around the role of the party leadership in this kind of election.

For example, if L Oyun-Erdene will lead the MPP into the coming election, should he secure the first spot on the party list as a his route to a parliamentary seat or should he return to Khentii to run in the majoritarian election there? Both elections would be relatively safe for him, but the decision may have implications for his as well as the party’s campaign strategy. If the party concludes that his leadership will be a net benefit to individuals’ electoral chances, there may a preference to have him in the top spot on the party list to allow him to campaign all over the country without having to spend particular attention to his own constituency.

One of the big questions about the MPP candidates will be where women will fit in. If my guess is right that incumbents will try to cling to their majoritarian districts, then presumably the party list for the 48 proportional seats will be heavily populated by female candidates to reach the overall required quota of female candidates. If this turns out to be true and many of those women will be pushed to the bottom of the party list, we might not see a significant increase in women’s representation in the next Ikh Khural. If, by contrast, a number of female candidates are able to secure nomination in higher ranks of the party list, their election may be quite likely and the number of females MPs might thus increase.

DP

In the past, the DP has always run a full slate of 76 candidates. This has been in line with its self-perception as the second party, but cynics might also observe that the funds that candidates have brought into the party have been necessary to finance party activities. With the new party law, that source of income may have changed, but I imagine that the party will still try to run a full slate in the 78 direct election ridings, as well as the 48 proportional representation ridings. The DP continues to have some kind of party organization all across the country, so that a full slate is at least plausible in terms of the campaign resources that would be required.

Access to the party list may also become a subject of negotiations between some of the spin-off parties as they consider re-merging with the DP. Lu Bold would be a prominent former DP leader who might expect a strong list candidacy as a condition for re-merging. On the other hand, he has prominence and a previous record in Khaan-Uul that might mean that he might demand a direct seat candidacy there.

For some of the DP grandees who lost their seats in the 2020 election, it’s unclear whether they will be more tempted by direct election candidacies. I imagine that it will also be likely that there will be some internal battles over the placement of younger candidates, especially some of the younger, more prominent female candidates. This is one of the areas where the electoral campaign will be interesting to watch. For DP, the nomination of strong women candidates on the party list could send a real signal of renewal to the electorate that might also benefit some of the direct election candidates. On the other hand, the DP has been unable to initiate any kind of generational change over the past five years as it has been under Kh Battulga’s peculiar leadership, so there i no real reason to believe that a renewal is coming.

KhUN

For KhUN it might be overly ambitious to nominate a full slate. There just does not seem to be the party organization all across the country to sustain a full campaign, so that nominations in ridings or at list spots that are somewhat hopeless, even with an eye toward establishing the party as more of a force for the 2027 presidential or 2028 parliamentary election, might just require too many resources to be a strategic decision.

There is a set of about a dozen individuals who have gained some prominence as KhUN leaders. I imagine that most of them will seek nomination via the party list and that that’s where their best chances lie. This includes a number of prominent women, of course, so that it would not be entirely surprising of the proportion of female candidates might be highest for KhUN among the three main parties.

If much of the KhUN leadership or its most visible representatives opts to be candidates on the party list not in direct ridings, that could change the nature of the campaign significantly and tilt their campaign toward a stronger party platform as a basis to approach voters. When you are trying to persuade a proportion of voters to vote for your party, you might emphasize the strong candidates that you have nominated in the first, say 15, spots, but it would seem more efficient to emphasize a substantive political agenda along with the collective personal qualification. The arrival of more substantive campaign platforms is something that I have been eagerly awaiting in all the elections since 2008 that I have observed in-country (with the exception of the 2020 and 2021 COVID elections, of course).

Posted in Democratic Party, Ikh Khural 2024, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, National Labor Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Friendship Medal

By Julian Dierkes

I was awarded a Friendship Medal by Foreign Minister B Battsetseg at a reception commemorating the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Canada and Mongolia, and also the announcement of an upgrade of the bilateral relationship to a “Comprehensive Partnership”.

Photo: Mongolian Min of Foreign Affairs

I was actually quite touched and felt that recognition for “friendship” suits my relationship with Mongolia and Mongolians very well.

The medal actually turns out to be quite handsome, I will definitely look for occasions to wear the full version or the lapel pin although those opportunities might come more often in Mongolian than in Canada.

I was delighted that a number of people who have been involved in Canada-Mongolia relations were at the reception, including former ambassadors Anna Biolik, Greg Goldhawk and Catherine Ivkoff. Greg was awarded an Order of the Polar Start, congratulations!

Also lovely that a number of former students were also there.

This Friendship Medal came almost exactly 10 years after I was awarded a Governor General’s Medallion by the Rt Hon David Johnston during his state visit to Mongolia.

Posted in Canada, Reflection, Research on Mongolia | Leave a comment