Challenging Supermajority

Posted on October 17, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Following the 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential election, there were some fears that the MPP’s electoral wins and occupation of all three highest offices would lead to some kind of one-party domination.

Most readers will recall then-Pres Battulga’s April 2021 warnings that Mongolia was about to descend into militarized one-party rule. Marissa and I didn’t think so at the time, and it doesn’t quite look like a one-party state at the moment. In fact, from all conversations that I’ve had this summer into the fall from afar and in Mongolia, with members of all parties and other observers, it seems that the MPP is struggling to make policy despite its huge parliamentary majority and occupation of the office of the president. By all accounts, this is what’s behind the late-August cabinet reshuffle as well, a move that has brought many MPs into cabinet again, but does not seem to be directed at any particular areas of policy-making.

Substantive Void at the Core of the Party System

What’s the challenge? One of the fundamental challenges that Mongolian democracy has been facing for some time, i.e. there are no politics in politics. The MPP has no ideological core and Mongolians did not vote for it on the basis of proposed or likely policies. This holds for all three individuals in offices, Pres. Khurelsukh, PM Oyun-Erdene, and Speaker Zandanshatar, but also for the party at large. If you have no direction nor political goals and neither does your party, then perhaps it is not so surprising that a super-majority is challenging to operate.

This is not limited to the MPP, of course. It’s hard to even say anything about the DP anymore. Kh Battulga and S Erdene both seem intent on sacrificing the party on the altar of their… what? Not political goals. After all, Battulga spent four years as president without a single identifiable policy goal. Erdene and his shenanigans involving party votes and stamps seem to be built primarily around his personal ambition despite a clear signal from voters in the 2021 presidential election that he is simply not electable. Some seem to hope that a more substantive, ideologically-motivated DP might arise from the ashes, but I’ll wait to see that to be convinced.

KhUN? Hints at liberalism and social democracy (not coincidentally, the two orientations that the DP and MPP pay some lip service to occasionally), but no coherent position beyond, “we’re different and potentially competent”, has emerged.

Practical Challenges

The 2019 amendments’ experiment of attempting to strengthen the power of the PM by limiting the number of MPs in cabinet and thus also promoting technical expertise, seems to have been deemed a failure. As I have argued in examining current proposals for further constitutional reform, we really haven’t had an opportunity to get a sense of the impact that these changes might have had, as they are being abandoned/amended again already. In the case of the maximum number of MPs in cabinet (double deel), this amendment had been struck down by the courts, but PM Oyun-Erdene could have still applied it. Instead, he re-populated his cabinet with MPs even for ministries where there was no obvious urgency driven by policy-challenges or underperformance of the minister.

Party Discipline

What is behind this and the lack of any agenda that is being pursued by the Oyun-Erdene government? In previous electoral cycles, party discipline had always been seen as a strength of the MPP. Once a leadership battle had been settled, the party leadership would be able to promote individuals within the party to become candidates for office and to count on them for support of legislative ambitions. That support was – apparently – rooted in the recognition that only a united party would be strong enough to stave off challenges from an opposition.

The fact that the current opposition poses no challenge has exposed the essential emptiness at the core of the MPP. Just like the DP’s fundamental raison d’être is to be opposed to state-socialism, authoritarianism, so the MPP is focused on being in power. But, in power for what? to do what?

What the PM thus seems to be struggling with and attempted to address in his cabinet reshuffle was the sense that MPs had few reasons to support his agenda. Party discipline goes out the window when the margin of the majority is so large that MPs may be looking out for their own re-election rather than supporting a government agenda.

There are two further factors that exacerbated this apparent breakdown of party discipline in parliament: weak ministers and the lack of resources that MPs have.

Ineffectual Non-MP Ministers

The intention behind the double deel constitutional amendment had been to make the role of ministers less political and more substantive. The hope was that the jockeying for a ministerial post (and the spoils that might come with that in terms of patronage, etc.) could be undercut by emphasizing ministerial competence. However, in the current parliament at least, the reputation of non-MP ministers has mainly been that they’re moderately competent, but entirely ineffective as they lack a parliamentary power base.

Would this be different if there were more opposition MPs? That’s hard to imagine since that opposition would be unlikely to side with a government minister only because she was competent. But, with a smaller majority in parliament, the PM might be able to lean on MPs to support the government and thus give leeway to ministers for substantive policy-making. That is not what the situation up until this summer was perceived as, however. MPs largely leaned back and ignored ministerial proposals and projects.

MPs’ Pet Projects

The extent to which MPs engage in pet projects has always been quite notable. One of the most obvious examples of this would be current speaker of the UIX, Zandanshatar’s deliberative polling. This was something that Zandanshatar picked up during a research stay at Stanford Univ where it is being pushed as an element of or upgrade to democracy. There’s much that recommends deliberative polling as an attempt to involve a greater number/variety of citizens (i.e. not professional politicians) in fundamental decisions. Yet, the implementation of such deliberative polls only makes sense when a majority of parliamentarians see the virtue of such a format and intend to support the results that it might deliver. And, the public would need to understand deliberative polling and be on board. Not only was the polling experiment conducted in Mongolia deemed flawed by some thoughtful observes like legal scholar O Munkhsaikhan, but it doesn’t seem like anyone other than Zandanshatar himself was particularly interested or even remotely committed to this exercise.

This appears to be relatively typical of parliamentarians’ initiatives; they rarely amount to much more than pet projects. MPs are thus often responsible for the actual drafting of legislation (though the Min of Justice also gets involved in some of the detailed work) and they do so not only without coordination from central party bodies (recall the lack of ideology or policy agenda I discussed above) or any apparent support for such initiatives. In a parliament with a super-majority they might then act as free agents on behalf of “their” projects and look for support directly from other MPs who might in return be seeking support for their projects.

Given this tendency towards legislative pet projects, it is perhaps no surprise that so many plans, agendas, and laws are poorly implemented as they may have been shaped in an MPs office without much benefit of consultation with the ministries/agencies implicated.

Of course, PM Oyun-Erdene’s Vision 2050 was supposed to combat this lack of implementation and out-of-control growth of pet project legislation. But then, he doesn’t seem to have the internal party power to really reign in his MPs and rally them to a government cause, though the recent cabinet shuffle may be an attempt to do just that.

One-Party Dominance?

All kinds of things might still happen during the remaining 20 months until the next parliamentary election, including a change of prime minister, but it does seem to me that in the current institutional context of Mongolia, a supermajority is not the obvious route to a one-party dictatorship.

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Posted in Constitution, Democracy, Democratic Party, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, National Labor Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Mongolia’s New PM-In-Waiting: Who Is D Amarbayasgalan?

Posted on September 22, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Amar Adiya

New Cabinet Chief Dashzegviin Amarbayasgalan is increasingly emerging to be a likely successor to Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene in the future, i.e., post-2024 election. As new ministers are settling into their roles following August cabinet reshuffle, Amarbayasgalan has been seen practically everywhere speaking and weighing in on pressing issues. He also made clear that No.2 in the Cabinet is him, not Deputy PM Amarsaikhan.

Many people were surprised by Amarbayasgalan’s nomination to Oyun-Erdene’s Cabinet 2.0. President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh is said to have pushed Amarbayasgalan into the government after the latter skipped to join the administration following his party’s landslide wins in 2016 and 2020.

According to the Mongolian People’s Party’s (MPP) leadership transition plan, Amarbayasgalan appears now to be a top choice to succeed Oyun-Erdene in post-2024 if the party wins the election.

The rumor suggests Oyun-Erdene’s next career step is anticipated to be that of a parliament speaker, which is considered the second highest post in Mongolia’s political hierarchy, with the top job being that of a president though constitutional reforms can change that order.

Who is Amarbayasgalan?

So, who is Dashzegviin Amarbayasgalan? Amarbayasgalan, 41, was born and raised in Govi Altai province (western Mongolia) and began his career in the early 2000s with his elder brother’s printing business. He studied political science and was educated as a telecommunications engineer. In the late 2000s, Amarbayasgalan entered politics, winning local elections in Ulaanbaatar. He rose to prominence as the campaign manager for the MPP in the 2016 general election with Khurelsukh’s backing.

Amarbayasgalan’s ideas are completely aligned with the MPP’s key message, as well as Oyun-New Erdene’s Revival Policy and Vision-2050. Both Amarbayasgalan and Oyun-Erdene aided Khurelsukh when the latter was managing the party in 2008-2012 as a secretary general.

Amarbayasgalan may favor China in international policy because of his past position as party secretary general and close contacts with the Chinese Communist Party during the MPP’s centennial anniversary. But he’s unlikely depart from the current foreign policy direction.

Amarbayasgalan has a far more convincing and elegant speaking style than Oyun-Erdene. His words are more powerful, and his messages are more focused. But he has also avoided media and public appearances.

Many people praise him for his ability to broker an agreement between powerful factions inside the MPP. He also cultivated an image of not only competent, but also affable and reasonable in dealing with wide ranging politicians. One of his accomplishments as an MPP secretary general is regarded to be reinforcing the party to social democratic principles and conceptualized those in the new party chapter.

Earlier this year, he also received broad support from other political parties for new constitutional reforms, particularly reintroduction of proportional electoral system and expansion of parliament size.

As Khurelsukh and Oyun-Erdene, Amarbayasglan strongly believes in a parliamentary system, which helps improve governance, ensures regulatory stability and promotes more accountability, transparency and participation of wider population in major economic decision-making.

Amarbayasgalan represents a rising millennial wave of politicians, including PM Oyun-Erdene, Justice Minister Khishgeegiin Nyambaatar, PM’s senior advisor Ayushiin Ariunzaya (former labor minister), Digital Development Minister Nyam-Osoryn Uchral and new governor of Khovd Enkhbatyn Bolormaa. They are expected to wield more real political power by 2024 as they represent Mongolia’s largest demographic.

About Amar Adiya

Amar Adiya writes and edits Mongolia Weekly, an English newsletter on political analysis and business intelligence every week. He is also a regional director at Washington-based strategic advisory firm BowerGroupAsia.

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Untold 25: A Better World for All Children

Posted on September 20, 2022 by mendee

By Degi Bolormunkh

Our guest today is Ms. Tuyajargal, the founder and president of Merciful World NGO. She shares some interesting stories about her personal life and the meaningful works done by the Merciful World NGO. She provides many insights based on her rich experience of helping children with special needs.

https://soundcloud.com/fesmongolia/25-asran-khamgaalagchiyg-demzhikhgygeer-khgzhliyn-berkhsheeltey-khkhdiyg-demzhikh-bolomzhgy?in=fesmongolia/sets/untold-the-hidden-stories-of&utm_source=clipboard&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=social_sharing

Founding of the Merciful World NGO

Ms. Tuyajargal is a journalist by profession and a mother of three children. Her middle son, who was born in 2005, had been found to have special needs in 2007 and needed all-round care. Going to hospitals and looking for a kindergarten for her son was tough. As a socially active mother who experienced the hardships faced by families with children with special needs, she wanted to do something to help. So, she founded the Merciful World NGO in 2009 and has been working at the organization since. Their first work was setting up a kindergarten class in a local kindergarten that provides equal education for children with disabilities. The main purpose of the Merciful World NGO is to help children with disabilities to grow up to be independent individuals within society who can take care of themselves well and help others. There are around 12,000 children with disabilities in Mongolia whom they hope to help. Currently they are operating a children’s development center called Enerel, founded four years ago with a sponsorship from MCS Estates LLC. To help fund the development center, they also set up a stuffed toy factory called Honey.

Photo: Ms. Tuyajargal, second from the left (courtesy Facebook page of “Merciful World” NGO)

Importance of Supporting the Caregivers

The Merciful World NGO is also working on influencing the policy and legal environment regarding children with disabilities and their caregivers. Ms. Tuyajargal emphasizes that supporting the caregivers is essential to support the development of children with special needs. In the early days of the organization, she recalls that they used to receive many calls from families asking for help with financial hardships. She acknowledges that compared to the weak state support provided then for families with children with disabilities, things have gotten much better in terms of financial assistance from the government. Based on a study they conducted, they found that many of these families are engaged in making handmade crafts such as traditional felt making or jewellery while taking care of their child or children and, their main challenge is selling their crafts to earn income. Since 2011, they were looking for ways to support the families and caregivers to solve this situation when the first order came in from a charity foundation founded by Jackie Chan, asking if the families could make 500 stuffed toys. The order was successfully carried out despite having little experience with the process of making stuffed toys. After this experience, there were talks to not pursue this line of production because of the extensive work and input required to make each toy. However, they decided that manufacturing stuffed toys was the best option to pursue considering that from a sale of one toy the profits can be divided among four people based on their different roles in the process such as tailoring, stitching, stuffing, and decorating. Most orders came from organizations such as museums, hospitals, or companies, who wanted to support their initiative. From 2011 this ‘micro-household factory’ with 120 people had grown to the size of a factory under the name Honey in 2018. Due to the pandemic, there are many unforeseen challenges such as the decrease in sales and cuts in income. Ms. Tuyajargal reflects on this initiative as a major success in terms of financing the operations of the Enerel Development Center while providing financial support for caregivers and families whose incomes has been supplemented by the project. Interestingly, Ms. Tuyajargal shares that the origins of stuffed toys can be traced back to the 1900’s to a German woman with disability.

Photo: Stuffed toys made in the Honey factory (courtesy Facebook page of “Merciful World” NGO)

Building the First Inclusive Child Development Center in Mongolia

Ms. Tuyajargal shares that having a Child Development Center for children with special needs was a long-time dream and she and her team would advocate for support and meet with government officials and parliamentary members every year. Despite the law stating that all children regardless of disability or other factors have an equal right to education, the reality is not so accommodating.  For children under six years of age, the special needs classes or programs can be incorporated into local kindergartens, but for those over six years of age, there is no place to go for public education. The MCS Estates Company has generously provided them with a place to run their Enerel Child Development Center, which Ms. Tuyajargal says was “a dream come true”. As they provide comprehensive services for all the needs of the children who come to the center, they are the only one of their kind in Mongolia. The center has two main groups, one is for children that need physical treatment or care and the other is for children with mental disorders who are trained from an early age to become workers at the stuffed toy factory with occupational training. On average, there are 12-15 children in group one and 10-12 children at the center every day. Based on their limited resources, including the availability of teachers and space, they are working at full capacity. Support from the government has been minimal and despite laws stating that there should be support from the state, there is no substantial response.

Photo: Enerel Development Center (with the permission of Tuyajargal)

Photo: Enerel Development Center (with the permission of Tuyajargal)

Government Support Needed to Foster Key Professions

One of the biggest challenges Ms. Tuyajargal identifies in the country is the shortage of professionals in Mongolia, specifically, in professions such as Occupational Therapy. Due to the lack of such essential professionals in the country, many problems arise that stem from it. The most essential person who can help a child with special needs is an occupational therapist. She underscores that there are various government support services and projects that focus on providing employment opportunities for people with disability. Yet, there is little support for education and training for professional fields such as occupational therapy and other care workers who can make a substantial difference in helping people with disability to lead a better life. With this strong conviction, Ms. Tuyajargal is studying to become a professional occupational therapist herself. In terms of having their concerns heard by the government, people with disabilities and organizations advocating their rights and needs have a strong voice in Mongolia. However, Ms. Tuyajargal feels that when government or officials change, the dialogue has to start all over again and there needs to be improvement in substantive support. They hope to establish more development centers around the country in the next few years but are mostly dependent on the government support for expansion. Ms. Tuyajargal shares a story about how when they went to the local clinic during the pandemic, she noticed how some people would treat or even look at her son differently, and resolutely states that she will keep doing her work alongside her dedicated team.

Author: Degi Bolormunkh is a young professional with a multi-disciplinary education and a diverse background. She is a recent graduate from the Master of Management program at the UBC Sauder School of Business. She completed her B.A. in Combined major of Political Science and Philosophy with a minor in International Relations from the University of British Columbia. She has lived in multiple countries and has developed a keen interest in issues surrounding DEI, social and political inequality, and good governance.

The Untold podcast and blog post are made available by the generous support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Mongolia. We also want to thank our editor Riya Tikku.

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Guest Post: Sukhgerel Dugersuren: Criminal or Marmite Character?

Posted on September 12, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Jennifer Lander

Contrary to popular opinion and the slogans of international organisations, democracy and economic development do not always make for easy bedfellows. One of the basic elements of democracy has to do with the function of law under an independent judiciary: law should no longer simply be a mask for state interests but a genuine space where different interests and rights can be adjudicated as impartially as possible.

In that sense, democracy is supposed to be good for economic development because it protects contractual relationships, transactions and other market activity from unlawful interference, thus creating a stable environment for the economy. However, democracy can also challenge the terms of economic development because the civil and political rights of citizens are also supposed to be protected by that very same mechanism: the rule of law.

Because the rule of law cuts both ways – protecting contracts as well as civil rights – there are times when democracy and economic development seem to be at odds. In these times it is not uncommon to see national governments trying to limit civil rights in order to “get the economy back on track”.

Enter our current case in point: the investigation of Sukhgerel Dugersuren, a high-profile civil society leader who has been deeply involved over the past two decades in monitoring the environmental and social impacts of large-scale mining and infrastructure projects. In early August, the General Intelligence Agency (GIA) began an investigation of Sukhgerel’s alleged role in “sabotaging” the country’s economic interests through “illegal cooperation with foreign agents/agencies” (Articles 19.4 and 19.6 of the Criminal Code). These are serious allegations and could lead to imprisonment if Sukhgerel is found guilty.

Here are two simple questions that I hope will shed a little more light and a little less heat on this controversial moment in a controversial figure’s career.

Why Now?

The first is a question of timing: why now? Sukhgerel has been working consistently as an advocate on socio-environmental issues since the early 2000s when the mining boom started in Mongolia. People may not agree with her politics or her assessment of the impacts of mining, hydropower and other energy projects, but she isn’t doing anything new. In fact, Sukhgerel has been extremely consistent in her advocacy approach, which is notable for its almost obsessive lawfulness: her modus operandi is to sift through every governing rule that applies to a given development project, whether that be national legislation, international law or standards, or corporate social responsibility commitments. Her June article on the Erdeneburen hydropower plant is just such an example of detailed legal analysis.

If Sukhgerel hasn’t been doing things differently, then what has changed?

In August, a few days after her investigation was announced by the GIA, the Chinese Foreign Minister arrived. The Erdeneburen hydropower plant was on the table for discussion. Coincidence? I think not. My research suggests that there is a consistently positive correlation between heightened national economic insecurity and increasingly erratic crackdowns on civil society. It was a similar story in 2013, when Mongolia’s mining economy began to tank and the most outspoken leaders of the River Movements were detained and imprisoned in a dubious judicial process.

Just as there have been “boom and bust” cycles affecting Mongolia’s economic returns from natural resource exports, there have been parallel “boom and bust” cycles in the central government’s relationship with sub-national administrations and civil society organisations. I think we are seeing another one of these cycles, where Mongolia’s political economy is profoundly shaping its constitutional balance and adversely affecting civil society.

Why Sukhgerel?

Sukhgerel is particularly high profile, and her “fine legal toothcomb” approach is something which makes her very tiresome in the eyes of corporations, investors and government ministries wanting to accelerate economic activities. Equally, she is very admired in the eyes of impacted communities and transnational advocacy networks. If the government succeeds in taking Sukhgerel out of the picture through criminalisation, they will simultaneously take a prominent thorn out of the side of economic interests and effectively threaten those who support her.

The problem is that by targeting Sukhgerel, the government is punishing a particularly civil and lawful mode of engagement with the impacts of development projects. While Sukhgerel may be famously combative in her tone, she notably doesn’t organise violent protests. She attends well-known international conferences, she promotes well-recognised campaigns on taxation and environmental impact assessment. In short, she is part of a well-known chorus of concerned civic leaders working on the social and environmental impacts of development projects globally.

She may be unpopular because she believes in prioritising social and environmental principles over economic activities, but that’s nothing surprising. Large-scale development projects are inevitably controversial, especially in democracies where people have sufficient freedom to raise their voice and promote their views. Sukhgerel is someone who sees more costs than benefits, and she is entitled to hold that opinion and seek to influence the governance of the sector as an informed civilian, particularly given that all she seems to spend her time doing is appealing to the very standards that companies, investors and governments say they are committed to.

So are Sukhgerel’s advocacy activities annoying for some actors? Sure. Are they disruptive for some projects? Potentially. Are they criminal? No.

So what is this all really about?

My concern is that this criminal investigation is not really about whether Sukhgerel is a “traitorous saboteur” of Mongolian economic interests. Frankly, that allegation seems extremely far-fetched (heavily edited Youtube videos and email screenshots on Twitter are not “evidence” in any sense of the word). The real issue is the democratic cost of the government’s current erratic attempt to reassure its economic partners that nothing – not even the fine legal toothcomb of Sukhgerel Dugersuren – will delay or disrupt economic projects. There is a heavy irony to all of this, in the sense that the government itself has routinely delayed and disrupted strategic economic projects over the past ten years, much to the ire of investors. But this time the government has the chance to blame someone else, and they are taking it.

Sukhgerel makes a particularly efficient scapegoat because she is a classic “marmite character” in Mongolia’s economic development sector (to borrow a British idiom). Marmite, if you don’t know of it, is a salty yeast spread for toast or sandwiches eaten in the UK, and people either love it or loathe it. There is no middle ground with Marmite, just like there is no middle ground with Sukhgerel: people tend to be either for or against her.

But being a “marmite character” is not a criminal offense. If no real evidence of “traitorous sabotage” turns up out of the blue (as I strongly suspect it won’t), then this criminal investigation is effectively a scare tactic to punish the very mode of civic engagement that Mongolia’s democratic constitution has been designed to protect. It scapegoats someone who has unfailingly, infuriatingly and tenaciously turned to lawful means to challenge economic activities by using the very standards baked into development projects themselves.

If this investigation is to have any credibility from a legal perspective, it must be very transparent, independent and stringently follow the rules of admissible evidence and fair trial. Innocent until proven guilty, right? The rule of law, if it is real and not just rhetoric, has to protect everyone, even marmite characters.

About Jennifer Lander:

Dr Jennifer Lander is a Visiting Research Fellow in Law at De Montfort University in the UK. She currently leads a project funded by the British Academy examining the implications of new dispute resolution mechanisms in Mongolia’s mining sector for practices and paradigms of citizenship. Her book Transnational Law and State Transformation (Routledge, 2020) explores some of the broader issues raised in this blog in detail. You can follow her for an occasional tweet at @jennylander4 or contact her directly at jenny.lander@dmu.ac.uk

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Posted in Environmental Movements, Jennifer Lander, Law, Politics, Protest, Protest, Renewables, Security Apparatus | Leave a comment

Oyun-Erdene Cabinet, Post-Constitutional Change

Posted on August 31, 2022 by marissa smith

By Marissa J. Smith

The “double-deel” rule, part of the Constitution, whereby only the Prime Minister and four cabinet ministers may also be MPs, has just been overturned. There are now ten new members of the Cabinet, eight of whom are current Members of Parliament.

Several former ministers are now either deputy ministers or in other posts (Ariunzaya is now senior advisor to the Prime Minister and Yondon is general director of the Erdenet Mining Corporation). It is of note that Nyamdorj, long time minister of justice and most lately, Cabinet Secretary, is now without a position (including a seat in Parliament).

Nyamdorj has been replaced with Amarbayasgalan, the young (b. 1981, age 41) general secretary of the Mongolian People’s Party. Uchral, now heading the Ministry of Digital Development and Communications, is also young (b. 1985, age 37). On the other hand, many of the new Cabinet members are returnees — Ch. Khurelbaatar (Minister of Finance in Khurelsukh’s Cabinet prior to the resignation and presidential campaign), Byambatsogt (former Minister of Justice), Choijilsuren (former Minister of Finance), and Bat-Erdene (former Minister of Defence), Sarangerel (former Minister of Health, Minister of Environment). Bolorchuluun is old enough to have worked as an agronomist in Dornod province during the state socialist system, and several others studied in the Soviet Union.

This brings the full roster, including continuing ministers to:

Prime Minister – L. Oyun-Erdene
Cabinet Secretary – D. Amarbayasgalan
Deputy PM – S. Amarsaikhan
Finance – B. Javkhlan
Defense – G. Saikhanbayar
Justice and Internal Affairs – Kh. Nyambaatar
Education – L. Enkh-Amgalan
Roads and Transport – S. Byambatsogt
Environment – B. Bat-Erdene
Foreign Relations – B. Battsetseg
Mining and Heavy Industry – J. Ganbaatar
Labor and Social Protection – T Ayursaikhan [D. Sarangerel]
Construction and Urban Development – B. Munkhbaatar
Health – S. Enkhbold
Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry – Kh. Bolorchuluun
Energy – B. Choijilsuren
Culture – Ch. Nomin
Digital Development and Communications – N. Uchral
Traffic Congestion – J. Sukhbaatar
Olympism, Physical Culture, and Sports – B. Bat-Erdene
Economy and Development – Ch. Khurelbaatar

The Mongolia Focus post on Oyun-Erdene’s first Cabinet may be found here.

New Cabinet members:

REPLACEMENTS:

Cabinet Secretary (Хэрэг эрхлэх газрын дарга): D AMARBAYASGALAN (Дашзэгвийн Амарбаясгалан) [Previous – Ts. Nyamdorj]

b. 1981, Taishir, Govi-Altai province
Communications Engineer, graduated from Mongolian State University of Science and Technology in 2002
State Academy of Management, graduated 2008
Political Scientist, graduated from Mongolian National University in 2012
Member, Citizen’s Representative’s Khural (Bayanzurkh), 2008-2016
President, Social Democratic Youth Association, 2009-2014
Member, MPRP Little Khural, 2010
MPP Leadership Council, 2015
General Secretary, Mongolian People’s Party, 2016-Present

Minister of Road and Transport Development (Зам, тээврийн хөгжлийн сайд): S. BYAMBATSOGT (Сандагийн Бямбацогт) (former MP, ran 2020, not elected) [PREVIOUS – L. Khaltar – now Deputy Minister]

b. 1974, attended secondary school in Khovd
Economist and manager, Institute of Finance and Economics, graduated 1998
Master’s degree in business studies, Maastricht university
MPRP Social Democratic Mongolian Students Association, 2006-2008
MPRP/MPP Little Khural, Member, 2005, 2007, 2010
MPP Leadership Council, 2013
Member of Parliament (Khovd), 2008 – 2020
2016, Minister of Justice and Home Affairs

(not to be confused with S. BAYARTSOGT)

Minister of Mining and Heavy Industry (Уул уурхай, хүнд үйлдвэрийн сайд):  J GANBAATAR (Жамбалын Ганбаатар) [PREVIOUS – G. Yondon – appointed Director of Erdenet Mining Corporation]

b. 1973
General Director, Orgil Shopping Center, 1996-2015
Citizen’s Representative Khural (Bayangol), 2008-2012
Member of Parliament (Bayangol), 2016-Present

Minister of Labour and Social Protection (Хөдөлмөр, нийгмийн хамгааллын сайд): T Ayursaikhan (Т Аюурсайхан) (MP)

Member of Parliament 2016-Present
Deputy Speaker of Parliament 2020-Present

Replaced D SARANGEREL (Даваажанцангийн Сарангэрэл) (MP) [PREVIOUS – A. Ariunzaya – appointed senior advisor to Prime Minister] on Oct 21 2022

b. 1963
Broadcaster, Omsk, graduated 1983 and Rostov, graduated 1990
Editor, Mongolian National Broadcaster, 1990-1994
Director, TV5, 2003-2005
Secretary, MPP, 2011-2012
Member of Parliament, 2012-Present
Minister of Health, 2017
Minister of Environment, 2020

Minister of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry (Хүнс, хөдөө аж ахуй, хөнгөн үйлдвэрийн сайд): Kh BOLORCHULUUN (Хаянгаагийн Болорчулуун) (MP) [PREVIOUS – Z. Mendsaikhan]

b. 1964, completed 10-year middle school in Dornod province
Agronomist, graduated 1987
Director, Khishig Agro Company, 1992-1997
Director, Dornod Guril [Flour] Company, 1997-2012
Member of Parliament, 2012-Present

Minister of Energy (Эрчим хүчний сайд): B CHOIJILSUREN (Баттогтохын Чойжилсүрэн) (MP) [PREVIOUS – N. Tavinbekh – now Deputy Minister]

b. 1970, Tes, Uvs province
Automation and telemechanics, Urals Higher Polytechnic, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinberg), graduated 1993
MPRP/MPP Little Khural, 2005-2015
Member of Parliament, 2012-Present
Minister of Finance, 2016

ADDITIONS – NEW (at least since 1/2021) CABINET POSITIONS:

Minister of Digital Development and Communications (Цахим хөгжил, харилцаа холбооны сайд): N UCHRAL (MP) (Ням-Осорын Учрал) [State Secretary B. Bolor-Erdene is now Deputy Minister]

b. 1985 in Ulaanbaatar
Degree in law, Ikh Zasag International University, 2007
MBA, University of Gloucestershire, 2010
Master degree in history, Mongolian University of Education, Master of History, 2012
Doctorate degree in history, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013
General Director, Royal Academy and Royal International Institute, 2010-2016
Member of Parliament, 2016-Present

Minister, Chairman of National Committee on Traffic Congestion (Хот хариуцсан сайд) – J SUKHBAATAR (Жамъянхорлоогийн Сухбаатар)

b. 1975, Darkhan-Uul province
Law degree, Mongolian National University, graduated 1997
Secretary and general manager, General Election Committee, 2001-2006
General Secretary, MPRP, 2016
Member of Parliament (Darkhan), 2008-2012, 2020-Present

Minister for Olympism, Physical Culture and Sports (Спорт, олимпизм хариуцсан сайд) – B BAT-ERDENE (Бадмаанямбуугын Бат-Эрдэнэ)

b. 1964, completed 10-year middle school in Khentii
Law degree, Higher Military School, graduated 1990
Naadam wrestling champion, 1988-2000
Member of Parliament, 2004-Present
Member, MPRP Little Khural, 2005-2009
Presidential candidate, MPP, 2013
Minister of Defense, 2016

Minister of Economy and Development (Здийн засаг, хөгжлийн сайд) – Ch KHURELBAATAR (Чимэдийн Хүрэлбаатар)

b. 1968, Ulaangom, Uvs Province
Leningrad Higher School of Economics, graduated 1991
University of Sydney, graduated 1998
Lecturer, economics and econometrics, 1998-2000
Advisor, economic affairs, to President Enkhbayar, 2000-2003
Chairman of Millenium Challenge Foundation, 2003-2007
Minister of Fuel and Power, 2007-2008
Member, MPRP Little Khural, 2005-2009, 2013-2015
Minister of Finance, 2017-2021
Member of Parliament (Uvs), 2008-Present

CONTINUING MINISTERS:

Deputy Prime Minister (Шадар сайд): MP S AMARSAIKHAN (С. Амарсайхан)
Born 1973, Nalaikh, Ulaanbaatar
Linguist and Lawyer, Fresno College (California) 1996;
English Metropolitan College, 1998
Los Angeles College, 2000
Master’s degree in law from Southwestern University
Staff at Science and Information Technology Center 1992-1994
Attache at the Embassy of Mongolia to PRC, 2000-2004
Manager of Investment and Foreign Trade at American Trade and Development, 2004-2007
CEO, President and Director of BOD, Oyunii Undraa Group LLC 2007-2017
Member of the Citizen Representative Council 2012-2020
Head of the budget, finance and economic committee of the Citizen Representative Council 2016-2017
Chairman of the Citizen Representative Council 2017-2019
Mayor of Ulaanbaatar 2019-2020
Member of Parliament 2020-Present

Minister of Environment and Tourism (Байгаль орчин, аялал жуулчлалын сайд): B BAT-ERDENE (Бат-Өлзийгийн Бат-Эрдэнэ)
Born 1977 in Ulaanbaatar
Korean Translator, degree in history, graduated Mongolian National University, 1999
Doctorate degree in history, Mongolian National University, 2013
General Director, “Silk Road Travel” LLC and “Air Ticket” LLC, 2003-2012
General Secretary, Social Democratic Mongolian Youth Union, 2012-2015
Head of Erdenet Development and POlicy Research Institute, 2017-2020

(Replaced N. Urtnasan in January 2022.)

Minister of Defense (Батлан хамгаалахын сайд): G SAIKHANBAYAR (Гүрсэдийн Сайханбаяр)
Born 1968 in Ulaanbaatar
Graduated from Defense University (Цэргийн нэгдсэн дээд сургууль) 1985
Public Administration and Development Institute under the Government of Mongolia, 1989
National Defense University of PRC, 2002
The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 2014
Specialist officer, Department of Training, Cultural Promotion and Discipline, and Head of the working group on Information, cultural promotion disciplinary work, 1994-2000
Deputy head and Head, Department of Public Administration and Management at the Ministry of Defense, 2000-2012
Head (Үүргийг түр орлог гүйцэтгэгч) of the Department of Strategic Policy and Planning at the Ministry of Defense, 2014 – 2020

Minister of Foreign Affairs (Гадаад харилцааны сайд): B BATTSETSEG ( Батмөнхийн Батцэцэг)
Born in 1973 in aimag center of Bayankhongor province
Graduated secondary school, Darkhan
Graduated from International Relations School at MUST in 1996
Directors of publishing houses Az Khur LLC, and Munkhiin Useg LLC 1996 to 2004
Institute of Finance and Economy 2000; Maastricht University of Management in 2005
Unit Director at Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency, 2005-2007
Chairman of the board, Munkhiin Useg 2007-2015
Advisor to MPP Secretary-General, 2010-2011
Administration office, and Head of Foreign Relations and Cooperation Department of MPP 2010-2012
Director of the Board of Directors of Munkhiin Useg Publishing 2020 to Jan 28, 2021
Advisor to the Minister of Finance 2015-2016
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 2016-2020

Minister of Finance (Сангийн сайд): MP B. JAVKLAN ( Б.Жавхлан)
Born 1975 in Darkhan
Economist, graduated from MUST in 1997
University of California, Riverside, 2008
Indiana University, 2009
Controller, Mongolbank 1997-1999
Plenipotentiary Mongolbank Representative to Agricultural Bank 1999-2000
Senior Controller, Mongolbank, 2000-2004
Deputy Director of the Trade and Development Bank 2004-2007
Elected to MPP Little Khural, 2013
MP since 2016 to Present
Head of Parliamentary Subcommittee for Local Leadership, 2016-2020
Deputy Vice President of the Bank of Mongolia 2010-2016
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Budget of the State Great Hural of Mongolia 2020-Present

Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs (Хууль зүй дотоод хэргийн сайд): KH NYAMBAATAR (Хишгээгийн Нямбаатар)
Born 1978, in Ulaanbaatar
Teacher, Orkhon University 2000-2007
Lawyer, Mongolian Defense Lawyer’s Association
Advocate at the Mongolian Bar Association 2005-2008
Legal Adviser at the Songinokhairkhan District Governor’s Office 2008-2009
Head of the Public Administration Department at the Songinokhairkhan District Governor’s Office 2009-2012
Acting Director of Governor’s Office, Songinokhairkhan, 2011-2012
Chairman of Songinokhairkhan District Citizens’ Representatives’ Khural 2012-2016
Deputy Chairman, Songinokhiarkhan District MPP Committee
Vice President of MPP SDM Youth Association 2015 – ?
Member, Ikh Khural (Songinokhairkhan) 2016-2020
2016(?) income declaration — 30 million MNT income, savings of 15 million, shares in Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi and Best Drilling
(Sanders 2017, 633)
Chairman of the State Great Hural’s Standing Committee on Legal Affairs 2019-2020
Member of Ikh Khural, 2020 – 2024 (Songinokhairkhan)

Minister of Construction and Urban Development (Барилга, хот байгуулалтын яам): B MUNKHBAATAR (Бэгжавын Мөнхбаатар)
Born, 1975, Ulaanbaatar
University of Science and Technology 1993
Mongolian State University, East London University business school 2004-2006
Mongolian Social Democratic Students’ Association 1998-2001
Senior Political Worker, Ulaanbaatar Committee of MPP 2001-2002
Deputy head, State Administration, Management, and Cooperation Department, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture 2002- 2004
Head, External Relations Department, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture 2002 – 2004
Director, City Policy and Planning Strategy Office, Ulaanbaatar Governor’s Secretariat 2006-2008
Chairman, Council of the Ulaanbaatar Section of the Mongolian Social Democratic Youth Association 2008
Governor, Bayanzurkh District 2008
Deputy Governor of Ulaanbaatar (one of four) 2008 – 2012
Deputy Governor of the Capital City in charge of Construction, Urban Development and Infrastructure 2008-2012
MPRP Little Khural 2009 – ?
Chairman, UB MPRP Committee 2009 -2012
Member, MPRP Leadership Council 2009
Candidate, Ikh Khural Election, MPP, Bayanzurkh and Nalaikh 2012
Deputy Minister of Population Development and Social Welfare 2014-2015
Member, Little Khural of MPP 2010 – 2016(?)
(Sanders 2017, 601)
Board Member, Oyu Tolgoi LLC in 2016-2018
CEO of Erdenes Oyu Tolgoi 2016 – 2018
Deputy Minister of Construction and Urban Development 2018-20

Minister of Education and Science (Боловсрол, шинжлэх ухааны сайд): MP. L ENKH-AMGALAN (Л. Энх-Амгалан)
Born 1970 in Khuvsgul; graduated secondary school in Murun
Economist and IT Engineer, Graduated from the University of Saint Peterburg in 1992; Dakota University [sic] in USA the in 1996; and Hangdon University in 2002
Director-General of Interpress LLC 1995-1996
Editor in Chief at Il Tovchoo Newspaper, Montsame Agency 1992-1995
Vice President of MCS Group, Board of Directors of Unitel Group 1996-2012
Advisor to the Prime Minister of Mongolia, 2011-2012
Member of Executive Committee of the MPP, 2012-Present
Member of Parliament since 2012-Present
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Education, Culture and Science, Deputy Speaker of the State Great Hural, 2016-2017
Deputy Speaker of the State Great Hural 2017-2020
Chairman of the Standing Committee on State Structure of the State Great Hural from 2020

Ministry of Culture (Соёлын сайд): CH NOMIN (Чинбатын Номин)
Born 1983, Ulaanbaatar
Daughter of Chinbat, Director of Gatsuurt Company (gold mining and agriculture)
University of East Anglia in 2003, Economics and Accounting 2006;
Director of External Relations of the Gatsuurt Group, 2006-2007
Manager, Terelj Hotel (owned by Gatsuurt), 2007
Director of “Terelj Suikh” LLC 2008-2011;
Harvard Business School 2018;
Executive Director of Mongol TV 2011-to Present

Minister of Health (Эрүүл мэндийн сайд): S ENKHBOLD (С. Энхболд)
Born 1979 in Ulaanbaatar
Graduated from Health Sciences University in 2004; 2006; 2020
Masters in Medical Science, Nagoya, Japan
Director of the Imaging and Radiology Department at the State Central Hospital #1 2007-2019
Director of the State Central Hospital #2 since 2019-present

Sources of information for this post include:

“New members of cabinet appointed,” Montsame

“Шинэ сайд нарын амлалт,” news.mn

“ЗГ: Л.Халтар, Н.Тавинбэх нар дэд сайдаар томилогдов,” news.mN

Current Members, parliament.mn

МОНГОЛ УЛСЫН ЗАСГИЙН ГАЗАР (mongolia.gov.mn)

Alan J. K. Sanders’ Historical Dictionary of Mongolia, Fourth Ed., Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017)

“Дашзэгвийн Амарбаясгалан,” Википедиа нэвтэрхий толь (wikipedia.org)

“Ням-Осорын Учрал,” Википедиа нэвтэрхий толь (wikipedia.org)

“БОАЖ-ын сайдад Б.Бат-Эрдэнийг томилохоор болжээ,” News.mn

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Untold 24: Adults Don’t Want to Understand Epilepsy

Posted on August 24, 2022 by mendee

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan

“In today’s selfish society, most people don’t even look at a poor person lying on the ground”, our guest sighs, “some people would just walk over the person without paying any attention to whether that person is suffering from a seizure”. A seizure is a common symptom for people with epilepsy – as Ms. Batzaya describes the challenges of people with epilepsy in Mongolia. She is a President of Elgemseg Orshikhui, a nongovernmental organization for people with epilepsy – a serious health condition that causes frequent seizures and can happen to people of all ages. She herself has been experiencing frequent seizures since 2006. To raise social awareness and to help people with epilepsy, she left her government job and established her organization.

https://soundcloud.com/fesmongolia/24-niygemd-epilepsig-oylgokhgy-baygaa-n-kharamsaltay?in=fesmongolia/sets/untold-the-hidden-stories-of&utm_source=clipboard&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=social_sharing

Photo: Ms. Batzaya herself (with the permission of Batzaya)

Getting the Medicine

Our interview immediately led us to address the most difficult issue for people with epilepsy in Mongolia – getting the necessary medication. There are about 70 types of different drugs for epilepsy, of course, depending on the type, severity, and frequency of epilepsy. But only a few of these medicines can be obtained with a prescription while the Mongolian government authorities, especially the Ministry of Health, are reluctant to approve the imports of other medicines. This causes two types of challenges. First, only a few of these medicines were approved, but most of them could not be covered by the social welfare benefits for the people with disabilities because they are not approved and included in the list of essential medicines . Second, people search and buy these medicines at the highest cost since they do not want to see their loved ones suffer from the frequent seizures. Furthermore, since most of these medicines are not approved, people import them illegally. According to Batzaya, the number of people with epilepsy is increasing while the age of the people who are being treated as patients is decreasing. Whenever she visited the doctor, she used to run into two or three people. Now she expects a long line and sees mostly young parents with small children. The clinic, Batzaya is referring to, is Alfa Dolgion, the only epilepsy outpatient clinic in the country. It was nice to hear about this special clinic and their doctor D. Bayarmaa, who advises Batzaya. Both are working together to fight for the approval of more medications for epilepsy.

Social Awareness

In one of earlier interviews of M.D. Bayarmaa, she stated that there are about 8,900 patients registered at the Alfa Dolgion Clinic, and 2,300 of them were more frequent visitors (link). Even though there are no government statistics, people with epilepsy are included in 30,000 ~ 40,000 people with intellectual disabilities. But doctors and activists/people like Batzaya are fighting to promote the understanding and to define epilepsy distinctively within the intellectual disability categories. Because of similar efforts, Down syndrome and autism are redefined, Batzaya explains. A person with epilepsy can learn and work like any other person until that specific health condition triggers seizures. Therefore, if people know about the specific causes, they can eliminate the seizures with the help of medicine or assistance from others. From 2015, the Mongolian Neurological Association and Association of Parents with Disabled Children together have celebrated the Purple Day – Supporting Epilepsy Around the World – and organized several informative events for the public. Batzaya was so enthusiastic about her involvement in the awareness work. These events were usually organized at a number of secondary schools, while welcoming representatives from neighbouring district schools. According to Batzaya, these school children are very curious and open to learn about epilepsy. However, she observed that people above the age of 25 are not so open to talk about epilepsy. If that is a popular attitude, this would be a sad fact, because it is mostly people above this age who make the decision on whether to employ or work with someone with epilepsy.

Photo: Ms. Batzaya first from the left (with the permission of Batzaya)

Let Them Socialize

Through the social interactions, people with epilepsy of any age – from kindergarten to adulthood – will reduce their anxiety and overcome their suffering. The more isolated from society they are, the more difficult it is for them to cope with epilepsy. Parents are afraid to let their children go to the kindergarten, either because they fear that their child will get hurt or because they avoid it out of embarrassment. According to Batzaya, everyone involved – teachers and parents – need to be open-minded about including children with epilepsy in kindergartens and all other types of schools. This works in two ways: (1) it will weaken, or eliminate, the conditions that cause frequent seizures of children with epilepsy and (2) it will create a learning environment for all other children to learn and work with children with epilepsy. Similarly, many employers do not want to hire a person with epilepsy because they do not know how to create an environment for these people, nor do they want to accommodate their needs. In fact, they do not understand that people with epilepsy are able to work like any other person. These people would contribute to the society by working rather than hiding and relying on the little social welfare benefits. We agree with Batzaya – not letting the people with epilepsy work is against the principle of an inclusive society.

One remark that did strike me during this interview was directed at the Ministry of Education. The Ministry,  and regional and district offices have been reluctant to talk about the inclusive education and educational opportunities for people with disabilities. This point has been raised by several of our guests. Even though the respective law was passed to provide post-secondary and graduate education free to people with disabilities, the authorities have done little to implement it. Here we should highlight again Batzaya’s concern – whether the Ministry is intentionally silent or too busy.

Photo: Ms. Batzaya first from the left (with the permission of Batzaya)

Impacts of Covid and How to Help

As our conversation comes to end, Sainaa posed two questions. One was about how Covid-19 has been impacting the lives of people epilepsy. Batzaya reiterated the challenge of finding medication. Medicine became scarce due to the delayed imports and therefore also expensive. Furthermore, some people could not get the right (meaning with potential side-effects) vaccines because of the potential side-effects. Hence, many people with epilepsy, especially those who haven’t been vaccinated, will be vulnerable to Covid-19.

The other question was about which approach to take in order to help people with epilepsy. As Batzaya advises, we should be open-minded about people with epilepsy and try to learn more about their health concerns. If someone falls to the ground, please don’t ignore them, even if they are badly dressed or appear to be drunk. You might be mistaken, it could be someone with epilepsy suffering from another seizure. You should provide first aid or help them to breathe and to get more air and space. Of course, authorities should be informed. Moreover, the police needs to be briefed and receive training in order to be able to recognize epilepsy and distinguish its symptoms from the ones of an intoxicated person. In a nutshell, we should welcome children and adults with epilepsy with open arms to create an environment in which they don’t feel intimidated or embarrassed.

The Untold podcast and blog post are made available by the generous support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Mongolia. We also want to thank our editor Riya Tikku.

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New to Ulaanbaatar August 2022

Posted on August 19, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I’ve been keeping lists of things that are arriving to/disappearing from central Ulaanbaatar: December 2019 | June 2019 | April 2019 | December 2018 | August 2018 | October 2017 | June 2017 | May 2016 | December 2015 | May 2015 | May 2014 | October 2013 | October 2011 | August 2011. More informal versions of these observations also appear in the /ulaanbaatar/change/ category.

Bulgan added her observations in Spring 2022.

I’ve copied the 2014-19 lists here and am adding to it. New items since previous posts appear in italics. Since this list has been growing, I’m also beginning to delete some items that I’ve had on the list for some time. Strikethrough means that these items will be off the next list.

This list was cruelly interrupted by something that was new to the world in 2020, a global pandemic and thus restrictions on travel. After not being able to visit for 32 months, I finally made it back in August 2022.

What has arrived?

  • bubble tea
  • yoga
  • pet dogs on and off leashes
  • Sunday morning joggers and bikers
  • the “#замчөлөөл” hastag, a city campaign to shame property owners about their infringement of public space. Seems – quietly – very successful when you look at many photos posted.
  • large-scale BBQ extravaganza on the banks of the Tuul river, particularly near the ASEM Road. On summer weekends, so many cars parked right on the riverside, BBQs planted right next to them, families camping out, some literally
  • drive-home service for drivers who have been drinking. You call the service, they drop off a driver who drives you home in your car and is then picked up again. Given – fortunately – much stricter enforcement of drunk driving laws, a great service!
  • bike lanes and bike parking, being shooed off bike lanes by riders (though not in December!)
  • fat tire bikes & fixies

 

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  • airport road is getting ever fancier, now there’s a giant overpass just before crossing the Tuul on the way into town. Lots of fancy on/off-ramps popping up everywhere on roads. While I dread the opening of the new airport, construction of the (real) highway out there is under way

 

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  • Canadian cold weather brands, Canada Goose and Arc’teryx are everywhere, fake or not
  • fully electric cars, charging stations, Tesla
  • electronic payment systems. There is the transit card and a number of apps issued by Mongolian banks. There are some QR-code based payment systems. Often credit card payment is approved via a fingerprint reader.
  • coffee roasting. Not only is instant coffee being beaten back (it obviously still reigns in the country-side), but beyond mass market chains, small roasters are now appearing in the market. Some Mongolians are speaking of a new coffee addiction.
  • surveillance cameras. I recall seeing these first at large intersections, presumably to monitor traffic. Now, every other buildings seems to have haphazardly attached a CCTV camera to its facade. I do wonder how many of these are operational and where the feeds lead and if any of them are monitored.
  • street art (several years now, but I hadn’t noted this before) and newly commissioned public art

 

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  • many more food and agricultural products from Mongolian sources available now
  • in April there had been a lot of concern about the lack of snow in the winter and the likelihood of drought. June brought some heavy rains and Ulaanbaatar turned quite green, almost lush.
  • convertibles
  • streetlights in the ger/khashaa districts
  • audible pedestrian crossing signals
  • green license plates for electric vehicles, yellow for natural gas vehicles
  • suddenly, there seem to be a whole lot more young people wearing reindeer boots, they seem to have supplanted Uggs as the fashionable choice for winter boots
  • awareness of plague of small water bottles in all meetings and in homes
  • Prius-based delivery services around downtown for online orders, food, etc. Just like informal taxis, lots of Priuses (?) roaming central Ulaanbaatar to pick up/deliver orders
  • construction of new road to Nalaikh completed in Nov 2019
  • skateboarders
  • several new parks: North of Winter Palace, Southeast corner of Sukhbaatar Sq, also astroturf on Sukhbaatar Square seemingly quite popular as picnic spot as well

  • When I first started visiting Ulaanbaatar in mid-2000s, streets were tree/shrub-lined. Trees disappeared, perhaps for lack of watering, but are definitely back now in the urban centre

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

  • stationary 80s-office-phone-looking old-granny cell phone booth
  • for-pay scales (actually, they seem to be hanging on)
  • free WiFi on Sukhbaatar, er Chinggis Khaan, er, Sukhbaatar Square, er, Chinggis Khaan Square
  • street kids (they seem to come and go)
  • packs of dogs
  • smoking
  • hillside Chinggis visible from the city centre as more tall buildings are constructed
  • stiletto heels
  • outdoor billiards tables
  • Natural History Museum, gone one week after photo below
  • small denomination bills
  • supposedly haunted house South of Choijin Lama Temple
  • Victims of Political Persecution Memorial Museum

  • private fences encroaching on public land/sidewalks

What will appear in the future

  • navigation systems
  • mental maps shifting to street names/addresses instead of landmarks
  • new airport, apparently opening in 2020. I drove by there in summer 2017. Oh my, it is far from the city!
  • subway (really, I wish they had selected light rail instead, but who knows whether either will come)
  • urban renewal and historical restorations embracing district north of government house (National University of Mongolia, German embassy, etc.)
  • road signs in the countryside (and not just the very random, very occasional ones that can be found now)
  • network of cross-country riding (bike and horse) trails (though not in central Ulaanbaatar)
  • parking (meters), electric charging in parking spots/lots
  • Combined Heat and Power Plant #5 (yeah, right!)
  • hipsters discovering УАЗ (minivan and jeep)
  • giant hole blown into Bogd Khaan mountain to “drain” polluted air out of the valley (that actually is a proposal, but it will not appear! There also seems to be a proposal to blast away mountains on either end of the valley to let bad air escape!)
  • some kind of traffic routing system with overhead displays
  • Mongolia-themed coffee travel mugs

What will disappear in the medium-term future

I’m going out on a predictive limb here… 2-3 years is what I mean by “near future”.

Actually, since I have been predicting this as “near future” change for some years now, I guess I was wrong with all these predictions, and have changed the listing to medium-term future.

  • stretched-out hand to signal for a car ride
  • that awkward extra half-step on most stairs
  • whitening make-up.

What will disappear in the long-term future

I mean around 7 years or so. None of these seems to be coming true quite yet, so I’ve changed the name of this category from medium-term to long-term.

  • new (to Mongolia) cars that are right-hand drive
  • the neo-classical Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, with its Stalinist (if that’s an architectural style) spire [Tough call to make as the MFA building is now dwarfed by its own annex]
  • deels in the city [actually, they seem to be making a bit of a fashion comeback among young people]
  • some of the downtown university campuses
  • buildings of 4 floors or less in the urban core
  • Russian minivans (УАЗ452)
  • the Winter Palace. It won’t disappear entirely, but it is more-and-more surrounded by a very urban and very tall landscape making it look somewhat forlorn, a fate it shares with many other buildings
  • heritage buildings
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Untold 23: Promoting Inclusiveness Through Sports

Posted on August 4, 2022 by mendee

By Odmaa Sod-Erdene

Ms. Altantsetseg.B is the Executive Director of Special Olympics Mongolia. Having spent most of her career as a geologist/geochemist at the Mongolian Academy of Sciences and several other mining companies, Ms. Altantsetseg believes it was fate that brought her to her current position four years ago. She is a proud wife, a mother of two, and a grandmother of three.

Photo: Ms. Altantsetseg herself (with the permission of Altantsetseg)

Photo: Ms. Altantsetseg herself (with the permission of Altantsetseg)

Special Olympics Mongolia

We began our interview by talking about Special Olympics Mongolia and what the organization is all about. According to our guest, it was founded in 2013 by families of children with intellectual disabilities. Today, it has over 2500 registered athletes and unified partners. Through the power of sports, Special Olympics Mongolia aims to help people with an intellectual disability to gain confidence, social competence, and friendship, as well as to raise awareness and to create an inclusive society for all regardless of their disability. The team working towards this important goal consists of five full-time employees and numerous volunteers. On top of the usual sports and health promotion events for athletes and families, they also organize many outreach programs for young people, teachers, doctors, social workers, and government officials.

During the interview, Altantsetseg openly shared that there is very little public knowledge about the Special Olympics compared to the Paralympics. She confessed that even she knew little about the Special Olympics before joining the organization. As she explained to our listeners, unlike the Paralympics, which is for elite athletes with physical disabilities, the Special Olympics is for all children and adults with intellectual disabilities, such as down syndrome, cerebral palsy, and autism. The focus of the Special Olympics lies not on competition but on participation by welcoming athletes of all ability levels without any qualifying standards. There are 42 different summer and winter sports. Mongolian athletes actively participate in around ten sports including table tennis, polo, football, basketball, volleyball, and badminton. During the last summer game in Abu Dhabi 2019, 28 athletes and unified partners (people with no intellectual disability, mostly family members and volunteers, who participate in team sports alongside the athletes) competed in seven sports and came home with an outstanding accomplishment of 19 medals in total (three gold, seven silver, nine bronze).

Photo: Ms. Altantsetseg with her team and the former President Battulga (with the permission of Altantsetseg)

Creating an Inclusive Society Is a Team Effort

Altantsetseg stresses the importance of sponsors, and the invaluable work of volunteers to run the organization. As the Special Olympics Mongolia is an NGO, it doesn’t receive any funding from the government. Most of the financial needs are sponsored by grants from Special Olympics International, international organizations, corporations, and other donors. Altantsetseg highlighted that especially with the increase of corporate social responsibility, it’s becoming less difficult to raise funding from private corporations as compared to 2017 when she first started the job. She is the most excited about how the young people are changing attitudes and their relentless, ever-increasing participation as volunteers. Until they get to know them, people don’t realize that children with an intellectual disability are often the warmest and most loving people. Their innocence and unconditional love are the best reward for the volunteers, who often say that they are the real beneficiaries, as Altantsetseg cheerfully added. She recalls how she herself received countless hugs and cuddles from the athletes during her trip to Abu Dhabi, more than she ever did receive in her entire life. During the interview, she repeatedly showed her optimism and appreciation for the volunteers.

Bilguunee’s Story

One of the inspiring stories she shared was about a boy called Bilguunee. He has an intellectual disability and lives in the ger district of Ulaanbaatar. He found interest in fitness training, unfortunately, there weren’t any gyms nearby. So, every time he wanted to train, he had no choice but to walk for an hour and a half to the nearest gym. Despite the challenges, he worked hard, and he even successfully competed in national championships. His story inspired the ‘Opportunities for All’ project with support from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The aim is to bring gym facilities to children with an intellectual disability in ger districts – Nalaikh, Bayankhoshuu and Tolgoit. Gym equipment will be given to local schools or sports clubs in exchange for the free admission of people with an intellectual disability from nearby areas. Proper training will be provided to the teachers and staff, as well to facilitate their training. Bilguunee’s story is one of many tangible examples of the hardship and limitations people with an intellectual disability face every single day.

Photo: Ms. Altantsetseg with member of Special Olympics Mongolia (with the permission of Altantsetseg)

Challenges Persist

As per world average, there are at least 60 thousand people with an intellectual disability in Mongolia – mostly young people. There are only four schools for children with an intellectual disability with a combined capacity of 1600 students, leaving behind no less than 30-50 thousand children and young adults with no access to education, Altantsetseg pointed out. This also translates into no access to healthcare, no chance to be in the labor force, and no friends or social circle. Even for families with the means, having their children with an intellectual disability to attend any sort of personal development activity takes a toll. Since teachers in these kinds of facilities are not trained to work with children with special needs, a parent has to chaperone at all times. As much as public attitude is changing slowly for the better, Altantsetseg worries that there is still so much more to do. She recalls that when she was a little girl, people with an intellectual disability were treated like a threat or danger and therefore avoided with no chance of expressing themselves as individuals. She believes the lack of education about intellectual disabilities is at fault for this sort of mistreatment. She emphasizes that in order to really create an inclusive society, educating the society in hopes of changing their attitude is just as important as providing educational and social opportunities to people with an intellectual disability.

We concluded the interview with a discussion of what the future may hold for Special Olympics Mongolia. Altantsetseg told us that the vision for Special Olympics for the next 50 years is to bring people with an intellectual disability to the forefront from their usual back seats. So that ultimately, they could share their story in their own voices and take an active part in the fight for their own freedom and wellbeing. As for her own future, Altantsetseg is hoping to hand over her role to the next generation of young people. Until then, she plans to continue working hard for as long as it takes them to achieve their goal.

If you are interested in volunteering opportunities at Special Olympics Mongolia, check out their Facebook page Special Olympics Mongolia.

About Odmaa Sod-Erdene

Odmaa Sod-Erdene holds a MA in Economics from the University of British Columbia and currently works as a data scientist at Fidelity Investments Canada. Previously, she worked as a research analyst at the Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, where she focused on evaluating the impact of social policies on population health and health inequalities.

The Untold podcast and blog post are made available by the generous support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Mongolia. We also want to thank our editor Riya Tikku.

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Guest Post: Naadam 2022 – International Participants and Backroom Deals

Posted on July 28, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Zorigtkhuu Bat-Erdene

What is Naadam?

“Naadam” is a traditional festival that is the most widely celebrated and watched in Mongolia and elsewhere among Mongolians, Inner Mongolians and Tuva Republic. The Naadam festival is celebrated during midsummer and officially takes place between the 10th – 13th of July. It is locally named “Eriin Gurvan Naadam” (Эрийн Гурван Наадам – The Three Manly Sports.) The three sports are Mongolian wrestling, horse racing and archery. Women can participate in archery and girls in horse racing, but not wrestling. The naadam festival is believed to have existed for centuries, and the games have been recorded in the thirteenth-century book called “The secret history of the Mongols” (Монголын Нууц Товчоо).

This year’s naadam wrestling

This year’s festival was exceptional because no naadam festivals were organized for the previous two years due to covid restrictions; hence the government postponed the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the people’s revolution of 1921, which was planned to be celebrated last year, in 2021. Instead, the government decided to integrate the celebration of the 100th and 101st anniversary this year.

Since it is a special year, 1024 wrestlers, including most of the top-ranked state and aimag (province) titled wrestlers, as well as wrestlers from Tuva (Russia), Kalmykia (Russia) and Buryatia (Russia) participated in the wrestling competition. In addition to the foreign wrestlers above, some inner Mongolian (China) wrestlers also planned to participate. However, they could not participate due to the covid restrictions in China. Before the 2022 year’s naadam festival, no foreign wrestlers were allowed to participate; this year’s naadam was the first time for them to participate. Although all the foreign wrestlers were defeated by third round, they were widely cheered and supported by the audience.

As a fan of Mongolian wrestling, I think the main reason that they did not succeed is that they were not allowed to use any title they held from their countries unless their titles had been given in Mongolia according to the relevant laws and rules. The title is an essential factor in a wrestler’s success; if someone does not hold any title, he is considered a “young wrestler” (Залуу бөх) who can be challenged by any higher ranked and titled wrestler. If someone holds the higher title, he has an opportunity to select the opponent.

There were ten rounds as 1024 wrestlers participated this year. As a result of the 10th round, O. Khangai won round 10 and was awarded the highest state title of “Champion ” (Аварга), while B. Orkhonbayar, who won round 9, was awarded the second-highest state title of “Arslan” (Арслан) as per the Pres Khurelsukh’s decree. Most Mongolians are delighted with the result of the tournament this year: the final two wrestlers qualified for the final round for the first time and both previously held the same state title of “Khartsaga.”

Over the past few years, many high-ranked state-titled wrestlers got involved in doping-related issues, and some of them have been restricted from participating in wrestling tournaments for a certain period. At the same time, others also have had their state titles rescinded due to positive doping test results. For this year, Mongolians believe and pray for the wrestlers who qualified for the final few rounds, hoping they did not use any prohibited substances by both Mongolian and international doping regulations.

As I emphasized in my 2018 blog post, military ranks are given (as a bonus) to a wrestler who is awarded any state title if he belongs to one of the sports clubs run by any law enforcement authority. However, today, there was no talks about any military ranks that will be given to a wrestler who has been awarded a new state title. Hopefully, no military ranks will be given to the wrestlers anymore because it is unfair to those who trained, worked and served in the military for a long time.

Backroom dealings for the state title (Начны найраа)

Seventeen new wrestlers were awarded the lowest state title of “Nachin” (Начин) after the 5th round, but it was clear that many of them got their titles through backroom dealing. Luckily, all the audience witnessed those who got the “Nachin” title with their true strength and skill while also seeing the ones who unfairly got the “Nachin” (Начин) title.

The backroom dealings for the state titles have been criticised widely and strongly over the past two decades, it has become one of the headaches of Mongolians who love their tradition and culture. The low-ranked wrestlers who are pursuing the state titles obviously do not buy or pay for the state titles directly. All they have to do is to pretend that they wrestle seriously because the rest is already organized. Their homeland associations usually organize the backroom dealing for them. The homeland association is a formation of politicians and business people. Their goal is to have new state-titled wrestlers because they want to be seen that they support the wrestlers from the their aimag (province), in turn, they can get the public support within their aimags (provinces). Fortunately, the audience is smart enough to distinguish who are the cheaters and who are not.

This year, N. Jargalbayar, who currently holds the state title of “Zaan,” (Заан) whose conversation over the phone was recorded and released publically. The Deputy Governor of Umnugobi province, N. Enkhbat, phoned Jargalbayar just before the 5th round (round of lowest state title, Nachin), asking/ordering Jargalbayar to wrestle with Nyamaa who is from Umnugobi province, who later got the “Nachin” title as a result of the 5th round after defeating Jargalbayar. Fortunately, this case is being investigated by the anti-corruption agency of Mongolia. Many people were talking about Jargalbayar as one of the top wrestlers who could win this special year’s wrestling competition; unfortunately, he disappointed all his supporters. Believe it or not, there is gossip that Jargalbayar was defeated because he was offered 1 billion Mongolian tugrug ( around 316 000 USD). Hopefully, he did not lose all his fans.

Generally, those who bought the state title get no respect from the audience. However, they still want to get the state title somehow with the political and financial support of the politicians and business people from their aimag. It has been a headache for Mongolians who love national wrestling and who want to see genuine wrestling, no conspiracy.

Unexpectedly luxurious event during times of crisis

Another surprising and most criticized event during naadam was the fancy and luxurious party that was held at the Ikh Tenger complex (Их Тэнгэр Цогцолбор), where over two thousand wealthy people, including celebrities, politicians and business people were invited. The public condemned Pres Khurelsukh for some fair reasons. Firstly, he walks on the red carpet like a king; secondly, why did he and his office organize such a luxurious reception when the citizens could barely make ends meet during the economic crisis. Thirdly, there is a law of state budget efficiency (Төрийн хэмнэлтйин тухай хууль). The goal of this law is to save unnecessary expenses of every state organizations during the economic difficulty.

Even though there were some criticisms regarding the opening ceremony, luxurious party and the backroom dealings for the state titles, it was charming to watch the Naadam festival online after two years. Everyone is happy with the result of the wrestling tournament.

We are looking forward to the next year’s naadam.

About Zorigtkhuu

Bat-Erdene ZORIGTKHUU currently lives in Vancouver, Canada. He holds a Master of Applied Science degree in Mining Engineering from the University of British Columbia. Zorig’s research focused on Mining Local Procurement (Local Content) in Mongolia.

Previous to his academic endeavour, Zorigtkhuu worked for the biggest coal mining company (Mongolian Mining Corporation) in Mongolia and an “International Medical Center (Intermed Hospital)” project that was jointly commissioned by the MCS group in Mongolia.

 

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Posted in Buryatia, Inner Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Kalmykia, Mongolian Diaspora, Naadam, Sports, Tuva, Wrestling, Zorigtkhuu Bat-Erdene | Leave a comment

Why Is the UB Dialogue Important?

Posted on July 25, 2022 by mendee

By Soyolgerel Nyamjav and Mendee Jargalsaikhan

Amidst increased geopolitical tensions and lingering pandemic effects, Mongolia, a
small, landlocked state hosted three major international in-person events in June.
Khaan Quest, an annual multinational peacekeeping exercise, was organized at the Five Hills Peace Support Operations Training Centre.  Over thousand military
personnel from fifteen countries, including the United States, South Korea, Japan, and
India – those dispatched a large military contingent, exercised for peacekeeping
deployments. At the same time, Mongolia hosted the first-ever Women, Peace and
Security conference welcoming over 60 female peacekeepers from 30 countries as well
as Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations of the
United Nations. Then, in June 23-25, Mongolia organized the 7 th “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue”
on Northeast Asian Security. Here we would like to explain why the Ulaanbaatar
Dialogue (known as the UB Dialogue or UBD) is an important foreign policy endeavour for
Mongolia.

History of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue

The UBD is a continuation of Mongolia’s multilateral foreign policy to welcome
international participants to Mongolia and to be a part of the international community.
This policy had been disrupted during the Cold War when Mongolia had no choice to
become the Soviet ally and its foreign policy had been dictated by the Kremlin. Even
though during this time, Mongolia invited many newly independent small states of the
Asia Pacific Region in 1960s-70s to share its experience of the socialist bloc (CMEA) –
aided economic development.

Also, Mongolia became a hub for the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace from the 1970s. In the late 1980s, as the geopolitical tension among the great powers declined, Mongolia pursued a quite aggressive policy for offering itself as a dialogue venue for peace and cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region.

Building on this successful foreign policy to develop bilateral ties with China and ‘third neighbours’ – mostly developed democracies (or the Western countries) in 1990s, Mongolia began to make renewed efforts to offer the multilateral platform. In 2008, the Mongolian Institute for Strategic Studies  along with the George Marshall Centre for European Security Studies organized a conference, titled “Ulaanbaatar as New Helsinki?” to promote Mongolia as a neutral venue for the regional security talk. Later, in 2013, the Pres Elbergdorj endorsed the ‘venue for multilateral dialogue’ idea and coined the UB Dialogue as a long-term foreign policy initiative to engage all Northeast Asian countries, including countries with hostile relations.

7th Ulaanbaatar Dialogue

After two years of disruptions due to the COVID19 pandemic, Mongolia hosted the 7th UB Dialogue – which is noted the first-ever in-person international dialogue in Northeast Asia. In several ways, this year’s dialogue was unique.

For one, North Korea was missing because of the pandemic and a lack of the virtual connection. In all previous dialogues, North Korean participation was important for many other participants, especially for Japan – who managed to organize a side bilateral meeting during the UB Dialogue, and many European participants. However, a well-known German expert on North Korea offered his insights on the DPRK.

Second, Russia’s participation in the dialogue was the hottest topic among international participants, some declined their participation, and some left during the Russian delegate’s speech. Many participants, including Mongolian speakers, were in agreement to end the hostility in Ukraine and to find a peaceful solution to ongoing military conflict.

Third, the inclusion of the youth speakers (as a main panel) was applauded by the majority of participants. This year, the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) organized a youth panel by providing opportunities for youth representatives from China, Japan, Mongolia, and South Korea to present their views on regional peace and security with policymakers and scholars.

Fourth, the Business Council of Mongolia (BCM) and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) organized sessions devoted to discuss the post-pandemic economic cooperation and power grid connectivity in the region. Finally, the host nation welcomed the participation from the Kyrgyz Republic and many other international participants from Europe; thus provides opportunities for Northeast Asian experts to share and compare their perspectives on regional cooperation.

In retrospect, the UB Dialogue is becoming a modest and unique regional venue for
policy-makers, academics, and youth exchange their views and hopes on Northeast
Asian matters. This year, the track one closed door meeting was hosted by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia and this meeting was attended by senior foreign ministry
officials from thirteen countries, plus the United Nations. The security session is now
divided into two parts: the first session discusses challenges and the other searches
ways to promote the confidence building. The UNDPPA will continue to work with
organizers to have the youth session as an important part of the dialogue, where youths
from Northeast Asia and elsewhere could share their visions of region. The economic
sessions are now jointly organized by the BCM, a Mongolian non-governmental
organization, and USESCAP, in hope to make the economic aspects as critical part of
the UB dialogue. Overcoming its two-year interruptions, the UB dialogue revived and
appears to be on a narrow path to become an international conference on Northeast
Asian matters.

About Soyolgerel Nyamjav

Soyolgerel Nyamjav is the Head of the Centre for International Security at the Institute for Strategic Studies, National Security Council of Mongolia. Soyolgerel’s research focuses on security studies especially Mongolia’s security environment, geopolitical situation, Central Asian regional problems and regional multilateral mechanisms.  

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Posted in China, Germany, International Relations, Japan, Kyrgyz Republic, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, UN, United States | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Mongolia’s International Conference on “Strengthening the Role of Women in Peacekeeping”

Posted on July 19, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Katharina P. Coleman

On 16-18 June 2022, Mongolia welcomed the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, other UN officials and representatives from over thirty countries to a three-day conference on “Strengthening the Role of Women in Peacekeeping”. The conference allowed for detailed and candid discussions of the obstacles to increased meaningful participation of uniformed women in peace operations and lively exchanges about ways to address these challenges. It also highlighted Mongolia’s willingness to play a leadership role on this issue and the resonance its engagement has in the UN and with other states.

Day 1: Commitment and Candid Conversations

The conference began with opening speeches by President U. Khurelsukh and Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix, underlining the political importance both Mongolia and the UN accorded the conference. President Khurelsukh used the opportunity to announce that Mongolia intends to increase the proportion of women in its own peacekeeping contributions to 15% for military contingents and 25% for staff officers and military observers by 2027. This is an ambitious and significant goal: as of April 2022, Mongolia is the UN’s 24th largest uniformed personnel contributor with 884 individuals deployed, of whom 73 (8.3%) are women.

For the remainder of the first day, conference participants exchanged insights on the barriers to the recruitment of women into uniformed services and to the training, deployment and meaningful participation of uniformed women in peace operations as well as best practices for overcoming these obstacles. Discussions took place over three panels in which a wide range of states (Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Korea, the Netherlands, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Rwanda) shared their perspectives and also – just as importantly – in many smaller, informal conversations in breaks and over delicious food.

Two factors made the discussions particularly powerful. One was the fact that all countries recognized and acknowledged challenges in their own efforts to recruit women into their armed forces and deploy them as peacekeepers. This made seeking solutions a collective endeavor in which all participants had a stake. The second factor was that most of the participants – both international and Mongolian – were women serving in their countries’ military or police forces who had themselves deployed on one or more peace operations. They generously shared their own experiences as well as national perspectives, enabling rich and deeply informed conversations.

Day 2: Five Hills Peacekeeping Training Centre

On the second conference day, participants were fortunate to visit the Five Hills Peacekeeping Training Center, where the annual multinational Khan Quest exercise was being held. The day included a panel on Mongolian experiences deploying women peacekeepers, a visit to the training lanes and a briefing on the Women, Peace and Security training that was being offered alongside the Khan Quest for the first time. We were then privileged to experience a Mini-Naadam ­– complete with traditional music, wrestling and horseback riding – before returning through stunning scenery to Ulaanbaatar.

Day 3: Next Steps

The conference ended by looking forward. One panel focused on mechanisms to support states seeking to increase their ability to deploy women peacekeepers, including Canada’s Elsie Initiative, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance’s barrier assessment methodology; and the Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations. A final moderators’ panel summarized discussions and identified major lessons learned. The closing session saw three important announcements. Under-Secretary-General Lacroix indicated that the Department of Peace Operations would launch a pilot virtual network of deployed women peacekeepers. Ghana revealed that it would host the 2023 Peacekeeping Ministerial meeting and place Women Peace and Security high on the meeting’s agenda. Mongolia closed the conference with a proposal to host follow-on conferences every five years.

Given Mongolia’s warm hospitality and how rewarding and constructive the conference was, I’m sure I was not the only participant who welcomed this announcement – and hoped to be able to participate again!

About Katharina Coleman

Katharina P. Coleman (PhD Princeton) is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. Her research focuses on international organizations, peace operations, the politics of international legitimacy and the creation and impact of international norms. Her regional area of expertise is sub-Saharan Africa. Dr. Coleman helped draft the Terms of Reference for the Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations and now serves on the Fund’s Technical Committee.

 

 

 

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Russophiles, Russophones and Russophobes

Posted on July 8, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Reactions to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine have been quite visible on Twitter.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s visit to Ulaanbaatar on July 5 have brought many of these reactions to the fore again.

Here’s a prominent and strongly-worded (in Russian no less) example representing the perception of Russia as an aggressive, (neo)imperial power.

Marissa J Smith documented initial reactions to the invasion of Ukraine in two posts earlier this year (February/early March | March). B Bulgan focused specifically on the close attention that the apparent involvement of Buryat soldiers in the invasion was receiving in Mongolia in March.

On the whole, I have been more surprised by the level of quiet and sometimes vocal support for Russia than by denunciations of imperial aggression. As it turned out, the absence of a government reaction to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan seems to have been a harbinger of the current policy to stay quiet, though for even more pressing Realpolitik reasons.

The Solitudes of Mongolian Foreign Relations

It has become very clear in the past five months how significant the Russophone (i.e. Russian-speaking) and Russophile (possessing an affinity for Russia) communities in Mongolia are. The fact that I found this surprising is surely due to my myopia and the fact that my own language abilities (not including Russian) have always steered me toward Mongolians with other language abilities and thus away from the Russophone/phile crowd. Some of my surprise is also rooted in the fact that there really is not very much of a Russian diaspora in Mongolia, unlike many Central Asian countries, though even there Russian population shares appear to be shrinking. With the transfer of ownership over Erdenet from Russian to Mongolian interests some years ago (as irregular as that was), even Erdenet as a regional/local stronghold of linkages with Russia is declining in significance.

Yes, I am aware of history prior to 1990. 😉 Yes, of course, I have seen numerous Mongolian officials, but also academics pull fairly fluent Russian out of their hats when called upon. And yes, I am also aware of the Russian educational trajectories and personal connections of numerous recent representatives of Mongolia, not least former pres Kh Battulga and current pres U Khurelsukh. But, I just never had a lot of interactions with this Russia-focused crowd.

Official Neutrality

Obviously, the government has studiously attempted not to take sides in this conflict. It has abstained on UN resolutions, has not joined in any sanctions, has received officials (like FM Lavrov) and even signed a pipeline deal placing it literally between Russia and China.

Why this neutrality? Well, even though some Mongolians political and values compasses might point to industrialized democracies, it remains surrounded by two autocracies (of very different nature) that are increasingly assertive internationally, though rooted in a perceived position of strength for China and in more of a desperate imperialistic rearguard action for Russia.

This is Mongolia’s foreign policy reality. While I still thought that on an issue like the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Mongolia could have publicly sided with Western allies without anyone in Beijing or Moscow really noticing, I do find the argument plausible that both neighbours’ governments might be quite miffed if Mongolia sided very publicly with the Ukraine. Whether there would be any consequences to Russian or – even less likely as they are only tangentially involved – Chinese displeasure at Mongolia taking a stance is very unclear. Of course, Mongolia is very vulnerable to any shifts in Russian hydrocarbons, even more so than Western Europe, for example. Regardless of any Russophile predilections in the MPP leadership, official silence might thus be a realistic assessment of Mongolia’s options, as painful as that is to committed democrats, those committed to international rules and the absolute injunction against aggression toward other countries, and those who are particularly concerned about Russian aggression and the threat it may pose to Central Asia, but also to Mongolia.

In this context I would also note that there has been a curious flurry of announcements of visits, MOUs, and general relations with Belarus over the past 2-3 years which has not looked better in the context of Russia’s reliance on Belarus as a staging ground for aggression against Ukraine.

Outright Support of Russia

There are clearly prominent voices supporting Russia, including voices in the government.

B Tsogtgerel, Vice-Minister of Roads and Transport, is an example of Russophile voices that come across as quite servile in the context of the Lavrov visit, tweeting in Russian here no less.

As has also been observed elsewhere around the world, there are significant portions of the Russophile and Russophone community in Mongolia who appear to buy into Putin’s propaganda narratives of persecution of Russophones by Ukrainian fascists. I find this no less puzzling in the Mongolian context of an active and fairly free press than anywhere else in the world.

Most of the support for Putin/Russia appears to be of a kneejerk/loyalty variety. I have not come across many reasoned arguments that actually point to any advantage Mongolia might gain by siding with Russia that would make this a conceivable foreign policy options. I cannot tell whether the same voices that occasionally show admiration for Putin’s style of personalistic, autocratic governance as having benefited Russia, are also the voices that are professing some kind of solidarity with Russia. That is largely due to my myopia and lack of understanding of the Russophile community as I have written above.

Condemnation of Russian Actions

FM Lavrov’s visit was an occasion for many voices on Twitter to be very vocal in their condemnation of the Putin regime. Broadly speaking that opposition appears to have three elements, democracy partisans, anti-aggression, and anti-(Russian)-imperialism.

Democracy Partisans

Some grandees of what remains of the Democratic Party have clearly taken a stance rooted in their dedication to democracy and the implied right to self-determination that is so obviously violated by the unprovoked invasion of a neighbour. Some of the DP’s “golden swallows” have been active in this regard.

E Bat-Uul, former mayor of Ulaanbaatar and longtime DP leader, makes an explicit link to risks that Russian aggression poses for Mongolia in this context.

But there are also defenders of democracy beyond the DP. MP T Dorjkhand has also position XYH clearly in this regard,

pointing very explicitly to the authoritarian threat that Mongolia’s neighbours pose to its democracy.

Civil Society

There are numerous voices that have condemned Russian aggression without an explicit link to Mongolian parties. I have already pointed to Ts Bat above, but here’s another example of this kind of voice:

Showcasing images from the demonstration against FM Lavrov’s visit behind Government House.

I do not imagine that long-time prominent commentator Baabar was endorsing the defense of Mongolia from outside forces that Lavrov offered.

Critics of Neo-Imperialism

There have been some rumblings across Central Asia pointing to Russian aggression against Ukraine as part of a broader pattern of Russian neo-imperialism, something that many European and North American analysts also point to as a motivation for Putin’s actions, namely the desire to make Russia great again. The “Kazakh-Russian Rift” in June was a prominently visible example of that, all the more remarkable coming in a Kazakh context, one that is just overcoming – maybe – a personalistic autocracy, and a government that had called for “international” (ie Russian) intervention when it was facing riots in January.

These fears about Russian neo-imperialism were very evident in early reactions to the invasion of Ukraine that focused on the deployment of Buyats in the war.

Implications

Obviously, there are many scenarios for further developments in Ukraine. However those developments unfold, Russian aggression has led to a new geopolitical position that Mongolia finds itself in. With the invasion of the Crimea and subsequent OECD sanctions against Russia, a process started that is bringing Russia and China closer together. Even for the most committed Russophile in Mongolia (who is likely to simultaneously be a Sinophone), that cannot be good news. The deepening division between Russia and most of the world, and the resulting attempt by the Putin regime to cozy up even more to its fascist counterpart in Beijing, has replaced the fear of a deepening U.S.-China confrontation where Mongolia might have to pick sides, with a context where Mongolia’s Third Neighbours may re-engage with the country again in a context of value-based diplomacy that may or may not be seen as threatening by the Xi regime.

Addenda

I received two quite justified comments/criticisms to this post on Twitter.

Generations

Yes, clearly feelings of solidarity/affinity with Russia vary across Mongolian generations, that is an important point. This difference may be visible even in officialdom. While Pres Khurelsukh was socialized with a focus on the Soviet Union, PM Oyun-Erdene is young enough that much of his political socialization was no longer (exclusively) focused on Russia. Given the demography of the Mongolian population, Russophiles are surely decreasing in number.

Interestingly, this is a question that Bulgan asked regarding foreign languages learned in 2016 already, i.e. “How Popular is Russian in Mongolia“.

Putin vs Russia

Also a very valid point in that I largely conflate Russia with Putin/the Putin regime. Obviously, there is a lot of attention being paid to any (growing) opposition to Putin within Russia, but this is also a question to be asked about Mongolian attitudes. It is a question that deserves a more sophisticated answer than I am able to give, but surely there is some anti-Putin Russophilia, as well as some anti-Russian infatuation with personalistic authoritarianism, so a true understanding of Mongolian attitudes should be more nuanced.

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Constitutional Amendments, Again?

Posted on July 4, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

It appears that constitutional amendments are in the air again and some claim that these are likely to be addressed in a special parliamentary session in August or early on in the Fall session.

These amendments would push in different directions, but also re-visit some of the issues taken on by the 2019 amendments.

Election System

It seems that there is momentum building toward some mix of majoritarian and proportional representation. Constituencies + countrywide or regional proportional representation perhaps? Regardless of what system would be pursued, any kind of proportional representation would require a constitutional amendment to overcome the hurdle raised by the constitutional court that each Mongolian’s vote directly elect a representative and the interpretation that proportional representation does not meet this standard set out in Article 21. Some such amendments were debated already in 2019, but ultimately not passed.

It strikes me as very interesting that some elements in the MPP seem to be in favour of proportional representation and willing to pursue a constitutional amendment for this purpose. Why interesting? Because the MPP has won a super-majority in the last two parliamentary elections relying entirely on majoritarian districts. U Khurelsukh was also elected president through direct election after being nominated by the MPP. So, for electoral purposes, majoritarian elections seem to serve the MPP well and conventional wisdom would predict that a winning party might not want to mess with electoral systems.

I am hoping to learn more about the motivations for moving toward proportional representation within the MPP when I will be visiting Mongolia in August. For now, I can only speculate that a super-majority where all MPs are bound to local constituencies may actually be hard to govern with as it could be relying on ad-hoc coalitions of MPs to support particular legislation, but there might be little motivation to do so when MPs are beholden to local issues. This may also be an area where the downside of a party system that is not structured by ideological differences but by patronage structures is an obstacle as bigger, national projects (i.e., legislation) may be hard to pursue on such a basis in parliament even when it seems necessary.

Opposition parties, the ever-shape-shifting Democratic Party and KhUN are likely to be in favour of proportional representation as it is likely to give them a greater share of seats in parliament.

Parliamentary Composition and Powers

Number of MPs

There have been repeated discussions about the size of the UIX. I have offered comparisons to German Länder and the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia as early as November 2015. By such comparisons, there does not seem to be an urgent need for a larger parliament, but I do recognize that these are sub-national parliaments rather than national legislatures.

The number that seems to be under discussion at the moment is 120 MPs. Perhaps the push toward a larger parliament comes from the notion of retaining the current 76 constituencies and adding seats elected by proportional representation? I am not sure that there is an ideal formula for balancing directly-elected vs proportionally-elected seats.

There is no obvious harm in having a larger parliament, but I am not entirely sure that there is an obvious benefit either. What about corruption? When MPs choose a political career as an earnings opportunity (rather than out of a motivation toward political change), this is not for the parliamentary salary, but instead for other “opportunities”. With more members, presumably, those opportunities would be reduced. I would be surprised if that was a motivation for increasing the number of seats, but it might be a side effect. On the other hand, some might see this as a move to give more people access to “feed at the trough” thus increasing corruption.

The Double-Deel, again!

The double deel has been a long-standing topic of discussion. Just try a search on this blog! The 2019 amendments reduced the number of MPs in cabinet to a maximum of four. That is what is governing the current government of L Oyun-Erdene.

The purpose of the prohibition of MPs serving in cabinet was a) greater power for the Prime Minister (in part to strengthen them vis-a-vis parliament, but also the presidency), and b) more competent ministers as they could be recruited on the basis of subject-matter expertise, rather than being MPs.

It seems fair to say that in the two years of the Oyun-Erdene government, we have not seen any noticeable change in the balance of power between the PM, the president and parliament. Maybe some are interpreting this as a failure of the prohibition of the double deel. I would point out, however, that a super-majority coupled with the president held by the same party is an odd situation in which to test a) the power of the PM, and b) the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight over the executive. While I have never quite understood the problem with MPs serving in cabinet (after all, the vast majority of ministers in Westminster systems are parliamentarians) and am thus not a proponent of the prohibition of the double deel, once the 2019 constitutional amendments committed to this change, in my mind, I would prefer for it to play itself out as a structural change, rather than being abandoned after only one parliamentary election. Constitutional change should be a rare thing, so why not let this one play itself out for some time to assess whether it has the desired impact, particularly under a different make-up of parliament.

But, I have heard some arguments that the non-MP ministers simply lack power to take any initiative as it is simple for MPs to oppose them when legislation is required or through the budget process. To me, this calls for a more assertive PM who relies on party discipline to strengthen the position of non-MP ministers, but that does not appear to be happening. Again, why not discuss how different structures are having an impact on policy-making rather than move to another constitutional reform, but perhaps these discussions are just not reaching me.

Governance

There also seems to be a renewed push for a realignment of local vs national power. For example, there may be a push for the appointment of aimag governors by the PM, rather than their election by aimag assemblies.

It remains unclear to me whether there are further changes planned for the status of Erdenet and Darkhan so allow them more administrative oversight as city-states rather than aimags that are dominated by the urban part of the province.

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Letting the Sun Shine on Garbage?

Posted on June 28, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

In thinking about economic diversification, I have previously dreamed about a long-term strategic approach for Mongolia. Such an approach would involve a taking stock of Mongolia’s riches (other than mineral resources), and then invest into applied research (modelled on something like the German Fraunhofer Gesellschaft) that might capitalize on these resources in the very long run.

The resources that come to my limited imagination are fresh air, sunshine, and cold.

Is there not some way that these riches could be brought to bear on Mongolia’s garbage problem?

In so many walks of life, we are afraid of UV rays. If you’re light-skinned, they have become a seemingly ever-present menace to our skin.  When I return from Mongolia trips (almost independent of the season, though outside time is obviously limited in the winter) I return with a deep tan that prompts colleagues to ask me which beach I have returned from. For Mongolians, even a short visit to the countryside gives them deep tans very quickly. UV rays bleach our clothes and turn gers into the bright colour that shows up so nicely on the green steppe background.

Harnessing UV Rays

So, dear engineers out there, is there not some process that can harness Mongolia’s powerful UV exposure to break down garbage?

Solar panels have been an obvious implementation of a recognition of powerful solar energy and they are an innovation to ger life that seems to have become almost universal in adoption.

There must be plastics out there that break down quickly through UV exposure. While they may be more expensive, might they be part of a solution to the garbage-strewn landscape?

Could there be materials that are broken down even faster by UV exposure in cold environments? That would seem the perfect combination for Mongolia’s environment.

Yes, if such materials existed, they would likely require exposure to UV rays which may be difficult to arrange in landfills, but worth considering.

Alternatively, could UV rays play a role in cleaning used vessels and containers for re-use? A solar dish washer maybe?

I dream of being reborn as a Mongolian throat singer, but a UV engineer would also not be bad…

Carbontech

Along a similar non-mineral vein (me, imagining that I can inspire an engineering revolution)… The NYT ran an article on June 27 2021 that focused on some of the production and technology advances of “carbontech” describing directions of product research and development that focuses specifically on carbon-reduction and has lead to some products that are not only carbon neutral, but actually carbon negative like the industrial carpets that are one of the main foci of the article.

Now, again, there is no specific discussion of products that Mongolia might be well-suited to in hosting production.

But, some of the production technologies do trade energy-intensity for carbon-sequestration. While elements of that are not obvious in a Mongolian context (wood construction, given limited forest resources in Mongolia), other elements might be more viable given Mongolia’s environment.

Outside-the-Box Thinking

Again, I am no engineer and neither the garbage processing using UV rays, nor carbontech are areas that I have technical expertise on. However, I do often get the sense that conversations about economic diversification in Mongolia reach for tried-and-tested solutions that seem generic rather than focusing on the specific environmental conditions of Mongolia and the potential that might lie therein.

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How Large Does Putin’s Russia Loom?

Posted on June 17, 2022 by Julian Dierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Earlier in the year, in the context of the coverage of the events in Kazakhstan, I jotted down some notes, but more in terms of what I might do in a global news event involving Mongolia than what this means, somehow, for Mongolia.

So, does any of what transpired in Kazakhstan have implications for Mongolia? More specifically, what about democracy and what about the action or threat of action by Russia and China as it impacts Mongolia.

Those were questions I was thinking about before Russia invaded the Ukraine. I’ll leave the sections I had begun drafting in January below with some edits as I had originally started them and will then return to the current context at the bottom of the post.

____________Original Jan 2022 Sections____________

Democracy

Kazakhstan and Mongolia play in very different democracy leagues. Mongolia is in the premier division here and has not faced relegation in many years, Kazakhstan has not even come close to promotion up from the 3rd division to the 2nd.

Security

I have no expertise on Russian politics or foreign policy beyond that of an eager reader/listener of quality media. I therefore have very little to say about the reality of Russian “interest” in Mongolia which is a euphemism for the extent to which Russia and its authoritarian president imposes his will on Mongolia, either through implied or threatened force. I do have some notes on the perception of Russia in this regard in Mongolia.

I want to emphasize the long historical legacy to these discussions. Clearly Soviet dominance over Mongolia from the late 1910s through 1990 is a central element of today’s situation not only because many older Mongolians including many policy-makers were focused on the Soviet Union in their own socialization, but also because that relationship continues to shape Mongolia’s foreign policy today.

Does Russia really notice what Mongolia decides/says? If yes, what is the implied threat, just fuel?

Critical infrastructure (pipelines), energy

__________Further Thinking Given Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine_________

As many observers of international relations have noted, the world is a different place with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. And, this has changed the geopolitical balance for Mongolia significant.

So far, the Mongolian government has remained carefully coy with statements on Russia’s aggression. While this is surely worthy of another post, public reactions have been mixed with some expressions of solidarity with Russia and repetition of spurious Russian portrayals of Ukrainian fascism or persecution of Russian-speaking populations, while others have been outspoken in their condemnation of Russian aggression, often rooted in statements of dedication to democratic governance and human rights, but also tinged with a sense of neo-imperialistic attitudes in Russia.

Yet, official silence seems to have been driven largely by fears of Russian reprisals, especially as the Chinese government has been positioning itself as a passive but nevertheless supportive partner to Putin’s Russia.

The questions I was thinking about in January in the context of the CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan thus seem ever more pressing in the current context and are questions that Mongolians are very much wrestling with.

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