Euclides da Cunha’s Os Sertões, Rebellion in the Backlands, from 1902, tells the story of the military campaign the government of the young republic of Brazil undertook against the Sertões, a set of rural communities in the Northeastern region of Canudos at the end of the nineteenth century. In an introduction from 1943, the Brazilian homme de lettres Afrânio Peixoto considered da Cunha as Brazil’s “number one-geographer and sociologist” (xxvii). Peixtoto goes as far as to say that if “the Book of Genesis may be said to be, in the symbolism that it holds for the faithful, a biography of earth, Euclides da Cunha’s Os Sertões is a Genesis which in epic accents tells of the meeting of civilization and barbarism; it is a saga of the first flaming days of the earth and of man and of primal man’s first direct contact with other men known as civilized” (xxix). What, perhaps, Peixoto misses in his laudatory “Preface,” is that the da Cunha’s text is the genesis of the Brazilian modern state.
The conflict between the Brazilian state and the sertões is not directly presented. Da Cunha digresses into observations of the landscape and the people of the Backlands. In an environmental determinism key, da Cunha presents a people that is strongly tied to the geographical conditions of the space they inhabit. That is, since the Canudos is a region of extreme climates, in which the dry season is unbearable because of its lack of “natural resources,” and the rainy season is chaotic due to the constant floods, the dwellers of these areas have, as well, an extremist and fatalistic behaviour. Nature, for da Cunha, has an energy “it shares with man” (37). And the people from the Backlands, the sertanejos, are a very particular type of people, for Cunha. They are mestizos, miscegenated individuals, but contrary to other mestizos in Brazil, for da Cunha, the sertanejo is “above all else a strong individual […] he is ugly, awkward, stooped […] He is the man that is always tired” and by the same token is “an amazingly different being, capable of extraordinary feats of strength and agility” (89-90). Between admiration and contempt, da Cunha paints an ambiguous enemy of the Brazilian state.
If the military campaign against the sertões marks the birth of modern Brazil, then, to some extent, the campaign is not only against a particular group of people, but against nature. Da Cunha empathized with the belief that in Latin American nations, at the end of the nineteenth century, there was a struggle between civilization (European values and traditions) and barbarism (the values of the peripheries). Just like Domingo Sarmiento in Argentina, da Cunha would champion civilization over barbarism. The rebellion in the Backlands ran for almost two years. And the event that triggered it was a dispute over the purchase of lumber between Antonio Conselheiro, a priest, leader of the sertanejos, and founding father of the settlements where the sertanejos dwelled, and Arlindo Leoni, the magistrate of the Joazeiro. Da Cunha states that Conselheiro had purchased “a certain quantity of lumber which the extremely impoverished caatingas of Canudos were unable to furnish him” (178). The purchase was legal and in good faith, but “when the time agreed upon for the delivery of the material, which was to be used in the completion of the new church, came around, there was no lumber in sight” (179). There was a pre-existing beef between Conselheiro and Leoni, so da Cunha tells us, and by not delivering the lumber, the magistrate was “evening the score” (179). So Leoni sent a telegram to the respective authorities informing of the possibility of an imminent attack from the setanejos. With this, several expeditions and four regular expeditions begun against the sertanejos. And while surely, in early October 1897, the dwellers of the Backlands were fully defeated, how did these enterprises of civilization had such a hard time defeating the poor barbarians of the Canudos?
“Nature protects the sertanejo” (195), tells us da Cunha. And it is not only nature that aids the setanejos. After the defeat of Moreira Cesar, a commander who was supposedly undefeatable, may of the soldiers became disappointed. These soldiers were all “mestizos, of the same racial stock as the backwoodsmen; and in their discouragement over the inexplicable defeat which they had suffered […] they fell victim to the power of suggestion and, seeing in it all an element of the marvelous and the supernatural, were filled with an unreasoning terror —a terror that was further increased by the extravagant stories that were going around” (369). As the campaign continued, the warfare increased its affects. During the last days of the struggle, the state forces used dynamite as a way of fully destroying the sertanejo’s labyrinthic settlements. For da Cunha, this was “fitting enough” because “the sertanejos had inverted all psychology of ordinary warfare; their resistance was stiffened by reverses, and they were strengthened by hunger, hardened by defeat” (464). With the bombing of the houses, the violence of dynamite was bringing hell on earth, and as da Cunha puts it the bombing was both “a recognition and a consecration” (463). From this perspective, then, just like the sertanejos had inverted all “psychology of ordinary warfare,” they had also inverted the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism. If civilization reveals to be destructive and annihilating, then on what grounds can it place itself superior to barbarism? And more importantly, how can civilization offer anything appealing to the barbarian? The Canudos, the sertanejos, da Cunha tells us, “did not surrender” (475). At the very end of the conflict when Conselheiro was already dead, “an old man, two other full-grown men, and a child, [were] facing a furiously raging army of five thousand soldiers” (475). While da Cunha tells us that what happened next “we could not describe” (475), the horror is alluded. The campaign against the sertanejos, then, had the “essential outlines of crime and madness,” and as the last two lines of the text suggest, (“The trouble is that we do not have today a Maudsley for acts of madness and crimes on the part of nations…” [476]), how can one determine that a nation-state is insane or has committed a crime when it is the nation-state who seeks civilization, order and progress?


